

THE COMPOSITE CRIME

THE ORIGINS OF RACIAL STARVATION IN YEMEN

HAMDAN NASSER AL-ALIE

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2024

The Composite Crime:

The Origins of Racial Starvation in Yemen

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February 2024

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Picture credited to the photographer, Nabeel Alawzari. Taken on January 29, 2015, in Arahb (North of Sana'a)
2016 UNISCO Prize for Children
Cover photo of a child perched amidst the rubble of his home in Sanaa, destroyed by the Houthis in 2015.

To the victims of racial starvation in Yemen,
To every free Yemeni engaged in the battle against racial discrimination,
Working to establish a just system based on equal citizenship,
To all the fighters and freemen rejecting racial discrimination,
And to all real believers in human rights worldwide...

Racism is not a religion or a political opinion deserving respect. It is an assault on the rights and privacy of others, and a catalyst for dismantling the values of coexistence and respect for diversity. This destructive force has ravaged Yemen, tearing apart the social fabric. Unless racism is unequivocally criminalized, regardless of ethnicity, belief, color, region, or gender, the consequences will be perpetual warfare, ongoing tragedies, and endless suffering. It is imperative to prioritize coexistence, equal citizenship, and social justice to pave the way for a better future.

Hamdan Al-Alie

Contents

Glossary ----------13
Foreword----------15
Foreword----------19
Foreword----------23
Foreword----------29
Preface ----------31
Introduction----------35
Chapter One ----------37
The Origins of Conflict ----------37
Resistance Against the Intrusive Racial Culture:---------- 46
The Genocide of the Matrafyah:---------- 48
The Distinction of Lineage:---------- 51
Fabricated Narratives:---------- 54
The September 26 Revolution against Racism:----------56
The Houthi Plant: ----------58
The Khomeini Support System: ----------62
The Systemic Starvation for Subjugation: ----------66
The Creation of The Catastrophe:----------71
The Beginning:---------- 72

The Objectives of Starvation ----------74
Military Aims: Enlisting Hunger to Safeguard Their Gains ----------74
Political Objectives: Consolidating Control and Undermining Yemen's Restoration Efforts----------75
Economic Goals: Concentrating Wealth and Businesses in the Holy Lineage:--77
Fanatical Racial Goals: Cultural Genocide and Houthization of Society---------79
Cultural Genocide (Targeting the Identity and Beliefs of Yemenis): ----------79
In the realm of international law, the discerning eye recognizes three fundamental manifestations of genocide:----------81
Are Yemenis experiencing genocide? ----------85
Two options that lead to destruction:----------91
The Oppressed Crowds: ----------93
Chapter Two ----------95
Methods of Starvation----------95
Revenue Collection and Levies----------95
Salary Looting: ----------99
The Bread vs Beliefs: ----------100
Plundering of Reserves and the Deterioration of the National Currency: -----102

Fake Stability: ----------114
Pensions:----------115
War Effort: ----------120
Increasing Tax and Zakat Fees: ----------124
Where is the Zakat money spent? ----------131
New Customs Centers:..... 135
Mobile Vendors' Carts ----------138
Manufacturing Fuel Crises and the Black Market: ----------139
Black-Market Princes Assassinate the Journalist Mohammed Al-Abssi:..... 145
Choking the Hostages to Achieve Demands: ----------147
Damage to Farmers: ----------154
Fighting Instead of Farming: ----------156
Damage to the Fishing and Transportation Sectors: ----------157
Gas: Black-Market and Political and Military Exploitation: ----------158
Electricity Black Market:----------166
The Looting of Power Generators: ----------170
Hodeidah... The Untold Story of Suffering: ----------172
Weakening the Private Sector and Establishing a Houthi/Racial Financial Activity: ----------176
The Judicial Guard and Legalizing Theft: ----------186
Theft and Exploitation of Endowment Funds and Properties: ----------191
The Appropriation of State and Citizens' Lands..... 203
Lands Plundering: (Samples from four Governorates): ----------208
Deprivation of Citizens from Services: ----------216
Education Allocations: ----------221
Community Initiatives to Save What Can Be Saved:----------228
Extorting Expats: ----------230
Corruption: ----------233
Efforts to Combat Corruption in Yemen:----------233
The Houthis and Corruption: ----------236
Extreme Poverty and Extreme Wealth:..... 240
Legitimizing Theft:..... 241
Corruption and the Rule of the Sanctified Lineage:..... 244
Corruption of Hamid al-Din Family:----------246
Unbounded Corruption:----------249
Racist Appointments: ----------256
Ethnic and Sectarian Political Cleansing:----------262
A Pure Feudal Approach: ----------269
Plundering in the Name of Religious and Political Events:----------271
Racial Collection of Al-Khums: ----------277
Illegal Collections of Fees: ----------285

Chapter Three ----------289
The Crime and Suffering of Forced Displacement ----------289
Forced Displacement Abroad: ----------296
Captives and Human Trafficking:----------298
Former Kidnapped Journalist, Essam Belghaith: 300
Former Kidnapped Journalist Akram Al-Qudami: 302
Former Kidnapped Journalist Haitham Al-Shihab:..... 303
Former Kidnapped Journalist Hisham Turmum..... 303
Former Kidnapped Journalist Hisham Al-Yousfi..... 304
Blackmailing African Immigrants: ----------306
Taiz and the Deadly Siege: ----------308
Preventing the Entering of Civil Medical Supplies:----------317
Journalists and Human Rights Activists: Direct Targets for Killing----------323
Besieged Taiz, forgotten internationally: ----------324
Multi-Faceted Siege:..... 325
Depriving Civilians from Water: ----------326
The Theft of Relief Aid - Another Unseen War:----------329
The Houthis and Humanitarian Aid: ----------331
How is the aid looting process carried out?..... 332
Closure of Civil Institutions and Establishment of Affiliated Ones: 332
The Houthi Members in the Organizations' Offices: 335
Blackmail and Exploitation of International Organizations: ----------336
A Body for Legitimizing the Theft and Exploitation of Aid: ----------338
Humanitarian Aid for Combat:----------348
Aid and the Famine in Tihama: ----------350
Destruction of Aid:----------352
Why the Silence? ----------353
Aids in the Reports of the UN Panel of Experts:----------356
Report of the UN Panel of Experts Submitted to the Security Council in January 2016: ----------356
Report of the UN Panel of experts submitted to the Security Council in January 2018: ----------357
Report of the UN Panel of Experts Submitted to the Security Council in January 2019: ----------358
Report of the UN Panel of Experts Submitted to the Security Council in January 2020: ----------358
Report of the UN Panel of Experts Submitted to the Security Council in January 2021: ----------359
Report of the UN Panel of Experts Submitted to the Security Council in January 2022: ----------360
Banning the Donations of Charity and Merchants' Alms: ----------361

Statement of solidarity against restrictions on individual freedom in spending on the poor and needy: ----------363
Destructing the Healthcare Sector: ----------365
Why was cholera in Yemen described as the "worst in the world"?----------365
Poliomyelitis:----------368
Corona Virus - COVID-19: ----------370
Decline in Healthcare Services: ----------377
Healthcare During the Time of the Early Imamates: ----------382
Landmines and Hidden Explosives: Sowing Hunger and Reaping Starvation--384
Chapter Four ----------391
Halting Development ----------391
Living Dependently on Relief instead of Development: 393
Deterioration of Human Capital as a Result of Starvation Policy: 395
International and Local Testimonies about Theft and Starvation Crimes:..... 396
Arab Study Confirms the Historical Crime: ----------400
Starvation in the Eye of International Law: ----------406
Racial Segregation:----------409
International Law and the Looting of Funds and Property:----------415
International Law and Landmines----------416
Conclusion ----------417
Annex 1 ----------419
Photos and Documents:----------419
Chapter One ----------419
1 - Their own handwritten Testimonies: 419
2- Cultural Genocide and Houthisation of Society: 427
..... 427
Annex 2 ----------437
Photos and Documents:----------437
Chapter Two ----------437
1-Collecting revenues and dues but do not paying salaries. 437
2- Looting the reserves and the depreciation of the national currency. 440
3 - Retirees' pensions: 443
4- Military Effort: 446
5 - Raising Tax and Zakat Fees and Establishing New Customs Centers. 448
6- Manufactured Fuel Crises and the Black Market: 453
7 – Gas: A black market and political and military exploitation: 456
8- Electricity Black Market: 459
9- The Judicial Guard: A Houthi Tool for Legitimizing Theft: 462
10 - Theft and exploitation of endowment funds and properties. 466
11- Plundering state lands and citizens' properties: 468
12- Deprivation of citizens from services: 472
13- Education allocations: 474

14- Community Initiatives to Salvage What's Possible:----------476
15- Corruption:----------479
16- Nepotistic (Lineage) Appointment----------484
17- Plundering in the Name of Religious, Political, and Lineage-Based Activities:----------495
18- Racial Discrimination Tax Collection:----------503
Annex 3 ----------504
Photos and Documents:----------504
Chapter Three ----------504
1-The suffering of refugees and internally displaced people:..... 504
2 - Extortion of Migrants:..... 508
3 - Siege of Taiz:..... 510
4 - Depriving civilians of water:..... 514
5- Theft of humanitarian aid: 515
6 - Healthcare Crisis: 519
7- Landmines, Hidden Explosives... Planting Hunger:..... 521
Annex 4 ----------526
Photos and Documents:----------526
Chapter Four ----------526
----------526
References----------529
News Websites: ----------534

Glossary

Al-Hashimiyah: (Al-Hashimite)

Refers to the tribe of Banu Hashim in Mecca. After the death of the Prophet, Muhammad, it transformed from a tribal affiliation to a political and racial connotation. Many families in various Arab and Islamic countries claim affiliation to the Hashemite lineage of the Quraysh tribe in order to prove their familial connection to the Prophet Muhammad. Many of them believe that they are descendants of his daughter Fatimah and her husband Ali ibn Abi Talib, who was the cousin of the Prophet Muhammad, according to traditional genealogies that cannot be proven. This has contributed to the expansion of claims of this lineage, as it provides its claimants with material, moral, and political benefits according to religious theories that are not agreed upon by the majority of Muslims.

Al-Zaydiyah: (Zaydi is the person who follows Al-Zaydiyah)

Al-Zaydiyah is attributed to Zayd ibn Ali ibn Hussein ibn Ali ibn Abi Talib, who was killed by the Umayyads. Until then, the sect associated with him (Al-Zaydiyah) had not yet emerged. However, more than a century after his death, Al-Zaydiyah was established in Tabaristan, northern Iran, and it evolved into a jurisprudential school and a racial political movement. It later spread to some Arab regions, including Yemen, by Yahya al-Rassi, also known as "Al-Hadi." However, many studies confirm that the religious and political theory established by Yahya al-Rassi was not Al-Zaydiyah, but a new theory called "Al-Hadiyah," named after Yahya al-Rassi. Some consider what Yahya al-Rassi brought forth as not Al-Zaydiyah, but rather Al-Jarudiyyah, attributed to Abu al-Jarud Ziyad ibn al-Mundhir al-Kufi, who believed in the right of the Ahl al-Bayt (Prophet's family) to rule and lead.

Al-Houthiyah: (Houthi Rebellious Group or Gangsters)

It is an armed ethnic Shia group that calls itself "Ansar Allah" and is based in the city of Sa’ada, north Yemen.

Al-Batnain:

It is a political and ethnic theory that confines governance and leadership in the Islamic world to the Alawites, who are descendants of Hasan and Hussein, the sons of Ali ibn Abi Talib and his wife Fatimah. Their other

siblings from Ali ibn Abi Talib's other wives are excluded.

A(h)l-Bayt:

Muslims differ in defining the term "Al-Bayt." Some Sunni groups believe that Al al-Bayt refers to the wives of the Prophet Muhammad and those who are affiliated with the Banu Hashim. Another group believes that the term "Al-Bayt" is just a myth and that what the Quran mentions is the "Ahl al-Bayt," which refers to the wives of the Prophet Muhammad. Most Shia sects believe that Al al-Bayt refers exclusively to the people of the cloak, which includes a group of the Prophet Muhammad's family, namely his daughter Fatimah, his cousin Ali ibn Abi Talib, and their two grandsons Hasan and Hussein and their descendants.

Zakat:

Zakat, as defined by Islamic law, represents a designated sum of money that is bestowed during a specific period to be allocated among impoverished members of the Muslim community. It stands as the third pillar among the five fundamental obligations of Islam, and its acknowledgment and fulfillment are deemed integral to the completeness of an individual's practice of the faith.

Atawat:

Atawat, in its essence, signifies the compulsory fees or tribute extracted from individuals or groups, serving as an emblem of their submission to a ruler or authority. It is important to note that within this specific framework, it diverges from the concept of taxes and zakat, as it pertains to funds that are coerced under diverse pretexts rather than being voluntary contributions for public welfare.

Al-Khums:

Certain Islamic (Shiite) factions adhere to the belief in the obligatory payment of Al-Khums, which entails allocating one-fifth of profits and wealth, particularly from resources such as treasures and minerals extracted from the earth or sea. This share is intended for distribution among the Hashemite families.

Foreword

In this precious and meticulously crafted tome, a captivating odyssey unfolds—a testament to the assiduous endeavors of a scholar and wordsmith endowed with a mastery of language, narrative, and composition. The author, assuming the roles of an inquisitive investigator, discerning critic, and contemplative thinker, delves into a pivotal epoch of our nation's history. This era is intricately woven around the enigmatic specter of violence that shadowed the ascent of the Imams, casting a pall over Yemen's destiny. The narrative explores the trials faced by Yemen in contending with Imams who arrived from distant lands, eschewing the foundational tenet of societal egalitarianism. Exploiting the cloak of religion, these Imams sought to rationalize acts of violence, subsequently becoming historical wellsprings of discord and affliction within the tapestry of Yemen's narrative.

The tumultuous chapters of civil strife, propelled chiefly by assertions of lineage entitlement to Yemen's throne and the subjugation of its people under the veneer of religious authority, have wrought a harrowing toll upon this once-great and illustrious land. The ensuing specter of poverty, deprivation, and hunger has cast a long and anguished shadow over the nation. Throughout the annals of history, architects of the Imamate agenda have recurrently sought succor from external quarters, and the Houthi rebels, in their belligerence against the populace, stand as no exception—relying on Iranian support as they plunge Yemen into the crucible of conflict.

In his exploration of the subject matter, the researcher, Hamedan Al-Alie lends significant weight to the human and human rights dimensions. Casting a discerning eye, he employs the period marked by the Houthi rebellion against the people's elected legitimacy as a paradigm for his inquiry. Drawing intricate parallels, Al-Alie weaves a narrative thread that links the mindset and methodologies of the Imams in quelling and subjugating the Yemeni populace. This intricate web of connections unveils the sinister repercussions stemming from such approaches, interwoven with racial ideologies.

This prolific writer has shed light on the vast amount of violence that exists. Those concerned with Yemen's affairs understand that Imams built their authority and entities during different periods of Yemen's history based on the theory of racial Imamate, which confines Muslim rule to the lineage of "Ahl al-Bayt," as they claim in their religious and political doctrine.

Those well-versed in Yemeni history, Arab and Islamic history, and other fields are acutely aware of the fallacy inherent in this racial theory. It has been discredited within the collective consciousness of the majority of

Muslims. This explains why the proponents of this racial theory, despite their numerous divisions, have remained a religious minority for 1400 years, followed solely by the uninformed and opportunistic. However, when they amass wealth and armaments, they pose a significant threat.

The esteemed writer Hamedan Al-Alie, whom we accompany on this captivating and profound exploration, does not confine himself to examining this phenomenon solely on an ideological and political level. He takes us on an enriching journey, delving into a wealth of recent and comprehensive information that unveils the root causes of wars and violence in Yemeni history, as well as the nefarious methods employed by this group to subjugate Yemenis under their racial dominion.

To establish a connection between the ongoing violence of the Imamate and its criminal past, the researcher provides an illustrative case: the Matrafyah sect, one of the Zaydi sects, whose preachers deviated from several fundamental tenets of this belief system. Unlike all the imams of the sect, the Matrafyah believed that the Imamate held validity among the general Muslim population. As a result, extremist factions within the sect branded them as disbelievers and launched a ruthless campaign of extermination against them in Sanaa and its surroundings. This tragic episode serves as a prominent example when discussing the violence, cruelty, and tyranny exhibited by the Imams.

"The Composite Crime" is the book main title, which initially may seem like a contemporary discussion of the phenomenon. However, the subtitle provides clarity on the subject matter, highlighting the writer's extensive research into unraveling the roots of backwardness and racial discrimination in Yemen. The author elucidates the objectives and tactics employed, encompassing both physical and psychological violence, through a range of strategies. The book meticulously documents the diverse forms and methods of violence employed by the Houthi rebels, which encompass confiscation of citizens' assets under various pretexts, imposition of oppressive levies, and the use of force. Additionally, it sheds light on the seizure of state funds, endowments, and relief aid resources.

The researcher presents a multitude of examples that vividly illustrate the extent to which the Imams have perpetuated impoverishment and marginalization in Yemen and its populace. Historical records substantiate a distressing incident during World War II when Yemen faced a severe famine. Shockingly, Imam Yahya's granaries were brimming with grain, yet he callously withheld its distribution to the citizens, refusing even to sell it to them. Instead, these vital crops were extracted from the Yemeni people through various unjust levies, such as tithes and numerous unfair taxes. It is disheartening to note that some Imams justified their actions by believing that God would not hold them accountable for collecting these levies

unjustly, while neglecting their duty to provide for their subjects who were dying from hunger.

The author astutely critiques the doctrines and actions of the Imamates, highlighting their use of lineage-based superiority, racism, and authoritarianism to subjugate the Yemeni people. This illuminating and profound book explores these themes, and in doing so, the author unquestionably exposes the truth. The true victims of deprivation and marginalization in Yemen, arising from the contrived religious narrative based on the Imams' heresies, are the Yemeni people themselves. This false religious narrative, rooted in the Imams' heresies, has had a detrimental impact on the lives of Yemeni citizens, a burden that persists to this day.

The author's emphasis on addressing the issue of racism within Houthi beliefs demonstrates a genuine comprehension of the underlying causes of numerous conflicts spanning Yemen's history. This matter deserves careful attention, thorough study, and meticulous analysis, as achieving a just and enduring peace in Yemen necessitates the elimination of the root causes of war, particularly the racism that divides the Yemeni population into ruling elites with authority, wealth, and influence, and subservient subjects akin to slaves who are compelled to fight for the first group's rule and pay taxes to their leaders.

It is crucial to underscore the gravity of one of the most perilous practices carried out by this group since the onset of the war, namely the crime of "cultural genocide." The Houthis exploit resources, funds, employment opportunities, educational institutions, and state platforms to forcibly propagate their catastrophic beliefs, all while implementing a ruthless policy of starvation. The cultural pillaging unfolding in Yemen does not only imperil our nation but also poses a threat to the entire region. This book serves as an urgent alarm, drawing the world's attention to rally in support of the Yemeni people, safeguarding their right to justice, equality, and a dignified existence. Its aim is to foster a just and enduring peace, ensuring that the Yemeni people can reclaim their rightful place in the world.

This unique book, rich in scholarly content, combines historical writing with political analysis. It draws from the past while focusing on the current Houthi version of Imamate manufactured in Tehran, with all its greed, ambition, and moral decay. This is accompanied by violence and cruelty in dealing with the people, met with an eerie international silence. This is the reason behind the outbreak of national resistance and successive uprisings, unprecedented in the history of Imamate. These will continue until a state is built based on equal citizenship and social justice among the people.

Dr. Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr
President of the Yemeni Shura Council

Foreword

Books have diverse messages and goals, but some books stand out for their service to the causes of people during pivotal moments in their history. They play a crucial role in confronting and championing the rights of oppressed and marginalized communities. These books, as well as their authors, become immortalized. While the significance of these books is evident during their time, it grows even more when the cause succeeds, and the final harvest of the confrontation and its tools and heroes becomes clear.

For the Yemeni people, who have engaged in multiple confrontations with the Imamate and the racism that tainted their history, suppressed their humanity, shattered their civilization, and hindered their future, history has immortalized numerous books that confronted the Imamate, exposed its crimes, and illustrated the abhorrence of its ideas. In the most recent wave of confrontation with the extremist and racially driven Imamate ideology cloaked in religion, which began in the 1930s, ignited the national and popular resistance, leading to various uprisings and revolutions. Prominent books and their authors were immortalized, becoming part of their struggle and the Yemeni people's fight for salvation and liberation. These books include works by Al-Zubairi, Al-Nu'man (the father and son), Al-Qadi Al-Iryani, and Professor Qasim Ghalib Ahmed, among many others.

In this critical juncture, as the new imamate, known as "Houthism," emerges, the history of our people will be immortalized through numerous books and writers. These works will form a part of the struggle and resilience of the Yemeni people against the Houthi-led imamate. Among these books, without a doubt, the one in our hands, which I am currently reading, will stand at the forefront of literature that serves the cause of countering racism. This book is indeed a powerful weapon in the battle against (lineage-based superiority) racism, and its significance is further enhanced by the fact that its author, Hamdan Al-Alie, is one of the foremost individuals dedicated to this cause. He is actively engaged in the fight against the racist and terrorist Houthi movement, making this book not just the creation of an isolated writer, but an essential contribution to the ongoing struggle.

The author has been known in this field as a relentless knight, absorbed in the daily battles of intellectual and cultural confrontation with racism, thanks to his tireless efforts in the realm of human rights and his unwavering activity across various media. Given the effort and time these two fields require, I did not imagine that he had enough time and energy to produce such a significant work as the book in our hands. This book, which will be remembered as a crucial work in the ongoing confrontation between the

Yemeni people and the racial policies practiced by the Houthi Imamate today, will go down in history as one of the most important books produced in this period of the renewed confrontation between the Yemeni people and the destabilizing impact of racism on Yemen throughout history.

The author, Hamdan Al-Alie, has always been considered, through my observation of his media and human rights activities and my admiration for his dedication to the Yemeni people's cause and rights, one of the prominent figures who will be immortalized by our people's history when this dark chapter of our history comes to an end, and the defeat of the Imamate and the triumph of the people's will.

I have expressed this admiration and encouragement to him on several occasions, but I believe it is time to make this statement publicly. This book's introduction provides an opportunity for me to do so, as it serves to express my support not only for the author, Hamdan Al-Alie, but also as a message of encouragement to all those working in this field or those who will emerge in the ongoing battle, which must not cease, even if this worst edition of the racial Imamate represented by the Houthi movement is eradicated.

The significance of the momentous victory on September 26, 1962, against the former Imamate was greatly underestimated by our people and their intellectuals. They entrusted the task of recording history and challenging the oppressive lineage-based superiority to the ruling authorities, mistakenly believing that the battle with this repressive group had been resolved and that the September 26 victory was definitive and final. Regrettably, these authorities, for the most part, either exploited the conflict for their own political gain or relegated it to a mere ceremonial memory, with only a few fleeting references in educational curricula. As time passed, these efforts diminished, allowing the Imamate to resurface after five decades, revealing its malevolent nature, and perpetrating atrocious crimes against our people. It is a deeply sorrowful situation.

The book skillfully elucidates one of the many crimes of the Imamate, the systematic "starvation" campaign, revealing the numerous other aspects that need to be written about, including marginalization, sectarianism, women's and children's rights violations, arrests, kidnappings, and more. The author has masterfully exposed the racial policy of systematic starvation practiced by the Houthi group, driven by racial motives and objectives, and as part of their violent policy and genocide that the Imamate has historically imposed on the Yemeni people. The book not only delves into the horrific history of racial Imamate but successfully reaches the roots that reveal the origin of this toxic tree. Although this tree was seemingly cut on September 26, 1962, it unfortunately was not uprooted as a necessary measure to end

racism, wars, and long-standing tragedies in Yemen. Therefore, this tree sprouted once again, bearing the fruits of the Houthi movement. Through his intellectual and cultural efforts, Hamdan Al-Alie devoted most of his energy to confronting the crimes of this movement.

This book is about the present, not the past, and we need such a book in the current era of the Imamate's racial movement. It is filled with evidence and examples that are no less horrific than the composite crimes committed in the past.

In my view, this book serves as a potent weapon in the pivotal confrontation between the Yemeni people and the Imamate, as it advocates for the condemnation of Imamate racism. Moreover, this call should extend beyond Yemen and resonate globally. Imamate racism, rooted in racial discrimination, religious exclusivity, and claims of divine entitlement, warrants inclusion in international documents as a form of racism and fascism, akin to ideologies such as Nazism, fascism, apartheid, and Zionism. The crimes of genocide, even if they initially appear to target the Yemeni populace exclusively, are ultimately crimes against humanity. Furthermore, with its Houthi affiliation to Iran, entanglement with global interests, and the proliferation of weapons, this ideology poses a threat not only to the region but also to global peace. This underscores the imperative of criminalizing the theory of racial exclusivity, and it can be asserted that this book serves as a steppingstone towards that objective.

In conclusion, I fervently urge for translating this book into multiple languages and its wide publication across nations worldwide. I also call for close collaboration with anti-racist organizations and coalitions, not only to criminalize the Houthis as a recognized terrorist group, but also to criminalize the Imamate as a racist movement. This is crucial to prevent its pernicious influence from jeopardizing the future of the Yemeni people, as it has already tainted their past and present. By criminalizing the Imamate, we can assist the Yemeni people in constructing a just and enduring peace, a cause for which they have made immense sacrifices, with thousands of martyrs. This endeavor aims to secure equality, freedom, justice, and human rights, allowing the Yemeni population to actively participate in progress and contribute to the development of human civilization. It is vital that we unite in these efforts for the betterment of Yemen and the world at large.

Abdulmalik Al-Mekhlafi
Former Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Foreign Affairs

Foreword

When my dear brother, friend, and exceptional researcher, Hamedan Al-Alie, approached me to contribute a foreword to his esteemed book that you hold in your hands "The Composite Crime", I welcomed the request from the outset. I was well aware of Hamedan's nature as a researcher and a seeker of truths, evidenced by his tireless efforts in matters of human rights violations, especially during the painful years of the war when the Houthi rebels took control of most northern provinces.

However, after reading several chapters of the book, carefully examining its contents, I discovered an exceptional and extraordinary effort. It is not intended merely to produce another book among the hundreds in Yemeni and human libraries on this subject. Instead, it aims to create a powerful human document before it's a political one, for a period marked by the worst atrocities committed against millions of Yemenis, with cold-bloodedness, racial tendencies, and a cruelty devoid of any mercy.

Upon reflecting on the tremendous effort Hamedan put into this book, in collecting information, documenting it, supporting it with evidence, and conducting thorough investigations, he provides readers, the concerned, and those interested with a document untainted by inadequacies, errors, or lapses, to the best extent possible. It is also a document free from malice, targeting, or intent to harm without proof, substantiation, or documentation.

During my contemplation, my memory took me back to the early 1990s when the scent of divisive sectarianism, in all its forms, began to reemerge. At the forefront of it was the resurgence of tribal racism upon which the Imamate regime in Yemen had been built since 284 AH, under the rule of Al-Hadi Yahya bin Al-Hussein. His descendants upheld the same ideology during varying periods of Yemen's history. The Imamate regime had collapsed repeatedly over time, only to resurface and commence a cycle of bloody violence once again, in recurring episodes of conflict that subsided and recurred. However, it never truly came to an end, even to this day.

I recalled what I used to write and warn about - alongside others - during that period, while many intellectuals, politicians, and thinkers looked at our writings and warnings with disdain and lack of seriousness. Some even later went on to align with the new Imamate movements and adopted their political views, whether knowingly or unknowingly, displaying a blatant ignorance of the history of Imamate in Yemen. They sympathized with their wars before 2011, conspired within the political system, embraced their causes before and after, and remained silent about their armed rebellion and their advance until they brought them back to Sana’a. Only to regret their actions when it was too late.

It crossed my mind that the best contribution to the book "The Composite

Crime" would be to quote excerpts from an article I wrote in the early months of 1994, with some adjustments. That article delves into the essence of the concept presented in this valuable and exceptional book. It explores the roots of racism, its conditions, and its practices, which can help explain much of what is happening today. Perhaps the published article represents an early anticipatory reading, but I wrote it back then with a spirit of concern for national unity.

I structured it based on the fundamental religious goals of unity, freedom, justice, equality, consultation, and other humane objectives that societies, civilizations, and nations throughout all eras strive to achieve. In the article, I did not take sides but rather dismantled the misleading foundations on which the racist idea is built. Here are some excerpts, condensed and focused under the title "The Deadly Nature of Racial Discrimination":

Deadly Racial Discrimination:

The social disorders that emerged in our country over the past few decades, particularly what can be described as "signs of fragmentation," within the broader context of a comprehensive plan encompassing the entire region. This scheme is based on fueling all forms of tribalism, intended to lead to a wide-ranging disintegration. Some aspects rely on igniting religious sectarianism in countries with diverse religions, while others hinge on sectarianism within religions. Another model depends on stimulating racial, tribal, regional, and provincial sectarianism.

The primary objective in the latter model is to generate social conflicts aimed at tearing apart the political structure of the targeted state and allocating new identities to members of society, effectively erasing the overarching national identity. The new identity becomes loyalty to the lineage, the sect, the tribe, or the region. As our countries crumble due to these regressive sectarian divisions, the forces of fragmentation reach their peak in the region.

Amidst the current political crisis in our country, these social disorders and tendencies have become more apparent in various forms and manifestations. This is what we would like to address, focusing on the racial or tribal dimension as one of the diseases that have become increasingly clear through the actions or writings of some politically ambitious leaders who have fallen prey to the ailments of racial supremacy and superiority. These leaders have tried to revive this tendency in various forms, either through practice or writings.

The role of some of these leaders in the recent political crisis has been suspicious. The best way to describe it would be as a role that foments discord and reinforces sectarian, tribal, and regional divisions. The coming

days will reveal these roles, regardless of how concealed they may appear.

I believe that crises such as the one we are currently facing, which highlights the disease so vividly, provide an excellent opportunity to discuss the problematic aspects of this issue. It is my hope that open hearts and attentive ears will be receptive to these discussions because, as the disease becomes more evident, the opportunity for treatment becomes more favorable. I'm not concerned with those leaders associated with external schemes; rather, I am concerned about the silent, bewildered Hashemites who do not know whom to trust. What matters to me are the religious and national values that will protect them, secure their future, dissolve the divisive elements, and put an end to the disease known as racial discrimination.

It is not hidden that these diseases are remnants of the era of Imamate. Despite the Republic’s progress in addressing them, it has not reached the point where society is safe from attempts to revive them. Nonetheless, I am confident that the seeds of goodness have grown enough to resist these social epidemics throughout society, from Sa’ada to Al-Mahra.

The idea of racial discrimination, which has permeated our lives for centuries, is part of a comprehensive ideological system designed to destroy the fundamental religious goals of freedom, justice, equality, consultation, and more. If we view racial and ethnic discrimination as a "disease," we find that it generates a succession of racisms that perpetuate the disease and expand the wounds. National affiliation, religion, and adherence to their values no longer determine an individual's status in the eyes of racists. Instead, genetic lineage and ethnicity have become the new criteria, regardless of an individual's behavior, morals, or religious devotion.

If we examine the issue of racial and ethnic discrimination as a "disease," we find that it leads to division and conflict. This is a universal and human outcome when things deviate from their natural course and essence. Let's consider some scenes of this discrimination to understand its destructive consequences. Some have manipulated this discriminatory idea in the name of religion.

First, they claimed that "Bani Hashim" had precedence over all others, and everyone who belonged to Bani Hashim was superior to all humanity.

Then, the circle of superiority narrowed a bit, confining it to a specific branch of Ali's lineage, alleging that they were exempt from giving alms (zakat). This branch included Ali, Ja'far, Abbas, Aqeel, and their descendants, thus excluding the rest of Bani Hashim.

The circle continued tightening, and the preference was limited to Imam Ali and his sons.

The circle of superiority became constricted even more until it excluded all of Imam Ali's sons except Hasan and Hussain. The right to leadership

was reserved for them and their descendants.

In Yemen, under the Imamate regime, the Imamate was practically limited to the sons and descendants of Hasan, starting from Imam Al-Hadi and his lineage, until the revolution of 1962.

Then the circle of discrimination tightened even further on two levels. Firstly, no one from the Hussain lineage generally assumed leadership in Yemen, except for Imam Yahya bin Hamza, owing to his adherence to the Hadi faith. The descendants of Hussain, who belonged to the Shafi'i school of thought, were entirely prohibited from leadership. This was because they were not adherents of the Hadi faith, and, for the most part, did not believe in the intellectual and political system of the Hadi Imamate, which began with the exclusive allocation of ruling rights in the Batnain, doubting the legitimacy of Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman, and questioning the majority of the Companions and authentic Sunnah, and eventually extended to excommunicating anyone outside their ranks. In their best-case scenarios, the Imams would transform Shafi'i[(1)] lands into Kharijite[(2)] territories, or even attempt to transform the entire land of Yemen into a Kharijite territory. This fact was confirmed by the diligent reformer Muhammad bin Isma'il Al-Amir in his famous poem "Sama'an Ibad Allah"[Listen, O God's Servants]:

"You have turned the whole land into a Kharijite land,
And the nations have been divided by your bad actions.
So, in the country, subjects are scattered,
And the nations have parted ways to escape the soldiers' fears.
You accepted a tenth of its wealth,
It will belong to you, and nine-tenths to the tenth."

Secondly, on another level, the racial circle reached its worst stages when the Hadi ruling family directed hostility towards the remaining Hussaini families, narrowing their opportunities as competitors for power. The conflict and bigotry even spread within the same family. For example, Imam Ahmed Hameed al-Din executed three of his brothers and exiled others to grant the right of rule to his son, Mohammad al-Badr. This continued until the blessed September 26, 1962, revolution, which served as salvation for the Yemeni people across all sects.

This is the true and ugly picture of racism. We've seen how it began broadly and gradually tightened to the point where it no longer accommodated anyone but individuals within the same family. It's a natural outcome of using inhumane standards. Because racism is diabolic, attempts to address it within the same racial context are conducted using the same diabolic methods, which deepen the disease rather than cure it. However,

(1) Shafi'I lands: means the land of the people who follow Imam Al-Shafi'i.
(2) Kharijite land: mean the land that has to be taxed and confiscated in the name of war spoils.

when treated within the framework of human values, ethics, and proper nationalism, things straighten out and become healthier.

The sound Islamic logic is embodied by the scholar Muhammad bin Ismail Al-Amir, contrasted with Imam Abdullah bin Hamza. While bin Hamza says in his racist poem denying virtue to a believer, scholar, fasting person just because he is not Hashemite, considering him like an animal in comparison to one who is below him in knowledge and piety just because he is Hashemite, saying:

"O people, virtue is not predefined like a horse apple,
Nor is pure clay like a stone.
Certainly not, jewellery is not like mud,
So, beware of hellfire in your speech."

On the other hand, we find Ibn Al-Amir who says:

"And do not think I see myself.
Having elevated status among people in praise and glory.

"For I am but a brick in a wall,
And a dark sea with no radiance."

And because Ibn Al-Amir had such purity and integrity, Imam Al-Mansur Muhammad bin Yahya, the grandfather of Imam Ahmad, would always deny Al-Amir's lineage in his gatherings, saying "Muhammad bin Ismail Al-Amir is not from us, Al-Albeit[1]."

I stress once again that racism is a product of a sick ideology, and succumbing to it is not inevitable for anyone. I make this explicit presentation to warn against falling into the traps of that minority, who seek to restore the country's governance to the Imamate, even if it's done in a republican form. This minority is known for its suspicious political affiliations, both domestically and abroad, with the primary goal of uniting Hashemite brothers first, and others second, based on racial and sectarian grounds, to serve their suspicious goals and ambitions that become clearer day by day. They do not realize that they are dragging themselves, and those they manage to deceive, towards destruction because the outcome of racial and sectarian calls and movements is usually a regrettable one.

It should not be in our minds that rejecting racism and ethnicity means denying our roots and disowning our races. No, it simply means we should

(1) Ibn Al-Amir and His Era. P. 19.

place these issues where they belong - in the realm of familiarity. What we must avoid is declaring oneself superior to others based on their racial or ethnic identity, as this is unacceptable. In contrast, we must embrace our unity as human beings and recognize the worth of each individual based on their character and conduct.

These were the end quotations that were taken from the article published at the beginning of the year 1994. Perhaps it will draw our attention to the danger of racism as a disease that threatens human stability. Wherever racist ideologies take hold, one consistently finds ruins and destruction in their wake. Human suffering abounds as all moral and ethical foundations disintegrate. Societal conditions degrade completely, with degeneration and deterioration permeating every facet of life. Our contemporary world has witnessed numerous examples that testify to the heinousness of racism and its savage, spontaneous practices, with its climax perhaps being during World War II.

The introduction of this important, objective, and exceptional book, rich with valuable and precious information, may have been lengthy. It is time to leave you to read it carefully, so you may realize the enormity of the tragedy the Yemeni people are enduring. This tragedy can end in a single human moment, but it requires all Yemenis to recognize the horrors of divisiveness in all its forms, foremost among them being class-based racism. It requires returning to the values of the true religion, transparent national allegiance, the principles of the Yemeni revolution, and the Republican system that made all Yemenis equal under the constitution and the law. These principles have come to embed in their lives the values of equality, justice, freedom, prosperity, security, peace, compassion, and brotherhood.

Nasr Taha Mustafa
Former President of the Yemeni Journalists
Syndicate Cairo, September 26, 2022

Foreword

With the Yemeni civil war now in its eighth year, it has become clear that media coverage of the conflict has normalized the crimes committed by Houthi militias. These crimes are either completely ignored or merely mentioned in passing.

Hamdan Al-Alie provides a comprehensive study of Houthi crimes during eight years of war, particularly within the context of the brutality carried out by the Houthi-led militias in their quest for power. Al-Alie succinctly organizes his summary of the history of the "Asada" ruling northern Yemen over the past millennium and offers a well-documented and detailed study of the crimes committed by those currently claiming the right to rule the Zaidi Imamate.

While Al-Alie's Arabic text will undoubtedly contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the Houthi militias within Yemen and the Arab world, we all agree that this rich text must ultimately be read by non-Arabic speakers worldwide. The Houthi group did not only emerge as an existential threat to Yemeni society but also as a destabilizing tool beyond the broader Middle East. The religious indoctrination of schoolchildren, the recruitment of children and deploying them to the front lines, and the manipulation of tribal communities toward extremism will have long-lasting repercussions on social and political relations for years to come.

The introduction here presents a thousand-year-old Yemeni experience that frames the perspective of a broad segment of Yemeni society. For Yemenis, history is still very much alive around them, and the fact that the Houthis wage their war based on a historical narrative and a claim to divine origin reminds Yemenis of a very dark past. While the memory of the circumstances leading to the 1962 revolution is still preserved in the minds of a significant portion of the population, it is the reality created by the Houthi movement, their crimes, and their rhetoric that instil fear in the hearts and minds of millions today.

As well-documented by this text, the Houthis are the ones who ignited this armed conflict, obstruct any progress in the UN-brokered peace efforts, and are responsible for crimes against civilians throughout the country. In February 2022, the United Nations Security Council designated the Houthis as a terrorist group. The European Parliament has condemned the Houthis for their wide-scale crimes against Yemenis and African migrants. Nevertheless, international organizations seek to normalize Houthi authority and their claim to rule by simply diverting attention away from their war crimes and attributing them to neighboring governments and Western powers. This should be considered a crime against the Yemeni people.

This text should serve as an alarm bell for the Arab world and its

governments, aiming to solidify an alliance that ends this conflict and ensures appropriate compensation for the victims. The international community must realize that most Yemenis want to end this conflict and re-engage in a democratic project that achieves stability and prosperity, under the fair and equal application of the law. This majority does not see the future of the country in the hands of any specific family or group claiming divine right to rule.

Fernando Carvajal
Former Member of the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen

Preface

Racism reigns supreme among the causes that ignite conflicts between peoples. It drives religious or ethnic groups to infringe upon the rights of others, believing in their superiority and distinction from others. Inevitably, racial discrimination is accompanied by economic, political, and social implications. Under the pretense of "racial purity" or "religious exclusivity," these racist groups allow themselves to commit acts of murder, looting, theft, displacement, and other crimes that have occurred since time immemorial and will persist as long as racism persists.

We find that stable nations experiencing growth and advancement in all fields have first and foremost decided to firmly confront the culture of racism by enacting laws that criminalize racial discrimination in all its forms, types, and levels, and punish those who practice it. They understand that social coexistence based on the bedrock of equality is the foundation of stability, the catalyst for progress, and the path to construction based on capabilities and competencies, not illusions and claims of divine right or racial purity.

Yemen is no different from other war-torn countries, as racism has been and continues to be one of the main causes of conflicts there, especially when intertwined with religion. For centuries, Yemenis have endured suffering and the horrors of tragedy due to racism.

The Houthi group believes in the heresy and fallacy of ‘Guardianship’, "Wilayah," which contradicts the purposes of the heavenly religions, including the pure Islamic religion to which the Yemeni people adhere. It also clashes with the principles and values of human rights, including equality, coexistence, respect for beliefs, justice, and other values that humanity has achieved throughout its struggle, all aimed at eliminating injustice, oppression, and racial discrimination among humans, as they are equal in rights and responsibilities.

Since the effects of racial discrimination in Yemen are broadly increasing every day and imposing their catastrophic burdens on Yemeni society, it was necessary to monitor and study some of those systematic and organized crimes.

The Houthis have adopted a harsh policy of starving the Yemeni society to achieve various goals mentioned in the depths of this work, the most important and dangerous of which, for Yemenis and Arabs in general, is "cultural genocide" and targeting the identity and beliefs of the Yemeni people.

Here, economic and social exploitation aims to erode the Yemeni

identity. Likewise, the theft and control of bread aim to dominate minds and establish a new identity based on the veneration of lineage and the humiliation of the people.

In this context, this book comes as an attempt to document the crime of starvation, one of the most heinous contemporary crimes that would not have occurred without racial discrimination and the belief of a certain lineage that it is distinct from others, and that God has chosen it to rule over Yemenis and possess their lives, even by force. This has led them to commit a multi-faceted and multi-dimensional crime, more than one crime at once. Hence, I determined the book's title, "The Composite Crime."

In the face of this dangerous scene in Yemen, it was necessary to take on the ethical and humanitarian responsibility and embark on documenting the crime of starvation resulting from racism. This is to prevent its painful details from being lost amidst the whirlwind of conflicts and disputes, and to ensure that it does not fade away and become a part of the dust of history. Yemenis should not ignore the reasons for the disasters they are facing, and we must write the answers to the questions that future generations will pose about the causes of this suffering that occurred and extended its impact to them.

This book sheds light on the tragedy of Yemenis in the areas controlled by the Houthis specifically because this suffering was not due to incapacity or failure, but rather a deliberate Houthi policy to subjugate Yemenis in those areas. There is no doubt that there is a difference between the failure or incapacity of any authority or group to provide for the needs of the people they govern, and turning them into hostages, starving them to subjugate them, erasing their identity and beliefs, and then use them to blackmail the world with their humanitarian situation.

Focusing on documenting the crime and identifying its sectarian and sectarian roots and motives is an attempt to diagnose the problem accurately, away from maneuvering and focusing on superficialities. Thus, I present a sincere call to solve it fairly, justly, and permanently, ensuring justice and equality among all Yemenis and not oppressing any component. Understanding the problem accurately contributes to achieving the solution.

In this book, I have relied on historical evidence in multiple instances to compare what the Houthis are doing today with what their ancestors did in the past, to prove that this criminal behavior is part of the belief system of this group and that it is firmly entrenched in their books as a creed. This necessitates studying and addressing it to end the rooted suffering of Yemenis, which has been proven through comparison to have its primary source in racial and lineage-based racism.

I have strived to ensure that every piece of information in this book is accompanied by its source and reference, duly documented through

impartial international reports focusing on Yemen's economic, humanitarian, and human rights situation. I have also given priority to testimonies from the Houthis themselves to reinforce the facts presented in many issues. Additionally, I have relied on several documents, some of which are being published for the first time.

The book emerged after collecting and analyzing its material, distributed across four chapters. In the first chapter, I delved into the roots of this war and its historical context, as well as the policy of starvation practiced by the Houthis today, reminiscent of the methods employed by their ancestors in the past. Furthermore, I explored the objectives of hunger as a gateway to cultural genocide and the erasure of the Yemeni national identity.

In the second chapter, I examined the most prominent direct methods of starvation inflicted upon the Yemeni society. The third chapter was dedicated to discussing displacement, aid theft, the collapse of healthcare, and the danger posed by the hundreds of thousands of mines planted by the Houthis. I also addressed the besiegement of cities and populated areas, using Taiz as an example.

The fourth chapter focused on the detrimental impact of Houthi practices on Yemen's development process, particularly the setback suffered by human capital due to the policy of starvation. This chapter concluded with the documentation of international and Arab testimonies and studies that affirm these crimes, as well as an exploration of the legal stance regarding some of these atrocities.

The collection and analysis of this material were not easy tasks. It took more than five years of research, investigation, follow-up, and writing to bring this book to its current form.

I embarked on this endeavor solely to support the oppressed and the downtrodden, those who have suffered from the hunger imposed by the Houthis, those who have been displaced and disappeared in prisons, and those who have endured years of racial discrimination during the war. I beseech Allah that this effort contributes to finding comprehensive solutions to the ongoing situation in my homeland, ensuring the eradication of racial discrimination, injustice, oppression, and suffering, while promoting the values of equal citizenship and social justice. There is no place for a state based on a single race or a single color. Great nations always thrive on diversity and coexistence.

Author: Hamdan Nasser Al Alie

Introduction

There is an undeniable correlation between wars and famines. While conflicts may enrich certain privileged segments of society, they also lead to the deterioration of economic conditions for the majority of people in countries affected by war, further exacerbating the spread of famine.

The rise in poverty and unemployment is an inherent consequence of war, as its leaders often redirect state resources towards the battlefield. This leads to the government's inability to provide essential services and assistance to the population, while also causing disruptions to work, mobility challenges, and deteriorating security conditions.

However, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, widely regarded as the most severe in the world, is not simply a byproduct of war but a deliberate policy of starvation and impoverishment pursued to achieve various objectives. Furthermore, this crime distinguishes itself, in terms of its perpetrators, from historical examples found within the annals of warfare, such as the Russian-induced famine among Ukrainian farmers in the 1930s or the Nazi-induced starvation of the inhabitants of Leningrad during World War II.

In many instances, nations find themselves besieged and subjected to starvation by hostile foreign forces. While the immorality of this crime is undeniable, it is, to some extent, comprehensible, as external enemies often lack a sense of belonging and disregard the well-being of the targeted nation's people. However, in the case of Yemen, it is the party claiming to represent the people that inflict starvation upon them in pursuit of political, military, religious, and economic gains. It can be asserted that the most prominent perpetrators of population starvation for gain in modern times are the Houthis in Yemen, who exert control over several densely populated Yemeni provinces.

Before delving into the specifics and methodologies of this historical crime, it is crucial to shed light on the roots of the catastrophe and the Yemeni war. The Yemeni people have grown weary of the narratives propagated by both deceivers and the deceived, who often fail to portray the true essence of their cause and the heart of their tragedy as Yemenis. This issue represents both a battle and a tragedy, and it is right time for the world to become acquainted with who the Houthis truly are, what they represent, and the origins from which they emerged to wage these wars, conflicts, and calamities in Yemen and the surrounding region. Why do they subject the Yemeni people to starvation, gazing upon their plight as they collapse on the roads due to hunger, without flinching?

Truly, one of the most significant errors that has led to the failure of efforts to confront this group in recent years is the treatment of it as a political entity, like any Yemeni political party, while disregarding its

ideological and sectarian roots that deeply influence its behavior, practices, and ceaseless crimes. If discussions about this pivotal aspect are approached, it is often done with hesitation, lacking the emphasis it rightfully deserves. Consequently, efforts to reinstate a unified state that values diversity and believes in social coexistence falter, allowing the expansion of the sectarian agenda.

We would not have initiated this introduction had it not been necessary to explore the ideological foundations that continually propel this group to take up arms against the Yemeni people. It is illogical to discuss this racist project without delving into its ideological roots, which serve as the fundamental impetus behind its aggressive and destructive conduct. This compels the group to subject an entire population to starvation to exert control.

Chapter One
The Origins of Conflict

In the year 897 CE - 284 AH, Yahya bin Al-Hussein bin Al-Qasim bin Ibrahim Al-Hassani Al-Rassi Al-Alawi[1] arrived in the city of Sa'ada, situated in northern Yemen, reportedly coming from the region of Hijaz, according to some historians. It was after this period that a series of wars and tragedies unfolded, which continues to this day.

Al-Rassi claimed descent from the lineage of the Prophet, peace be upon him, through his daughter Fatimah, the wife of Ali bin Abi Talib, may Allah be pleased with them both. This lineage evolved into a religious doctrine that gave Al-Rassi and his succeeding lineage the right to rule over the Yemeni people through force. This led to enduring conflicts in Yemen, as the Yemenis resisted submission to this new and foreign theory of governance, which rejected the principle of human equality and subjected them to a dynasty from outside their borders, turning them into virtual slaves in their land.

It is reported that Yahya Al-Rassi, also known as Al-Hadi, cited fulfilling the will of the Prophet, peace be upon him, as his reason for leaving his homeland and journeying to Yemen. He recounted, "I saw the Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, in a dream, and he said to me, 'O Yahya, why do you hesitate to leave? Rise and command them to cleanse this land of impurities.'" It was understood that he, peace be upon him, referred to the sins committed by the people of that land. Consequently, I arose and set off for Yemen."[2] This indicates that Yahya Al-Rassi viewed Yemen as a land tainted by sin and saw himself as the savior appointed by divine assignment to rescue its sinful inhabitants. This sentiment was explicitly expressed in one of his letters to the people of Tabaristan, in which he sought their support to invade Yemen. In this letter, he described his son Al-Nasir Ahmad, aligning with the justification he presented for his control over Yemen. He stated, "He arrived in Yemen- may Allah bless him - and its people are ignorant of the truth, unable to distinguish between falsehood and truth. They do not worship Allah in the true sense, nor do they truly know Him," and he added, "Their words are contradictory, and their hearts are divided. They are like scattered fragments, and the living among them are

(1) Al-Rassi: Yahya bin al-Hussein bin al-Qasim Al-Rassi bin Ibrahim Tabataba and was described by his followers as al-Hadi, "the guide to the truth", and he is considered the founder of dynastic rule in Yemen, which was named after him as Zaydi or Jaroudi Hadawism. According to some sources, Yahya Al-Rassi arrived in Saada in 284 AH / 897 AD, with about 50 of his cousins, then his followers from Tubba joined them and waged bloody wars to subjugate Yemeni tribes under Yahya Al-Rassi's rule, the catastrophic effects of which continue until today.

(2) Al-Tayyib, Bilal. "The Maze: The Lost Chapters of Zaidi Imamate in Yemen." Arwaa Foundation for Studies, Translation, and Publishing, 2021, p. 67.

like the dead, persisting in actions that displease Allah."[1]

Yahya Al-Rassi utilized religion to substantiate his ideology, which turned the Yemenis into not only followers but into slaves to him and his descendants. He often manipulated and employed texts attributed falsely to the Prophet, peace be upon him, despite most Muslim scholars affirming their inauthenticity. Moreover, some of these texts were erroneously interpreted in a manner contradicting the essence of the Islamic faith, which aims to equalize humanity and prohibits dividing people into classes and hierarchies based on genetic lineage.

In his book, "Al-Ahkam: In the Halal and Haram," Yahya Al-Rassi claimed that the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "O Ali, whoever loves your offspring has indeed loved you, and whoever loves you has indeed loved me, and whoever loves me has indeed loved Allah, and whoever loves Allah, He will admit them into Paradise. Whoever detests them has indeed detested you, and whoever detests you has indeed detested me, and whoever detests me has indeed detested Allah, and whoever detests Allah, it is the right of Allah to admit them to the Fire." He also attributed a saying to the Messenger of Allah, "No one dislikes the people of my household except that his foot slips, until it is firmly established until Allah saves him on the Day of Resurrection." Likewise, he fabricated a statement falsely attributed to the Messenger of Allah, "The people of my household are a sanctuary for the people of the Earth, and the stars are a sanctuary for the people of the heavens. So, when the people of my household are gone from the Earth, the people of the Earth will face what they have been promised. And when the stars are gone from the heavens, the people of the heavens will face what they have been promised[2]."

And Yahya Al-Rassi also proclaims, "The best of this nation is the one who takes the command of Allah, His Messenger, and Al-albeit, and the prince of the believers, peace be upon him, and his progeny, because Allah has commanded their authority. And the worst and most unjust of this nation are those who harbor hatred towards Allah, His Messenger, and the Al-albeit, the prince of the believers, and his progeny, because Allah has forbidden such hatred in His Book and on the tongue of His Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. He has made them the successors on His land, the leaders of His creation, the guardians of His land, the custodians of His revelation, and the protectors of His Book. He entrusted them with it and made them the guides to Him. He has commanded them to seek their counsel and resort to them in matters of knowledge and obligations. He has bestowed upon them the knowledge of the Book and the ability to discern

(1) Ibid p.5.

(2) Al-Ahkam... Fi al-Halal wal-Haram," Yahya ibn al-Hussein ibn al-Qasim ibn Isma'il, Volume 2, Ahl al-Bayt Library, 1st edition, 1435 AH, page 418.

and clarify what may be ambiguous. They guide people to the Most Merciful and call for righteousness and excellence, as Allah illuminates with His light whomever He wills[1]."[2]

With these fabricated texts or those that are wrongly interpreted and used, the lineage to which Yahya Al-Rassi and his extended family belong ignites wars that have spanned over a thousand years, with the aim of seizing control over Yemen and the entire Arabian Peninsula. Those who refuse to pledge allegiance to them, to submit and dedicate themselves, their children, their wealth, and their lands in their service, will face the wrath of Allah Almighty - according to their narrative - and be deprived of paradise, subject to immediate punishment in this world at their hands. They exploit the ignorance and poverty of the Yemeni people, as well as their innate love and devotion to the Islamic faith and the noble Prophet, peace be upon him.

Based on a political theory known as "Wilayat al-Batnain" (the guardianship of Al-Batnain), the Al-Rassi lineage confines the Imamate (absolute rule and control over people's lives) to the descendants of Imam Hasan and Imam Hussein, the sons of Ali ibn Abi Talib and Fatimah (may Allah be pleased with them all), until the Day of Judgment. They believe that authority is a right bestowed upon them by Allah, which is considered fundamental within their religious perspective. The researcher, Zaid Jaber indicates that this claim is "one of the essential components of the theory of divine preference or selection. Allah has preferred the family of the Prophet, namely Ali and Fatimah (may Allah be pleased with them), and their descendants until the Day of Judgment. This claim has granted them rights and privileges over humanity that others do not possess, the most significant of which is the monopoly of power, or what is known as 'the confinement of Imamate to the Batnain.'[3]"

The belief in confining the Imamate and governance to the hidden ones is deeply entrenched among the followers of Al-Rassi, irrespective of their affiliation with other sects within the Ahl al-Bayt. The Al-Rassi followers staunchly uphold this belief and do not engage in any discussion or debate on the matter, even with those considered moderate, such as Imam al-Mahdi Ahmad bin Yahya al-Murtada, who mandated the appointment of a ruler from their lineage. He explicitly stated, "According to religious law, it is the duty of Muslims to appoint an Imam who is a responsible and free male from the Alawi Fatimi lineage, even if he is elderly and has impairments[4]."

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(1) Surah An-Nur in the Quran, verse 35.

(2) Al-Ahkam... Fi al-Halal wal-Haram," Yahya ibn al-Hussein ibn al-Qasim ibn Isma'il, Volume 2, Ahl al-Bayt Library, 1st edition, 1435 AH, page 418.

(3) "Al-Hadawiyah and Al-Houthiyah: Imamate in the Two Batnain," Zaid Jaber, Ab'ad Center for Studies and Research, February 8, 2018.

(4) The Text of Flowers in the Jurisprudence of the Pure Imams(Mutn Al-Azhar Fi Fika Al-Aimmah Al Athar)" by Al-Mahdi Ahmad bin Yahya Al-Murtada, 251 AH.

The racial discrimination observed here is not merely a product of human populist ideologies like Nazism in Europe or other racist movements that emerged in the last century. Rather, it is a more perilous phenomenon that contradicts the fundamental principles of equal citizenship and directly conflicts with the first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights(1). This ideology claims the superiority of a particular race and the selection of individuals based on their genetic lineage. Furthermore, its proponents assert that Allah Almighty has chosen them to bear the responsibility of propagating their religious beliefs, even using force. Consequently, anyone who does not accept their beliefs is deemed to oppose religion and defy the will of the Creator. In essence, they have amalgamated racism rooted in lineage with ideological religious terrorism, creating a blend that is unparalleled in any other contemporary group.

If we draw a parallel between Nazism in Europe and this particular lineage in Yemen, we find that the latter claims exceptionalism in their genes while also attributing themselves with a divine character reminiscent of a theocratic rule. They firmly believe that Allah has entrusted them with the governance of people, including control over their wealth, possessions, and destinies. Opposition to this governance is deemed apostasy, punishable by death. The so-called "intellectual and cultural document" signed by the Houthis in March 2012 serves as evidence of this belief, emphatically stating that Allah has chosen this lineage above all humans to guide humanity and carry the Quran after the Prophet until the Day of Judgment. According to this document, Allah continually prepares individuals from this lineage in every era to be beacons for worshippers, capable of leading the Islamic nation and uplifting it in all aspects(2).

This racist inclination, along with oppressive practices and a contemptuous view towards those not belonging to their lineage, is evident in the fatwas and messages of their prominent authorities, such as Abdullah bin Hamza(3). He has been involved in committing heinous crimes against Yemenis who reject racial and ethnic rule under the guise of religion.

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(1) The first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." Source: United Nations website.

(2) The intellectual and political document signed by the leader of the Houthis, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, and some scholars of Zaidism, including Abdulrahman Hussein Shayem, Hussein bin Yahya al-Houthi, Mohammed Mohammed Al-Mansur, Hamoud Abbas Al-Mouayed, all belonging to the Al-Rassi dynasty. Source: Nashwan News website, March 24, 2012.

(3) Abdullah bin Hamzah is for the Houthis the second most important religious and political reference in the history of the Zaydi/Hadawi sect. His followers call him the "Victorious Imam" and he belongs to Al-Rassi dynasty, where he became Imam during the period 1197-1217 according to some sources. He is considered one of the most bloody and criminal Rassi figures, as he carried out mass extermination operations against the Matrafyah sect.

The Imamate ideology's disdain for Yemenis takes various forms and is documented in their religious and historical texts. They assert that their preference for and contempt of Yemenis is a matter of celestial significance and a divine belief that cannot be questioned. These claims find expression in the poems of Yahya Al-Rassi, the founder of this ideology, which serve as religious edicts for the lineage. For instance, he states:

"Allah honored me with the migration of my father,
And with his sword... by his standing and mine."

In a poem by Abdullah bin Hamza, the second most important religious authority for this lineage, a comparison is drawn between his lineage and the rest of the Yemeni population. He describes his lineage as "precious, radiant, essential, and lion-like," while depicting Yemenis as "despicable, stony, filthy, dogs, and tails"... and so on. In this poem, which we will address in the chapter dedicated to the Matrafyah, he says:

Praise be to the One who supported us with His protection,
And singled us out with His grace and mercy.
We have become under the rule of the One, the Benevolent,
We hold the reins of those with faith.
And whoever disobeys us shall face the fire,
Between the hands of Pharaoh or Haman.
If only he had prayed, fasted, and strived,
And worshipped Allah alone with devotion.
If only he had kept his garment clean and his body pure,
And performed obedience with unwavering determination.
But he disobeyed our renowned leader,
And said, "I am not obliged to follow."

Considering himself exempt from your command,
He would have been cursed and doomed.

He belongs to the people of the blazing Hellfire,
And his mother is undoubtedly destined for it.
And his claim:
"The descendants of Ahmad are the masters of nations,
For their Lord, the ruler of the heavens, has decreed so."
Whoever denies their excellence with deaf ears,
Has equal worth to pearls and pebbles.
We say this, whether he complains or objects,
The head and the tail hold no equal weight in our eyes.
Also added:

So, I said, "Wait, O brother of the ascetics,
We have learned from the narrators of the masters,
That they are leaders of the Muslims,
And their love is among the greatest forms of worship.
My Lord has no objection to anyone,
He does as He wills, exalted and glorified.
He did not make the dog equal to the lion,
So cast away the garments of stubbornness and envy.
O people, the pearl is not equal to the pasture,
Nor is the emerald like the stone.
No, nor is the jewel measured like the pebble,
So, beware of uttering words that touch the Hellfire[1]."

The adherents of the Imamate theory, also known as "al-Wilaya" by the Houthis today, hold the belief that God created the Yemeni tribes and other segments of the Yemeni population serve the lineage of the Al-Bayt. According to this perspective, they are expected to engage in combat and make sacrifices, even giving their own lives and their children's. Furthermore, they are required to contribute their resources and relinquish their lands and possessions. Those who resist these demands are seen as challenging religion and Allah, and they are branded as apostates, becoming targets of incitement under various religious, political, and ethical banners.

Alongside this attitude of disdain and perceived superiority over other Yemenis, tribal conflicts have been among the destructive mechanisms fueled by the Imamate. They have propagated sayings that were adopted by many people due to ignorance, such as "A dog's bite in a dog's head" in the context of conflicts between two tribes. Another saying is "Keep the tribal member preoccupied with his own affairs before he preoccupies you," as well as "The stone comes from the ground, and blood comes from the head of the tribal member.[2]" Even historians associated with this ideology have highlighted the policy of sowing discord among Yemeni tribes in their writings as a means of boasting. For instance, Mohsen bin Hassan bin Al-Qasim, also known as "Abu Talib," mentioned in his book "The History of Yemen... The Era of Independence from the First Ottoman Rule" that their Imam deliberately instigated conflicts among tribes as a method of control. He would foster alliances with one tribe against another, maintaining a consistent strategy that thrived on their disagreements[3].

The Imams were notorious for their practice of spreading rumors,

(1) "Al-Hadawiyya Between Political Theory and Divine Creed" by Thabit Al-Ahmedi, published by Arooqah Institute for Studies, Translation, and Publishing, First Edition 2018, p. 63.
(2) Ibid. 64.
(3) "History of Yemen: The Era of Independence from Ottoman Rule (1056 AH to 1160 AH)" by Hussam al-Din Mohsen bin Hassan al-Qasim bin Ahmad bin al-Qasim bin Muhammad, also known as "Abu Talib." Edited by Abdullah Mohammed Al-Habshi, Al-Mufaddal Press, p. 317.

falsehoods, and fabrications about the Yemeni people to justify their warfare, suppress their uprisings, or coerce them into submission. According to the researcher, Dr. Thabit Al-Ahmedi, Yahya Hussein Al-Rassi was widely regarded as one of the most adept Imams in disseminating rumors, spreading falsehoods, and casting disgraceful accusations against others to undermine their reputation and diminish their standing, particularly within the conservative Yemeni society. Al-Rassi intimately understood Yemeni society, comprehending its joys and sorrows. He would create baseless charges against any opponent among his adversaries and propagate these accusations among his predominantly uninformed followers, ensuring their perpetuation across generations(1).

Among the rumors and lies used to justify the aggression of Yahya Al-Rassi and the Tabaristanis against the Yemeni tribes that rejected the racist Imamate theory was what he repeated and spread about the leader of the Hamdan tribe in Yemen during that period, Al-Da'am bin Ibrahim, who opposed the racist Batini theory. Al-Rassi, with the assistance of the Tabaristanis, launched a slanderous campaign to tarnish his image and the history of his noble tribe. A biographer of Yahya Al-Rassi stated: "With Al-Da'am, there were immoral soldiers who drank alcohol and engaged in homosexual acts openly, and they committed flagrant acts against women." In the context of incitement and reputation defamation to justify the war against the Hamdan tribe and its subjugation, he added: "In the military camp of Al-Da'am, there were four hundred immoral women in "Beit Dhu'd," openly displaying their immorality without any shame. The soldiers would seek permission and approval from their leaders and supervisors. Every evening, they would gather at the door of their sinful leader, playing and revealing their desires, displaying their beauty and wearing the finest clothes they could afford to expose their bodies. When a soldier desired one of them, he would offer her money in the presence of those accompanying him. If she did not go to him that night, in the morning, he would go to the leader and inform him that his cursed woman did not come, and that she had taken his money. At that moment, the leader would give the order to punish her and to be returned to her master(2)."

Yahya Al-Rassi employed the same politics with the people of the Al-A'sum region in northern Sana'a. He spread rumors that its inhabitants would honor guests by offering their daughters and sisters to them, spending their days or nights with the guests. He even claimed that they allowed the

(1) "The War of Rumors: Imamat in Yemen... A History of Fabrication" by Thabit Al-Ahmedi, Arab Renaissance Center, First Edition 2020, p. 9.

(2) "The Biography of Imam Al-Hadi Yahya bin Al-Hussein" by Ali bin Muhammad Ubaidullah Al-Abbasi Al-Alawi (cousin of Yahya Al-Rassi and his companion). Edited by Suheil Zakar, p. 94.

guests to touch their bellies and bodies, and that their fathers and mothers would watch[1].

Prior to the invasion of Al-Rassi and the Tabaristanis in Sana'a, which was ruled by the Jufatam during that period, rumors were spread against its inhabitants, stating: "As for the Jufatam, I have heard that some people from Sana'a mention that a man among them may take a boy from the market for sinful purposes. Similarly, some of them would take women from the streets, and there were also hooligans and young men in the markets who would forcefully take people's money, without anyone being able to confront them[2]". On another occasion, Al-Rassi described the people of Sana'a as dogs[3].

Similarly, the inhabitants of the Akhṭūṭ region faced the same treatment. After their leader, Ibrahim bin Khalaf, refused to comply with Al-Rassi, writings were circulated among them justifying their fight, saying: "Immorality was prevalent among them. When Al-Hadi arrived in Akhṭūṭ, some of the afflicted people and corrupt women left with him. They used to reside there with Ibrahim bin Khalaf, may Allah curse him[4]".

Al-Rassi also spread rumors that Sasa'a bin Ja'far, from the Rida region north of Sana'a, would unjustly consume the property of the Bun people and take some women for immoral purposes, as well as indulge in drinking alcohol[5]. When the people of Sana'a expelled Al-Hadi's workers, a narrator of Al-Rassi's biography and his cousin described the people of Sana'a as "not wanting religion to prevail and not ceasing their consumption of alcohol and engagement in immorality." On the same page where the narrator mentioned these lies, he also described the people of Yemen in the Shabam region, west of Sana'a towards Al-Mahweet Governorate, as wicked and considered Yemen a "bewitched land whose people cannot be trusted[6]" . All this defamation and insult towards the Yemeni people was documented in their books and writings.

When Al-Hasan bin Ahmad Al-Hamdani, the eloquent poet of Yemen, composed his famous poem "Ad-Damighah," which praises Yemen, its civilization, and its history, it disturbed the descendants of Yahya Al-Rassi who came after him. They considered it an attack on their dignity and status, as they saw themselves as the best people in terms of lineage and piety. This led them to incite against him and tarnish his reputation among the Yemeni

(1) Ibid. p. 125. The people of Al-A'sum refuted this rumor after it reached Al-Rassi.
(2) Ibid. p. 205. Al-Jafatim is attributed to Jafatim, the military commander of the Abbasids who came from Baghdad to Yemen during that period to confront opponents of the Abbasid Caliphate.
(3) Ibid. p. 209.
(4) Ibid. p. 213.
(5) Ibid. p. 216.
(6) Ibid. p. 221.

people to justify his imprisonment and torture[1]. They falsely accused him of "inciting discord between the Qahtanis and the Adnanis" simply because he took pride in the history and civilization of the Yemenis and rejected claims of tribal superiority and the monopoly of governance, authority, and knowledge by a specific lineage. This is something that Yemenis reject today[2].

And just as they incited and attempted to tarnish the reputation of Al-Hamdani, they used the same means against the renowned scholar Muhammad bin Ali Ash-Shawkani, the Yemeni revolutionary and king Nushwan bin Sa'id Al-Hamiri, the revolutionary jurist Saeed bin Yasin, and many other symbols of Yemen and its free people who rejected the racist practices against Yemenis.

It is crucial to highlight that this lineage only extols the virtues of Yemenis when it serves the purpose of mobilizing them to fight against their adversaries, urging them to sacrifice their lives and fortunes to maintain their grip on power. They exalt Yemeni tribes as indomitable warriors, enduring hunger, making sacrifices, and capable of defeating their foes. Such glorification, however, is intended to pit these tribes against one another, aiding those in power to attain their objectives. Paradoxically, they view Yemenis' pride in their history, civilization, ancient artifacts, and historical landmarks as an act of associating partners with Allah, heresy, and apostasy. This sentiment was echoed by Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, the founder of the Houthi movement, who derided the history of Yemenis and Egyptians in a publication titled "International Jerusalem Day[3]". As a

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(1) Abu Muhammad Al-Hasan bin Ahmad bin Ya'qub bin Yusuf bin Dawud bin Sulaiman Al-Arhabi Al-Bakili Al-Hamdani (280 AH / 893 CE - 356 AH / 967 CE) is one of the scholars and thinkers of Yemen. He conducted early research on several scientific issues and arrived at their final conclusions before Western scholars spoke about them, such as oxygen, the spherical shape of the Earth, the nature of matter, the layers of the Earth, genealogy, and Yemeni tribes. Among his works is the book "Al-Iklil," in which he narrates the stories of Arab and ancient nations, the book "Sifat Jazirat Al-Arab" (Description of the Arabian Peninsula), the book "Sirair Al-Hikmah" (Secrets of Wisdom), and other books.

(2) Following the Houthi takeover of the capital Sana'a, a societal intellectual movement called "Al-Aqyal" emerged, advocating for pride in Yemenis' national identity, history, and civilization, and condemning tribal racism as a result of the Houthis' attempts to forcibly impose their belief in racial discrimination against the Hashemites to the detriment of other Yemenis.

(3) The founder of the group, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, states in his booklet, citing a recorded lecture by him: "In Yemen, they urge Yemenis to focus on the history of the Sabean and Himyarite civilizations, making them revere and glorify the remains of columns in Ma'rib from the Kingdom of Ma'in or the remains of the Kingdom of Saba in Ma'rib, Al-Jawf, or elsewhere, claiming that this is our history, and we were a civilization, and we were... and we were... Where does all this come from? Do Arabs become attached to their pre-Islamic history through ordinary individuals? Or through the ministries of culture in their countries? The Ministry of Culture, which is a part of the state in every Arab country, is responsible for attaching the people of that nation to their pre-Islamic history. In Egypt, it is the same. They urge Egyptians to focus on =

result, for centuries, they have meticulously worked to vandalize, sell, and smuggle Yemeni artifacts.

Yahya Al-Rassi and the Tabaristanis employed the policy of disdain and distortion against the Yemenis who rejected the theory of governance by the descendants of the Batnain persisted and was passed down through generations. This derogatory approach was also utilized by the descendants of Al-Rassi against Ali bin Al-Fadl and the tribes that supported him. Similarly, Abdullah bin Hamza employed it against the Matrafyah. Furthermore, this policy was also adopted by all imams, including Al-Qasim bin Muhammad, the founder of the Qasimiyah state, and Imam Al-Mutawakil Ala Allah Ismail. A remarkable reference that delves deeper into this ongoing crime and its multifaceted aspects is the noteworthy book titled "The War of Rumors: Imams in Yemen... A History of Fabrication," meticulously penned by the insightful writer and researcher Thabit Al-Ahmedi.

Through the succinct examples and illustrations cited earlier, the magnitude of the baseless accusations and falsehoods that defy reason and logic comes to light. The scale of defamation endured by the Yemeni people since the arrival of Al-Rassi and the Tabaristanis in Yemen until this very day becomes apparent. Those championing Yemen's freedom and refusing to succumb to the racism ingrained in notions of lineage and religious sect are unjustly labeled as Daesh, collaborators, traitors, mercenaries, atheists, and infidels, among other derogatory terms.

Just as this lineage has inherited and perpetuated this abhorrent racist belief, so too has the organized crime associated with it evolved into a more abominable and catastrophic form in the present era.

Resistance Against the Intrusive Racial Culture:

The issue with this specific lineage in Yemen lies in their elevation of ethnicity or family to the status of doctrine, sect, religion, state, and creed. They have limited the salvation of Yemenis to the recognition of the supreme status of their lineage's ethnicity. It is important to note that this is not our saying, but it is theirs. Consequently, their conflict with the inherent order of things, the realities of history, identity, memory, and all relevant considerations became inevitable, natural, and recurrent. This clash manifested in every episode of the conflicts they manufactured against Yemeni society and its people, seizing any opportunity to ignite their sacred conflicts.

= their Pharaonic history and place a large statue of Pharaoh Ramses in a square they call Ramses Square, and you hear Ramses Street, Ramses Restaurant, Ramses Salon, and you see the Pharaonic inscriptions again."

Yahya Al-Rassi sent his cousins to Tabaristan seeking assistance. They sent fighters from Tabaristan, entrusted with guarding, and led his army to wage wars against Yemeni tribes. However, he faced fierce resistance from Yemenis who rejected racism throughout the fourteen years he lived in Yemen (from 284 AH to 298 AH).

In 288 AH (901 CE), Yahya Al-Rassi led a gathering of fighters who came from Tabaristan towards Sana'a to seize control of it but encountered strong resistance from its inhabitants. Yemeni leaders urged people to fight, chanting slogans such as, "We do not want the rule of the Alawi, nor shall he enter our land. Support us against this stranger, whom we will expel from our homeland and lands to the mountain of Al-Rass[1]."

The historian Ahmad Sharaf Ad-Din (who belongs to the lineage of Yahya Al-Rassi) proudly indicates that the number of battles that took place between Yahya Al-Rassi, also known as Al-Hadi, and the families of Ya'far, Ad-Dhahak, At-Turayf, and Al-Akiliyyin in Yemen exceeded 80 battles, excluding the battles he fought against the Qarmatians, which exceeded 70 battles[2]. Considering the period in which Al-Rassi lived in Yemen until his death, which was approximately 168 months, this means that he fought a battle almost every five weeks.

Therefore, Yahya Al-Rassi never enjoyed a day of peace in his rule. As soon as he finished a war in one Yemeni region, another would erupt, rejecting his system based on racist beliefs. When Al-Rassi passed away in 298 AH, he left behind a "deteriorating state on the verge of collapse, with an economic and financial situation that did not support its survival, relying on non-Yemenis, including Alawis and Tabaristanis (who flocked to Yemen during his rule to participate in wars against Yemeni tribes) in managing public affairs, such as military leadership, zakat collection, and judiciary[3]," according to researcher Dr. Ali Muhammad Zaid.

The conflict and discord continued between the Rassi Imams with the assistance of armies that came from Tabaristan and Daylam, and the Yemenis. Yemeni researcher Dr. Ali Al-Bakkali states in his doctoral dissertation titled "Political Ideology and Its Impact on Stability... Yemen as a Model" that the number of wars that occurred between the indigenous population in Yemen and the Imamate since the arrival of Yahya Al-Rassi to Yemen until today exceeds 2,000 wars.

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(1) The Maze: The Missing Links of Zaidi Imamate in Yemen, a previous source, p. 75.

(2) Yemen Throughout History: A Comprehensive Geographical, Historical, and Political Study" by Ahmed Sharaf ad-Din, 2nd edition, 1964, p. 241.

(3) "The Mu'tazilites in Yemen: The State of Al-Hadi and His Ideology" by Ali Muhammad Zaid, Yemeni Studies and Research Center, Dar Al-Awda, Beirut, p. 95.

The Genocide of the Matrafyah:

The battles of the Imams did not cease since their arrival in Yemen, as mentioned earlier. They waged wars against the Hamdani, Hamiri, Mudhaj, Zaraniq, and Khawlani tribes, which would revolt against them from time to time whenever they had the opportunity. According to the publications of the same Imams, their wars against the Yemenis were characterized by brutality and savagery, often ending in massacres and genocides, as was the case with the Matrafyah group.

The Matrafyah are a Yemeni faction of the Zaidi sect, and they were systematically targeted for extermination during the fifth and sixth centuries AH in Yemen. The Imams considered them a deviant and apostate group due to their differing opinions, particularly their rejection of confining authority and governance to the Batnain (lineages). Eventually, they were uprooted by Abdullah bin Hamza(1).

Abdullah bin Hamza, who declared himself an Imam in the month of Dhu al-Qa'dah, 593 AH - October 1197 CE, is considered one of the most racist and bloodthirsty Imams. He permitted the killing of any non-Alawi Yemeni(2) who aspired to presidency and governance (Imamate). It is narrated that he said, "We are the people of prohibition, permission, revelation, and interpretation. We are the flags of guidance, the moons of darkness, the seas of knowledge, and the mountains of dreams. May Allah do not divert your mercy from our path, and may you not follow anyone other than our party, for with us, turmoil is expelled, and mercy is returned to us(3)." He also said, "If Muhammad (peace be upon him) had left behind a beast among the animals, the Ummah (nation) would have honored and distinguished it above all other animals(4)." He even addressed the Yemenis, saying, "Accept us as Imams, and we will accept you as followers(5)."

To emphasize their distinctiveness and their right to rule and possess the lives of the Yemenis during their battles with the Matrafis, bin Hamza wrote a lengthy poem in which he compared them to the "tail" that belongs only to

(1) "Abu Muhammad Abdullah bin Hamza bin Suleiman bin Hamza bin Ali bin Hamza bin Abi Hashim Al-Hasan bin Abdul Rahman bin Yahya bin Abu Muhammad Abdullah bin Al-Hussein bin Al-Qasim." He was born on February 24, 1166, corresponding to 21 Rabi' al-Akhir 561 AH in Aishan, currently in Dhamar Governorate. Abdullah bin Hamza is known for being one of the most brutal and criminal Imams, committing numerous crimes, most notably the massacre of the Matrafyah. He is considered the second reference by the Houthis after Yahya Al-Rassi.

(2) "Non-Alawi: Does not belong to the lineage of Ali ibn Abi Talib, may Allah be pleased with him."

(3) "The Sacred Beast, Bilal Al-Tayyib, Al-Harf Website, March 8, 2020."

(4) Ibid.

(5) Ibid. Accept us as Imams, and we will accept you as followers: Accept us as rulers over you, and we will accept you as subjects ruled by us."

the "head," representing himself and his lineage:

We have attained the rule of the One, the Bestower,
We possess the necks of those with faith, our power.
Whoever disobeys us shall face the fires,
Before Pharaoh or Haman, their desires.
Even if one prays, fasts, and strives with might,
Uniting with Allah, worshipping day and night.
If their garment is clean, their body pure,
And obedience to Allah, resolute and sure.
Yet they disobey our renowned leader,
Claiming they are not obliged to follow the feeder.
Accountable to your command, oppressed they'll be,
Cursed and condemned for their audacity.
They are among the people of the scorching Hell,
Their mother surely a chasm where they dwell.
Indeed, the descendants of Ahmad are rulers supreme,
By the Lord of heavens, their dominion deemed.
Whoever denies their virtue, deaf to the call,
Their worth and virtues, like pearls and crystal.
We say this, should anyone complain or protest,
The head and the tail, in our view, do not rest.

The Matrafyah's view, embodied in allowing the imamate in other than the Ahl al-Bayt, was what angered Abdullah bin Hamza, despite the fact that Al-Matrafyah followed Yahya Al-Rassi in his jurisprudential opinions and endeavors, they refused to confine the Imamate and governance to a specific lineage, excluding the rest of the Yemenis. They allowed for it to be held by any Yemeni. For this reason, Abdullah bin Hamza launched an extensive war against them in 603 AH, which resurfaced in 609 AH, ultimately culminating in their complete eradication. In this context, Abdullah bin Hamza recited the following:

What is your opinion of a faithful observer,
A monotheist, diligent and steadfast in his endeavor?
A scholar with knowledge encompassing all mysteries,
His mention widespread among humanity.
He adheres to the true religion,
With sound judgment and a healthy physique.
He has no connection to the family of Hassan,
Nor to the trusted lineage of Hussein.
Rather, he belongs to the Sayyid family in Yemen,
Where secrets and revelations hold equal domain.
He rises and calls for the Imamate,
For himself, the steadfast believer, as his fate.

What is his ruling in the eyes of the virtuous,
When his lineage deviates from my own ancestry?
He does not belong to my kin and relatives,
The people of Kisa, the realm of the Messengers.

Then he answered his questions with a fatwa summarized in the following statement:

As for what is present among my ancestors,
They sever the ties of those who possess it.
And they abandon the rights of their own children,
When the rights of others are claimed.

In doing so, he affirms the prohibition of ruling and imamate for any Yemeni, even if they are Muslim, knowledgeable, influential among people, or from the noblest households in Yemen. This is because the condition for imamate is affiliation with the lineage of Al-Hasan and Al-Hussein exclusively. Whoever claims the right to rule outside of this lineage must be punished by having their tongue cut off, then being killed at sunrise, so that their children become orphans, and their fate serves as a lesson for anyone who dares to claim the rights of others(1).

Furthermore, Bin Hamza issued a decree mandating the capture and public execution of the descendants of the Matrafyah. No opportunity for repentance would be granted to any of them. He also issued a fatwa, declaring, "According to our testimony and that of our revered ancestors, peace be upon them all, they are the most malevolent disbelievers in their beliefs, openly opposing the noble lineage of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ. We have granted permission to all Muslims to eliminate them, seize their wealth, confiscate their possessions, and consider them permissible to be slain by any Muslim, based on their beliefs or even a favorable disposition towards them, their kindness, and association(2)."

Acting upon this fatwa, Ibn Hamza relentlessly pursued Al-Matrafyah for two years, perpetrating atrocious crimes against them. He mercilessly killed tens of thousands of their men, enslaved their women, and subjected their children to servitude. Their homes and mosques were reduced to ruins, their farms ravaged, and their properties confiscated. He sought to justify his heinous deeds, proclaiming, "What we have done is an act of drawing closer to the Almighty Allah, exposing their blatant disbelief amidst the flourishing of Islam." He fervently swore that "engaging in combat with them and shedding their blood is a more sacred endeavor to Allah than battling the

(1) "Threads of Darkness: The Era of Zaidi Imamate in Yemen (284-1382 AH), Abdul Fattah Muhammad Al-Batoul, First Edition, 1428 AH/2007, Nashwan Al-Humairi Center for Studies and Media, pp. 119, 120."

(2) "The Maze: The Missing Links of Zaidi Imamate in Yemen, Bilal Al-Tayyib, p. 18."

disbelievers in the fortresses of Islam[1]."

The Distinction of Lineage:

In their composition and practices, the Imams, embody a convergence that is not found in any other racial or ethnic group. They share with racially discriminatory groups the distinction of their lineage, surpassing other Yemenis, Arabs, and all of humanity in terms of their racial superiority. However, this lineage goes beyond racial discrimination as they attribute their exclusivity to divine theology, claiming that it is God who has distinguished and elevated them above the rest of humanity. Not even Hitler, at the height of his racial Nazism, made such a claim. Throughout history, during their tumultuous reigns, they relied on terrorism, persecution, and the extermination of non-believers in their pursuit of supremacy. The chronicles chronicling their leaders are replete with atrocities and horrors that, had they not been recorded by their own hands, would be difficult for present-day readers to fathom, despite their pride in their deeds and wars. And why should we look far? The Houthis and their heinous terrorism and violations stand today as a living example of the heinousness and atrocities of their ancestors.

There are many countries where ruling families or ethnicities of different races exist or govern. Yet, these families or immigrant ethnicities have assimilated into the societies they govern, melting into their culture, identity, and refraining from dividing their communities into masters and slaves.

For example, the origins of the ruling family in Britain trace back to a German family (Saxe-Coburg-Gotha), a name with German connotations. However, as this became problematic with the rise of British nationalism in the face of the Germans, they changed their family name in 1917. They named themselves after one of the British palaces (Windsor), in respect for the people and the nationalism they lived in, and as a disregard for their former German connection[2].

On the Arab and Islamic levels, there are families affiliated with the Hashemites in all Arab and Islamic countries. However, they do not claim divine rights in governance and wealth or divide the societies they live in into masters and slaves. They do not incite wars and conflicts in the countries they have settled in to seize power, as the Hashemites do in Yemen.

And let us not go far... in Yemen, there are different families and

(1) Ibid. p. 18 and 19.

(2) "The ruling family in Britain is not English... so how did they reach the throne?," The Economist website, September 12, 2017.

ethnicities such as Turks, Kurds, Abyssinians, Indians, Umayyads, and others. However, they have assimilated into Yemeni society and have become indistinguishable from the rest of the Yemenis. No one can differentiate between them and the indigenous population (Qahtanis), and they have never fought Yemenis to gain control over governance and Yemeni properties based on religious and racial beliefs. However, they have reached high positions and positions in the country like any other Yemenis, based on their capabilities and qualifications.

The problem did not lie in the adherence of the Rasissi lineage, his extended family, and his followers from the Tabaristanis who came with him from the Jil and Daylam[1], to their beliefs. Instead, the problem stemmed from their culture that glorifies their racial superiority and belittles other Yemenis, making it an integral part of their religion that must not be deviated from. Based on this, they invented political, social, and economic racist concepts and practices that have caused devastating wars in Yemen.

This lineage imposed different patterns and conceptualizations of life on cultural and social levels, aiming to solidify its superiority and the necessity of approaching it through devotion and self-sacrifice. Love for the lineage became an integral part of worship, and their rule a pillar of Islam, while opposing them was deemed disbelief. Researcher Adel Al-Ahmadi[2] points to some of the imposed practices and social behaviors of the Rassi lineage in Yemen, including:

- In literature and arts: The artistic folklore of Yemeni society has been blended into weddings and celebrations, turning them into continuous and essential occasions for mentioning and praying upon the lineage.

- They created a system of behaviors called "Al-Barastiij" which solidifies the distinction between "Al-'itra[3]" and the rest of the people. They divided people into "Al-Sada" (singular: Sayyid) and "Al-Ashraf" who occupy the top of the social class, followed by judges, then tribes, farmers, "Al-Mazayina[4]" (circumcisers), "Al-Dawashin[5]" (narrators of tribal

(1) "The Tabaristanis are the soldiers and leaders who came from the Gil and Daylam regions in Iran to Yemen with Yahya Al-Rassi during various stages. They were one of the reasons for the consolidation of his rule, and Al-Rassi married some of them to his daughters, according to the Yemeni historian Dr. Abdullah Al-Shamahi."

(2) Adel Al-Ahmedi is a Yemeni writer and researcher, as well as the head of the Nashwan Al-Humairi Center for Studies and Media. He is one of the earliest to write about the Houthis as an extension of the Rasulid dynasty in Yemen.

(3) Al-'Itra: It refers to the branches of a tribe, a person's offspring, his relatives, and his clan (Al-Mu'jam Al-Waseet). The "Al-'itra" of a man refers to his immediate relatives, and from it comes the saying of Abu Bakr, "We are the 'itra' of the Messenger of Allah" (Shams Al-'Ulum - Nashwan bin Sa'id Al-Humairi - Died: 573 AH/1177 CE).

(4) Al-Mazayina: They are the circumcisers, barbers, and cupping practitioners.

(5) Al-Dawashin (singular: Dushman): It refers to an individual chosen by a tribe in Yemen to fulfill the duty of highlighting the tribe's achievements, reporting its news, preserving its genealogy, narrating its epics and stories on various occasions, and conveying its messages.

epics), and finally "Al-Akhdam[1]" (marginalized individuals).

- Women who belong to the Hashemite lineage are referred to as "Al-Sharifa", and as a result, they do not marry someone from a tribal background ("Qabili"). The woman from a tribal background is called "Al-Hurra" (free woman), as if she were a slave who had been emancipated.

- Instead of shaking hands, they perform a bow and kiss the knee or hand of "Al-Sayyid". Their scholars have differed greatly regarding the permissibility of kissing the feet due to its association with the reverence of prostration. Some said it is obligatory, some said it is permissible, and some said it is recommended. The one who does it will be rewarded, and the one who refrains from it will not be sinful[2].

- They distinguish themselves through address, using the plural form when addressing each other. As for titles and designations, they have the honor of religion, the sun of religion, the prince of religion, the victorious, the purified, the supporter, and so on, while the rest of the Yemenis have whatever they please.

- They invented a special attire that distinguishes them from other Yemenis. The "Tawza[3]" (a specific garment) of the Sayyid differs from the "Asib[4]" (traditional male clothing) of the tribal member, and their turban differs from the "Mishadah[5]" (headgear) of an ordinary Sheikh[6]. Each group must adhere to its designed attire, and individuals who choose to dress differently will face negative consequences.

- While they were in power, they ensured the education of their children and family members while depriving the rest of the Yemenis, as their sole mission was agriculture and fighting to defend the rule of the lineage.

- The families belonging to this lineage in Yemen were keen to differentiate their graves, and Yemenis were not buried in their cemeteries.

Al-Ahmadi continues to depict the effects of introducing a new societal

(1) Al-Akhdam is an ancient term used to refer to a group of dark-skinned Yemenis, and recently they are referred to as marginalized individuals.

(2) Badr al-Din Al-Houthi, who is one of the prominent figures of the Houthi group and the father of Hussein and Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, was asked about the denial of the Sunnah or those referred to as "Al-Nawasib" or "Al-Wahhabis" kissing the knees of the Hashemites or those described as "Al-Sada". The question also asked about the benefit of kissing the knees. He replied that there is "great benefit in it, as it is a remedy for arrogance," and the benefit is like "the benefit of prostration to Adam" (Source: Book "Al-Silsilah Al-Dhahabiyah fi Al-Radd 'ala Al-Wahhabiyah" by Badr al-Din Amir Al-Din Al-Houthi, Volume 1, pp. 55, 57, 58).

(3) "Tawza": It is characterized by a wide belt, and it is worn diagonally on the waist of the person. The Yemeni dagger, known as the "Khanjar" or "Jambiya," is placed in it.

(4) "Asib": It is a sheath made of wood covered with tanned leather, used to hold the Yemeni dagger or what is known as the "Jambiya." Some believe that this type of dagger was initially worn by early Yemenis, but the lineage monopolized it for themselves.

(5) "Mishadah": The Yemeni shawl that is worn on the head or placed on the shoulder.

(6) "Sheikh": It refers to the leader of a tribe in Yemen.

culture into Yemen and imposing it on Yemenis, stating: "Consequently, the society tried to keep up. Various details sprouted to differentiate people based on profession, ethnicity, region, and dialect. Thus, discord becomes the weapon of the oppressed among themselves[1]."

Fabricated Narratives:

There are numerous fabricated religious texts and sayings, or misinterpretations and exploitations of existing texts, aimed at legitimizing racial discrimination and urging Yemenis to surrender their lives, wealth, and lands to this lineage. I have examined some of these texts and found that many experts have confirmed their falsehood and lack of authenticity. For example, the founder of this ideology, Yahya Al-Rassi, claimed in his book "Al-Ahkam... Fi al-Halal wa al-Haram" under the section titled "The Chapter on the Merits of Those Who Support the Family of Muhammad" that our noble Prophet (peace be upon him) said, "O Ali, whoever loves your offspring has loved you, and whoever loves you has loved me, and whoever loves me has loved Allah, and whoever loves Allah, He will admit him to Paradise. And whoever hates them has hated you, and whoever hates you has hated me, and whoever hates me has hated Allah, and whoever hates Allah, it is incumbent upon Allah to admit him to Hell[2]."

In the book "The Truths of Knowledge" by their reference, Ahmed bin Sulaiman Al-Mutahar, they lied about the Messenger, peace be upon him, when they claimed that he said, "Why is it that when the family of Ibrahim, peace be upon him, is mentioned among people, they rejoice and are delighted, but when the family of Muhammad is mentioned, their hearts turn away? By the One in whose hand is the soul of Muhammad, if a servant comes on the Day of Resurrection with the deeds of seventy prophets, Allah will not accept it from him until he acknowledges my guardianship and the guardianship of my family[3]." Their intention is that a person cannot be a true Muslim or enter Paradise unless they are loyal to his family, regardless of their virtues, deeds, or piety. They also claim that Allah, the Mighty and Majestic, addressed our noble Messenger, peace be upon him, saying, "You were created from my clay, and your Shia (followers) were created from you[4]."

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(1) "Al-Zahr wal-Hajar": The Shiite rebellion in Yemen and the position of Shiite minorities in the new scenario. Adel Ali Na'man Al-Ahmedi. Nashwan Al-Humairi Center for Studies and Media. Page 81-82.

(2) "The Rulings in Halal and Haram": Yahya bin Al-Hussein bin Al-Qasim bin Ismail, Part Two, Ahl Al-Bayt Library, First Edition, 1435 AH, page 418.

(3) "Facts of Knowledge in the Science of Theology": Ahmad bin Sulaiman Al-Mutahhir, Imam Zaid bin Ali Cultural Foundation, page 474.

(4) "Al-Shafi", Part Three: Abdullah bin Hamza bin Sulaiman, edited by Majd Al-Din Muhammad Al-Mu'ayyidi, Ahl Al-Bayt Library, page 72.

They have also claimed that the Messenger, peace be upon him, said that whoever hates the "family of the Prophet" is born out of wedlock, or from a woman who conceived after sexual intercourse while she was menstruating, or a man who lacks goodness and is approached from behind like women are approached, as well as being a hypocrite and an immoral person[1]. According to their described reference, the absolute diligent scholar Ali Yahya Ahmed Al-Ajri Al-Mu'ayyid, transmitted in his book "The Virtues Applicable to the Illuminated Lights."

The Mu'ayyadi, like others promoting racial supremacy, sought to prove the superiority of this lineage over others due to genetic distinction rather than deeds, capabilities, competence, or qualification. He claimed that preference, distinction, and status do not fall away from those who are wicked or corrupt but belong to this lineage, as they remain connected to the "Prophetic lineage and the chosen lineage." Their rule is like an abrogated Quranic verse that must be respected and not acted upon[2].

It is important to note here that when this lineage speaks of the virtue of the family of the Prophet, they do not refer to Ali ibn Abi Talib and his sons, Hassan and Hussein (may Allah be pleased with them). Rather, they make Ali and his progeny a gateway through which entitlement reaches them in every era until the Day of Judgment. Their goal is to seize the Yemenis' necks and wealth and gain control over governance.

In addition to the aforementioned, we encounter yet another falsehood perpetuated by the lineage, further affirming the racial dimension within the beliefs of the Houthis. The leader of this group, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, also known as Hassan bin Hussein al-Houthi, conveyed this narrative, claiming that Ali bin Abi Talib said: "We are the creations of our Lord, and people are our creations." Ibn Abi al-Hadeed interpreted this statement to mean that we are the slaves of Allah, while people are our slaves. Abi al-Hadeed, in response, poses the question: "How can a slave be favored over his master?[3]" The Houthi leader invoked this discourse within the context of establishing a racial distinction, elevating the Sada (Sayyids) lineage in Yemen above all Yemenis. This racist assertion, which the Houthis consider an integral part of their religious doctrine, is the root cause behind the majority of the wars that have transpired and continue to plague Yemen. The Yemeni people staunchly reject the discriminatory practices of a lineage

(1) "The Virtues Applicable to the Radiant Lights: A Study on the Superiority of the Believer from the Ahl al-Bayt over the Worldly People": Ali bin Yahya bin Ahmad Al-Ajri Al-Mu'ayyidi, edited by Yahya Ibrahim Al-Darsi Al-Hamzi, Imam Mansur Allah Center for Islamic Studies, pages 15-16.

(2) Ibid. page 17.

(3) "Al-Ta'liq Al-Wafi fi Takhrij Ahadith Al-Shafi": Edited by Abdulmajid Abdulrahman Hassan Al-Houthi, Commentary on the Book Al-Shafi by Abdullah bin Hamza, Part Four, Ahl Al-Bayt Library, page 477.

that forcefully seizes power and the wealth of the nation, based on a fallacy that segregates and divides society into masters and slaves. Consequently, they persist in their resistance, striving torealize equal citizenship for all Yemenis, without exception.

The September 26 Revolution against Racism:

After a prolonged struggle and societal opposition to the Yemeni rule of racism, rooted in lineage, race, and purportedly sacred genes, the Yemeni people achieved a momentous milestone on September 26, 1962. They ignited a popular revolution that ultimately led to the establishment of a republic and the overthrow of imamate rule, personified at the time by Ahmed bin Yahya Hamid, who arrogated the title "the ruler by the order of Allah." Ahmed bin Yahya Hamid was one of the grandsons of Yahya Al-Rassi.

Receiving substantial support from the Arab Republic of Egypt(1), the Yemeni revolutionaries successfully solidified the republic. They ushered in a new era founded on the principle of equality among all strata of Yemeni society. This came after a protracted period of dominance by the lineage, which had fostered divisions within society along racist class lines and perpetuated a ceaseless cycle of violence.

Among the primary catalysts that precipitated the eruption of the grand revolution in the nation was the yearning of diverse segments of Yemeni society to dismantle the authority of autocratic feudal imams and dismantle the hegemony of the ruling class. These forces had hindered the progress of economic and social life, relegating the country to the ranks of the most backward nations and archaic states worldwide, as eloquently described by Russian historian and writer Elena Golubovskaya(2).

The primary objective of the Yemeni revolution is embodied in the pursuit of equality, the abolition of racist theocratic rule, and the eradication of societal divisions among its members(3). This quest for equality has driven the Yemeni

(1) Egypt stood with all its capabilities alongside the Yemenis in order to succeed in the revolutions of September 26, which aimed to liberate Northern Yemen from the Imamate theocratic rule, and October 14, against British occupation in the South. The Republic of Egypt, led by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, sent tens of thousands of soldiers to fight alongside the Yemeni revolutionaries. Egypt provided financial support, administrative expertise, and educational assistance to consolidate republican rule. To this day, the Houthis describe Egypt's support for the Yemeni revolution as an "invasion," as described by one of the prominent Houthi leaders in Sana'a, Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi.

(2) "September 26 Revolution in Yemen": Elena Golubovskaya, Ibn Khaldun Publishing House, Beirut, First Edition, 1982, page 150.

(3) The objectives of the September 26 revolution were as follows: 1) Liberation from despotism, colonialism, and their remnants, and the establishment of a just republican rule, removing class differences and privileges. 2) Building a strong national army to protect the country, safeguard =

people to engage in protracted battles since 897 AD (284 AH).

As the republican rule took hold, Yemenis began to breathe the air of joy. Governance now belonged to the people, determined through consultation (shura), and the nation's leadership rested in the hands of ordinary Yemenis. As for the fate of the lineage that had oppressed Yemenis for extended periods in the name of religion and privilege, they now lived in the era of the republic, alongside other Yemeni citizens, safeguarding their human rights just like any other group or component. However, many among them still held onto the belief in their entitlement to rule, setting themselves apart from the rest of the Yemeni people.

In November 2012, Dr. Yahya bin Yahya Al-Mutawakil, hailing from Al-Rassi lineage in Yemen, published an article in the official and foremost Yemeni newspaper, Al-Thawra. In it, he called for the "removal of injustice" and appeasement of certain marginalized groups and regions. He specifically mentioned the "Hashemites(1)" as one of these groups that needed to be appeased. It is noteworthy that the author held positions such as Minister of Trade and Industry and previously served as Deputy Minister of Planning and International Cooperation(2).

The republican rule did not exclude the Alawite lineages from power, despite the harm they had inflicted upon the Yemeni people. On the contrary, they were involved in all aspects of the state's military, security, financial, and administrative apparatus. Like other Yemenis, they occupied high-ranking and sensitive positions as ministers, governors, military and security leaders, deputies, directors, judges, journalists, and more. Their influence and dominance extend across every field, sector, department, and political party in Yemen.

During the signing of the covenant and agreement between the unity partners before the 1994 war(3), Ali Salem Al-Beidh, Yahya Al-Shami, and Haidar Al-Attas represented the Socialist Party, Yahya Al-Mutawakil represented the Congress Party (later becoming the Minister of Interior), and

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= the revolution, and its gains. 3) Improving the economic, social, political, and cultural conditions of the people. 4) Establishing a fair democratic and cooperative society, derived from the spirit of Islam. 5) Working towards achieving national unity within the framework of comprehensive Arab unity. 6) Respecting the charters of the United Nations and international organizations, adhering to the principles of positive neutrality and non-alignment, working towards global peace, and strengthening the principle of peaceful coexistence among nations.

(1) He tried to mislead the public sphere, because most of the Hamites hold high position in the government. The former leader of Al-Houthi group, Hussein Badr al-Din Al-Houthi and his brother, Yahya were members of the Yemeni Parliament.

(2) President Ali Abdullah Saleh issued a decision appointing Dr. Yahya Yahya Mohammed Al-Mutawakil as the Minister of Industry and Trade on April 5, 2007.

(3) An agreement was reached after four years of Yemeni unity on January 18, 1994, in Jordan, to settle the political crisis between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his deputy Ali Salem Al-Beidh.

Abdul Qaddous Al-Mudawwahi represented the Nasserists. Ibrahim Al-Wazir represented the Union of Popular Forces. All of them belonged to the same lineage (extended relatives). This simple glimpse refutes claims of victimization and exclusion during the rule of the republican regime in the country.

Many who lay claim to their affiliation with the Alawite families in Yemen perceive themselves as oppressed and subjugated when they are not in positions of power. They believe that governance is a divine and exclusive right bestowed upon them, and any attempt to deprive them of this right is regarded as a crime and aggression. Consequently, they portray themselves as victims and the downtrodden. This sentiment is inherently associated with Shia ideology, which asserts that the authority was unjustly taken away from Ali ibn Abi Talib, Hasan, and Hussein (may Allah be pleased with them all) and transferred to others. As a result, the majority of those belonging to this lineage in Yemen view any resistance to their fervent aspiration for forceful rule as a form of persecution against the family of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). They either aspire to be rulers themselves or claim to be oppressed and subjugated, feeling compelled to take up arms and reclaim power, even at the expense of the lives, dignity, and rights of the Yemeni people.

The Houthi Plant:

In the city of Sa'ada[1], where Yahya Al-Rassi embarked on his journey centuries ago, one of his descendants emerged in the late twentieth century under the name Hussein Badr al-Din Al-Houthi[2]. He raised the same banner: the right of the "Ahl al-Bayt" (Family of the Prophet) to govern the Yemeni people, even by force. This banner has intermittently been raised in Yemen, leading to wars and humanitarian tragedies from that time until the present.

Hussein Al-Houthi commenced his political career with a minor political party known as "Al-Haq" (The Truth). In the 1993 elections, this party secured two out of the 301 seats in the Yemeni parliament, indicating their limited popularity[3]. Hussein Badr al-Din held one of these seats in

(1) Saada Governorate is one of the governorates of the Republic of Yemen. It is located northwest of the capital Sana'a, approximately 242 kilometers away, and the population of the governorate represents about 3.5% of the total population of the republic.

(2) Hussein Badr al-Din Al-Houthi. He was born in 1958 and killed in 2004 in Saada Governorate.

(3) The "Al-Haq" party won only two seats (out of 65 party candidates) in the membership of the Yemeni House of Representatives, while the "Al-Motamar" party won 123 seats, the "Reform" party won 62 seats, the Socialist party won 56 seats, and the Ba'ath party won 7 seats. In the 1997 elections, the Al-Haq party failed to win any seats despite running with 26 candidates. In 2003, the party nominated 11 members for the elections, but none of them were successful.

parliament from 1993 to 1997[1].

The party was known for catering exclusively to families who believed themselves to be descendants of the lineage of Yahya Al-Rassi. Due to its racial undertones and its adherence to the Imamite theory based on divine selection, a theory that Yemenis reject as racist, the party failed to attain success in any democratic competition it participated in. Consequently, they resorted to taking up arms later on in order to assert their perceived divine entitlement.

In his book "Al-Zahr wal-Hajar" (*The Flower and the Stone*), the researcher, Adel Al-Ahmedi, , points out that the so-called Islamic revolution in Iran played a role in reviving the aspirations of the Alawite families and their desire to rule Yemen once again[2]. They resumed their intellectual activities in 1982, aiming to spread the concepts and principles of the Iranian revolution among Yemenis. These activities later transformed into a political project with the establishment of the Republic of Yemen on May 22, 1990. They founded the "Forum of Believing Youth" to disseminate their ideology more widely. Between 1999 and 2004, the Forum of Believing Youth took on a military character alongside intensifying its cultural role, exploiting the loopholes of democracy in the country. This eventually led to the outbreak of the first war between the government, backed by tribes, and the Houthis in July-September 2004.

Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi and those with him needed to justify their rebellion against the state. It wouldn't be logical to openly reveal their true motive, restoring their perceived right to govern as descendants of the Prophet, peace be upon him, and the bearers of authority. Therefore, they adopted the Iranian slogan of "Assarkha" (The Scream)[3] and made it the focal point of the ideological path for the Houthis. They also employed numerous political, religious, and social slogans and justifications, such as the liberation of Palestine, combating corruption, high prices, and others.

At the beginning of their journey, the Houthis used the slogan of "The Scream"[4] because they couldn't openly demand "al-Wilaya" (religious

(1) BBC Arabic, "The Houthis: From the Mountains of Saada to the Rule of Sana'a," July 18, 2017.

(2) Power transition shifted from Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to the religious authority Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, known as the Supreme Leader of the Revolution. He claims lineage to Ali ibn Abi Talib, and based on this belief, the descendants of Al-Rassiyyin in Yemen are considered the extended family of Ayatollah Khomeini.

(3) The Houthi slogan is "Allahu Akbar, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam." It was first chanted by followers of Khomeini in Iran in 1978, formulated in Persian as "Marg bar Amrika, Marg bar Israel..." which also included the addition: "Death to those who reject the guardianship of the jurist." The Houthis later adopted and spread it in Yemen.

(4) The slogan "Al-Ssarkha" (The Scream) is considered one of the prominent ideological paths for the Houthi group. The Houthis view it as a measure of righteousness and loyalty, and anyone who rejects it is considered a hypocrite and an agent of Jews and Christians. It was first chanted in =

authority) as it carried a dark image associated with destruction and tragedies in the Yemeni mentality. They justified taking up arms against the state to overthrow the republican regime at the time.

On October 23, 2013, the current leader of the Houthi group, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi[1], delivered a speech to his supporters on the occasion of Ghadeer Day[2], clearly stating that his group follows in the footsteps of the authority of Allah, the authority of the Prophet (peace be upon him), the authority of Ali ibn Abi Talib, and his descendants, according to his words. The independent newspaper "Al-Shar'a" highlighted the content of this speech the following day, focusing on its most important message. The front page carried a large picture of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi with a bold headline, stating, "Houthi: I am entitled to rule."

The importance of this coverage lies in the fact that the newspaper "Al-Shar'a" was among the independent media outlets that covered the Houthi movements, providing space for writings by soft Houthi elements who used the cover of "victimhood" and some human rights slogans to sedate and deceive Yemenis. However, the racist nature of the group has caused many who sympathized with them in the past to stand strongly against them today. The editor-in-chief of "Al-Shar'a" newspaper, journalist Naif Hassane, commented on the speech of the Houthi leader, saying: "We knew that Abdul-Malik al-Houthi believed that he was entitled to rule, and we ignored that, relying on his decorum and our ability to avoid underlying racist and backward tendencies. However, yesterday, he abandoned the minimum required decorum, openly speaking about the 'rule of the Al-Batnain' in a context that only portrayed him as a person claiming entitlement to rule.[3]"

The group's war against the Yemeni government, supported by the Iranian regime, continued until it seized control of the capital Sana'a on September 21, 2014. It then continued southward and westward, gaining control over several Yemeni provinces as a natural result of the ongoing disputes among Yemeni political factions, which had exhausted central authority and weakened army units during that period.

= Iran in 1978 by groups affiliated with Khomeini.

(1) Abdul-Malik bin Badr al-Din al-Houthi is the leader of the Houthi group in Yemen. He assumed leadership in 2006 after the death of his brother, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, during his armed rebellion against the Yemeni government.

(2) Eid al-Ghadeer is one of the Shia holidays celebrated on the 18th day of Dhu al-Hijjah in each Hijri year. Shia Muslims believe that on this day, the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, appointed Ali ibn Abi Talib as the leader of the Muslims after him. This event took place during the Muslims' return from the Farewell Pilgrimage to Medina at a location called "Ghadir Khumm" in the year 10 AH.

(3) A post by Naif Hassan, the editor-in-chief of Al-Sharq newspaper, on his Facebook page, October 24, 2013.

Over the years, with each increase in their strength and possession of weapons, the Houthi group has revealed more about its racist ideology based on the theory of divine selection and the confinement of authority and governance to the Alawi lineage, after long periods of concealing and denying this issue. In 2018, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi delivered a lengthy speech on the occasion of Ghadir and the Day of Authority. It was more explicit as he spoke about Al-Wilayah Day (the Day of Authority) and the selection of those who represent it without the need for human choices. He said: "His tradition (God's) with his servants is to select from the angels, and they are the angels of messengers chosen for this role to deliver his guidance. He specifically chooses from among the angels for this role, even though all the angels are creatures, righteous and upright, which means there are no bad angels and good angels, but the issue is not... until one of the angels says he can take on this role... No, he chooses from within the angels entrusted with this task and this job to deliver his guidance through revelation to those he chooses as messengers to send to people. God chooses messengers from the angels, people, and the human society. In human reality, it is also a matter of who God entrusts with this task, who bears this responsibility, and who he chooses for this role. It is not a matter of elections, for example, for his servants to elect a prophet or a messenger. It would be very wrong If the matter were left to human choice. For example, let's look at the society of Mecca. At the beginning of the Prophet's movement, how much denial did the majority in Mecca face? They disbelieved in him and rejected him. Indeed, God said about them, 'The majority of them do not believe.' The majority ultimately betrayed, turned away from the truth, denied the message, and disbelieved in the Messenger. It means the majority were on the side of Abu Jahl and Abu Sufyan, and they rejected the Messenger. If they were told to elect, they would not have chosen Abu Jahl or Abu Sufyan[(1)]."

This discourse seems to speak of Allah's selection of messengers, prophets, and angels. However, the message it seeks to convey and establish to the public is that Allah, the Almighty, has His own special choices, not only among messengers, prophets, and angels but also among the saints and rulers who must belong to His lineage. These individuals do not require human elections and choices, as Allah, the Almighty, has chosen them.

With these words, he responds to the Yemenis who reject his lineage's seizure of Yemen by force of arms. Their proportion, i.e., the Houthis, does not exceed 1%[(2)] of the total population of Yemen, which exceeds 30

(1) Text of a speech by Abdul Malik al-Houthi on the anniversary of the Day of Allegiance, Ansar Allah website, August 30, 2018.

(2) The percentage was determined by Mohammed Azan, one of the founders of the =

million people. He tells people who have been raised on the principles of democracy, pluralism, and elections that his process of election and selection, along with his extended family, is divine. Thus, he does not need the support of the majority.

This is what the founder of the group, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, revealed in one of his lectures, in which he overturned the republican system by saying, "Power belongs to the people, that's what we say! This phrase is not easy; it is very dangerous for the nation for a state to believe in it and for a people to believe in it(1)."

Based on the above, the theory of "al-Wilaya" and the confinement of power, knowledge, prestige, and wealth to the "sacred lineage" form a significant part of the Houthi ideology. It is reflected in their dealings with Yemenis and their overall governance approach. It serves as a fundamental motivation for this group to commit countless organized and systematic crimes and violations because they consider these practices as part of their worship and approach to Allah, the Almighty(2).

Since this project, based on racial ideology and the terrorism of belief, lacks popularity or public support in Yemen, this group has worked from the first day of its control to impose its racist beliefs and impose its ideology, which is a result of the fusion of Imamate in Yemen with Khomeinism in Iran. They have employed various practices of enticement, intimidation, and other means to subdue and subjugate Yemenis, erase their national identity and memory, and replace them with the belief in "race" or "lineage" as described by the Yemenis.

The Khomeini Support System:

As for the current Iranian regime, its inception dates to 1979 when

= "Believing Youth" organization, which was the initial foundation for the emergence of the Houthi group. Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper, June 12, 2020.

(1) A document titled "The Kingdom belongs to Allah, and He gives it to whom He wills and takes it away from whom He wills," from a lecture by Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, Ansar Allah website.

(2) It is mentioned in the collection of correspondence of Abdullah bin Hamza (one of the prominent imams, religious authorities, and symbols of the Houthis today) that he told one of his workers that if someone is killed and houses are destroyed and belongings are stolen with the intention of harming him, then it is forbidden (haram). But if someone is killed and things are destroyed and stolen with the intention of supporting the imam or obeying the imam, then it is permissible (halal). Source: Book "Majmoo' Makaatib al-Imam Abdullah bin Hamza," edited by Abdul Salam Abbas Al-Wajeeh, p. 46, 45.

Khomeini exploited the Iranian revolution to establish an ethnic-sectarian[1] ideology that interpreted religion to dominate the Iranian people and work towards exporting this ideology to other Arab and Islamic countries through what is known as "revolutionary export."

The justification for Khomeini's aggression against the Arab and Islamic region and interference in the affairs of nations can be found in various articles of the Iranian constitution. One of the most notable is Article 154, which emphasizes that the Republic of Iran considers "the happiness of humanity in the entire society to be a sacred cause" and regards "independence, freedom, the establishment of a just government, as rights for all people worldwide." Therefore, the Islamic Republic of Iran supports the just struggle of the oppressed against the arrogant in any part of the world[2].

Iran has made use of this noble verse: "Verily, this nation of yours is one nation, and I am your Lord, so worship Me[3]" as a justification for exporting its extremist ideology through supporting armed groups in different countries. And since Muslims are one nation, "the Islamic Iranian government is obligated to base all its general policies on the solidarity of Islamic peoples and to continue its efforts to achieve political, economic, and cultural unity in the Islamic world," as stated in Article 11 of the Iranian constitution[4].

Furthermore, the organization of Iranian foreign policy is based "on Islamic principles and fraternal obligations towards all Muslims, as well as the full protection of the oppressed worldwide," according to Article 3/16. However, these hollow and deceptive contents were formulated to justify intervention in the affairs of other nations and forcefully propagate their ideology.

The Khomeini regime has made the principles of "political, economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world" and "supporting the oppressed worldwide" a justification for its military and ideological aggression against

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(1) The term "ethnic-sectarianism" is employed by the author to delineate the foundational principles of the Houthis, specifically, and the broader Imamate movement in Yemen. The assertion is that every action and transgression undertaken by the Houthis is primarily rooted in ethnicity and only secondarily in sectarianism. In essence, the activities are propelled by a pursuit of ethnic superiority, camouflaged under a sectarian guise, utilizing religion as a tool to dominate the Yemeni populace. This narrative suggests that the religious dimension is strategically employed by a particular dynasty claiming distinctiveness, religious sanctity, and divine selection to assert complete control across political, social, economic, and religious realms.

(2) "The Stormy Transformation: Iran's Foreign Policy between Two Eras," by Abdul Qadir Yassin and others, Madbouli Library, 1st edition 2006, p. 165.

(3) Quran: Surah Al-Anbiya, verse 92.

(4) The Constitution of Iran issued in 1979, including its amendments until 1989, translated by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance; Updating the Comparative Constitutions Project.

several Arab and Islamic countries through locally formed militias that it has financially and militarily supported. These militias include the Houthi militia in Yemen, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement in Lebanon, the Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, the Badr Organization, and the Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi in Iraq, the "Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade" in Syria, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, Hezbollah in the Hijaz, the Peace and Unity Organization in Turkey, the "Fatimids" Brigade in Afghanistan, Ibrahim Zakzaky's group in Nigeria, as well as extremist factions in Pakistan.

Returning to Yemen, in addition to the fact that the Houthi group is an intellectual and ethnic extension of what is known as "Hadiyah Imamate in Yemen," it is also intellectually and organizationally linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or as they call it Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to hide its real identity. The relationship between the Houthi group in Yemen and the Khomeini revolution and its arms in the region can be understood through their reliance on the Twelver Ja'fari sect, which claims to rely on the Quran alone without the Prophet's Sunnah(1). This can be clearly understood in the lectures of the group's founder, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi.

Some studies assume that Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi underwent training courses provided by the Forward Operations Base of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which had been present in Sudan for some time. He was there under the pretext of pursuing a master's degree(2). In 1994, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi fled to Iran with his father following a crackdown by the authorities due to his support for the secession of southern provinces. In Iran, he also taught students sponsored by the Houthi movement in Qom and Mashhad(3) cities.

The Houthi group regards Ayatollah Khomeini(4), Iran, Hezbollah, and other Shiite proxies in the region as their role models and intellectual, political, and organizational references. They consider themselves as a unified front against their enemies, also known as the "Resistance Axis," as described by the group's leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi.

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(1) The Prophetic Sunnah refers to the sayings, actions, approvals, physical and behavioral characteristics, and the biography of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ, whether before or after the start of revelation and prophethood. According to the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah (the people of the Sunnah and the community), the Sunnah is the second source of Islamic legislation after the Qur'an.

(2) A study titled "The Evolution of Ansar Allah Group: How Did the Islamic Revolution (Iranian) Invade Yemen?" p. 11.

(3) Al-Zahr wal-Hajar" (The Flower and the Stone), previous reference, p. 177.

(4) Ruhollah bin Mustafa bin Ahmad Al-Musawi Al-Khomeini, an Iranian Shiite religious leader, religious authority, philosopher, writer, and politician. He was the founder of what was called the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, which witnessed the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran.

Many Yemeni researchers argue that some individuals claiming affiliation with the Hashemites in Yemen have Iranian origins. This interpretation finds wide acceptance in Yemen, as expressed by historians such as Harith Abdul Hamid al-Shawkani, who stated that "the Houthi Imams seek to glorify Iranian leaderships because they came to Yemen from Tabaristan and Daylam, falsely and fraudulently claiming Alawite lineage. It is mentioned in the books of the Houthi Imams themselves that Al-Hadi came to Yemen with an army from Tabaristan, so where have those Tabaris gone?! They assumed Alawite lineage, and thus their relationship with Iran is a blood tie and a shared destiny, aspiring to revive the Persian empire once again(1)." Prominent Yemeni historians, including Muhammad Al-Akwa, Qasim Ghaleb Ahmad, Hussein Al-Siyaghi, Abdullah Al-Mujahid Al-Shamahi, and Mahmoud Ibrahim Zaid, have also supported the notion of Iranian "Rassi" lineage in their book, "Ibn al-Amir and His Era(2)."

Initially, Hezbollah and Iran's support for the Houthis was clandestine. Whenever the Yemeni government accused Iran and Hezbollah of supporting the Houthis, they vehemently denied it. However, once the Houthi group seized control of the capital, Sana'a, Ali Reza Zakani, Tehran's representative in the Iranian parliament and a close associate of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, swiftly announced that Sana'a had become the fourth Arab capital under Iran's influence, alongside Baghdad, Beirut, and Damascus. He affirmed that the Houthis' actions in Yemen were an extension of the Khomeini revolution and described it as the "Greater Jihad(3)."

Following the Houthi takeover of the capital, Sana'a, the connection between the Houthis and Iran became increasingly apparent as Iran and its regional proxies escalated their support for the Houthis(4). Statements and positions from entities such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran, and various factions in Iraq consistently affirmed their coordination and pride in this ideological and ethnic alliance. Consequently, they provided the Houthis with military, financial, political, and media support.

(1) Dialogue with researcher and politician Harith Al-Shawkani, published in Al-Minbar Al-Yamani magazine and also on the Bawabati website, May 2020.
(2) "Ibn Al-Amir and His Era," a collection of Yemeni historians, p. 17.
(3) Zakani: Sana'a, the fourth Arab capital to fall into the hands of Iran after Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad, Al-Jumhuriya website, September 22, 2014.
(4) The second session of the World Assembly of the Oppressed, Mehr News Agency, Iranian.

The Systemic Starvation for Subjugation:

The deliberate starvation of Yemenis during the war years did not come as a surprise to those familiar with historical accounts, particularly those authored by the very leaders who chronicled their histories. According to numerous historians, the strategy of starvation was employed by the Houthis' predecessors even before the September 26th Revolution in 1962, to subjugate the Yemeni people, aligning with the adage, "Starve your people, and they will follow you."

North Yemen was governed by an economic system based on feudalism, where large landowners(1), mostly belonging to the Hashemite families in Yemen, held feudal ownership. The Imam would appoint them in various regions under his rule and assign them to collect taxes and zakat.

The remaining population labored under these feudal Sayyids, with individuals who owned land or engaged in independent businesses obligated to pay tributes to the Imam's representatives or intermediaries. Even farmers received just 20% of the crop returns, while the remainder was allocated to taxes, feudal Sayyids, and intermediaries. This situation has led the majority of Yemenis to live in abject poverty(2).

Elena Golubovskaya, a Russian writer, vividly described this situation, stating, "The burden of giving the majority of their harvest to the Imam was incredibly taxing for farmers. As previously mentioned, Imam Yahya significantly increased taxes compared to the Ottoman rule. One scholar described Imam Yahya's policy by saying, 'Imam Yahya created taxes like an octopus(3).'"

Abdullah Badhaib also commented on this issue, remarking, "The method of estimating and collecting taxes... rendered these taxes beyond the bounds of law or fair practice, making them unbearable for farmers who had no choice but to flee their land or succumb to starvation. Many were forced to sell their land at meager prices(4)."

The matter did not stop at imposing levies, taxes, and zakat to keep the general population in a state of abject poverty, which facilitates control over them. Yemenis still recall campaigns of tree felling, destruction of crops, and filling of wells, all aimed at punishing the local communities and impoverishing the tribes that the imams feared would rebel and rise against

(1) The feudal lords, according to the Russian writer Elena Golubovskaya, are mainly the Zayyud family, and they represent the aristocracy of the system and serve as intermediaries between the majority of the Yemeni population in many social matters. The term "Sada al-Zayyud" refers to the families claiming descent from the lineage of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ and are said to represent the Zaydi sect in Yemen.

(2) "September 26 Revolution in Yemen," previous reference, p. 123.

(3) Ibid. p. 119-120.

(4) Ibid. p. 124.

their racist rule.

One of the most prominent means employed to subdue Yemenis is the practice of "Al-Khattat." This local expression signifies the Imam compelling one tribe to attack another, not only to weaken their power but also to establish complete dominance over them. The attacked tribe would then declare its obedience to the Imam or pay off any outstanding financial obligations. The purpose of "Al-Khattat" was to subjugate the targeted communities, requiring them to vacate their homes for the soldiers or followers to occupy. Furthermore, the targeted communities were obligated to offer their guests food, drink, and the stimulant plant called "qat[1]" throughout their stay. All of this resulted in the impoverishment of the targeted communities and forced compliance with the Imam's demands[2].

The Imam referred to "Al-Khattat" as the "War of Al-Asid[3]," with "Al-Asid" (porridge) being a well-known Yemeni dish. The intention here was to wage a war against food, meaning plundering the available food resources in these tribes and regions, hastening their submission and subjugation. In truth, the Imamate employed the method of "Al-Khattat" to suppress numerous Yemeni uprisings led by tribal leaders against racial rule[4].

This practice was not only used to subdue Yemeni tribes that rejected the rule of the Imams but also served to punish small households that delayed payment of the levies and taxes imposed by the Imam's authority. The Imam would dispatch one or more soldiers to reside with the family that had fallen behind in their payments. This residence would be fully sponsored by another family that often struggled to pay their taxes due to poverty.

Ahmed Mohammed Nu'man describes this crime as follows: "Every tax imposed on Al-Ra’awi, [5]the pastoralist is executed by Al-'Amil [6] (agent), or his military substitute, whether one, two, or three, depending on the scarcity or abundance of the required amount. As soon as the military personnel receives the execution order[7], he commands the worker to cut his salary and daily expenses because he will be a guest of the farmer. In addition to the hospitality, he is entitled to a fee estimated according to the long or short distance, called the 'distance,' then the 'mamsi,' which is a nightly tax paid by the farmer for the soldier's stay with him. This fee varies;

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(1) Qat: A stimulating plant that grows in East Africa and Yemen. The population is obliged to provide it for the Imam's troops, which costs them a considerable amount of money.

(2) Yemeni Documents: A Historical Documentary Study, Dr. Sayed Mustafa Salem, p. 105.

(3) "Glimpses from the History of the Yemeni Free Movement," Part One, Ali Mohammed Abdo, French Institute for Archaeology and Social Sciences, and Al-Nu'man Cultural Forum for Youth, January 2002, p. 48.

(4) "September 26 Revolution in Yemen," previous reference, p. 153.

(5) Al-Ra'awi: The pastoralist or peasant in rural areas.

(6) Al-'Amil: the agent or the representative of the Imam in the city or region.

(7) Execution Order: A document handwritten by the responsible official of the tax or collection authority.

if he is an ordinary soldier, it has a known value, and if he is a 'corporal' or a 'captain,' it is doubled, and if he is a 'judge' or a Sayyid,' it is multiplied many times over, according to rank and position. Also, the choice of hospitality belongs to the military, not the farmer[1]", until he says, "Zakat, obligations, tenth, or the rights of the treasury are synonymous terms with the same meaning, which is the seizure of the subjects without compassion, mercy, fairness, justice, measurement, or estimation[2]."

Imamate has initiated this type of extortion and theft through ancient fatwas, the most prominent of which was issued by their Imam Abdullah bin Hamzah, who authorized "coercing people to provide hospitality," saying: "As for the method of coercion, the ruling regarding its permissibility or prohibition has been previously discussed in the issues. When the Imam permits taking money by force for the welfare of the Ummah, whether it is hospitality or "private" funds or other, sufficient evidence has been presented to those with a sound and attentive heart[3]."

During the period of Imamate, the term "tasmir" spread among the people, which means sealing the house or shop of a citizen with metal sheets and nails after evacuating the occupants or owners, and then confiscating its contents for the benefit of the Imam[4].

The Yemeni people are well aware of the outlandish group's tactics in exploiting their wealth through force and coercion when they hold power, disguising their actions as lawful and in the name of the state. However, even when they are not in power, they continue to exploit the Yemeni population through deceitful and manipulative practices.

The extensive history of plundering has resulted in recurrent famines, which were not prevalent during the rule of the Imam. Mohsen Al-Aini provides a firsthand account of the dire situation faced by Yemenis during the reign of the Hamid Al-Din family. He describes how people flocked to Sana'a, the capital, in desperate search of assistance. These individuals, hailing from Tihama, were plagued by starvation. Men and women emerged from their villages, their faces filled with despair and their steps faltering. Tragically, many children, women, and elderly individuals succumbed to the harsh conditions along the way, while the determined youth and men continued their arduous journey to Sana'a, the capital of the Kingdom of the Prophet's Descendant.

In Sana'a, Amir al-Mu'minin, the leader of the faithful, prevented these starving individuals from approaching his position of power. Consequently,

(1) "Glimpses from the History of the Yemeni Free Movement," previous reference, p. 134.
(2) Ibid. p. 137
(3) The Complete Collection of Letters of Imam Mansur Billah Abdullah bin Hamza, Part One, edited by Abdul Salam bin Abbas Al-Wajeeh, Imam Zaid bin Ali Cultural Foundation, p. 209.
(4) "Return of Tanning," Thabit Al-Ahmadi, Al-Mushahed Al-Yamani website, September 30, 2020.

they resorted to knocking on the doors of houses, seeking assistance, and proclaiming their dire need for help. Mosques, streets, and alleys became filled with these desperate individuals. Hunger consumed them, leading to their untimely deaths. Those who were more fortunate, individuals with wealth, offered them meager remnants from their own tables, which only prolonged their suffering. They endured days without food, and perished if they continued fasting. If they managed to eat, they also met the same fate.

As young individuals situated in the "Orphans' Office" at the time, we would venture out to these suffering individuals with whatever meager provisions we had remaining, offering them the little that was left of our sustenance—our "qurwans[1],"bowls "kudma (ancient roll)," and bread. We watched as they devoured the food ravenously, and then we would provide them with a cup of water. We gathered around them, witnessing the final moments of their struggle for breath and the departure of their souls. Have the people of Sana'a forgotten these scenes? Have they forgotten the weariness and exhaustion that came from witnessing such tragedies? Burial grounds were filled with graves containing the remains of five or six bodies interred together. This account only captures a fraction of the injustices we witnessed as children. Back then, we did not fully comprehend that these were acts of injustice or understand the true nature of tyranny, as nobody had enlightened us on these matters. We used to hear them praise Allah—(pardon), praise Imam[2].

The Imamate often justified the plundering of Yemenis. For example, Imam Al-Mansur Abdullah bin Hamza interpreted the saying of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him): "No Muslim's wealth is lawful except with their consent." He claimed that the obligatory funds, referring to collecting khums and other taxes from the people, were exempted. These funds were taken from Muslims' wealth regardless of their consent, and it was permissible, as we have mentioned before, to seize their necks and violate their sanctity more than the sanctity of wealth[3].

Likewise, Abdullah bin Ali bin Ahmad bin Muhammad Al-Hasani, known as "Al-Wazir," one of their leaders, justified the legitimacy of plundering the wealth of those who differed from them intellectually and doctrinally. He cited the position of their Imam Ismail bin Al-Qasim, who took the wealth of Yemenis. When one of his relatives questioned him about it, he justified it by saying that they were disbelievers and that the books of the Imamate were filled with definitive evidence of their disbelief. He

(1) "Gathering Qarwan," bowl which is a deep container used for placing food.
(2) "Battles and Conspiracies against the Yemeni Cause," Mohsen Ahmed Al-Aini, first edition, Dar Al-Shorouk, 1999, pp. 69-70.
(3) "The Complete Collection of Letters of Imam Mansur Billah Abdullah bin Hamza," Part Two, p. 139.

claimed that when the Imam seized their wealth, it became his property, and he could do whatever he pleased with it[1].

As for Al-Mutawakkil Ismail bin Al-Qasim[2], he issued a fatwa titled "Guidance for the Listener on the Permissibility of Taking the Wealth of the Opponents." In it, he said, "I am not concerned about what I took from their wealth, but I am concerned about what I left for them. I fear that Allah will punish me for leaving this wealth for them while they are in need[3]."

Imam Ahmad bin Sulaiman referred to the approach of Imam Hadi Yahya Al-Rassi before him in collecting wealth from the people of Sana'a. He said, "...what is narrated from Al-Hadi, may peace be upon him, is that he sought to take a quarter of their wealth to ward off the evil of Ibn Fadl and to fight in the cause of Allah (...) There is no doubt that what he, may peace be upon him, took from the people of Sana'a was many times greater than what we take. He is our role model in what we do. Whoever criticizes us criticizes him. As for the destruction we carried on, it was only done against a group of people who showed stubbornness and appeared to be disbelievers[4]."

Imam Muhammad bin Ali Al-Shawkani referred to this about Imam Nasir Muhammad bin Ahmad bin Al-Hasan, saying, "The fact is that he was one of the greatest rulers who took money from his citizens without any estimation. Yemen remained protected from oppression and taxes after the Turks left until the time of its ruler, the one with the title of the Interpreter. He took what was not permissible according to Shariah. When this ruler came to power, he took money from what was lawful and unlawful. His state grew, authority increased, power expanded, and armies multiplied. He became more like kings than caliphs... He spilled blood based on mere

(1) "The History of Yemen during the Eleventh Hijri - Seventeenth Gregorian Century: The History of Tabq Al-Halwa, Sahaf Al-Mann, and Al-Suluwi," Abdullah bin Ali bin Ahmed bin Mohammed Al-Hasani (Al-Wazir), edited by Mohammed Abdul Rahim Jazem, Yemeni Studies and Research Center, Sana'a, p. 121.

(2) After the Turks withdrew from Yemen, Al-Mutawakkil ala Allah Ismail bin Al-Qasim ruled over some regions of Yemen following the death of his brother Al-Mu'ayyad. He is considered a jurist of the Zaydi sect and was known for his strictness and excommunication of the Sunnis and Ash'aris in Lower Yemen and Eastern Yemen until Hadramaut and beyond. He dealt with them as disbelievers by interpretation, and their lands were regarded as taxable lands from which taxes, similar to the lands of disbelievers, were collected, rather than being considered tithe lands from which the tithe of Zakat is taken as with the Muslims.

(3) "Black Pages of the Houthis' Excommunication of Yemenis in the North and South," Nasser Yahya, March 30, 2014.

(4) "The Biography of Imam Ahmad bin Sulaiman," Sulaiman bin Yahya Al-Thaqafi, edited by Dr. Abdulghani Mohammed Abdul-Ati, Ein for Human Studies and Research, First Edition 2002, p. 303.

suspicions and doubts[1]."

In the book "Al-lmam fi Hukm Jihad Al-Muhtal Al-Ghazi wa Al-Mu'tadi Al-Thalim bi Ghayr Imam" (Guidance on the Ruling of Jihad Against the Invading Aggressor and the Oppressive Transgressor without an Imam), Al-Qasim bin Al-Hasan Al-Saraji mentioned that their grandfather Imam Yahya Al-Rassi Al-Tabatabi (known as Al-Hadi) permitted taking people's wealth to defend them, even if it was "disliked[2]."

The Houthis relied on these narratives to legitimize their forceful plundering of Yemenis' wealth under the pretext of defending them, a practice they indeed carried out as will be detailed later.

The Creation of The Catastrophe:

Over the course of more than half a century, the republican regime worked to establish equality among Yemenis and abolish the dynastic economic, social, and political policies characterized by racism. These policies were a fundamental cause of famine, poverty, and the backwardness of Yemenis during the rule of the Imams[3]. However, with the return of the Imamate in its new form represented by the Houthi group, the process of impoverishment and starvation returned. Still, this time it relied on advanced and diverse tools and methods, making it more deadly to the Yemeni people.

United Nations estimates indicate that 20.7 million Yemenis (66% of the total population in Yemen) need humanitarian assistance in 2021. Among them, 12.1 million are in dire need. These individuals face difficulties in obtaining the necessities of life, maintaining their health and safety, and can barely survive.

According to the UN organization, more than 2.25 million Yemeni children and over a million pregnant and lactating women may suffer from acute malnutrition in the same year. Additionally, more than 15.4 million Yemenis require support to access their basic needs of water and sanitation, with 8.7 million in urgent need of such support[4].

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(1) "Al-Hadawiyya between Political Theory and Divine Creed," previous reference, p. 84.

(2) "Knowledge in the Ruling of Jihad against the Occupying Aggressor and Oppressive Transgressor without an Imam," Al-Qasim bin Al-Hassan Al-Saraji, published by the Zaidi Islamic Council, Yemen - Sana'a, 2020, p. 23.

(3) The Palestinian Islamic researcher and thinker Bassam Jarrar says in one of his lectures: "When you read about the history of Yemen, which remained stagnant for a thousand years (do you not notice that Yemen is still backward) for a thousand years, and they attributed this backwardness to the name of the Ahl al-Bayt... and they oppressed the Yemenis, insulted their women, considered them like slaves, allowed shedding their blood, and killed Muslims in the name of the Ahl al-Bayt."

(4) "Humanitarian Needs Document in Yemen, February 2021," issued by the Office for =

Regardless of the accuracy of these numbers and the intentions behind declaring such statistics, the Houthi war has undoubtedly produced a tragic situation. Antonio Guterres, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, stated, "The situation in Yemen is the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. This is not a natural disaster. It is man-made. Yemen stands on the brink of the abyss(1)." But the question here is: why? What happened to cause this catastrophe? There have been more brutal wars in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, with international alliances participating in these wars. Entire cities were destroyed in these countries, and millions were displaced and killed. However, the humanitarian situation in those countries has not been described as the worst humanitarian crisis. The crisis in Yemen has reached an unprecedented level of human suffering. So, what happened? Who caused this tragedy in Yemen? Why has misery in Yemen reached this level?

The Beginning:

The control of the Houthi group over the capital, Sana'a, led to the departure of dozens of foreign embassies, companies, and international trade and development institutions due to the absence of a constitutional environment in the country and the dominance of an extremist group over state institutions. In just the year 2014, around 35 oil companies left Yemen(2). According to a report issued by the Yemeni Central Bank, Yemen's revenues from export value declined to $1.673 billion in the same year, compared to over $2.662 billion in 2013, a decrease of $989 million(3). This had a negative impact on the lives of thousands of Yemeni families who benefited from the presence of these companies in Yemen.

In such a situation, a lack of trust grew in Yemen, and the outflow of foreign and domestic investment continued, along with thousands of workers falling into unemployment(4).

After approximately six months of the Houthi group's control over Sana'a(5), specifically on March 21, 2015 (five days before the

= the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on behalf of several organizations concerned with the humanitarian situation in Yemen.

(1) "Learn about the United Nations' Efforts to Address the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen," a report on the BBC Arabic website, published on November 10, 2018.

(2) "American Oil Company Leaves Yemen," Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, February 18, 2015.

(3) "Statement Issued by the Yemeni Government, Published in Al-Araby Al-Jadeed Newspaper," August 25, 2015.

(4) "Economic Expert Abdulmajid Al-Batli: Embassy Closures Isolates Yemen Economically," Al-Araby Al-Jadeed Newspaper, February 13, 2015.

(5) "Since September 21, 2014, until March 21, 2015, the Houthi militias targeted political, social, and religious factions in an attempt to subjugate them and impose their ideology. =

announcement of the start of operations by the Arab coalition supporting the Yemeni government), the Houthis declared what was called "General Mobilization[1].[2]"

Under this declaration, and under the pretext of general mobilization, all state resources, capabilities, and financial allocations, including the budgets of the Ministries of Education and Health, food support, and environmental sanitation, were harnessed in favor of the group and its military operations, which produced a class of war profiteers from the same faction. This measure was considered one of the main reasons that led to the destruction of vital sectors in the country, contributing to an increase in poverty rates after government employees were deprived of all allowances, bonuses, and other entitlements. Moreover, the salaries of all government contractors were halted. It is well known in Yemen that salaries, allowances, and bonuses are the main source of support for millions of families.

After the declaration of war on the central and southern regions, the Arab coalition supporting the legitimate government, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, announced the beginning of its operations. Over the following months, the Houthi expansion began to shrink. Yemenis succeeded in retaking several provinces that the Houthi group had previously seized, such as Ad-Dali, Aden, Shabwah, and Al-Jawf. Yemeni forces reached the peaks of the Nihm mountains overlooking Sana'a from the east and were just a few kilometers away from the port of Hodeidah to the west.

The Houthi group realized it would not be able to decisively win the military battle as it was losing vast territories every day. Based on this reality, their only option was to exploit the humanitarian file to gain sympathy from the international community and achieve military, political, economic, and cultural gains that would ensure the halt of liberating cities from their dominance.

= The latest incident was the attempted assassination of Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansur Hadi through the bombing of Maashiq Palace in Aden by aircraft on March 19, 2015, one day before the declaration of general mobilization."

(1) "The Supreme Revolutionary Committee, led by its President Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi, declared a general mobilization under the pretext of confronting terrorism and 'Daesh' in the provinces they had not yet controlled, with the aim of subjecting those areas to their control. On the second day, the leader of the Houthis, Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, appeared in a televised speech confirming this declaration."

(2) "General Mobilization, in English: (General Mobilization) refers to the conversion of the national armed forces to a state of war or quasi-war, and the reconstruction of the state's economy, institutions, capabilities, material resources, human resources, and laws to meet the long-term needs of war and achieve its objectives, particularly the principle of mobilizing forces." (Encyclopaedia).

The Objectives of Starvation

Military Aims: Enlisting Hunger to Safeguard Their Gains

The Houthi group, driven by their desire to safeguard their gains, resorted to a calculated strategy of depriving government employees and retirees of their rightful salaries, constricting their means of sustenance, and tightly sealing the doors of livelihood. However, in a twisted trade-off, they flung open the gates of recruitment. They beckoned the desperate masses to join their ranks—a tantalizing choice for those who had lost their income and yearned for financial security, or the meager sustenance provided by charitable organizations. Government employees, left without their due wages, were compelled to take up arms alongside the Houthis, seeking a monthly stipend to eke out a precarious existence and ensure their families received the food provisions dispatched by international aid agencies. Similarly, the destitute, unable to secure employment or weighed down by the burdensome Houthi impositions, found themselves gravitating towards serving the Houthis in civilian, security, or military capacities, driven by the imperative of financial survival for themselves and their loved ones. It is worth noting that the majority of those who toiled or fought for the Houthis did so out of sheer necessity, as alternative avenues of livelihood remained elusive.

During my tenure as a journalist, I encountered a wounded combatant who, despite lacking ideological alignment with the Houthis, had joined their ranks. Puzzled, I inquired about his motives for participating in the conflict. He responded, "For the past two years, we have been deprived of salaries, and employment opportunities are non-existent... Should we resign ourselves to death? I had no recourse but to take to the streets, begging for alms, or join the frontlines in exchange for a paltry sum of 30,000 rials per month (roughly equivalent to 30 US dollars at that time), and sporadic food aid parcels provided by charitable organizations to sustain my family." A perusal of the testimonies of numerous Houthi fighters, captured by the Yemeni government, reveals a stark truth. Their decision to engage in combat against government forces was not driven by a fervent belief in the Houthis' political or religious doctrines, but rather by the dire imperative of earning a livelihood after enduring the ravages of starvation. This reality was further underscored by Abdulghani Al-Iryani, a researcher at the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, who, following his visit to Houthi-controlled regions, stated, "Some fighters join the Houthis at the behest of their parents, who see no other means for their children to secure a meager living,

and the sole path to earning income lies in taking up arms[1]."

The utilization of starvation as a means to recruit and propel citizens into battle was by no means an innovative strategy, as the ancestral progenitors of the Houthis had employed it in Yemen's bygone eras.

The Houthis, and their forebears before them, perceive Yemenis as mere subjects within their dominion. This accounts for their unwavering readiness to spill Yemeni blood, even among those who believe in their fallacies and fight on their behalf. The Houthis employ cunning strategies crafted to inflict casualties upon their followers, deliberately sacrificing lives. Such actions harmonize with the Houthis' philosophy and doctrines of warfare, which decree that one must expand the circumference of bloodshed amidst their supporters, thereby submerging their adversaries in the blood of their comrades. Hence, their historical aphorism emerged: "Blood prevails over the sword" or "Triumph of blood over the sword."

Political Objectives: Consolidating Control and Undermining Yemen's Restoration Efforts

Confronted with incessant military setbacks after the liberation of the city of Aden in southern Yemen, the Houthi group exploited the humanitarian predicament to impede the advancement of the Yemeni government and circumvent international resolutions, most notably UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which underscored the imperative of disarming them and withdrawing the militias from state institutions. To provide organizations and Western nations an opportunity to intervene and forestall the collapse of the Houthis on the military fronts, it became indispensable to engender hunger and destitution among the Yemeni populace.

The group perceived that it derived benefit from the dire humanitarian conditions in Yemen. Being an unrecognized rebel faction, assigning blame or holding them accountable for the deteriorating circumstances they instigated is arduous. Moreover, the international community lacks the diplomatic and political leverage to enforce their humanitarian responsibility.

Consequently, as the ranks of the famished and impoverished swelled, organizations and nations mobilized to impede the operations aimed at liberating Yemen from the clutches of the Houthi group, which pledges allegiance to Iran. This stratagem achieved significant success during the battle for Hodeidah. Precisely when the joint forces stood on the threshold

(1) "Yemen: How the Houthis are Reshaping the Country Following the Path of Saada... Here is a Summary of an In-Depth Visit by Researchers". Location: Sana'a, Yemen Future website. Date: August 11, 2021.

of liberating the city, the international community intervened under the pretext of averting a humanitarian catastrophe, culminating in the so-called Stockholm Agreement, which the Houthis failed to fulfil, ultimately solidifying their control over Hodeidah(1).

The Yemeni government has persistently accused the Houthi group of exploiting the dire humanitarian situation for their political gains. In September 2020, President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi of Yemen voiced his concerns, stating that the Houthi militia manipulates humanitarian issues as a means of coercion against the government and the international community. They continue to plunder funds intended for salaries and impede the efforts of the United Nations(2).

On December 30, 2020, during the waning days of President Donald Trump's administration, the Houthis were designated as a terrorist organization. This designation took effect on January 19, 2021, following its presentation to Congress(3).

As a result of this decision, international relief organizations, in collaboration with various other entities and international institutions, spearheaded a widespread media and advocacy campaign, aligning with pro-Iranian media and the political system. They called for the reversal of the U.S. decision, arguing that it would exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in areas under Houthi control(4) and impede the ability of international organizations to carry out their work. They cautioned against the looming threat of famine if the terrorism label persisted(5).

On February 12, 2021, the U.S. Department of State announced the rescission of the Houthi group's designation as a "foreign terrorist organization," acknowledging the deteriorating humanitarian situation in

(1) "Stockholm Agreement in Hodeidah: It is an agreement under the auspices of the United Nations, and its main provisions include the withdrawal of militias from the ports of Hodeidah, Saleef, and Ras Issa to the north of the Sana'a road. The agreement was held in Stockholm, Sweden, on December 13, 2018."

(2) "Hadi: Houthis Exploit the Humanitarian File as a Blackmail Card," Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Newspaper, September 24, 2020.

(3) "What are the implications of classifying the 'Houthi' group as a terrorist organization?" TRT Arabic, January 22, 2021.

(4) "The Yemeni government understood the concerns raised by international organizations regarding the humanitarian situation, and expressed its readiness to take steps and find economic solutions to ensure the flow of aid, funds, goods, and commodities to areas under the control of the Houthi group, in order to prevent harm to the population as a result of the classification decision. However, the organizations escalated their campaigns against the decision, and many observers believe that this escalation was due to concerns about tracking the funds provided to organizations as assistance to the Yemeni people. This decision required organizations to disclose the ultimate fate of every dollar they received as aid to Yemenis, to ensure that it does not reach the Houthis, especially after multiple societal demands for transparency in humanitarian work."

(5) "International Relief Organizations Call on Biden to Reverse the Classification of Houthis as a 'Terrorist Organization'," France 24, January 25, 2021.

Yemen. However, it should be noted that certain leaders within the group remained on the sanctions list, as stated in a departmental release[1].

The Houthis have effectively utilized the suffering of the Yemeni people as their "first line of defense," according to Dr. Yasin Saeed Nu'man[2], a prominent Yemeni leftist politician. In his article titled "Terrorism Protected by the Humanitarian Situation," Dr. Nu'man argues that the Houthis manipulate the humanitarian crisis to shield their crimes and hinder efforts to end the war and achieve peace.

By exploiting the dire humanitarian situation, the Houthis have obstructed the recapture of Hodeidah and are using it as leverage to resist being classified as a terrorist group. They cloak their atrocities in the guise of addressing the humanitarian crisis, enabling them to maintain their arrogance and insistence on rejecting peace.

These examples illustrate how the crimes responsible for the deteriorating humanitarian situation are concealed within it, allowing the Houthis to exploit the suffering of the Yemeni people to shield themselves. This intervention creates an illusion that it is unrelated to the humanitarian situation, even though ending the war is the only path to liberating Yemen from its dire conditions. If the Houthis enjoy continuous protection, preventing a shift in the military balance through unenforced agreements and safeguarding their terrorist agenda, the suffering of the Yemeni people will be exploited to perpetuate the crimes causing that suffering—an unprecedented phenomenon in history, unique to this troubled country[3].

The Houthis' pursuit of gains through the degradation of the humanitarian situation has driven them to implement measures that further worsen conditions in the areas under their control. Within the pages of this book, we will shed light on some of these practices.

Economic Goals: Concentrating Wealth and Businesses in the Holy Lineage:

Many observers of the situation in Yemen, especially non-Yemenis, often wonder how a small ethnic group can dominate and control a large population like the Yemeni people!

In reality, many political, military, regional, and international factors

(1) "Revocation of the Terrorist Designations of Ansarallah," U.S. Department of State, February 12, 2021.

(2) "Yasin Sa'id Nu'man Al-Sha'abi is a Yemeni politician and diplomat, the Ambassador of the Republic of Yemen to the United Kingdom. He was born in Tour Al-Baha, Lahij Governorate, southern Yemen. He is a former Prime Minister and Minister of Yemen, and he held the position of Secretary-General of the Yemeni Socialist Party."

(3) "The Terrorism Shielded by the Humanitarian Situation," Dr. Yasin Sa'id Nu'man, Nashwan News website, citing the author's page, January 27, 2021.

have contributed to granting the Houthis the opportunity to seize control over Yemen's institutions, resources, and military capabilities, subjecting the Yemeni people through the force of arms and terrorism. However, there is another fundamental reason that played a significant role in subjugating the Yemeni people, which is linking their needs and interests to this lineage that has spread throughout Yemen's regions.

After taking control of the capital of Sana'a, the group carried out operations to displace active and intellectual social elements that opposed them. They also dismissed tens of thousands of employees in government and mixed institutions, empowering their ethnicity. Additionally, they targeted the national wealth, private sector, and businessmen who did not belong to their group, while establishing a new generation of businessmen, traders, and contractors. The lineage took control of everything, including organizations that provide humanitarian aid, thus linking all essential and non-essential needs of the people to its authority.

These policies and practices, along with others that will be addressed in the following chapters, have led to the concentration of wealth in the "holy lineage" and the impoverishment of the rest of the Yemeni people. This has facilitated the process of subjugating society, in addition to other military, local political, and international reasons.

Just as the Houthis have worked during the years of war to starve the Yemeni people and concentrate wealth and properties within their lineage, their ancestors, the early Imams, committed the same criminal behavior against the people who hosted and received them.

During the rule of the Hamid al-Din family in North Yemen, Mustafa al-Shaka'a[1], an Egyptian thinker and academic, responded to a frequently asked question, stating, "The Yemeni government fights any attempt to uplift the people. It opposes any citizen who returns to Yemen with wealth. Its objective is to keep the populace impoverished, sick, and uneducated, maintaining an iron grip on affairs, subjecting them to injustice, and fueling their passions through tyranny[2]."

Therefore, the Houthis employ tactics such as starvation and the denial of rights to accumulate wealth within their dynasty, positioning themselves as the wealthiest and most influential group in Yemeni society. This wealth accumulation solidifies their control and influence in the future. A significant study conducted by the Ahram Center for Political and Strategic

(1) "Dr. Mustafa Mohammed Al-Shak'a is an Egyptian thinker, university professor, member of the Islamic Research Academy, former Dean of the Faculty of Arts at Ain Shams University, and the Chairman of the Islamic Definition Committee at the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs in the Egyptian Ministry of Awqaf. He is also a member of the Islamic-Christian Dialogue Committee at Al-Azhar Al-Sharif."

(2) "An Egyptian's Adventures in the Challenges of Yemen," Dr. Mustafa Mohammed Al-Shak'a, Yemen Studies and Research Center, Sana'a, p. 148.

Studies, titled "Armed Militia Economies in the Arab Region: The Houthi Ansar Allah Group as a Model," highlights the various methods employed by the Houthis to dominate the economy, both within government and private institutions. They redirect economic resources towards their war efforts and enrich their members. The study also suggests that the Houthi economic elite may surpass any future Yemeni government in terms of wealth, provided the current situation persists or a settlement is reached between the conflicting parties. Due to their significance, the study's findings will be further explored in a dedicated section.

Fanatical Racial Goals: Cultural Genocide and Houthization of Society

The dire situation resulting from deliberate starvation and impoverishment has enabled the Houthis to subdue many families, making them more willing to abandon their beliefs in exchange for a means of survival. The government employee deprived of his salary for long periods now accepts attending weekly Houthi cultural courses, aimed at changing the political and religious beliefs of Yemenis, after previously refusing to participate in such activities. The teacher in school agrees to teach his students the concepts and culture of the Houthis through their books and materials, lest he is deprived of the meager amounts and occasional assistance provided instead of salaries and bonuses. The academics in the university and the soldiers in the camp are also compelled to comply. The farmer who cannot afford fuel to operate his water pump accepts shouting the Houthi slogans in the mosque and supporting the fronts with money in exchange for scarce petroleum derivatives. Even the head of the household is forced to allow his son to participate in Houthi summer centers and cultural events in exchange for receiving household gas cylinders controlled by the neighborhood leader or Houthi supervisor(1) in the area.

Overall, the interests of Yemenis in Houthi-controlled areas have been tied to their response and engagement with the Houthi cultural and military project. This has driven many Yemenis to leave and settle in areas not controlled by the Houthis or outside of Yemen.

Cultural Genocide (Targeting the Identity and Beliefs of Yemenis):

The United Nations was established promote human rights, protecting their fundamental freedoms in full, and encourage respect for them, without

(1) "The responsible person: They are responsible for addressing the problems of the neighborhood residents and providing for their needs, often being in charge of distributing gas cylinders to the residents in many neighborhoods."

discrimination based on race, sex, language, or religion. Consequently, international conventions agree to grant every individual or group the right to protection, encompassing all aspects related to their existence, with cultural preservation and peaceful beliefs at the forefront. Culture and beliefs are considered of the existence of these groups, whether they are minorities or majorities. Therefore, when one group or party seeks to undermine the culture and beliefs of another group or attempts to uproot them due to disagreement or other reasons, whether religious, ethnic, or otherwise, such actions are deemed a violation of the rights of that group and an infringement on its existence. Such actions, as stated in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide issued by the United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1948, are considered acts of genocide. Paragraph (b) of the article states that causing physical or mental harm to the members of the group is considered an act of genocide[1]. It is well known that the destruction of groups inherently includes the destruction of their culture and beliefs, and causing mental or spiritual harm to the members of the group can only be achieved by targeting their beliefs and undermining what their souls have believed in.

In defining genocide, the wisdom of specialized international courts, including the esteemed International Criminal Court, has shone forth. The hallowed statute of this court, embraced by the General Assembly of the States Parties on that momentous day of September 10, 2002, illuminates the essence of genocide. Within Article 6(b) of this statute lies a profound truth: genocide encompasses the infliction of both physical and mental anguish, grievous harm that can be discerned through the following elements:

1) The deeds of the perpetrator engender profound physical or mental suffering upon one or more individuals, a torment of grave proportions.
2) Those who suffer belong to a distinct national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, their identities woven into the tapestry of humanity.
3) With calculated intent, the perpetrator harbors the desire to dismantle, whether in part or entirety, the very fabric of this national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.
4) The transgressions committed transpire within the context of a consistent pattern of comparable acts, directed purposefully against the group, or they possess the inherent capability to precipitate its annihilation[2].

Behold, within the hallowed chambers of Article 7(1)(h)(3) of the

(1) "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide."

(2) "The International Criminal Court, elements of crimes, was adopted by the Assembly of States Parties in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court during its first session held in New York from 3 to 10 September 2002."

International Criminal Court statute, persecution based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, or religious motives directed towards a specific group is deemed a crime against humanity(1).

In the realm of international law, the discerning eye recognizes three fundamental manifestations of genocide:

1) Physical genocide: This sinister specter encompasses the merciless slaughter and physical obliteration of a collective, akin to the haunting massacres that befell the Native Americans in the land of America, the tribes of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom and others in Yemen, or the tragic genocides that stained the landscapes of Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
2) Biological genocide: A malevolent force, it seeks to stifle the procreation of a group or people, aiming to eradicate the very essence of their existence. This nefarious pursuit manifests through forced abortions, steri lization, and other insidious measures, as witnessed in the annals of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
3) Cultural genocide: In the wisdom of the erudite scholar of international law, Dr. Amer Fakhouri, cultural genocide transcends the realm of physical assault or biological boundaries. It extends its sinister grasp to exclude a particular group, assuming myriad forms. It stifles the spoken word of a people, savages their national culture, and desecrates their sacred places of worship. Moreover, it ravages museums and manuscripts that bear witness to the historical tapestry of that group, erasing their heritage from the annals of time(2).

According to Professor Fakhouri, the Secretariat of the Genocide Convention Project divided the actions that can fall under the concept of genocide into three categories initially. The third category was titled "Destroying the Unique Characteristics of the Group" and was further subdivided into five subcategories as follows:

1) The forced transfer of children from one group to another.
2) Deliberate and organized displacement of individuals representing the culture of a specific group.
3) Prohibition of the use of the native language in schools.
4) Deliberate destruction of printed books in the native language, religious works, or prevention of new publications.
5) Organized destruction of religious and historical artifacts, or their

(1) Ibid. same page.
(2) "Cultural Genocide in Public International Law: A Study in International Jurisprudence," Dr. Amer Ghassan Fakhouri.

conversion to unfamiliar uses, destruction of documents or objects with artistic, religious, or historical value[1].

These aspects reflected the concern of the majority of legal experts to include these types of crimes as an integral part of the concept of human extermination, as no ethnic, national, or religious group can endure unless its moral and spiritual unity is preserved[2].

Humanitarian law experts acknowledge that separating children from their families physically and biologically destroys them. However, they also recognized that forcibly instilling in children customs, language, or values that do not belong to their environment is equivalent to the destruction and eradication of the group to which these children belong. This is precisely what the Houthis are doing in schools, teaching children the values and concepts that their parents neither believe in nor accept.

In the year 1994, the draft of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples utilized the evocative term "cultural genocide" within Article 7. However, during its sixty-second session on September 13, 2007, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" without explicit mention of the concept of "cultural genocide." Instead, it expanded upon the principles outlined in Article 8 of the declaration, presenting the following provisions:

1) Indigenous peoples and their individuals possess the fundamental right to be shielded from forced assimilation or the destruction of their cultural heritage.
2) States are obligated to establish effective mechanisms that prevent and rectify the following actions:
    a) Any endeavor or consequence aimed at depriving indigenous peoples of their distinct identity, cultural values, or ethnic identities.
    b) Any endeavor or consequence aimed at depriving them of their lands, territories, or resources.
    c) Any coerced population displacement that aims to violate or undermine their rights.
    d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration.
    e) Any propaganda intended to foster racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination or incite such discrimination against indigenous peoples[3].

(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid.
(3) "The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted and proclaimed =

This declaration is considered one of the international legal instruments through which the existence and culture of indigenous populations can be protected from assaults by groups, lineages, or states that claim racial, religious, or national superiority or discrimination. It stated in its preamble that "all peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of civilizations and cultures, which constitute the common heritage of humanity," and that "all doctrines, policies, and practices based on or advocating superiority of peoples or individuals base on national origin, racial, religious, ethnic, or cultural differences are scientifically false, legally invalid, morally condemned, and socially unjust. It is incumbent upon indigenous peoples, in exercising their rights, to be liberated from any form of discrimination, regardless of its nature(1).”

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples draws its foundation from the cherished principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This pivotal document underscores the utmost significance of safeguarding the rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals and communities, without discrimination based on gender, race, religion, or language. To realize this noble human endeavor, a comprehensive framework of international agreements has been established, bestowing upon individuals and communities the essential right to preserve all facets of their culture. Central to this preservation is the profound protection of cultural and intellectual heritage, as they profoundly shape their distinctive identities.

From a pragmatic standpoint, cultural considerations continue to play a vital role in the prosecution of genocide perpetrators under the Convention. This was strikingly highlighted by the former International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia(2) (ICTY), which recognized the Serbian campaign of destroying libraries, Islamic mosques, and targeting intellectuals as compelling evidence of genocidal intent against Muslims in the former Yugoslavia. The obliteration of libraries signifies not only the eradication of knowledge but also the extinguishing of a culture that thrives through the vibrant participation of diverse national components within the population(3).

Legal experts acknowledge the perilous reality that a group of people can be decimated through the systematic targeting of their culture, ultimately leading to the annihilation of their spirit and existence. "Thus, genocide

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= by the United Nations General Assembly under Resolution 61/295, dated 13 September 2007."

(1) Ibid.

(2) "An article by David Nersessian, Rethinking Cultural Genocide under International Law."

(3) "International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Office of the Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, Cases IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, Re-Presentation of the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 11 July 1996, Paragraph 94."

cannot be confined to its physical manifestations alone[1]," as there exists an intrinsic connection between cultural and physical violence. In this context, the profound statement by the renowned German poet Heinrich Heine in 1812 reverberates: "Where books are burned, human beings will be burned too[2]."

When we speak of the culture of a society or community, it encompasses far more than mere ideas. Culture encompasses a rich tapestry of behaviors, customs, facial expressions, distinctive and notable personalities, and symbols that set a community or nation apart from others. It encompasses tangible elements such as artifacts, books, value systems, language, sacred traditions, knowledge, customs, dances, attire, and even the laws, regulations, and norms that shape and define a particular community or people.

According to the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, culture should be seen as "the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual, and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It encompasses not only the arts and literature but also ways of living together, value systems, traditions, and beliefs." Consequently, culture, as stated in the first article of the mentioned declaration, "takes diverse forms across time and space. This diversity is embodied in the uniqueness and plurality of the identities of the groups and societies making up humanity. As a source of exchange, innovation, and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature. In this sense, it is the common heritage of humanity and should be recognized and affirmed for the benefit of present and future generations."

Therefore, the defence of cultural diversity is an ethical duty inseparable from respect for human dignity. It implies a commitment to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, especially the rights of individuals belonging to minorities and indigenous populations. No one should use cultural diversity as a pretext to violate the human rights guaranteed by international law or to restrict their scope[3].

As we delve into the notion of cultural genocide, it becomes evident that definitions of this term have exhibited variability. It stands as one of the most abhorrent crimes committed against various peoples in our present time, including the Palestinian, Iraqi, and Yemeni populations, subjects we shall illuminate within the pages of this book.

The Encyclopaedia of Black Studies[4] defines cultural genocide as the

(1) "David Nersessian, aforementioned reference."

(2) "'Holocaust of Books'... When the Works of Famous German Authors were Burned, Mark Lubké/ Ibtisam Fawzi, Germany in Arabic DW (Arabic), Published on: 10 May 2013."

(3) "UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. This declaration was adopted at the 31st General Conference of UNESCO on 2 November 2001 in Paris."

(4) "'Encyclopaedia of Black Studies': It is the primary reference source for innovative research on =

deliberate and systematic eradication of a people's culture at the hands of another group. This nefarious process is executed through the channels of physical terrorism, violence, psychological torment, and seduction.

Within his seminal work "Cultural Genocide," Lawrence Davidson[1], a distinguished professor of history at West Chester University in Pennsylvania, provides us with a profound definition: "It signifies the calculated erosion and destruction of values and cultural practices intrinsic to groups that stand apart from the perpetrators. The objective of cultural genocide may be to weaken the adversary group or to effect a resolute annihilation of their culture, all as part of a comprehensive scheme aimed at undermining effective resistance to occupation or control[2]."

Further elucidating upon the multifaceted dimensions of cultural genocide, American writer David Nersessian expounds that it surpasses mere assaults on the material or biological aspects of a group, extending its dominion to encompass the far-reaching elimination of all institutional frameworks. This is accomplished through a plethora of methods, frequently entailing the suppression of the group's language, curtailment of their time-honored customs, destruction of religious establishments, persecution of spiritual leaders, or targeted attacks against scholars and intellectuals. Elements of cultural genocide may materialize when artistic and literary endeavors are stifled, or when national treasures, libraries, archives, museums, and archaeological sites are ravaged or seized.[3]

The recognition of an act as a cultural genocide crime necessitates the establishment of legal criteria, encompassing material, moral, and legal aspects. These pillars will be further explored in the context of discussing the crime of cultural genocide in Yemen.

Are Yemenis experiencing genocide?

Just as societies develop tools to confront crimes and violations committed against civilians through the enactment of laws, the establishment of international agreements, and the pursuit of criminals for justice, those who perpetrate such crimes also devise methods to commit

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= the Black experience in America. The concept of this encyclopedia was developed from the American journal 'Black Studies' (SAGE) and includes a comprehensive analysis of economic, political, social, historical, literary, and philosophical issues related to African Americans. The encyclopedia goes beyond a mere narrative of Black culture or Blacks, which originated from protests at San Francisco State College in 1967 and led to the establishment of a specialized department that grants university degrees in Black Studies."

(1) "Lawrence Davidson, retired professor of history from West Chester University, Pennsylvania."

(2) "Cultural Genocide, Lawrence Davidson, translated by Manar Ibrahim Al-Shahabi, Al-Obekan Publishing, p. 26."

(3) - "Rethinking Cultural Genocide under International Law, previous reference."

and conceal them, aiming to evade punishment and deceive those who seek to uncover the truth.

Like other groups that have committed crimes, the Houthi group in Yemen has drawn from past experiences and eras, inventing new methods that have largely deceived both Yemenis and the international community. Their ultimate objective is to exert control over Yemenis and determine their destinies under the guise of "authority."

In our modern era, racial discrimination is universally condemned and criminalized, at least in theory. To conceal the racial and tribal origins upon which their war against Yemenis is based, the Houthis do not explicitly state that they are fighting because those who belong to the lineage of the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, are the rightful rulers of Yemenis, even, through force, as their predecessors used to proclaim and practice. However, they utilize various political, national, ethnic, and religious slogans and concepts, such as the liberation of Jerusalem, confronting global arrogance, fighting corruption, combating poverty, and other deceptive narratives to manipulate Yemeni society and deceive international observers, thereby consolidating their grip on governance.

Many Yemeni elites hesitate to openly disclose the precise definition of the intellectual and ideological racial roots of the Houthi group. The intention here is to shed light on the racial dimension veiled beneath sectarianism (racial sectarian motives), clearly highlighting the motives and origins that drive this group to commit its various crimes in Yemen.

This hesitation stems from the belief held by some Yemenis that refraining from explicitly addressing the racial dimensions masked by religion would suffice to confine the conflict within the national framework, fostering equal citizenship and upholding the values of a state that nurtures and ensures equality among all Yemenis. Undoubtedly, this is a noble aspiration. However, it is essential to understand the roots of the Yemeni problem comprehensively and accurately to effectively address it. The proposed solution is the establishment of a state that guarantees equal citizenship for all Yemenis, irrespective of race, sect, religion, or color.

The comparison between the motivations driving the Houthis to abandon their homes and take up arms against the Yemeni people since 2004, and the motivations that have spurred Yemenis of diverse sects, denominations, regions, and political parties to resist this group is of great significance. Yemenis do not confront the Houthis out of a belief in their superiority over the lineage that has monopolized power, wealth, and influence within the Houthi group. Instead, their aspiration is to establish a just state that rejects racial discrimination and fosters equality among all segments of society.

Conversely, the Houthis wage a battle against the collective will of Yemen, propelled by their conviction of belonging to a "sacred race." In

accordance with their doctrine and the concept of "wilaya," they have proclaimed themselves as the rulers, while regarding others as mere subjects and slaves. This is precisely what the people of Yemen reject.

Moreover, the Houthis perpetrate their crimes against Yemenis by concealing their racial motives beneath the veil of religion. In response, Yemenis confront this terrorism by striving for equal citizenship that encompasses all individuals in Yemen, irrespective of their race, denomination, or religion. Those who delve into the literature, books, writings, and theories of the Houthi group will discover that their ideology is founded on empowering a lineage that claims affiliation with the lineage of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), with the aim of exerting control over the lives, wealth, and destinies of Yemenis. These motivations become apparent even in their chants, such as "The war drums of Hashem" or "The men of Haydariyya," among others.

From the year 897 AD - 284 AH until the present moment, the quest for dominion over Yemen and control of its resources has driven those who claim divine authority in governance to commit heinous crimes, reaching the horrifying scale of mass extermination. This pattern is evident in the case of the Matrafyah group mentioned earlier, as well as the unorganized and selective acts of physical annihilation carried out by the Houthi militias against Yemenis who reject their racist ideology since 2004.

The sheer brutality and extreme cruelty displayed in their treatment of Yemenis serve as a stark testament to the lack of genuine attachment the Houthi group and their ancestral imams have towards Yemen, despite their proclamations. Instead, they perceive Yemenis who refuse to submit to the rule of the "sacred lineage" as rebellious adversaries deserving punishment in the form of murder, displacement, starvation, and torture. This grim reality becomes apparent when one contemplates the ongoing atrocities committed by the Houthis against the Yemeni people, atrocities that they have vindicated and endorsed through their fatwas and legislative measures. Notably, one of their prominent religious authorities, Abdullah bin Hamza[1], issued a repugnant fatwa that stands as one of the most abhorrent in history. When questioned about the responsibilities of a shepherd (ruler) towards his flock (the people), he callously responded: "The shepherd is accountable for his flock, and if they become scattered, they are considered prey rather than a flock. It is permissible to kill them, cast them aside, unleash dogs upon them, strike them with clubs, and exert every effort to

(1) "The 'Collection of Letters of Imam Al-Mansur Billah Abdulullah bin Hamzah' is considered one of the prominent references for the Houthis. It was edited by Abdul Salam Abbas Al-Wajeeh, who was appointed by the Houthis as the Secretary-General of the Scholars Association affiliated with them, following their control of the capital, Sana'a."

annihilate them from all angles[1]."

Here, the Houthis treat the Yemeni people as "stray" subjects because they have not fully accepted the rule of the lineage as their ancestors did. Consequently, they deem it permissible to kill, starve, and displace Yemenis, even going as far as throwing them to the dogs and annihilating them by any means, based on this unequivocal fatwa. By "hunting dogs," they mean thieves, criminals, and opportunists belonging to certain ethnicities and Yemeni tribes, or those who have been brought in from outside Yemen at different stages.

During the same period, parallel to the killing and displacement of Yemenis, the authoritarian regime executed systematic operations in pursuit of an ancient strategic goal: eradicating the identity of Yemenis and uprooting their cultural history. This would enable them to impose another culture that guarantees their empowerment, governance, collection of funds, control over tribes, and dominance over them. This method would diminish the resistance of Yemenis who have rejected the rule of the lineage since its arrival in Yemen from day one.

In addition to the unorganized physical extermination, the Houthis commit the crime of cultural genocide, which many legal experts consider a form of genocide. Many of these experts have resorted to applying the criteria and conditions used to describe physical genocide to determine whether an action against a community can be classified as cultural genocide or not.

To describe the crimes of the Houthis as cultural genocide, we can identify several key elements that are often used to define the crime of physical genocide:

1. **The Material Element:** This element involves carrying out actions or refraining from actions that threaten the essential interests of a specific religious, ethnic, or political group, to eliminate the beliefs or culture of that community or minority, either partially or completely. These actions must have a tangible impact on the cultural or intellectual beliefs of the targeted group. Committing cultural genocide requires that the crime be directed against a group to change its identity and culture.

There are many examples of practices that can be considered cultural genocide in Yemen including, manipulating the primary, secondary, university, and vocational education systems to alter the identity and culture of Yemenis without the consent of parents or students themselves. This can include recruiting children to shape their ideas and beliefs against the wishes

(1) "Collection of Letters of Imam Al-Mansur Billah Abdulullah bin Hamzah, previous reference, p. 174."

of their parents, exploiting all media outlets, religious platforms, and mosques to spread an ideology that Yemenis do not accept. Other practices may involve organizing cultural courses for employees, forcibly displacing and destroying homes, deliberately causing starvation to subdue citizens, replacing public sector employees with members of their group while looting properties and starving the Yemeni population, burning and concealing libraries, confiscating books, changing street names, public facilities, and classrooms, engaging in the sale, smuggling, and destruction of artifacts, altering educational curricula, and various other actions carried out by the Houthi group in this context.

2. **The Moral Element:** The moral element is manifested in the presence of general intent, which is the knowledge of the aspects of the crime and the will to commit it. It also requires the presence of specific intent, which is the remote criminal intent. However, the existence of specific intent without general intent is meaningless. Therefore, the moral element of the crime of cultural genocide is based on general criminal intent, which is the intent to commit the crime for political, religious, or racial motives, and the specific intent, which is the intention to cause serious harm to the intellectual or cultural beliefs of the targeted group or to eradicate them permanently(1). This refers to the intention of the accused in committing the crime of cultural eradication. This element can be perceived in a declaration by the Houthis, where they publish what they describe as 'religious identity,' 'Quranic culture,' 'religious flag,' and 'Quranic march,' which are intellectual projects aimed at spreading the beliefs of the group that make the rule of the dynasty an essential condition of Islam, and whoever opposes it is considered an infidel. Thus, his blood, property, land, and honor become permissible to violate.

The Houthi group adopts declared plans and projects to disseminate these ideas within the community, harnessing all its capabilities to achieve this through intimidation and persuasion. Therefore, the moral pillar is present in the crime of cultural genocide committed by the Houthi group, as this group, both its leadership and individuals, has the intention to change the identity of Yemenis and uproot their culture. They possess knowledge of all stages of genocide crimes and the resulting consequences.

3. **The Legal Element:** It lies in the fact that the act is criminalized by law.

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(1) "A study: The International Legal System for the Crime of Cultural Genocide, Atiya Ahmed Atiya Al-Suwaieh, Head of the International Law Department at the Faculty of Law, Al-Jafra University - Libya. Published in the International Law Journal of Research Studies, Issue Four - July 2020. Published by the Arab Center for Strategic, Economic, and Political Studies - Berlin, Germany."

At the domestic level, no criminal can be punished except by a law based on the principle of "no punishment or crime except by text or law." However, the situation differs in international law, as most acts classified as cultural genocide find their basis in international norms(1). In the Yemeni context, many of the crimes committed by the Houthis in order to erase the identity of Yemenis are punishable under domestic law. On the international level, international humanitarian law has addressed many of these crimes. The Genocide Convention and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1969, as well as the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property of 1954, can be considered legal frameworks for dealing with this type of crime in Yemen.

Some may argue that the Houthis are Yemenis, but that does not negate the fact that they commit crimes that reach the level of physical and cultural genocide, driven by deeply rooted ethnic motives veiled by a religious character that, in itself, serves as a reference for igniting wars and killing dissenters. In Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) did not treat the Tutsi tribe as a separate ethnic group from the Hutu tribe because they both share culture and language(2). This posed a challenge for the court, as they found it difficult to distinguish between the Tutsi and the Hutu. Historically, there was no distinction between the Hutu and the Tutsi at the group level, but as individuals. In other words, the differences between the two tribes were not based on ethnic or genetic grounds, and determining a person's affiliation to either tribe was flexible and depended on their wealth or poverty(3).

Based on this, the International Criminal Court established its standard that contributed to determining the affiliation of individuals involved in crimes by stating that "the Tutsi tribes constituted a different ethnic group in the minds of the perpetrators of the crime, the Hutu tribe(4)." In this way, it affirmed that collective identities, including ethnicity, are imagined identities based on prevailing ideas in the dominant social imagination of a specific society. The distinction between groups relies entirely on superficial or temporary sentiments, rather than objective social or natural facts(5).

It is worth mentioning that approximately 800,000 people were killed during the genocide that took place in Rwanda between April and June

(1) Ibid.

(2) "The court concluded that Belgian colonialism established a permanent division in Rwanda in the early 1930s based on the classification of the population into three ethnic groups: Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. Each person was given an identity card specifying their ethnic affiliation, without any genetic or hereditary basis."

(3) "The Crime of Genocide in International Criminal Justice, Dr. Mohammed Khalil Morsi, p. 6."

(4) Ibid. p.7.

(5) Ibid.

1994. Most of the victims belonged to the Tutsi tribes, in addition to moderate members of the Hutu tribes who opposed the genocide policy carried out by their tribes against the Tutsi tribes. This indicates that the International Criminal Court dealt with the crimes committed in the Republic of Rwanda as a genocide perpetrated by the Hutu tribal leaders against the Tutsi tribes, as well as tribal and military figures from the Hutu themselves who opposed the criminal policies of the Hutu tribes.

Two options that lead to destruction:

Since the early stages of the Houthi rebellion, they have committed a series of violations that amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Because these violations target Yemenis who reject the rule of the dynasty instead of the rule of the people, the killings resulting from bombings, assassinations, and torture to death can be considered organized physical extermination.

The Houthis have gone to great lengths to kill their opponents and have resorted to excessive violence. This calculated process aims to demonstrate strength and the severity of terrorizing people. For example, they detonated the house of the Al-Habishi family in Sa'ada in 2011, where 16 women and children were inside in front of their families. This resulted in the death of 14 people, including five women and seven children(1). They also mutilated the body of Brigadier General Hamid Al-Qushaybi, the commander of the 310th Brigade, after firing more than seventy rounds into his body. In a similar bloody scene, they executed several tribal elders and university students who did not support their control over Yemeni cities. They targeted children, shelled civilian airports, and water tanks. When there was collective resistance in Taiz Governorate in central Yemen, they besieged it tightly, preventing the entry of water, food, and medical supplies into the city, and bombarded it with rockets. This constituted a form of physical extermination that intentionally leads to cultural annihilation in the same region and other areas where the population was preparing to resist the violence of this group.

In the face of the violence inflicted upon Yemenis since 2004 and persisting to this day, those residing in regions under Houthi control are confronted with two stark choices, without any viable alternatives. They must either reject the brutality of dynastic rule and face direct physical annihilation or succumb and coexist with a reality that subjects them to intellectual and cultural eradication, along with the imposition of an

(1) The statement of Najib Al-Saadi, the president of the "Wathak" organization for rights and freedoms, to the London-based newspaper "Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed," published on February 21, 2016, under the title: "Yemen: House Bombing as a Means for the Houthis to Seek Revenge."

alternative identity and culture.

This alternative identity grants superiority to a small ethnic group, constituting only 1% of the total population, labeling them as Sada or Sayyids [masters] who claim the right to rule on behalf of God, while the rest of the Yemenis are relegated to the status of servants or slaves. However, the plight of the Yemenis transcends their attempts to assimilate and adapt to Houthi beliefs for the sake of peaceful coexistence. It surpasses their expectations as they discover themselves and their children being subjected to brainwashing, forced indoctrination, and ideological education, embroiled in battles against their society and their original identity. Furthermore, they are utilized as mere pawns in the Houthis' sectarian wars against regional states.

The Houthis have spared no effort in their pursuit of murder, bombings, shelling, and starvation, all aimed at terrorizing and subjugating society to the imposed reality. Consequently, those seeking to save themselves from physical liquidation, abduction, torture, or displacement must accept intellectual eradication. This holds true for the remaining Yemeni regions as well. [(1)]Taiz, a city that resisted the Houthis, endured the most heinous violations that rose to the level of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Meanwhile, regions that chose not to confront the Houthis under the pretext of preserving peace and humanitarian conditions are systematically subjected to cultural genocide, punctuated by killings, assassinations, abductions, and torture. With time, these acts will uproot people from their very foundations. Uprooting Yemenis' culture and identity means uprooting them and transforming them into mere human instruments in their land, submissive to an imported dynasty.

Religious beliefs, customs, and social traditions cherished by Yemenis, in addition to the human rights and humanitarian concepts cemented by the republican system after the September 26 revolution, now face an existential threat. These concepts and values—the republic—emphasize equality among Yemenis and reject discrimination based on ethnicity, color, or religion. This is what drives the Houthis today to carry out a series of cultural massacres aimed at uprooting the collective identity of Yemenis and replacing it with the belief of the dynasty.

(1) Taiz is a Yemeni governorate located south of the capital, Sana'a, at a distance of approximately 256 kilometers. Taiz Governorate ranks first in terms of population in the Republic, with its inhabitants accounting for 12.2% of the country's population. It consists of 23 directorates. Taiz Governorate is considered one of the most affected Yemeni governorates by the war that erupted after the armed Houthi militias took control of it in late March 2015.

The Oppressed Crowds:

In a meeting that gathered us with the Russian Ambassador to Yemen, Vladimir Dedushkin, as part of a journalistic and human rights team, at the beginning of December 2019, the ambassador expressed his astonishment at the Houthis' ability to mobilize thousands of Yemenis in the marches they organize in Sana'a from time to time.

Indeed, this is an observation made by many observers of Yemeni affairs, especially Western observers. They feel perplexed... How can the Houthis manage to gather thousands of Yemenis in the squares to chant their slogans? Doesn't that mean they have significant popularity? And is it unrealistic to claim that the Houthis are racist and do not represent the Yemeni people or a large portion of it?

The Houthis managed to seize control of the capital, Sana'a, and as a result, they governed all state institutions in the areas under their control. With money, influence, public and private jobs, the central bank, schools, universities, mosques, the army, security forces, and the media, these institutions and resources have been turned into tools of oppression and subjugation of Yemenis in the areas under their control.

I asked many people, especially those living outside of Sana'a: Why do you leave your provinces and regions and travel all this distance to participate in the Houthis' marches, knowing that you are against them? The head of the household answers that if he doesn't go with them, he will be deprived of the household gas cylinder and the food basket provided by organizations. The student in school or university answers that if they are absent from the marches, they will fail or be deprived of grades. On the other hand, if they show commitment by attending the Houthi events, they will receive higher grades and pass without exerting effort or studying. The employee in government or private institutions answers that they will be deprived of their rights if they are absent from attending these marches and events. Thus, they have tied people’s interests and basic needs their commitment to their activities and events that never cease throughout the year.

Parliament member Abdu Bashir confirmed in one of his speeches under the parliament dome the exploitation of "half a salary" handed over by the Houthis from time to time to employees in order to control them. "It is no longer a monthly salary, but a salary for participation. Whenever there is an event, they give them half a salary(1)." This testimony demonstrates the Houthi group's use of the policy of starvation to achieve political and

(1) Parliamentarian Abduh Bashir ridicules the Houthi anti-corruption campaign and presents a list of the group's corruption. Published on the Yemeni Republican Channel's YouTube website.

sectarian goals. The intention here is that the Houthis do not hand over half the salary to employees except when they have events, festivals, and "cultural courses," to push employees to participate in them in exchange for receiving a fraction of their rights.

After years of Houthi control over state institutions in Sana'a, many Yemenis find themselves compelled to align with the Houthis to secure their basic rights. This was one of the group's objectives behind starving Yemenis and depriving them of their salaries and livelihoods.

The oppressed crowds... those we witness on the Houthi channels and the Iranian media lobby. There are Houthi supporters who participate in these marches out of conviction and belief in the Iranian project in the region, undoubtedly. However, most claim affiliation with the Hashemite lineage to which Abdul-Malik al-Houthi belongs, thus aligning themselves ethnically with their cousin. As for many Yemenis who took part in these events, they did so out of compulsion, driven by their hunger and deprivation of their rights.

Chapter Two
Methods of Starvation

Revenue Collection and Levies

The Houthis rely on a belief specific to them that legitimizes looting the wealth of Yemenis, even by force under the pretext of taxes and zakat. One of their references, Abdullah bin Hamza, said: "As for taxes, market fees, tolls and forcing owners of farms to take more than zakat, the Imam is permitted to do so in order to strengthen borders and improve public affairs... Religion takes precedence over money, and money is not put before religion, and no one denies the practices of our forefathers - may peace be upon them - except the ignorant, for Al-Hadi - peace be upon him - took aid from the people of Sana'a... And Al-Mu'ayyad Billah, may God sanctify his soul, said: Whoever has surplus wealth is obliged to spend it in God's cause, and it is a sin not to do so, and Al-Qasim - peace be upon him - took aid from the lands over which his authority was established, not once[1]."

The Houthis excel in inventing and regulating systematic practices to loot the wealth of Yemenis, sometimes under the guise of religion, such as zakat, endowments, and khums, and other times under the name of the state, such as taxes, customs, fees, telecommunications, and services that the Yemeni citizen no longer sees since the Houthi takeover of Sana'a in 2014. They also exploit the pretext of war, which they call "war effort," and compel the general public, traders, and even relief organizations to provide financial and material support to the Houthi fighters on the frontlines under different designations.

The report of the UN panel of experts on Yemen summarized the Houthis' money collection process as follows: "The financial system in Yemen is collapsing. There are two competing central banks, one in the north under Houthi control and the other in the south under the government's control, and both are not functioning at their full capacity. The government is unable to effectively collect revenue, while the Houthis collect taxes, extort traders, and seize properties under the pretext of the war effort[2]."

The group has directly succeeded in controlling most of the national economy in its areas through ministers and directors loyal to them (most of

(1) "The Polite in the Fatwas of Imam Al-Mansur Billah Abdullah bin Hamza, compiled and refined by Muhammad bin Asad Al-Muradi, corrected and compared by Abdul Salam Abbas Al-Wajeeh, Zaid bin Ali Cultural Foundation, page 455."

(2) "Dated January 26, 2018, addressed to the President of the Security Council from the team of experts concerned with Yemen and tasked with Resolution 2342 (2017), the final report, page 2."

whom belong to the same lineage that is present in state institutions), or through revolutionary committees or deputies who act as supervisors within their organizations(1).

For example, Yemen Media, a Yemeni news website, published a financial document at the beginning of November 2020 confirming that the total sales tax revenue collected by the Houthi group from qat sales in the province of Hodeidah, which is under their control, amounted to 1,800,905,795 Yemeni rials in August 2020, an increase of 25 percent compared to the previous month(2). This means that the Houthi's tax revenue from qat alone in just one province during a year could reach 22 billion Yemeni rials. We are talking here about one province, one commodity, and approximately 22 billion rials in one year. What about the revenues in the rest of the areas and provinces under their control?

In another example, Sultan Al-Samai, a Houthi-supporting parliamentarian, and member of the group's Political Council, confirmed that the Houthis receive over 200 billion rials annually from the areas under their control in Taiz province (six districts) alone. However, they refuse to allocate a portion of these revenues to essential projects such as building hospitals and constructing roads(3).

According to repeated confirmations from the United Nations, the Houthis have managed to control state-owned income-generating entities and collect taxes imposed on individuals and companies, amassing billions of Yemeni rials annually(4). They have forcefully targeted the flow of Yemeni government's revenues by taking control of company and institution management. In 2019, they intensified their efforts, leaving the Yemeni government with very limited revenues under the third category. Through their control of these companies, the Houthis impose expenses that affect the companies' profits, leaving minimal tax revenue for the Yemeni government(5).

In the year 2018, they obtained approximately 407 billion Yemeni rials (1.6 billion dollars)(6) solely from the taxes of the major taxpayers (such as corporations, banks, prominent traders, and importers, such as wired and wireless communication companies, tobacco, and others). This is in addition

(1) "The Yemen Expert Team in 2018, previous reference, paragraph 126, page 44."
(2) Around 2 billion rials were collected by the Houthi rebels from qat taxes in Hodeidah during a month. Where is it headed? Yemen Media News, November 12, 2020."
(3) "From the capital... with General Sultan Al-Samai discussing the military display and his visit to Saada Governorate. Al-Sahat Channel on YouTube, September 3, 2022."
(4) "Dated January 22, 2021, addressed to the President of the Security Council from the team of experts concerned with Yemen in accordance with Paragraph 8 of Security Council Resolution 2511 (2020), Paragraph 90, page 38."
(5) "Yemen Expert Team, 2021, previous reference, Paragraph 92, page 38."
(6) "Yemen Expert Team, 2018, previous reference, Paragraph 127, page 44."

to property taxes, professional taxes, customs duties on city entrances, military efforts, zakat (alms), and other levies that they extort from the people through intimidation and force, as well as plundering millions of dollars in aid. As for the year 2019, their revenues amounted to no less than 1.039 trillion Yemeni rials, equivalent to 1.8 billion dollars (1 US dollar = 568 Yemeni rials in 2019), primarily intended to fill the coffers of the Yemeni government, pay salaries, and provide basic services to the citizens. The Houthis, however, diverted this amount to finance their military operations or buy loyalties(1).

In a memorandum addressed by the impersonator of the Prime Minister in the Houthi government to the leadership of the Central Bank in Sana'a, the Houthi group affirmed that they had obtained more than 56 billion Yemeni rials during the month of October 2020 alone. This means that they could simply deliver the salaries of civilian and military employees in the areas under their control. However, they choose not to do so to achieve the goals we mentioned earlier(2).

Officials working in the Duty Department, a governmental institution supervised by the Ministry of Finance, confirm that the warehouses of Duty branches in the provinces under Houthi control, for the first time, are filled with grains such as various types of corn, tobacco, lentils, peanuts, coffee, and other fruits. The Houthis have sent their armed elements to villages, valleys, and farms during the harvest season to force farmers to provide a portion of their crops under various pretexts, using the same method employed by the ancient Imams(3).

Furthermore, the printing presses of Al-Thawra newspaper, which is under the control of the Houthis in Sana'a, received a request in early October 2020 from government financial institutions for the printing of three million financial collection booklets. This is an immense quantity, and such a few collection booklets have never been printed before. They are used in campaigns to collect illegal levies and taxes.

The Houthi group experienced a significant financial upturn amid the

(1) "Yemen Expert Team in 2021, previous reference, Paragraph 93, page 38."

(2) "The payroll bill in Yemen, according to the 2014 data, amounted to approximately 75 billion rials monthly (with the exchange rate of 1 dollar = 250 rials at that time). Of this, 50 billion rials went to civil service employees, while retirees received 5.4 billion rials monthly, benefiting 124,000 retirees."

(3) "As the harvest season approaches, workers of the Imam, known as 'Al-Mukhamana' or 'Al-Khurasain,' are sent to villages to estimate agricultural crop yields in order to determine the amount of almsgiving (zakat) that goes to the Imam and his assistants. The 'Khurasain' or 'Mukhamana,' a specific group of judges and scholars, compete to the government's doors wearing white turbans, long prayer beads, and wide sleeves, each claiming to be the most trustworthy and entitled to this work due to their commitment to the Imam's treasury. However, in the end, they end up embezzling the rights of the farmers, as mentioned in the first public political pamphlet by Ahmad Mohammad Naaman in the Yemeni Free Movement opposing the Imam's rule."

ravages of war, thanks to the substantial funds it acquired from diverse financial sources, both within and outside the country, as mentioned previously. However, in return, it neglects its responsibilities, failing to distribute salaries, provide essential services to citizens, or partake in any developmental endeavors expected of a governing authority. Instead, it heavily relies on intermittent assistance and development initiatives offered by international organizations.

Conversely, the Yemeni government confronted substantial and varied financial challenges throughout the war years, resulting in occasional delays in salary disbursement within the areas under its control. Nonetheless, it made concerted efforts to fulfil its commitment by paying the salaries of government employees in select institutions under Houthi control from January 2019 until the year's end.

According to the 2014 budget, the total number of civilian government employees in Yemen amounts to 472,335. As an initial phase, the Yemeni government commenced the disbursement of salaries to a portion of employees residing in Houthi-controlled areas starting from January 2019, alongside employees in government-held regions. By the conclusion of the year, 297,710 employees had received their salaries, constituting 51.37 percent of the overall workforce in various provinces. Additionally, pensions were disbursed to all retirees across the nation, including those in Houthi-controlled areas, encompassing a total of 123,248 retirees. However, the Houthis refused to remunerate approximately 174,643 employees (36.97 %[1]). It is noteworthy that economic reports indicate the annual revenues acquired by the Houthi group are more than sufficient to cover the salaries of civilian employees across all provinces for several years, not solely confined to their controlled territories.

The Houthi group perceived the government's allocation of salaries to specific sectors in their controlled regions, including universities, the judiciary, healthcare, retirees, and the insurance institution, as a direct challenge to their authority in those areas. They believed that the payment of salaries undermined their status and influence while empowering employees to assert their rights. As a result, the Houthis imposed a ban on the circulation of the new paper currency. This led the government, on December 30, 2019, to suspend salary transfers to employees in Houthi-controlled territories. The Houthis' actions were aimed at preventing the circulation of the new edition of the national currency, which the government possessed. Consequently, the Houthi militias were solely responsible for obstructing tens of thousands of employees and retirees from receiving their salaries and pensions, which the government had been

(1) "A governmental report issued by the Ministry of Civil Service and Insurances."

regularly disbursing for over a year. Despite the militias' ongoing misappropriation of public revenues and their failure to remit them to the central bank in Aden[1].

Salary Looting:

On July 1, 2019, the Houthis presented an economic initiative on their online platforms as a solution to address the salary crisis. The initiative proposed the establishment of a dedicated account at the Yemeni Central Bank branch in Hodeidah governorate. It aimed to channel the revenues generated from the three ports (Hodeidah, Ras Isa, and Al Salif) into this designated account, with the purpose of paying salaries to all Yemenis[2].

Subsequently, the Houthi economic initiative evolved into a UN proposal, which the Yemeni government accepted. The agreement committed to paying salaries to government employees in Houthi-controlled areas using the revenue generated from oil derivatives import fees. These funds were allocated to a new neutral account at the Central Bank in Hodeidah, following guarantees provided by the United Nations. However, what unfolded afterward? Did the Houthi group adhere to the agreement? Were the salaries of the employees disbursed?

On May 18th in the same year, the Yemeni government condemned the Houthi militia for looting the funds allocated for salaries. This came after the total deposits reached more than 35 billion Yemeni rials, which were designated for employee salaries, from the revenues of oil derivatives importation. It is evident that the Houthi militias, as is their custom, violated the agreement based on an economic initiative they presented and endorsed by the United Nations, and instead, they plundered the salaries of employees in the areas under their control, diverting them for war operations and enriching their leaders.

The Houthis continued to plunder the funds allocated for employee salaries despite ongoing government condemnation, in violation of the economic understandings and the Stockholm Agreement. In July 2020, the United Nations acknowledged the Houthis' theft of funds intended for employee salaries under the Stockholm Agreement and the economic understandings. The Special Envoy of the United Nations to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, stated, "My office mediated between the parties last year to agree on a set of temporary arrangements to support them in fulfilling their

(1) "A statement issued by the Ministry of Finance, published on the Yemeni official news agency Saba on December 30, 2019."

(2) "The 'Houthis' call for paying employees' salaries from the revenues of Hodeidah ports, Anadolu Agency, published on July 2, 2019."

commitment in the Stockholm Agreement, directing the revenues collected from the port of Hodeidah to the Yemeni Central Bank through its branch in Hodeidah and allocating them to contribute to the payment of salaries for civil service employees in Hodeidah and other regions of Yemen. Under the temporary arrangements, the parties agreed to establish a temporary account at the Yemeni Central Bank branch in Hodeidah, where taxes, customs, and revenues from fuel and oil derivatives entering through the port of Hodeidah would be deposited and then disbursed according to an agreed mechanism to pay the salaries of civil service employees. Unfortunately, these arrangements have currently been suspended after Ansar Allah [Houthis] unilaterally withdrew the funds collected in the account earlier this year(1)."

According to the United Nations panel of experts presented to the Security Council, the Houthis have unlawfully withdrawn a staggering amount of 50 billion Yemeni rials from the Yemeni Central Bank in Hodeidah, thus flagrantly violating the Stockholm Agreement. This agreement explicitly states that revenues generated from the ports should be deposited into the Yemeni Central Bank and utilized for the payment of civil service employees' salaries(2).

From the aforementioned facts, it becomes evident that the deliberate withholding of salaries from government employees by the Houthis serves a purpose: to subject them to impoverishment in order to further their own objectives, while reserving exclusive control over benefits, funds, and privileges for those aligned with their cause.

The Bread vs Beliefs:

For years, the Houthi group has continued to loot employees' salaries in plain sight of the world. However, persisting in this crime indefinitely is illogical, especially with the ongoing international pressure demanding the payment of salaries to employees in their controlled areas. But the reason that might compel the Houthis to pay at least a portion of employees' salaries is the popular revolution that erupted in Iran following the killing of Mahsa Amini. They fear its spread to Houthi-controlled areas, considering the Houthi group as one of the arms of the Khomeini regime in the Arabian Peninsula.

To exploit salaries and impose the beliefs of the Houthis and spread them in Yemen, the group announced what it described as the "Code of Conduct and Ethics of Work in Service Units," which included provisions obligating

(1) "Yemenis' fears and hopes at the heart of the United Nations' plans for a better future, United Nations News website, July 15, 2020."

(2) "Yemen Expert Team Report for the United Nations, 2021, previous reference, Paragraph 13, page 11."

Yemenis working in government institutions to abandon their religious beliefs and embrace the Houthi religious doctrine.

The Houthi code replaced legal and constitutional principles with sectarian determinants disguised as religious commitment and administrative rules. However, it is fundamentally a racist decree that imposes the beliefs and religious doctrine of the Houthis and their intellectual references on the rest of Yemenis, forcibly and collectively, by controlling their sources of income and basic needs.

The contents of the Houthi code emphasized the employees' commitment to the racist theory of "Wilayah" through which the Houthis restrict power, prestige, and status to their own ethnicity, excluding other Yemenis. Additionally, employees were obliged to attend and participate in all sectarian courses, political events, and religious activities(1).

The Houthi code is considered one of the prominent means used by the Houthis to implement "cultural genocide" in Yemen and impose their religious beliefs while eradicating other sects that do not recognize the political and religious theory of "Wilayah," which confines power and authority to a specific ethnicity.

Through this code, public employment is limited to individuals who adhere to the Houthi religious beliefs, while punishing those who do not believe in them by depriving them of jobs and livelihoods. This leads to hunger and impoverishment, which may drive many people to abandon their own beliefs due to destitution and necessity and embrace the Houthi beliefs, turning them into slaves of the dynasty.

In an interview broadcasted on the Belqees TV channel, Houthi media figure Talib Al-Hassani stated that the code is mandatory, and any Yemeni employee who does not adhere to the principle of "Wilayah" will be dismissed from their job because "Wilayah" is Islam. Therefore, naturally, a Yemeni who does not believe in the authority of Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi and his dynasty is considered a disbeliever and should be dismissed from their job and subjected to hunger(2). Minister of Information in the Houthi government, Dhaifullah Al-Shami, described those who reject the code as having a problem with Allah and His instructions, not with the Ansar Allah Houthis(3).

The Quranic texts that fill the code and employ them to enforce loyalty and obedience to a specific faction that does not exceed 5% of Yemen's population, and the code's insistence on adherence to fundamental principles

(1) "Behavior Code - A New Houthi War of Slavery in Yemen in the Name of Employment," Nashwan News website, November 9, 2022.

(2) "Free Space | Houthi Behavioral Blog... From monopolizing public employment to exploiting it," Balqis TV channel on YouTube, November 11, 2022.

(3) "Dhaifullah Al-Shami, a tweet on his page on the social media site Twitter, November 12, 2022."

with a clear sectarian bias, is an unacceptable violation of the Yemeni constitution, laws, and customs, including the tribal custom that does not allow one group to dominate at the expense of others.

This is just a small part, not exceeding 1%, of what is stated in the code regarding the allocation of public employment in favor of one group, obligating the employee to loyalty and obedience, and imposing religious ideas and principles on them, while this employee was waiting for a code that focuses on receiving their salaries that have been withheld for seven lean years under the pretext of transferring the bank to Aden and the so-called legitimacy controlling oil resources. This is a feeble excuse because the one who uses it is responsible for disbursing the salaries of the employees working in the areas under their authority, and they pay their obligations, while they refrain from providing them with their financial dues and others. Authority is a responsibility, and it must ensure that the people's rights are fully met, just as it insists on them fulfilling their duties towards it. It is an innovation and unacceptable for citizens to have only duties and no rights because it deprives people of a decent life when their means of livelihood are cut off or when it becomes almost impossible to attain(1).

Plundering of Reserves and the Deterioration of the National Currency:

In the aftermath of their invasion of the capital, Sana'a, on September 21, 2014, the Houthi group managed to tighten their hold on all financial institutions, including the Yemeni Central Bank. They embarked upon a systematic depletion of the Central Bank's reserves, which were estimated to be at $5.6 billion and over a trillion of the local currency(2) at that time. Despite the pleas from international monetary institutions to stabilize the economy and maintain the presence of the Central Bank in Sana'a, provided that its management remains untouched, and changes are kept within the bounds of the President's authority, with the provision of revenue flow for the payment of government employees' salaries in all provinces, the Houthi group rejected these conditions. Instead, they continued their plundering of the cash reserves, withdrawing $100 million monthly, and halting salaries for all employees who opposed them within both the civil and military sectors of the state(3).

The process of plundering the cash reserves was the first blow suffered by the national currency and the Yemeni economy, leading Yemen to a

(1) "An unconstitutional code rejected by Yemenis," Naif Al-Qanesi, Opinion Today website, November 10, 2022.

(2) "The Annual Report of the Central Bank of Yemen for the year 2014."

(3) How did the Houthi militia contribute to the deterioration of the national currency's value?" Wafig Saleh, Al-Asima Online website, April 1, 2021.

deteriorating and severe collapse in living conditions.

At the same time, speculation on hard currency became active as a natural result of increased imports, especially fuel imports, after the Houthis began establishing private fuel companies that played a crucial role in speculation and increased demand for foreign currencies. During this period, the national currency began to rapidly decline due to the lack of foreign cash availability in the country.

Instead of implementing economic measures to halt the currency's deterioration, the Houthi group dealt with the currency's collapse through security campaigns, such as targeting currency exchange company owners and seizing a significant amount of their funds. These actions led exchange shops to protest these measures, describing the Houthi's actions as "arbitrary" and incapable of halting the deterioration of the national currency against foreign currencies. They called on the Central Bank, under Houthi control, to take appropriate financial measures, emphasizing that "the continuous deterioration of the Yemeni rial is due to the Central Bank's failure to meet the market's need for foreign cash and its refusal to cover importers' credits in dollars, which has led to an increased demand for foreign cash in the local market and subsequently its price hike(1)."

The group had imposed house arrest on the Governor of the Central Bank, Mohammed Awad bin Humam, preventing him from moving or traveling. However, he managed to leave Sana'a on August 10, 2015, and settled in his hometown in the Ghayl Bawazir area in the Hadhramaut Governorate (eastern Yemen) after reaching a deadlock with the Houthi group. The national currency deteriorated during his tenure due to economic violations, especially the floating of oil derivatives prices through their link to the global market. Within less than three months, the Houthis sought the assistance of the Central Bank Governor to address the crisis of the Yemeni rial's collapse against the US dollar and salvage what could be saved. He returned to Sana'a on October 27, 2015, under the directives of Yemeni President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi(2).

However, the return of the Central Bank governor did not halt the Houthi's mischief and their exploitation of the state's resources for their own benefit. This prompted the Ministry of Finance in Aden to warn against the Houthis' looting of the cash reserves and their fiscal policies that targeted the national economy on multiple occasions, but to no avail.

Regarding this matter, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdulmalik al-Mekhlafi stated on January 20, 2016: "The

(1) "Collective Closure of Exchange Companies in Sana’a in Protest Against the Houthis," Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, October 26, 2015.

(2) "Yemen's Central Bank Governor Returns to Sana’a to Save the Rial," Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, October 27, 2015.

government has been keen to spare the Central Bank and fiscal policy from the conflict, and the President directed the Central Bank governor, Mohammed Awadh bin Humam, to return to Sana'a to prevent the currency's collapse." In a meeting with the British ambassador to Yemen, Edmund Brown, al-Mekhlafi elaborated on the government's attempts to dissociate the economy from the ongoing war, in the face of the Houthi's stubbornness, as they implemented extensive changes in the Ministry of Finance and exerted pressure on the banking sector. They continued to hinder the convening of the Central Bank's board of directors meeting, which we wanted to hold to stop the deterioration. If confidence in the national currency collapses, it becomes difficult to restore it. The economic situation is no longer tolerable, and the government's economic committee has extremely negative indicators(1)." The Central Bank in Sana'a had become unable to inject cash into the market, as the amount of cash in individuals' possession had increased eightfold. Starting from a value of $103 million in 2014, it reached $884 million in June 2016, leading to a complete depletion of cash reserves within the banking system(2).

The pillage of the cash reserves constituted the initial blow suffered by the national currency, resulting in the overall deterioration of the Yemeni economy and a drastic collapse in living standards.

Concurrently, speculation on hard currency grew rampant as a natural consequence of increased imports, particularly in the realm of fuel. The Houthis established private fuel companies that played a pivotal role in fueling speculation and the escalating demand for foreign currencies. During this period, the national currency experienced a precipitous decline owing to the scarcity of foreign currency within the country.

Instead of implementing economic measures to curb the currency's deterioration, the Houthi group resorted to security crackdowns, targeting currency exchange business owners, and seizing their assets. These heavy-handed actions prompted currency exchange shops to protest such measures, decrying the Houthi group's actions as "arbitrary." They argued that these measures would not put an end to the depreciation of the national currency vis-à-vis foreign currencies. They called upon the Central Bank, now under Houthi control, to adopt sound financial measures. They stressed that "the ongoing devaluation of the Yemeni rial stems from the Central Bank's failure to meet the market's demand for foreign currency and its refusal to cover importers' credits in dollars, thus leading to an increased local demand for foreign currency and consequent price surge."

On May 18, 2016, Prime Minister Dr. Ahmed Obaid bin Daghr delivered

(1) "Yemen News Agency (Saba), news published on January 20, 2016."

(2) "A letter dated January 27, 2017, addressed to the Security Council from the Yemen Expert Team, Paragraph 94Z, page 45."

a speech at a press conference, addressing several issues related to that period, including the Houthis' manipulation of the economy, printing currency without backing, looting reserves, and withholding salaries from employees, leading to the collapse of the local currency. The following is the excerpt concerning the economic aspect of that speech:

"Dear brothers, our country is currently experiencing a horrifying economic and monetary collapse. The Houthis have recklessly spent approximately three billion dollars, which represented most of the country's cash reserves. They used these reserves in their military efforts to seize control of the state and authority, overthrow the republic and unity, and manage the war. The Houthis violated financial and monetary management systems and continued to print more banknotes, causing the Yemeni rial to plummet against the dollar and other foreign currencies. The currency collapse resulted in significant price increases, economic chaos, reduced citizens' income, and inflicted disastrous living conditions on the poor and middle class, worsening day by day.

We, in the government, have committed to an economic ceasefire proposed by our friends since the beginning of the war, and we have respected the neutrality of the Central Bank despite knowing that the militias have no regard for ceasefires or neutrality. We have fully supplied the public revenues to the Central Bank in Sana'a, including taxes, customs, fees, and all ports and facilities under the legitimacy's control, including external revenues. This was driven by our sense of national responsibility towards our people and our commitment to what we pledged. We have continuously warned against the risks of the destructive economic, financial, and monetary policies adopted by the Houthis in recent months.

The Houthis have stopped paying salaries to officers, soldiers, and employees in the liberated areas, including members of the House of Representatives and the Shura Council who refused to submit and surrender to the coup authority. They have also prevented operational budgets from reaching hospitals and public facilities, denying treatment to the wounded and compensation to the families of martyrs in the liberated and recovered areas. This is a violation of the agreed-upon terms. Our people throughout Yemen have suffered because of these policies, and we are all witnessing a complete collapse of our country's economy and the plundering of its public wealth, for which they bear a unique responsibility.

It has become evident that deliberate and systematic destruction has been directed towards our people, their capabilities, and national resources, in an attempt to force them to accept the reality on the ground or starve them, and to destroy their political, economic, and social entity[1]."

(1) "Yemen News Agency Saba, published on May 18, 2016."

The international community was finally awakening to the immense scale of the economic and humanitarian crisis stemming from the Houthis' economic crimes. This realization prompted the British Ambassador to Yemen to express that "halting the economic deterioration and collapse may take precedence over ceasefires, given the alarming signs of the situation[1]" during his meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister.

The Houthis have displayed a remarkable talent for pillaging cash reserves through various means, including siphoning funds under the guise of fictitious development projects. In March 2015, they declared a sweeping mobilization decree, seizing all of the state's resources and financial allocations, including the budgets earmarked for education, health, and the support of food and environmental initiatives. These resources were redirected to benefit the group and its military activities.

Confronted with this worsening economic reality resulting from the Houthis' relentless exploitation of the central bank's resources and the diversion of cash reserves to finance the war, President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi issued a presidential decree on September 18, 2016. The decree aimed to relocate the central bank's main headquarters to Aden, restructure the board of directors, and safeguard the remaining resources of the state. Its purpose was to sever the sources of Houthi war financing against the Yemeni people[2]. However, the Houthis obstinately clung to their parallel bank, refusing to relinquish control over the state's revenues. Consequently, this refusal engendered economic fragmentation and successive financial crises, including a salary crisis and the devaluation of the Yemeni currency.

In essence, this undertaking can be seen as the establishment of a new central bank from scratch in Aden. The original central bank in Sana'a remained intact, while Yemen's stock of local and foreign currency remained under Houthi control. The savings accumulated by Yemenis over the past decades, which were meant to serve the nation's development, became a tool for sustaining the war effort and enriching Houthi leaders.

The members of the board of directors and all the staff of the central bank remained in Sana'a, and all the resources from Houthi-controlled territories flowed into the central bank in Sana'a. In Aden, a separate communication mechanism was established with foreign banks, while the

(1) "Presidential decree regarding the reformation of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Yemen and the relocation of its main headquarters, Yemen News Agency Saba, May 18, 2016."

(2) "Presidential Decree No. (119) for the year 2016 concerning the reformation of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Yemen and the relocation of its headquarters to Aden, and the reformation of its board as follows: Mansur Saleh Mohamed Al-Qa'iti as the Governor of the Bank, Abbas Ahmed Abdullah Al-Basha as the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank, Dr. Mansur Ali Al-Battani as the Deputy Minister of Finance representing the Ministry of Finance, Ahmed Hussein Abubakr as a member, Dr. Jalal Ibrahim Fakira as a member, Sharaf Mohamed Saeed Al-Foudai as a member, and Shakib Saeed Abdullah Hubeishi as a member."

existing communication channels of the central bank in Sana'a continued to function. This arrangement facilitated the transfer of funds for certain international organizations through Sana'a instead of Aden. Consequently, a considerable number of projects implemented by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and European Union banks were executed through transfers to the central bank in Sana'a.

There was a distinctive feature that set the Central Bank in Aden apart from its counterpart in Sana'a: its exclusive control over the printing of local currency. This authority was granted due to the international community's recognition of the legitimate government and its implementation of financial measures, which the Houthis repeatedly failed to achieve despite their numerous attempts. However, the Houthis did manage to succeed in counterfeiting the currency on multiple occasions.

According to a testimony I received from Dr. Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr, who served as the Prime Minister during that period, the government demanded that the Houthis relinquish the revenues they were acquiring. In return, the government would utilize those funds to pay salaries to employees across the Republic and fulfill all of the state's obligations in terms of public services and development. Regrettably, the Houthis refused to comply. Dr. Daghr expressed the following about this matter: "We urged the Houthis to surrender the resources, and in return, we would honor all of the state's commitments to society, including employee salaries, services, and development. However, they rejected our proposal. Despite some of the previous three international envoys showing partiality towards the demands of the Houthis, they were unable to exert pressure on us because they acknowledged our just cause. Furthermore, our allies and the ambassadors of the five countries stood by our side. They all recognized that the Houthis were exploiting public resources for their war efforts. Nonetheless, we continued to pay the salaries of academics in Houthi-controlled areas, as well as doctors, nurses, judges, the Supreme Election Committee, and various other government institutions until the Houthis obstructed the disbursement process."

One of the direct and significant reasons for establishing a central bank in Aden was the gradual cessation of salary payments to civil sector workers in government-controlled areas by the Houthis through the Central Bank in Sana'a, which held sway over all the country's resources. The cessation of payments extended permanently to the military sector, and they also refused to allocate budgets for vital service institutions such as healthcare, education, electricity, water, and sanitation. Consequently, we were compelled to confront this challenging predicament.

The Yemeni government found itself burdened with numerous responsibilities towards the Yemeni people and the employees of the state's

administrative apparatus when it made the decision to establish a central bank in Aden. However, the available resources were meager, as the Houthis had plundered approximately one and a half trillion Yemeni rials. Adding to the complexity, the Houthi group persistently hoarded vast quantities of the local currency, exacerbating a liquidity crisis that forced the Yemeni government into a dire predicament, aptly described as the "last resort" by Mustafa Nasr, an esteemed economic expert and head of the Center for Economic Studies and Media. Nasr confirmed that the government faced a choice between two options: either printing a new currency with marginal differences in large quantities or introducing an entirely new and distinct currency(1).

In a bid to address the situation, the Yemeni government entered into an agreement with a Russian company to print over one trillion and 700 billion Yemeni rials. This initiative aimed to replace damaged banknotes(2), meet financial obligations, and ensure the payment of salaries to both civil and military personnel. The new currency circulated across various regions of Yemen for approximately two years. However, the course of events took a distressing turn when the Houthi group took a shocking step, resulting in catastrophic consequences for the Yemeni economy and the overall humanitarian situation. Starting from February 28, 2018, they imposed a ban on the use of the newly printed banknotes of 1000 and 500 rials, which had been issued by the Yemeni Central Bank(3). They conducted extensive campaigns to seize these banknotes from stores, banks, merchants' residences, and the public. Additionally, they accused anyone found in possession or involved in transactions with these banknotes of treason and collaborating with foreign entities.

The Houthi rebels often blame the Yemeni government for the collapse of the currency, attributing the official printing of a new currency as the recognized government to the primary reason for the devaluation of the national currency in the international market. However, these justifications seem peculiar when we consider that the Houthis, in collaboration with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, printed massive quantities of counterfeit Yemeni banknotes and smuggled them into Yemen, according to the U.S. Treasury Department.

On December 20, 2017, the U.S. Treasury Department announced sanctions against a network of Iranian individuals and entities affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard for their involvement in purchasing

(1) "Statement by Mustafa Nasr, Al-Mawqif Post, September 27, 2016."

(2) "The Central Bank of Yemen in Aden has confirmed that damaged currency accounts for 90 percent of the circulating cash, and arrangements are being made to replace the damaged currency with new notes by the Russian company Goznak."

(3) "Houthis Prevent Dealing with New Currency for the Aden Government," Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, February 28, 2018.

equipment and materials used in currency printing and producing counterfeit Yemeni banknotes worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

The Iranian network, led by the company "Baradazish Tasvir Rayan," managed by Reza Heydari, employed deceptive measures to bypass European export restrictions and acquire advanced equipment and materials for printing counterfeit currency for the Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Treasury Department described the printing of counterfeit money as part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's plan to destabilize Yemen and Gulf countries(1).

In the same context, the news and radio website "Radio Farda," which broadcasts in Persian and English, published recordings of high-ranking leaders in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, some of which indicated that elements of the Revolutionary Guard were working to provide counterfeit Yemeni currency to the Houthis. According to the recordings, the Revolutionary Guard commander Mahmod Saeef "Mohsen Sajjadi Nejad," who operates in Iran, managed the company "Almas Mobin Trading," which, in coordination with the Revolutionary Guard, provided the means and equipment for counterfeiting currency. It played a significant role in arms deals and the production of counterfeit currency to meet the financial needs of the Houthi rebels in Yemen(2).

Once, the governor of the Central Bank, Mansur Al-Qa'iti, announced that security forces had apprehended a truck carrying a quantity of counterfeit banknotes. Additionally, this group had been issuing coupons with varying financial values that lacked any legal status for issuance and circulation, with the aim of deceiving citizens and squandering their wealth(3).

In their direct targeting of the national currency, the Houthis closed dozens of currency exchange shops and companies in Sana'a in early April 2018, due to their dealings with the new banknotes, confiscating millions of rials in the process(4). However, despite this, citizens continued to use this currency until the Central Bank, under Houthi control in Sana'a, issued a decision at the end of December 2019, completely banning the circulation and use of the new banknotes.

(1) "U.S. Department of the Treasury website, dated: November 20, 2017."
(2) "Radio Farda Exposé On IRGC Corruption, Infighting Raises Ire Of Iranian Authorities," Radio Farda, February 18, 2022.
(3) "Yemeni authorities seize quantities of counterfeit currency in a new denomination and accuse the Houthis of counterfeiting," Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, May 29, 2017.
(4) "Houthis Punish Money Changers in Sana’a for Dealing with New Currency," Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, April 4, 2018.

The group provided many justifications for legitimizing this decision, with the main one being the preservation of the exchange rate. However, many economists considered it more of a political move than an economic one. This step aimed to sever any societal ties with the internationally recognized government, while maintaining a state of hunger and social deprivation to facilitate control over the people.

To convince people to surrender their holdings of the new national currency, the Central Bank under Houthi control claimed that it would compensate citizens who handed over their new cash with electronic currency.

Preventing the circulation of the new national currency in Houthi-controlled areas had negative repercussions on its value against the dollar. Exchange rates fluctuated, causing significant damage to cash transactions and financial dealings. It also resulted in depriving many traders and ordinary citizens of their new cash savings after approximately two years of circulation.

Naturally, this Houthi move was a new means of plundering the citizens' money, especially targeting employees and workers. After confiscating these funds from citizens, exchange shops, and traders at all levels, the Houthis would divert them to areas under the control of the legitimate government through various means.

These measures compelled the United Nations to issue a warning about the risks of the collapse of the national currency on October 5, 2018. Liz Grande, the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Yemen, stated that millions of impoverished and destitute Yemenis were now threatened with hunger due to the soaring prices of goods caused by inflation resulting from the rapid devaluation of the local currency. She emphasized that even a slight increase in the prices of wheat, cooking oil, or milk in local markets would have a catastrophic and immediate impact. Families that could barely afford their necessities suddenly found themselves unable to do so(1).

In response to the economic devastation caused by the Houthis, the Yemeni government called on the international community to halt what it described as a policy of impoverishment and starvation. Information Minister Muammar al-Iryani urged the United Nations, represented by its Special Envoy to Yemen, Martin Griffiths, to fulfill its responsibility and exert pressure on the Houthi group, which pursued policies that impoverished and starved the Yemeni people, leading to dire living conditions. He warned of the consequences of banning the circulation or possession of the national currency in Houthi-controlled areas, criminalizing

(1) "Statement issued by the United Nations Resident Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Yemen, Liz Grande, on October 5, 2018."

its use, and the group's dangerous attempts to seize national capital and withdraw citizens' savings through the promotion of electronic currency as a replacement.

The Yemeni government affirmed that these measures fell within the destructive policies adopted by the militia since its coup, aiming to undermine the national economy, promote corruption, manipulate currency, and undermine the government's monetary policies, which had successfully stabilized the currency, preserved its purchasing power, and improved exchange rates and food prices(1).

Economic researcher Abdulwahid Al-Awabli summarized the economic effects of these measures, stating that the withdrawal of the new currency led to speculation on its value against the old currency, especially after the Houthis, through their supervisors and influential figures in the group, exchanged the old currency for the new one at a rate of 900 or 800 new rials for every 1,000 old rials. They also withdrew cash from citizens and exchanged it for hard currency, leading to increased demand for foreign currencies and their appreciation against the local currency, contributing to inflation and further increases in the prices of goods and services. Consequently, the real value of savings, income, and consumption decreased, exacerbating poverty indicators, food insecurity, malnutrition, especially since Yemen relies on imports to meet most of its food and other needs(2).

These measures triggered a significant backlash among the Yemeni population, who viewed them as a form of theft that directly targeted their funds. Fathi bin Lazraq, the editor-in-chief of Aden Al-Ghad newspaper, a prominent independent newspaper in Yemen, strongly criticized the confiscation of the new currency in Houthi-controlled areas and the introduction of electronic currency, describing them as "baseless claims made by an immoral and unprincipled group that only seeks to exploit the people(3)."

On December 31, 2019, Yemeni traders in provinces under Houthi control initiated an open strike to protest the decision to ban the circulation and seize the new cash currency issued by the Central Bank in Aden. The Yemeni Traders Union issued a press statement urging the Houthi-controlled Central Bank to reconsider its decisions regarding the new local currency. They argued that replacing the new currency with electronic rials was not a viable solution(4). Unfortunately, this labor movement faced

(1) "Yemen News Agency (Saba), December 19, 2019."
(2) "Independent Arabia News website, December 25, 2019."
(3) Ibid.
(4) "Statement by the Yemeni Traders Union, published on Arabiya.net, December 31, 2019."

suppression, leading to the compliance of all financial and commercial institutions in Houthi-controlled areas with these decisions. This further aggravated the financial challenges faced by Yemenis, adding to their already heavy burden, and depriving them of basic daily necessities.

As a result of these actions, exchange shops began imposing fees on financial transfers from provinces and areas under the control of the Yemeni government to those controlled by the Houthi group. These fees, which sometimes reached up to 40 percent, were justified by the exchange rate difference between the new and old currencies. This significantly impacted citizens. For instance, an individual working in Hadramout who sent 100,000 Yemeni rials to their family in Sana'a through a money exchange company would have approximately 30,000 to 40,000 rials deducted from the transferred amount, leaving the recipient with only 60,000 to 70,000 rials.

Unfortunately, the situation did not end there. The Houthi group continued implementing measures that contributed to the devaluation of the national currency by targeting banks and exchange companies. Since most financial institutions are concentrated in Sana'a, the capital city, the group gained access to detailed data and information about these institutions, enabling them to exert control. They prevented these institutions from engaging with the internationally recognized Central Bank in Aden, thereby hindering their ability to utilize their deposited funds as legal reserves in the Central Bank in Sana'a. The Houthi group even resorted to storming banks in Sana'a and kidnapping their managers. Media reports confirmed that approximately ten banks and financial institutions in Sana'a were targeted by the Houthis during only the year 2020(1).

The Houthis, with their brazen disregard for official financial documentation, arrogate the authority to determine the profits of each bank at their whim. These capricious assessments serve as the basis for imposing exactions on these earnings. Those who dare to resist are callously thrown into dungeons, subjected to unspeakable torment, or witness their institutions forcibly seized. To compound matters, the Houthis prohibit banks from establishing documentary credits with the internationally recognized Central Bank in Aden, effectively obstructing the importation of vital sustenance through the compensation system administered at the bank's headquarters. Consequently, several bank employees have been unjustly incarcerated, most notably Abbas Nasser(2), the esteemed deputy director of Bank of Yemen and Bahrain.

To carry out their unholy designs, the Houthis have entrusted the

(1) "Wafiq Saleh, previous reference."

(2) "Houthis Impose a 30% Payment of Profits on Banks," Al-Arabiya Net website, published on January 28, 2019.

audacious task of raiding financial institutions to Salih Musfer Al-Sha'er, a trusted confidant of Houthi leader Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi, and Ameer Al-Murani. Together, they have meticulously woven a web of influence, encompassing members of the Al-Sha'er family, including those ensconced within the specialized criminal court, the Yemeni Central Bank in Sana'a, the registration departments at the Ministry of Industry Trade, and select private banks under their sway. This nefarious network assumes responsibility for extortion, intimidation, and the unlawful detention of corporate executives and bank directors, brandishing the sword of collaboration and espionage on behalf of the enemy government. Ameer Al-Murani has been assigned the odious duty of orchestrating the arrest and subsequent torture of business owners, directors, and employees within the banking sector. Among the victims of these heinous acts are the dedicated employees of the International Islamic Cooperation Bank, the Yemen Kuwait Bank (YKB), the International Bank of Yemen, and various other currency exchange establishments(1).

On the fateful day of June 22, 2021, the Houthis brazenly declared a prohibition on engaging with a recently minted currency denomination of 1000 Yemeni rials, authorized by the Yemeni government, on grounds of being "counterfeit and illegal(2)." However, it didn't take long before they hastily reversed their stance, permitting the transfer of a sum of 100,000 rials to everyone entering their dominion, provided that the serial number on the new banknotes aligned with those of the preceding circulating currency(3).

During the year 2020, one catastrophic result of the "forced separation" between the areas controlled by the Yemeni government and the Houthi-controlled areas, as described in a report by the Studies & Economic Media Centre (SEMC), became clear. The volume of trade between the areas under Houthi control and the internationally recognized government areas declined by 40%.

The Center for Economic Studies considered the Houthi decision not to deal with the new denominations of the local currency as a "dangerous turning point that has multiplied the challenges facing the Yemeni economy and exacerbated the humanitarian and living crisis, which is considered the worst globally(4)." Economic expert, Mustafa Nasr commented on this catastrophic Houthi measure, stating, "The most dangerous step in dividing Yemen from an economic standpoint during the current stage was

(1) "A letter dated January 27, 2020, addressed to the President of the Security Council from the Yemen Expert Team in accordance with Paragraph 6 of Resolution 2456 (2019)."

(2) "Statement issued by the Central Bank in Sana’a, under Houthi control, dated June 22, 2021."

(3) "The New Currency Denomination Confuses the Houthis in Yemen: 3 Decisions in One Week," Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, June 28, 2021.

(4) "Report Reveals Decline in Trade Volume in Yemen," Arabi21 website, February 28, 2021.

represented by the Houthi group's decision not to deal with the new denominations of the currency, resulting in the use of two different currencies, regardless of the justifications. The repercussions of this step are catastrophic, and its consequences are greater than we currently imagine[1]."

This is just a drop in the ocean of measures implemented by the Houthis, which contributed to the devaluation of the national currency to record levels against other foreign currencies. Furthermore, it created a sharp monetary and banking division in the country, leading to the deterioration of the living conditions of Yemenis.

Fake Stability:

In one of the television interviews, the official spokesperson for the Houthi group, Abdul Salam al-Houthi (Mohammed Abdul Salam), claimed that their financial policy was the reason for maintaining the value of the currency against foreign currencies in their controlled areas. This was one of the prominent lies spread by the group among the public during the years of war, but it did not fool any economic specialist[2].

In May 2020, the exchange rate in Houthi-controlled areas increased from 600 to 700 Yemeni rials per US dollar due to the pressure on the old currency and the non-circulation of the new currency. However, it later returned to its previous level due to natural economic reasons. One of these reasons is that the Houthis accumulate massive revenues, to the extent that they receive funds owed to the state that have been with financial institutions since the 1990s, but they do not provide any services or salaries to the citizens. Massive revenues without obligations. In contrast, the legitimate government's revenues were scarce, as indicated by the United Nations, but it is committed to delivering what it can in terms of salaries and services despite the problems and economic challenges it faces. Therefore, when the revenue is disbursed in the form of salaries, services, and oil derivatives in various provinces under its control, it weakens the currency. Ultimately, it is a state responsible for society. Meanwhile, the Houthi group only cares about its supporters from the same lineage and affiliated elements, while leaving the rest of the Yemenis in poverty and destitution, relying on occasional assistance provided by international organizations.

The remittances sent by expatriates and the aid provided by organizations play a crucial role in bringing foreign currency into Yemen. These inflows often reach the areas controlled by the Houthi group due to the concentration of population, major banks, and organizations in Sana'a,

(1) Mustafa Nasr, a post on his Facebook page, dated May 23, 2021.
(2) "A dialogue broadcast on March 17, 2021, with Al Jazeera channel in the program 'Without Borders' with the host Jalal Shahada."

which contributes to a certain level of monetary stability in those areas.

The primary factor that has led to the devaluation of the national currency in government-controlled areas and the illusion of stability in Houthi-controlled areas is the difference in external transactions. The internationally recognized Central Bank of Yemen in Aden facilitates documentary credits, foreign currency purchases, and trade with the outside world through recognized banking channels. However, the Central Bank in Sana'a, which is under Houthi control, does not engage in external transactions. As a result, the demand for hard currency increases in Aden, causing the Yemeni rial to weaken against it.

When I refer to the relative stability of the currency in Houthi-controlled areas as "false," it is because the prices of goods and services rise naturally in those areas due to the currency's collapse in the internationally recognized Central Bank in Aden, which is a result of the monetary measures implemented by the Houthis. This means that the citizens do not truly benefit from the apparent stability of the currency in Houthi-controlled areas since it is merely nominal stability without any real significance.

Pensions:

A pension is a regular payment provided to individuals who have earned it through their service and work in a governmental or private institution. It can be a monthly pension or a lump sum amount. Pensions are intended to alleviate poverty and meet the needs of retirees or employees whose service in the institution has ended due to age or years of work. Funds for pensions are collected through monthly instalments or deductions from the employee's salary throughout their working period. These funds represent a debt owed by the government, which is then repaid to the retiree in the form of a monthly pension during their retirement period or as a lump sum at the end of their service.

In Yemen, the General Authority for Insurance and Pensions used to provide salaries for 123,248 retirees, with an approximate monthly cost of their pensions totalling 6,664,967,000 Yemeni rials[(1)] until the Houthi group entered Sana'a in September 2014. This marked the beginning of the misappropriation and exploitation of funds belonging to the General Authority for Insurance and Pensions, as well as the General Authority for Social Insurance, for the benefit of warlords.

It became evident that the Houthi group started depleting the funds intended for retirees, prompting the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of

(1) Nabil Hassan Al-Faqih (Minister of Civil Service and Insurance), Civil Service... Issues and Reforms, his personal blog, June 19, 2021.

Civil Service and Insurance, Abdulaziz Jabari, to issue a warning in January 2016 regarding the tampering with the funds of the General Authority for Insurance and Pensions and the General Authority for Social Insurance. He emphasized that these insurance funds do not belong to the public but rather to the beneficiaries of social insurance services in various sectors, including public, private, and mixed-sector institutions. The beneficiaries of these funds are primarily the elderly, orphans, widows, and individuals who have lost their providers among the workers in those sectors.

And Jabari added that he had "sent memoranda to the Minister of Finance, the Governor of the Yemeni Central Bank, the Chairman of the General Authority for Insurance and Pensions, and the Chairman of the General Authority for Social Insurance, warning that any tampering with the insurance funds would mean depriving this group of their retirement pensions and exposing the insurance and banking system to collapse." He also emphasized "the importance of preserving the balances of the authority and the institution away from any interventions or conflicts, and that the relevant authorities are responsible for the risks and damages that may befall the funds of the retirement and social insurance funds as a result of their mismanagement in violation of the laws that established them(1)."

Despite the transfer of the Central Bank's operations to Aden in May 2016, the funds belonging to the authority and the institution, like other institutions, remained in Sana'a. What was transferred were only the official transactions of the Central Bank. The funds remained under the control of the Houthis, and the group continued to collect the state revenues under its control, such as taxes, zakat, customs, telecommunications revenues, and others. As a result, the Houthis continued to plunder and invest the insurance funds in treasury notes and other projects, reaping their benefits.

To gain absolute control over the insurance funds, the so-called Supreme Revolutionary Committee of the Houthis implemented changes in the leadership of the insurance institution and appointed followers from their own ranks. Furthermore, in late June 2016, they issued a decision called the "Enforcement of the Social Insurance Law," which allowed the intervention of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee in legislative matters, in clear violation of the constitutional provisions that allocated legislative authority to the elected House of Representatives in Yemen. This Houthi decision was met with rejection from labor unions in Sana'a, as we will explain later(2).

The Houthi group took advantage of the decision to transfer banking operations to Aden and halted the payment of insurance salaries at the

(1) "Jabari warns against tampering with insurance funds and exposing the insurance and banking system to collapse," Yemen News Agency (Saba), January 4, 2016.

(2) "Major labor unions in Sana'a reject the Houthis' passage of the insurance project (document)," Yemen Monitor, February 18, 2017.

beginning of 2017, to blame the Yemeni government for not delivering the salaries. As days passed, local and international media began to talk about the Houthis' looting of retirees' funds. In early February 2017, the newspaper "Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed" revealed that the Houthi group "withdrew large sums of money from the insurance and pension funds deposited in the central bank, as part of its moves to cover the deficit, pay its members' salaries, and finance its internal wars." According to responsible government information and statements to the newspaper, the misuse of funds "is not limited to the funds of the insurance institution deposited in government banks only but also affects the institution's budget." After the group appointed many of its members to important administrative positions in the institution, they engaged in corruption and misappropriation of funds, buying cars and issuing contracts for unfinished projects(1).

It didn't take long before a union committee tasked with monitoring retirees' funds revealed the disappearance of 300 billion Yemeni rials (1.2 billion dollars at the exchange rate of that period) from the General Institution for Social Insurance for the commercial, industrial, service sectors, oil companies, telecommunications, and banks across the country. The committee demanded that the fate of those funds, which disappeared while retirees were not receiving their pensions, be revealed.

The committee confirmed in a press conference in Sana'a that "more than 11,093 insured individuals (in areas under Houthi control) have not received their insurance salaries for three consecutive months, which increases concerns about the supposed existence of liquidity in the allocated balances for these funds(2)."

After a few days of the press conference that revealed these facts, the largest labor unions in Sana'a announced their rejection of the project to amend the insurance law imposed by the Houthis, as mentioned earlier. Among these unions were the banking unions, gas and oil companies, representatives of the postal and telecommunications sectors, the Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

Saleh Abu Hadra, the representative of the oil company workers' unions, described the Houthi decisions and appointments in the Houthi insurance sector as "unconstitutional." He added, "There are additional amounts added to 300 billion Yemeni rials from the funds of the insurance institution that were managed and withdrawn from the central bank, and these amounts were looted from the funds of every Yemeni employee who spent his life

(1) "Yemen's Insurance Funds: $6 Billion at Risk of Loss," Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, Farouk Al-Kamali, February 12, 2017.

(2) "Disappearance of $1.2 Billion from Yemen's Pension Funds," Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, Farouk Al-Kamali, February 16, 2017.

paying insurance from his salary[1]."

The group had fully managed to control the decisions of the institutions responsible for delivering retirees' salaries through its tribal elements, which it placed in these institutions following September 2014, or by pressuring and directing the leaderships that manage these institutions. However, they didn't stop there and worked on removing most of the qualified staff in these institutions and appointing their own elements.

Houthi elements stormed the building of the General Institution for Insurance in Sana'a on April 7, 2017, forcibly imposing the Houthi leader Abdul Salam al-Makhdouri as its president and expelling the head of the institution. Meanwhile, the government accused the Houthi group once again of stealing "more than 750 billion Yemeni rials (2.99 billion dollars at the exchange rate at that time) from the institution's balances in the central bank in Sana'a by disbursing them without the permission of the institution, while seeking to loot the remaining balance estimated at about 200 million dollars and harness it for the so-called war effort.

In an official statement published by the Yemeni news agency Saba, the government affirmed that "the Houthi militia's seizure of the General Institution for Insurance and Pensions through the decision to appoint Abdul Salam al-Makhdouri is not only a threat to the retirees' salaries and the institution's balances and resources, but also to what has been collected over the past fifty years, through which salaries are paid to more than a million Yemeni citizens, both civilians and military personnel[2]."

The community activities opposing the Houthi seizure of retirees' rights in Yemen continued. In August 2017, the "Monitoring Committee for Social Insurance in Yemen" once again demanded that the Houthi group pay the monthly pensions of retirees in the provinces under its control, amounting to two billion and seven hundred million Yemeni rials per month from the current account of the institution. This is because the pensions of retirees in the liberated provinces are disbursed through the Central Bank in Aden[3].

In April of the same year, the committee published documents proving the Houthi looting of retirees' funds (insurance). The banking unions, representatives of the postal and telecommunications sectors, gas and oil companies, the Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry rejected the Houthi's invitation to engage in dialogue to stop the social

(1) "Major labor unions in Sana’a reject the Houthis' passage of the insurance project," Previous Source.

(2) "Houthi militias looted $750 million from the General Authority for Insurance and Pensions funds," reported by Al-Yemeni Al-Jadeed website citing Yemen News Agency (Saba), April 7, 2017.

(3) "Insurance Authority demands Sana’a Central Bank to pay retirees' salaries on par with Aden Central Bank," Yemen Monitor website, August 10, 2017.

movement demanding the delivery of retirees' pensions(1).

In December 2017, an entity under Houthi control called the Retirees' Union in the Yemeni Republic sent a letter to the World Bank complaining about retirees not receiving their pensions since the beginning of 2017, despite their contributions being deposited with the Yemeni Central Bank in the name of the General Institution for Insurance and Pensions, amounting to around 2 trillion Yemeni rials. The letter added that retirees' funds are private and not public funds, and the laws governing retirees' rights are clear and unambiguous. It also pointed out that the state, represented by the General Institution for Insurance and Pensions, included retirees' rights in public debt bonds without the consent of the retirees themselves, which is a violation of the Yemeni constitution and retirement laws.

Due to the severe impact on retirees and their families' livelihoods, urgent intervention was sought from the esteemed person and the management of your respected bank to pressurize the Yemeni Central Bank to disburse their retirement rights. This is particularly important as retirees have been involved in legal disputes before the Yemeni judiciary, and they have obtained final court judgments that have not been implemented, especially considering the severe harm suffered by retirees, leading to their death from illness and hunger(2).

As for the recognized Yemeni government, after the formation of the government of Dr. Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr in April 2016 and its operations in the temporary capital, Aden(3), the Ministry of Civil Service and Insurance, represented by its minister Nabil Al-Faqih, worked on providing pensions to retirees in areas under the control of the Yemeni government and areas under Houthi control, despite limited resources and the Houthis' control over insurance funds. The government effectively started disbursing pensions in November 2018 and continued the process until the end of 2019(4).

However, the payment process for retirees in Houthi-controlled areas was halted after the Houthis banned the circulation of the new edition of the national currency. They also seized the funds collected in the branch of the

(1) "25 documents prove Houthi raid on insurance funds," Yemen Monitor website, April 23, 2017.

(2) "A memorandum issued by the Yemeni Retirees Union addressed to the World Bank and the United States, dated December 19, 2017."

(3) "On April 3, 2016, Presidential Decree No. 49 of 2016 was issued, appointing Dr. Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr as the Prime Minister, replacing the government of Dr. Khaled Bahah."

(4) "Based on a memorandum issued by the Minister of Civil Service Nabil Al-Faqih on September 26, 2018, to Prime Minister Dr. Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr, requesting the provision of retirees' salaries in Houthi-controlled areas, the Prime Minister directed their payment. This was done in accordance with the directives of the President issued on November 22, 2016, which stipulated the payment of retirees' salaries in all Yemeni governorates without exception (attached are documents of the directives)."

Central Bank in Hodeidah according to the Stockholm Agreement[1]. As a result, tens of thousands of Yemeni families were deprived of their right to receive retirement pensions.

War Effort:

Historically, the ancestors of the Houthis (the Imams) would send their armies to control other areas of Yemen, which had no money or provisions. The local populations in the areas they passed through were forced to provide them with provisions and money. Each region had to receive the armies and provide them with what they needed, even at the expense of their own well-being and the well-being of their children. This allowed the Imam to prepare for invasion and gain new areas of influence without incurring any costs, in addition to the money and properties that warlords seized under the banner of fighting enemies, aggressors, or invaders[2].

The rule of the Imams did not stabilize in Yemen, and the struggle between the Imams with the help of armies that came from Tabaristan to support them, and the original inhabitants of Yemen continued for long periods. The number of wars that have erupted between Yemenis and the Imams since the arrival of Yahya Al-Rassi to Yemen nearly 1200 years ago until today is estimated to be more than 2000 wars. In each of these wars, the wealth of Yemenis is stolen, sometimes under the pretext of fighting oppressors, disbelievers, atheists, drunkards, and those who show off, and other times under the pretext of defending sovereignty or confronting aggression, corruption, extremists, agents, and mercenaries, among other justifications they use to fight Yemenis and steal their wealth.

The imams authorize plundering wealth during wars by using some fabricated or misinterpreted religious texts. When Muhammad bin al-Mansur al-Qasim Abu Muhammad was asked about taking wealth by coercion to support wars, he began his answer by mentioning the noble verse: "And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged" (Quran: 8:60[3]). And the verse: "Go forth, whether light or heavy, and strive with your wealth and your lives in the cause of Allah. That is better for you, if you only knew" (Quran: 9:41[4]).

(1) "Nabil Hassan Al-Faqih, previous reference."
(2) "Yemeni Imams used to refer to military leaders who led wars against the rebellious Yemeni tribes as 'Warlords'."
(3) Surah Al-Anfal, Verse 60.
(4) Surah At-Tawbah, Verse 41.

Then he said: "And other verses all testify together that it is obligatory to expend lives and wealth in jihad and fighting, and that is an obligation from Allah the Exalted, the Magnificent. And if that was an obligation, it could not be done except by coercion. So, coercion is obligatory in some cases. But since many people cannot be coerced into personally attending, nor [coerced] regarding intentions and the like, and many of them as Allah has said: "If they had come out with you, they would not have added to you except corruption and [would have] hurried to [spread] among your affection. And among you are attentive ones to them. And Allah is Knowing of the wrongdoers" (Quran: 9:47[1]). It is permissible, and even necessary to force someone to give money or contribute to the Imam's parties under certain circumstances, because compelling someone to fulfill an obligation is permissible when the obligation is necessary. In this regard, what we have mentioned in the Book of Allah, the Exalted, is sufficient evidence[2].

And their imam Abdullah ibn Hamzah said, "It is obligatory upon Muslims with their selves and their wealth to defend their territory, not willingly desiring jihad with their selves or their wealth, nor coercing them into jihad with their selves even if corruption may be possible; because coercion regarding jihad with their selves, even, if possible, is corruptible. But coercion regarding their wealth is possible without corruption[3]."

As observed, the religious leaders argue using these noble verses that come in the context of urging Muslims to prepare weapons and equipment for fighting in defence against non-Muslim aggressors. However, these verses do not justify looting money under threat and intimidation to fight peaceful Yemeni Muslims, as the Houthis are doing today.

The Houthis spare no effort in inventing means and methods to facilitate the looting of Yemenis' resources in their areas of influence under the pretext of "war effort" and "frontline support." However, most of these funds and donations go to enrich the Houthi leadership.

Their demands for the "war effort" initially started timidly, relying on their ability to convince people of the necessity and importance of their war against "America, Israel, and their agents inside Yemen." They resorted to some tricks to persuade people to donate, such as displaying money, food supplies, livestock, jewelry, agricultural products, honey, and others in front of citizens on the streets or through the media, pretending that they were donations from the locals. They aimed to deceive them into believing that

(1) Surah At-Tawbah, Verses 47.

(2) "The Luxuriant Branches with the Evidence of Political Rulings" by Ahmed bin Abdullah Al-San'ani, Introduction and Verification: Ayman Abdel Jabbar Al-Bahiri, Al-Afak Al-Arabiya, Branch 36, Page 196.

(3) Ibid. Branch 37, Page 201.

all Yemenis were spending money to support the fronts, and anyone who fails to do so is opposing the group and will be deprived of the profits and spoils of victory and will be treated as a traitor. After this show, the displayed items are returned to their owners, who are often wealthy families. This is how they deceived the people into making donations and plundering their money and savings in the beginning.

In May 2015, tension arose between the residents of Al-Mahweet city (western Yemen) and the Houthi militias coming from outside the province after they attempted to confiscate over 10,000 liters of gasoline from each gas station selling petroleum products to citizens, out of a total of 25,000 liters, in favor of what they described as the "war effort[1]." This incident occurred after the residents had waited for weeks in long queues with their cars in front of fuel stations, waiting for supplies to be provided.

And it was not limited to looting citizens' fuel in the name of the war effort. In the same month, the Houthi leadership directed the management of the Republican Hospital - in the same province - to submit an official memorandum to the Yemen Petroleum Company requesting 20,000 liters of diesel fuel for the operation of electricity. Only 4,000 liters of the mentioned quantity reached the hospital after the militias seized 16,000 liters for the war effort. This forced the hospital administration to request another quantity estimated at 10,000 liters. However, the Houthis in the province knew about it and took part of the new quantity as "war effort," despite the hospital's need for every liter, especially with the presence of a specialized center for kidney failure patients that relies entirely on electricity. These incidents, which I witnessed myself as a resident of the province, were one of the features of that stage that revealed the Houthis' preferred hobby of robbing Yemenis and depriving them of the necessities of life under the banner of war. What was happening in Al-Mahweet province was happening in the rest of the provinces under the control of the group.

After tightening their control over all state institutions, the process of looting Yemenis in the name of the war effort and supporting "the mujahideen" became more severe and with different methods. These methods include deducting funds directly from the salaries or rights of employees in government and civil institutions or sending an envelope to each family with the family name written on it to place a monetary amount and return it to the Houthi official in the neighborhood or village. This way, it becomes clear to them who paid and how much they contributed to support the group. If the head of the family refuses, he is focused on and subjected to intensified surveillance, considering him a traitor, agent, or

(1) "Houthi corruption reduces the chances of aid reaching those in need." Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, published on March 17, 2015.

member of ISIS, and depriving him of some of his rights and needs until he submits like the rest of the population. In some areas, the envelope is handed to the student at school to request a donation from their family, and if the parent does not interact with the donation campaign and does not contribute money, the student may face failure.

The Houthis are not incapable of inventing justifications and means to blackmail Yemenis and plunder their savings. Sometimes it's for the fronts, sometimes for the families of their casualties, sometimes for supporting the Central Bank that they control(1), or for supporting military manufacturing and missile power as they describe it, and donating to Hezbollah in Lebanon while the world acknowledges that the Yemeni people are suffering from the biggest humanitarian crisis in our contemporary time(2).

In each stage, the required amounts to be paid by citizens are multiplied. This pressure and blackmail have often led to confrontations between the locals and the Houthis, resulting in the abduction or elimination of those who oppose or refuse, after labeling them as ISIS members, mercenaries, or agents of foreign countries.

Examples of plundering under the pretext of the war effort include forcing owners of medical laboratories to add an additional amount to each test conducted for patients in support of the "war effort." In mid-2020, some residents of Sana'a were surprised by the increased costs of certain medical tests, as directed by the Houthi group. These funds were collected from medical laboratories, including those in hospitals, and were handed over as a contribution to support the "caravans and war effort(3)."

In rural and agricultural areas, Houthi elements impose the provision of livestock and agricultural products such as grains, coffee, grapes, pomegranates, peaches, and qat on village chiefs and elders, under the pretext of sending them to fighters on the front lines. Farmers are forced to hand over these items despite knowing that most of these funds and foodstuffs go to benefit Houthi supervisors and leaders. This was acknowledged by the leader of the Houthi group in a recorded video released by the Houthis in a desperate attempt to absolve himself of the systematic looting operations carried out by his men and to improve his image in front of Yemenis, after it became clear to them that this group is based on looting and depriving Yemenis of their rights. The Houthi leader stated in the widely circulated speech on social media that some people

(1) "The Houthis carried out a widespread campaign to collect donations for the Yemeni Central Bank under their control during the second half of 2016, to the extent that they forced school students to provide support."

(2) "Houthis collect donations to finance Hezbollah." Middle East Online, published on May 25, 2019.

(3) "Threats and extortion: The Houthis and the theft of people's money in the name of the Prophet's birthday." 4th of May newspaper, October 16, 2020.

donated their valuable dagger or their sheep[1], only to find them being sold in the markets to purchase qat with the proceeds. Instead of clearing his name with this statement, he proved that he leads a group of thieves and killers.

Among the testimonies that indicate the fate of the looted funds under the banner of the "war effort" is what was revealed by a former member of the so-called Revolutionary Committee of the Houthis through some of his publications. He said, "The biggest corruption goes under the name of the war effort, and by the Lord of Muhammad, only 30% of those enormous amounts actually go to the war effort[2]." On another occasion, he said, "Billions upon billions have been taken by the Wali (referring to the leader) under the name of the war effort, and only 20% or less actually reaches the war effort[3]."

It can be said that the Houthis do not leave any Yemeni category without taking money from them in the name of supporting military operations, including employees, traders, street vendors, farmers, drivers, students, expatriates, journalists, elders, and soldiers, both men and women, children, and the elderly. All Yemenis in their controlled areas without exception.

Increasing Tax and Zakat Fees:

The Houthis believe that they are responsible for collecting tax and zakat funds, not the state, because their religious belief makes their lineage the ruling authority over Yemenis and the owners of their lives and wealth. This is emphasized by their leader and one of their most important religious references, Abdullah bin Hamza, in his collected messages, where he stated that "charity in the form of grains, dates, and raisins must be given to the Imam, as well as the obligations of livestock. This is known from the religion of the Prophet (peace be upon him) as a necessity for the obligations to be given to him, and what belonged to him during his time belongs to the standing Imam after him. This is because Allah Almighty combined the Imamate with Prophethood for our Prophet, and this was not the case for most prophets. Rather, they had prophethood without Imamate. It has been proven that most of those who believe in the Imamate of the ruler of Baghdad do not attribute rights to him, and some people do not consider him worthy of it. So, if they do not surrender it to us out of

(1) "Houthi leader confesses: The group's supervisors sold the military effort for the 'cache'." Al-Masdar Online, January 19, 2021.

(2) "Post by a member of what is called the Houthi Supreme Revolutionary Committee, Mohammed Al-Muqalih, on his Twitter page." November 5, 2021.

(3) "Post by a member of what is called the Houthi Supreme Revolutionary Committee, Mohammed Al-Muqalih, on his Twitter page." December 29, 2017.

permissibility for delaying it, they would be considered disbelievers in that. What we wanted to clarify to you is the confirmation of evidence and its manifestation of the disbelief of most of the Ummah with clear and evident proofs. Consider this with a thoughtful eye to save yourself from confusion and regret, as most people fall into negligence in considering the consequences and ignorance of the impact, objecting to the Imams and scholars and calling them to themselves while rejecting the foundations of knowledge[1]."

Abdullah bin Hamza addresses all Muslims, including Sunnis who believe in the leadership of the Abbasid Caliph Ahmed Al-Mustadi' billah in Baghdad. He demands that they submit their zakat to him, and anyone who refuses to do so is considered a disbeliever. Based on this foundation, the Houthi leaders believe that any Yemeni who does not pay zakat to them is considered a disbeliever. However, they do not openly state this today; instead, they cloak the issue in legal terms. Those who refuse to pay zakat to them are considered lawbreakers, traitors, and agents. At the same time, they cannot deny the fatwa of excommunication issued by Abdullah bin Hamza.

Abdullah bin Hamza was asked about collecting taxes and zakat and forcing people to pay more than the required amount of zakat and taxes. The questioner said, "What is the evidence for the permissibility of taking taxes, fees in markets, and levies from traders and industrialists, and forcing farmers and others to pay more than the general zakat based on the Sunnah of the Prophet or the practices of the imams? I said, "The imam exaggerates in this matter." The objector says, "The existing verses refer to zakat, and the excess is recommended without compulsion." The objector also said, "The Prophet never forced any of his companions to pay more than the zakat, despite the urgent need for it and the abundance of wealth among some of them. This has been narrated from him by the predecessors."

He answered, "The answer to this question depends on its various aspects and ramifications. Does it allow the imam to take from the wealth what can defend the borders and improve the conditions of the majority? If that is permissible, then there is no valid question. But if it is not permissible, then its ruling remains, and the question remains valid. His statement that the Prophet and the imam after him have the authority to deal with the wealth and lives of Muslims in a way that serves their interests, and it is upon them to exert their efforts, and success is from Allah. Whatever his efforts lead to for the benefit of the religion, he is allowed to take it. But if he does not consider it beneficial, he does not take it out of respect for those who are above suspicion, and he is accused of that, he is not recorded in the register

(1) The total number of messages of Imam Mansur Billah Abdallah bin Hamza, Part One, previous source, page 166.

of the righteous among all Muslims.

So, we say with the help of Allah: The Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him and his family, wrote a document on the day of the Khandaq (Trench) for Uyaynah bin Hisn and his followers from the Ghatafan tribe, granting them one-third of the dates of Medina without the consultation of the Aws and Khazraj tribes. May Allah have mercy on them all. The document reached the two Sa'ds: Sa'd bin Ubada and Sa'd bin Mu'adh, among others, and they said, "O Messenger of Allah, is it a matter that Allah has ordered you with, so it is not permissible for us to leave it, or is it your opinion, so you have considered it for our sake?" He said, "Rather, I have considered it for your sake." They said, "O Messenger of Allah, by Allah, we used to worship idols, and they did not desire a date from their dates unless it was for villages or trade. How about now, while Allah has honored us with Islam and with you, O Messenger of Allah?" So, he gave them the document, and they tore it up. This report is agreed upon by the ummah (Muslim community) regarding its authenticity, and it is clear evidence that the ruler has the right to take people's wealth without their consent for the interests of the nation. The evidence from the report is that the Messenger of Allah, peace, and blessings be upon him and his family, was concerned about it and wanted to implement it until the people informed him of their strength and weakness, and he prevented them. His abstaining from it was not because it was not permissible, but because he, peace and blessings be upon him and his family, did not seek or want protection for himself except through what is permissible and not through what is forbidden. So, if it is permissible for the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him and his family, it is permissible for the imam after him. No one can differentiate between the ruling of the imam in dealing and the ruling of the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him and his family, except in what Allah has specified for prophethood[(1)]."

These Imamate fatwas explain the Houthis' collection of zakat and taxes from the residents of some villages and districts they have dominated in Sa’ada during the past decades, before they seized control of the city in 2011, because they do not recognize the state in Sana’a, as the elected president is not from the lineage that claims a divine right to rule. Moreover, they interpret the Houthis' multiplication of taxes, zakat, customs, and other services, as well as their forcible collection after seizing control of state institutions in the provincial capitals.

After the Houthis took control of the capital, Sana'a, in 2014, they did not leave a single revenue source of the state untouched. The United Nations stated in one of its reports that this group forcefully targeted the flow of

(1) Ibid. p. 203-204

Yemeni government revenues by taking control of private companies and government institutions.

In 2019, the Houthis increased their efforts to the extent that they left the recognized Yemeni government with very minimal revenues under the third chapter. By controlling these companies and institutions, the Houthis imposed expenses that directly affected their profits, leaving the Yemeni government in Aden with very minimal tax revenues(1).

In fact, the Houthis did not settle for the available revenues that the state used to collect. They implemented many oppressive measures to multiply the revenues they obtain. Instead of benefiting the Yemeni people, these actions worsened their living conditions even more, as these funds went to the benefit of the Houthi leadership and contributed to a record increase in prices of goods and services.

Previously, the General Administration of Zakat Duties operated within the organizational structures of local authorities in the provinces, distributing zakat to finance development projects within the same provinces from which the zakat was collected(2).

After the Houthis' seizure of Sana'a, an imposter posing as the Minister of Finance, Saleh Shaban, issued a decision directing the zakat revenues from local authority accounts to a special account in the Yemeni Central Bank, which is under their control in Sana'a, bypassing the Local Authority Law. On June 8, 2017, they issued a decision numbered (141) regarding the mechanism for collecting zakat from major taxpayers, which stipulated that the funds should be transferred to the special account in the Yemeni Central Bank, after previously being allocated to the benefit of local councils in the provinces(3). Previously, the residents of the provinces benefited from the zakat revenues, which represented 80% of the revenues relied upon by local authorities in all provinces. However, these funds now go to a special account in the Central Bank controlled by the Houthi leadership, who squander most of what is collected on sectarian activities, Houthi fighters, and supervisors.

The same applies to taxes, as they have turned the local authority taxes into a central authority under their control(4). This has resulted in depriving Yemenis of most of the services provided by local authorities through the utilization of local tax funds.

According to UN reports, in their first year, the Houthi group started developing their sources of income, including the following:

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(1) The Yemen Expert Group in 2021, previous reference, paragraph 92(A), page 38.

(2) Law No. 4 of 2000 regarding local authority, National Information Center website.

(3) Economic supervisors for its collection... This is why Houthi militias plunder Zakat funds, Samir Al-Sanani, News Yemen website, May 23, 2018.

(4) A letter dated January 27, 2017, addressed to the Security Council from the Yemen Expert Group, previous reference, paragraph 96(H), page 46.

- Customs duties from smugglers and profiteers in the black market.

- Imposing a 20% commercial tax on the sales of all commercial institutions and all civil service salaries, including the trade of qat, which represents 10% of the national GDP.

- Transforming local authority taxes into a central authority under the control of the Houthis.

- Imposing taxes amounting to 4 Yemeni rials per litter on all petroleum products, generating an amount of 59.3 billion Yemeni rials ($237 million) per year.

Exploiting mobile phone technology to collect funds, using weekly text messages to request money.

- Establishing new and different networks of agents and affiliates around the Houthis after the dissolution of the old ones(1).

They also worked on significantly increasing the rates of Zakat and taxes and establishing customs centers in several provinces and imposing what the United Nations called "mandatory donations," in addition to "illegal taxes" imposed on all traders and farmers under religious justifications(2).

The group implemented several changes in tax, customs, and Zakat laws and regulations in an attempt to legitimize the process of stealing money and ensure the highest revenue percentage for themselves.

On May 14, 2018, the Houthi group announced the establishment of what was called the General Authority for Zakat, which has become one of the most prominent sources of corruption in the country according to various reports.

The Yemeni government condemned this action and affirmed that it aims to abolish the Social Welfare Fund(3), which played a role in alleviating poverty in Yemen before the Houthis took control of Sana'a. They considered this authority as a new means of collecting money and using it in their war against Yemenis, and "it represents an additional burden that weighs on the citizens and increases their suffering(4)."

In another governmental stance, it was clarified that this illegal measure comes in the context of "the continued looting of public revenues by the Houthi group, the suspension of employees' salaries for four years, and the

(1) A letter dated January 27, 2017, addressed to the Security Council from the Yemen Expert Group, page 46.

(2) A letter dated January 22, 2016, addressed to the Security Council from the Yemen Expert Group, established in accordance with resolution 2140 (2014), paragraph 94, page 38.

(3) The Yemeni Social Welfare Fund was established in 1996 under Law No. 31 of 1996 and has been operational since 1997. Its activities have significantly increased due to the growing number of social groups living below the poverty line.

(4) Statement by the Minister of Social Affairs and Labor, Deputy Head of the Supreme Relief Committee, Dr. Ibtihaj Al-Kamal, Yemeni News Agency Saba, June 1, 2018.

worsening living conditions and humanitarian suffering of citizens in the areas under their control[1]."

The Houthi Zakat Authority imposed an increase in the value of Zakat al-Fitr (charity given at the end of Ramadan) on individuals in the areas under their control from 300 to 500 Yemeni rials per person in 2018. In 2021, it reached 550 Yemeni rials, and in 2022, it increased to 700 Yemeni rials. This is despite the difficult living conditions that Yemenis are experiencing due to the war and the policy of starvation. Not content with this step, they also obligated all government institutions, public sector companies, and mixed-sector companies to deduct Zakat from all employees and their families. This measure was not in place before the war, and individuals have the freedom to choose how to pay Zakat, and it is not forcibly taken from them.

This amount is forcibly taken at a time when most government employees in their controlled areas have been without salaries for years, except for receiving half a salary every five or six months.

As for families who do not have anyone working in government institutions or mixed-sector companies, they must submit Zakat according to the new percentage to supervisors and neighborhood leaders appointed by the Houthis to be delivered to their affiliated entities. Those who refuse to hand over the money are classified as not recognizing the rule of the Houthis, and a series of intimidation, mobilization, demonization, and incitement against them begins. This has led thousands of families to borrow money to pay Zakat to the Houthis, enduring the hardship and injustice imposed upon them.

In 2019, the group approved legal changes in the tax and Zakat sectors, allowing them to loot the money of traders and small business owners by redefining import and sales amounts to increase the number of high taxpayers. Previously, the volume of imports and sales for high-taxpayers was set at 200 million Yemeni rials (about 800,000 dollars), but they reduced it to 100 million in their new law, which multiplies the number of high-taxpayers by twenty.

According to these changes, traders were divided into three categories: high-taxpayers, medium-taxpayers whose capital exceeds ten million Yemeni rials but does not exceed forty million, in addition to small taxpayers who own less than ten million Yemeni rials. These are often owners of shops and small projects.

This measure contributed to increasing the number of high taxpayers from around 1,300 individuals to over 25,000, mostly small traders who were not previously included in the law. This means more money going to

(1) A tweet by the Minister of Information, Muammar Al-Iryani, on Twitter, published in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper, May 31, 2019.

the Houthi treasury[1], while negatively affecting citizens by causing a rise in commodity prices, especially food and medicine, for which traders pay high taxes and Zakat to the Houthis.

The authority did not spare any project from doubling the imposed levies on it in the name of Zakat, despite objections from individuals of various wealth levels. For example, dozens of quarry owners in Sana'a staged a protest in front of the Zakat Duties building, demanding an end to the continuous extortion they face[2].

The protesters stated that they are suffering from the measures imposed on them by the Zakat Authority, which demanded additional financial amounts beyond the specified Zakat obligations that they are committed to paying according to Islamic law. They added in their statement: "We buy from landowners, and this is done through official contracts. We already pay a significant amount for that, and now we are being asked to pay again for Zakat duties. We also pay the Geological Survey Authority because it is devoid of residential areas. All of this has led to the exhaustion of quarry owners, with most of them ceasing operations, and some are still working without making any profits. The quarry owners are left with only around 200 Yemeni rials in return for 1,500 Yemeni rials paid to the Zakat Authority and the Geological Survey Authority, and sometimes the quarry owner sells at a loss[3]."

Reports issued by the Houthi Zakat Authority indicated that the Zakat revenues for the capital city of Sana'a alone during the year 2020 amounted to approximately 5.214 billion Yemeni rials (around 8.69 million dollars), an increase of 73 percent compared to 2019. In the areas under Houthi control in the Taiz Governorate, which hosts the largest private industrial complex in Yemen, the Houthis collected cash Zakat revenues of around 894 million Yemeni rials (approximately 1.49 million dollars) and 900 cups of grains during the year 2020, an increase of 214 percent compared to 2019[4].

On April 18, 2021, the Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Sana'a, under Houthi control, issued a press statement condemning what it described as "arbitrary measures" against the private sector by the Houthi group, represented by the General Authority for Zakat,

(1) "Houthi Zakat" - A sword hanging over the heads of Yemenis, Sky News Arabic, published on May 9, 2019.

(2) Crushers are factories that occupy a large area of land, where massive machinery is used to crush stones extracted from mountains, which are then sold and exported to building material factories and citizens.

(3) Dozens of crusher owners demand corrective measures against arbitrary government actions, Al-Marsad News, April 8, 2021.

(4) Houthi persecution of Yemeni merchants: Seizing Zakat exacerbates living conditions, Zakaria Al-Kamali - Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, published on April 22, 2021.

which conducted a field campaign that involved "sending armed teams, security, and intelligence personnel to demand the private sector to submit their database or close their shops."

The campaign aimed to double the Zakat funds imposed on private sector institutions, despite their commitment to paying what is required according to the statement of the Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry, which considered these measures arbitrary and in violation of "the noble provisions of Islamic law and contrary to the laws."

On the day following the the Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry's statement, the Houthis stormed several companies and financial institutions, including Shumlan Mineral Water Company and City Max Mall, one of the largest shopping malls in Sana'a. They attacked the employees, destroyed surveillance screens and cameras, and expelled shoppers who happened to be there, then closed it down and prevented its owners from reopening it(1).

Under the measures implemented by the Houthis under the name of the "Zakat beneficiaries' data update project," traders and businessmen were prohibited from disposing of the Zakat, which the private sector used to directly distribute to the poor during the month of Ramadan every year.

During the years of war, I have spoken to many owners of small, medium, and large businesses, and everyone agrees that the Houthis not only demand Zakat but also want to be partners in their businesses, sharing their profits or turning them into mere workers in their projects, taking the majority of their profits forcibly in the name of Zakat, taxes, obligations, military effort, and other justifications for plunder.

At the end of the month of Ramadan in the year 1442 AH - 2021 CE, some sources estimated that the group collected 11 billion Yemeni rials from Zakat on individuals, while they estimated what they collected from the Zakat resources on money and gold to be over 100 billion Yemeni rials(2).

Where is the Zakat money spent?

To answer such this question, it should be noted that the Houthi group enacted racist changes to the executive regulations of Zakat on June 8, 2020, granting the so-called "Hashemites" what is known as the "Khums," which is 20 percent of all public and private wealth in Yemen. They based this on a religious claim that obliges taking one-fifth of the wealth of Muslims, and

(1) Houthi appetite for taxation closes one of the largest shopping malls in the capital, Capital Online News, April 20, 2021.

(2) The Houthi militia deprived the poor of 11 billion rials, 2 December Agency website, published on May 27, 2021.

that it is a mandatory duty on every Muslim for those who call themselves "Ahl al-Bayt" (the Hashemites) because Zakat and charity are forbidden for them, as they describe them as "people's filth."

However, in addition to seizing all revenue sources in the country, they take the Khums and Zakat funds, as we will explain with clear evidence.

On September 26, 2020, the "Yemen Site" website, managed by the well-known journalist and writer Nabil Sabee, published one of the most important reports that clearly indicate the fate of a portion of the Zakat funds collected by the Houthis. The report revealed that it obtained 48 records that contain names of individuals who received funds and trusts from what the Houthis call the "General Authority for Zakat," including check numbers, dates of disbursement, and the beneficiaries during the first half of 2019 alone.

According to the documents, the group disbursed 620 checks to a number of prominent and known Houthi leaders, as well as others whose identities are unknown but are believed to be from large Hashemite families, according to their titles mentioned in the records. The sizes of the checks and the amounts they received indicate that they have influence within the group. These checks carried hundreds of millions of Yemeni rials of Zakat funds during the mentioned period(1).

Here are some details that reveal the fate of the Zakat funds collected by the Houthis, according to the mentioned report:

- On April 30, 2019, the head of the so-called Supreme Revolutionary Committee, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, received a check for twenty million rials.

- On June 15, 2019, Youssef al-Madani, the second military leader in the Houthi group after the group's leader "Abdul-Malik" and the husband of the founder's daughter, Hussein, received a check for 50 million rials.

- On the same day, June 15, 2019, Houthi leader Amin al-Madani received a check for 100 million rials.

- On June 18, 2019, a check for 50 million and 400 thousand rials was disbursed from Zakat funds to Mohammed Ahmed Al-Ayani.

- On March 13, 2019, a check for two million and ten thousand rials was disbursed to Mahmoud Mokbil Al-Sharafi.

- On April 22, 2019, a check for five million rials was disbursed as "assistance to scholars" without indicating their identities. However, the identities of the two individuals for whom the check was issued and considered were Hussein Ahmed Al-Ayani and Ahsan Mohsen Shaafal.

- On April 28, 2019, Shams al-Din Mohammed Sharaf al-Din, the Houthi's mufti, received a check for 3.5 million rials.

(1) Where does the Yemeni Zakat go? Yemen Site, September 26, 2020.

- On June 18, 2019, Ahmed Saeed Majli received a check for two million and 330 thousand rials, which was for the beneficiary "Mohammed Ahmed Miftah," one of the extremist Houthi leaders who was sentenced to eight years in prison for spying for Iran in May 2005.

- On May 19, 2019, Mahmoud Mokbil Al-Sharafi received a check for 600 thousand rials based on a request submitted by Mohammed Miftah.

- On March 5, 2019, 4 million rials were disbursed to Ahmed Mohammed Al-Dailami.

- On the same month, the 28th, Ahmed Al-Dailami received a check for 4 million rials.

- On May 28, 2019, Ahmed Al-Dailami received a check for 4 million rials.

- On February 19, 2019, Naif Saleh Saleh received a check for 15 million rials from Zakat funds as "assistance to the Badr School Center," which is one of the well-known sectarian Houthi centers in Sana'a.

- On the same day, February 19, Hamza Abdullah Al-Murtada received a check for 3.375 million rials in the name of "Beit Al-Sayyid Center." The center is a well-known sectarian religious center in Bani Hashish district, Sana'a Governorate.

- On March 20, 2019, Mahmoud Mokbil Al-Sharafi received a check for 7.6 million rials.

- On March 27, 2019, the educational center affiliated with the Houthi religious authority, "Ahmed Darham," received a check for 4 million rials from "Ahsan Mohsen Saleh Shaafal."

- On April 22, 2019, "Naif Saleh Saleh" received a check for 400,000 rials for the restoration of the "Imam Zaid Center in Al-Jawf." The center is a sectarian Houthi center, and the check was issued upon the request of "Abdul Qader Ahmed Abdullah Al-Mahris."

- On May 4, 2019, Naif Saleh, referred to as the "Director of Supplies," received a check for 10 million rials for the "completion of the Badr Center" mentioned earlier.

- On May 6, 2019, Hussein Ahmed Al-Ayani received a check for 4 million rials.

- The next day, May 7, Al-Ayani himself received a check for 2 million rials.

- On January 3, 2019, the "Yemen Stability Development Foundation" received a check for 50 million rials.

- On April 22, 2019, Hussein Abdulwahab Hussein Al-Qadi received a check for 30 million rials.

- On April 27, 2019, Hassan Ghanem Salem Al-Badri received a check for 5 million rials in the name of "Yemen Stability."

- On May 19, Mahmoud Mokbil Al-Sharafi, on behalf of "Yemen

Stability," received a check for 375.9 million rials, which is more than a third of a billion.

- After about two weeks, specifically on June 2, Hussein Abdullah Yahya Al-Wazir received a check for 230 million rials, which is approximately a quarter of a billion, in the name of the "Yemen Stability Foundation." Thus, the "Yemen Stability Development Foundation" received 655 million rials from Zakat funds, which is more than half a billion, in just 4 days.

- On May 8, the organization "Bayan" received a check for 100 million rials.

- On June 11, the same organization received a check for 150 million rials. Thus, the Bayan organization received a quarter of a billion rials from Zakat funds in just two days during the first half of 2019.

- On May 5, 2019, Mohammed Yahya Saleh Al-Soumali received a check for 1.25 million rials in the name of "Afaq" radio, managed by Ali Al-Sharafi.

- On May 23, 2019, Mahmoud Mokbil Al-Sharafi received a check for 2.5 million rials in the name of "Watan" radio, managed by the Houthi singer Abdul Azim Azaldin.

Based on these details, it can be summarized as follows:

The information provided in the report published by "Yemen Site" is considered a small sample of the disbursement mechanisms, individuals, and entities to which the funds are disbursed. This data are a simple sample of documents showing the disbursement of Zakat funds during the first half of 2019 only.

The Houthis claim that Islamic religion prohibits the Hashemite families from taking Zakat funds, and they have described them as "the filth of the people." In return, they impose what is called "Al-Khums" (one-fifth) on the people. However, they take Zakat funds and distribute them among the Hashemite families, as stated in this report.

The Houthis provide large sums of money only to religious figures who follow them.

All the names mentioned in the report as recipients of the funds belong to the Hashemite ethnicity. There are no Yemenis from other groups unless they act as intermediaries for the benefit of individuals or people from the Hashemite group in Yemen.

The Houthis use a significant portion of Zakat funds, collected from Yemenis of various backgrounds, to support Houthi sectarian centers. These centers are usually used to recruit fighters, including children, erase the Yemeni identity, and spread Iranian beliefs, which further escalates the war.

The Houthis spend Zakat funds only on the mosques that belong to them.

7) The Houthis spend Zakat funds on Houthi organizations and

associations, which exploit the aid to push poor families to recruit their members, including children, or to spread Houthi beliefs among these families.

8) The Houthis spend Zakat funds on their media outlets, which are used for sectarian mobilization, propaganda, and spreading the Imamate/Iranian ideology.
9) Zakat funds are used to serve the sectarian/ethnic project militarily, culturally, and politically, often depriving the poor in Yemen of these substantial funds.

New Customs Centers:

The Houthis have established new customs centers in ports where goods from areas under the control of the Yemeni government pass through to increase the amount of revenues going to the Houthis' treasury.

On May 28, 2016, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi appointed Yahya Mohammed Abdullah al-Ashtai as the deputy of the Customs Authority in Sana'a. He was tasked with "implementing illegal mechanisms and collecting customs fees for the benefit of entities and individuals acting on behalf of and under the control of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi(1)."

Customs center in Harf Sufyan (Amran Governorate), and a center in Al-Jawf, and a center in Afaar and a center in Rad'a (Al-Bayda Governorate), and a center in Jabal Rass (Al-Hodeidah Governorate), and a center in Maytam and a center in Al-Hazm (Ibb Governorate), and a center in Al-Rahidah and a center in Saqam and a center in Ras Al-Rajm (Taiz Governorate), and a center in Amran and a center for control in Dhamar, and the Revolution Stadium center and the May 22 center and the People's Customs center and the Shu'ab Customs center (Sana’a), and the Customs and Control Center in Hajjah Governorate(2), and other customs centers and checkpoints aimed at doubling customs revenues "and imposing additional customs duties on imported goods coming from areas under the control of the Yemeni government(3)".

A UN report has indicated that "the Houthis illegally collect fees and additional customs duties from traders in their land customs centers. It has been found that fuel supply activity to areas under Houthi control is highly profitable for many, and consumers bear the cost." It noted that the Houthis obtained "official revenues from fuel imports (i.e., customs duties and other

(1) The Yemen Expert Group 2018, previous reference, paragraph 131, page 45.
(2) A human rights report titled "Barriers of Fear and Deceptive Media" documents Houthi violations related to the right to freedom of movement and mobility, from January 2015 to December 2021, issued by the Sam for Rights and Freedoms organization.
(3) The Yemen Expert Group 2018, previous reference, paragraph 130, page 45.

taxes through the port of Hodeidah) exceeding 70 billion Yemeni rials" during six months[1].

Like other economic measures by the Houthis, the gradual increase in customs duties at the port of Hodeidah and the establishment of new customs centers at the entrances to areas under Houthi control have led to an increase in the prices of all goods and commodities, whether essential (such as food, medicine, and medical supplies) or luxury goods and construction tools. This is what the UN report means by saying "consumers bear the cost" behind the Houthi measures, which have caused some traders to stop importing essential goods and have led others to transfer their capital abroad and conduct their business outside Yemen, negatively affecting the economic landscape in the country despite warnings from businessmen about the continued implementation of these measures.

In Sana'a, Traders have complained greatly about these measures, which some have described as deadly, paving the way for an outrageous wave of inflation that has affected citizens, especially middle-income families. This has been accompanied by a sharp decline in the value of the local currency to unprecedented levels in a country where its inhabitants largely rely on imported goods. The merchant Yahya Al-Ashti commented on these measures, saying, "The goods come out of the warehouses (inside the country) and are transported to your shops in Hodeidah or Dhamar... Everyone wants customs duties. What is the fault of the merchant? From where? Everyone wants customs duties. And the looters, who have no connection either with customs or with the state, they are thieves[2]."

Similarly, the businessman and vice president of the Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry in the capital Sana'a, Mohammed Salah, appealed to the Houthis to stop these measures due to their danger to the country's economy and Yemeni citizens. He said, "We say fear God, reconsider your calculations, do not oppress traders. It will result in a shortage of all goods. They will stop importing or leave the country. There is no country in the world that seeks to displace or destroy national capital, except in these days, by the customs authority[3]."

In a failed attempt to dissuade the Houthis from these destructive economic decisions, the Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Sana'a issued a statement stating that what the Customs Authority is doing is nothing but extortion and illegitimate collection,

(1) A report issued by the Yemen Expert Groups presented to the Security Council on January 25, 2022, page 43, paragraphs 88-89.

(2) A flash report by the Yemeni Media Observatory titled "Houthi Levies Exacerbate Poverty," published on February 2, 2017.

(3) A news report on the Yemen Today channel discusses a comprehensive meeting addressing the challenges faced by businessmen in Yemen due to Houthi customs procedures, published on YouTube on March 1, 2017.

especially considering the current conditions in our country. The statement also highlighted the hardships and risks that traders endure to provide essential goods and meet the needs of citizens, and the complete lack of security and safety requirements in most vital areas of the republic. Instead of sympathizing with members of the commercial and industrial sectors and encouraging them to continue, the Customs Authority responds to the resilience and patience of traders with insane measures and significant and illegitimate levies in every city and point, without considering even the simplest constitutional and legal requirements. They claim that these measures are aimed at replenishing the state treasury, even if it means using unlawful means. We appeal to the President and members of the Supreme Political Council, as well as the Prime Minister (Houthi), and we rely on them to stop the madness and recklessness of the Customs Authority, as the consequences will be severe for the entire society(1).

On an official level, the Yemeni government warned against the establishment of new customs ports at the entrances of Sana'a, Taiz, Dhamar, Ibb, and several other provinces under their control. They emphasized that the Houthi militia's action to force thousands of trailers, trucks, and all commercial and relief transportation to go through all customs procedures again, including inspection, examination, and valuation, and imposing new fees amounting to 100 percent, contributes significantly to increasing the burdens on traders and the population in those provinces. Such illegal points and ports will exacerbate the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in those provinces. The humanitarian situation cannot tolerate further harassment and abuses against citizens(2).

Despite years passing since the implementation of these measures, traders' rejection of these procedures continues, especially as customs ports increase customs fees every year. Disputes have erupted multiple times between traders and truck drivers transporting goods across Yemeni cities and employees at Houthi-controlled customs ports, resulting in the killing and detention of several drivers by the Houthis.

In early February 2021, cement truck drivers completely went on strike, protesting the imposition of additional customs fees on locally produced cement in areas under the control of the Yemeni government. This contributed to raising cement prices in the local market(3).

The Houthi customs authorities have exceeded their collection of customs duties on imported goods from abroad by imposing customs fees on

(1) Learn about the complaint of Sana’a traders about the Houthis' arbitrary actions (statement), Yemen Al-Arabi, February 22, 2017.

(2) Statement by the Minister of Local Administration and Chairman of the Supreme Relief Committee, Abdul Raqeeb Fateh, Saba News Agency, February 19, 2018.

(3) Cement truck drivers to Houthi-controlled areas go on strike to protest the imposition of customs fees by the militia, Al-Masdar Online, published on April 5, 2021.

local agricultural goods and products transported between provinces under Houthi control. This forces traders to add these fees to the total costs of production and transportation of goods and crops, ultimately leading to price increases for citizens.

Similarly, they imposed customs duties on furniture or gifts belonging to citizens rather than commercial goods. Many families who were moving from one province to another were forced to pay fees to allow the truck carrying their furniture to pass. To illustrate the extent of this group's greed, the newly established customs center in Dhamar province-imposed customs duties on personal gifts such as "Halawiyat Al-Abd(1)" that Yemenis returning from the Arab Republic of Egypt were carrying to their homes in Sana'a, according to a journalist colleague who personally told me.

According to data published on their official websites by the Houthis, these customs centers have provided the group with revenues estimated in billions of Yemeni rials within a few months. For example, customs revenues obtained from some importers exceeded 79 billion Yemeni rials for the years 2016-2017 and the period from January to June 2018(2). The revenue from vehicle registration and machinery alone at the customs checkpoint in Sana'a was over 4.71 billion Yemeni rials in less than a year(3). Furthermore, the revenues generated by some other customs centers during the period from January to June 2017 reached 5.122 billion rials(4). Based on these figures, which reflect the amount of money the Houthis have collected from customs revenues over a few months, one can estimate the scale of the funds they have accumulated during the years of the war without meeting their obligations towards Yemenis or paying government employees' salaries, at the very least. Instead, they have used these funds for military operations and enriching their leaders(5).

Mobile Vendors' Carts

Mobile vendors' carts are only resorted to by the poorest segments in Yemen, whether in small markets or by itinerant sellers. However, even this group has not been spared from the Houthis' extortion and demands. They have carried out a process of numbering carts in some markets in Sana'a in

(1) Sweets purchased from "Hilwani Al-Abd" shops in Cairo to be presented as gifts in Yemen upon travelers' return.

(2) Meeting with the Central Inspection Authority to discuss the reports on Customs Revenue Review, National Information Center under Houthi control, January 7, 2019.

(3) More than 4 billion and 710 million revenues from vehicle registration in Sana'a Customs Control, Al-Thawra Net under Houthi control, September 11, 2017.

(4) Holding the first consultative meeting for the Customs Authority leadership and customs control centers, Saba News Agency under Houthi control, July 6, 2017.

(5) Sam for Rights and Freedoms organization, previous reference.

exchange for one thousand Yemeni rials per cart. They also attempted to impose monthly taxes on them, but these measures were met with strong rejection, forcing the Houthis to postpone this step[1].

This process indicates the greed and insatiable desire of this group to devise methods to exploit society in such difficult conditions that Yemen is experiencing due to the war. Parliamentarians in Sana'a condemned this process, as it targets one of the weakest and poorest social groups[2].

Manufacturing Fuel Crises and the Black Market:

From time to time, illegal fuel trade (diesel and gasoline) would emerge in Yemen as soon as these products disappeared from the markets. However, these were temporary practices carried out by individuals seeking quick profit or small criminal gangs operating outside the law. They would sell their fuel stocks secretly at higher prices compared to the official prices set by the government. Once the authorities conducted campaigns to arrest fuel traders and provided fuel at its official price, these practices would cease. Similar practices occur in many countries.

However, we are talking here about an organized and permanent black market established by the Houthi group, which is considered a de facto authority. They control the affairs of Yemenis in the areas under their control since they dominate the political, security, military, and economic institutions of the state.

The first step towards legitimizing the black market for fuel in the country was represented by a decision issued by what was called the Supreme Revolutionary Committee[3], the Houthi group, on July 28, 2015. The decision floated the prices of petroleum products, linking the selling prices to the fluctuating global stock market prices, abandoning the support for petroleum products, and allowing the private sector to import petroleum products[4].

This step was sufficient to expose the falsehood and propaganda of the Houthis. The same group that made the decision to completely remove the support for petroleum products in 2015 is the one that seized control of the capital and other provinces under the pretext of fighting corruption,

(1) A video of one of the children working on a cart in Ali Mohsen Market in the capital Sana'a, confirming that the Houthis took 1,000 rials in exchange for giving them a number for the cart, published on the Yemen Republic channel on YouTube on November 4, 2019.

(2) A speech by parliamentarian Abdo Beshir in the parliament hall, published on YouTube.

(3) The Houthis assigned the Supreme Revolutionary Committee led by Mohammed Ali al-Houthi the task of supervising and managing the affairs of the areas under their control following their coup on February 6, 2015.

(4) The Houthis decide to float the prices of oil derivatives, Al Jazeera Net, published on July 28, 2015.

reducing prices, and ending the economic suffering of the people.

Prior to the Houthi "floatation" decision, the process of importing and supplying petroleum products to the local market was limited to the government, represented by the Yemen Petroleum Company(1). However, this decision opened the door for Houthi leaders(2) to establish multiple companies for oil imports and to generate profits outside of state institutions. They also gained control over the distribution process of petroleum products in the local market. Additionally, they facilitated the arrival of Iranian oil, which is sent as support for the Houthis under the guise of Houthi traders, to be sold on the black market at inflated prices. The revenues are then used to support combat operations, buy loyalties, and enrich Houthi leaders, as mentioned in the section on Iranian support for the Houthis.

The report of the UN panel of experts, which was issued in 2019, is considered one of the most important international reports that highlighted the Houthis' control over the fuel market and their control over the distribution process, as well as their exploitation of this vital commodity to support combat operations. Among the oil companies established by the Houthis after their control of Sana'a, mentioned in the experts' reports, are "Yemen Life" owned by Abdul-Salam Salah Fletah (the official spokesperson for the Houthis and the chairman of the board of directors of the Houthi-run Al-Masirah TV network), "Oil Primer" owned by the contraband merchant Dughshan Mohammed Dughshan, "Black Gold" owned by Ali Qarsha, "Yemen Elaf," "Oil Premier," and "Black Gold," in addition to two additional companies, "Wheelers" as a front for Oil Primer, and "Balad al Khairat" operating as a sales agent for Black Gold. These companies are mentioned in the twelfth figure of the network associated with these companies(3).

The fuel trade is considered one of the most important sources of support for the Houthi group, as well as for armed militias in Iraq and Syria. Fuel is a strategic and essential commodity with a high demand and turnover rate, and it generates significant profits. Militias benefit from trading in hard currency for fuel imports.

The Houthis have achieved financial, political, and military gains through this decision by engaging in the following practices:

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(1) According to the regulatory regulations of the Ministry of Oil and Minerals issued by Republican Decree No. 40 of 2000, the Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) is an economic unit working for the General Oil and Gas Corporation under the Ministry of Oil and Minerals in Yemen. The company manages the marketing mix of petroleum products to ensure the supply of local market needs for petroleum derivatives and provide them to consumers at fixed and uniform prices.

(2)A letter dated January 25, 2019, addressed to the President of the Security Council from the team of experts concerned with Yemen, p. 40.

(3) Experts' Report 2019, previous source, p. 40, 41.

- Establishing private oil trading companies owned by Houthi leaders, including the group's spokesperson, Abdul-Salam Fletah (also known as Mohammed Abdul-Salam).

- Monopolizing the oil market in the areas under their control, which helps them control the distribution process of petroleum products in the local market. They exploit this financially, politically, militarily, and sectarianly, such as buying loyalties and mobilizing fighters in exchange for petroleum products.

- Providing cover for Iranian funding to the Houthis, part of which comes in the form of oil sold on the black market for the benefit of the group(1).

- Engaging in currency speculation for fuel imports.

- Importing fuel from unknown sources that does not meet the standard specifications in Yemen and selling it to citizens at inflated prices in the black market.

The Houthis have absolute control over the fuel market in the areas they dominate. Whenever they need funds, they prevent its sale in official stations at the official price, which they have doubled since their control over Sana'a. In return, black-market traders affiliated with them are allowed to sell fuel. This directly and indirectly contributes to the worsening suffering of Yemenis, as prices of food, services, transportation within cities and between provinces, and electricity rise significantly. Moreover, this step depletes the Yemeni people's reserves of valuable assets and cash liquidity, according to economic analysts. Mohammed Rajeh stated that "the black market established and overseen by the Houthis is the one that drained cash liquidity from the market, and this in itself is a war crime and aggression. The problem is that they continue to drain the remaining currency(2)."

On September 6, 2020, the Houthis closed Sana'a International Airport to international and humanitarian flights under the pretext of a lack of petroleum derivatives, which are used to operate the airport(3). This step was one of many deliberate Houthi measures to starve Yemenis and deprive them of their needs, using it as part of their political and military blackmail policy(4).

During that period specifically, petroleum derivatives were available in large quantities in the stores, tanks, and Houthi-controlled facilities and

(1) Experts' Report 2019, previous source, p. 40.

(2) Yemen... Houthis Construct Parallel Entity Benefitting War Merchants, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, October 30, 2016.

(3) Due to Fuel Shortages... Houthis Decide to Close Sana’a Airport to International Flights, Al Jazeera Net, September 6, 2020.

(4) The Houthis closed Sana’a Airport again in mid-March 2021, claiming a shortage of petroleum derivatives, at a time when the main city streets were filled with petroleum products. (Source: The website of the Yemeni news agency under Houthi control).

stations. Yemenis witnessed with their own eyes Houthi warehouses burning in Sana'a, Sa'ada, Dhamar, Ibb, and other areas more than once, while the Houthi militia claimed that oil was not available in the markets and prevented its arrival at hospitals and institutions serving citizens(1).

The Houthis claim that petroleum derivatives are not available in their controlled areas from time to time, and because of that, they closed Sana'a Airport to essential relief aid needed by Yemenis and deprived hospitals of their sufficient fuel allocations on multiple occasions. However, at the same time, they sell it in the black market at multiples of its official price and wage a comprehensive war on Yemenis to seize control of Bayda, Marib, and Al-Jawf. This war undoubtedly relies primarily and significantly on petroleum derivatives.

Parliamentarian Abdo Bashir, who was present in Sana'a and spoke under the dome of the Houthi-controlled parliament, explained that the Houthi group fabricates petroleum crisis and suffocates the lives of Yemenis under the pretext of "aggression." He said, "Yesterday, I saw the oil company announce that the coalition is holding five ships. My brother (referring to the oil company), you have eight ships that you couldn't unload in the oil tanks in Hodeidah because the tanks are full of oil," describing the Houthi group's fabrication of petroleum crises as "aggression."

In another parliamentary session, he said: "The existing warehouses and stations filled with petroleum derivatives and household gas are located in Omran Street, in such and such places. They are full, and the Minister and the directors of the oil and gas company are aware of it... He mentioned that there is not a single rial imposed on gas... Three million, O Minister of Oil, are imposed in Afar and Sufyan on each oil tanker, and despite that, they are prevented from entering... And I am responsible for my words, and the merchant, the minister, and the company know it(2)."

What the parliamentarian Bashir referred to was revealed by investigative journalism supported by documents, including what was published by Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed newspaper in March 2017 as part of a series of investigations into corruption in the Yemen Petroleum company under Houthi control.

The report, based on a document issued by "Krojaz Yemen Limited" company on October 10, 2016, addressed to Mahmoud Al-Junaid, the director of the Houthi-controlled Presidency Office, Saleh Al-Sammad, the president of the Houthi Political Council, and Ali Al-Taifi, the executive

(1) In Sana'a: Fuel Crisis... and Fires in Black Fuel Markets (Photos and Video), published on the Al-Sahel Al-Gharbi website, on March 16, 2021.

(2) Abdo Beshir Reveals Part of the Corruption of the Militias and Their Trade in Petroleum Derivatives, published as part of a news report broadcast on the Yemen Today satellite channel and posted on their YouTube channel on November 2, 2019.

director of the Yemen Petroleum Company in Sana'a. The document stated that ships loaded with imported petroleum derivatives remain for months at the depths of the ports of Hodeidah and Salif without the Houthi-controlled oil company emptying them into its tanks.

The document from "Krojaz" directed to the Houthis added that the company requested "the necessity of receiving and unloading the shipments present at the depths of Hodeidah for a year, but to no avail." On the other hand, petroleum derivative ships belonging to some traders are sold directly in the black market after unloading them in the Yemeni ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Isa(1).

The Yemeni government's Supreme Economic Council, in turn, has refuted the Houthi lies on this matter on multiple occasions, proving that the fuel crises are "fabricated to promote the black market by the Houthis." For example, the council published data on the flow of fuel to Yemen during the period from January to August 2020, showing a 13% increase compared to 2019, with a total of 3,260,443 tons.

The council indicated that the share of areas under Houthi control accounted for about 53% of the imported fuel quantity to Yemen, of which 73% entered through the port of Hodeidah and 27% through land routes, sufficient to meet local needs for 10 months without any crises.

During the period from October 2019 to August 2020, 36 fuel ships entered the port of Hodeidah, with more than half of their cargo going to areas under the control of the Houthi militia, which continued to fabricate crises throughout that period and exploited the claims of a blockade to increase fuel prices by 150%(2).

International reports have highlighted the deprivation of Yemenis from petroleum derivatives for the purpose of selling them in the Houthi-controlled black market in multiple locations. Among these reports, the UN panel's submission to the Security Council stands out. It confirms an "escalating pattern" of fuel imports into Houthi-controlled areas via Hodeidah port since June 2020. This directly contradicts the Houthis' claims of restricting access to this critical resource, a tactic allegedly used to force residents onto the black market and further worsen the plight of Yemenis.

The United Nations, under the title "Fuel Sales in the Black Market and the Imposition of Illegal Fees on Imports," states that a significant change has been observed in the pattern of fuel imports through the port of Hodeidah since June 2020, with around 10,000 tons of fuel entering Houthi-

(1) With Documents... How Oil Corruption Expanded in Yemen After the Houthi Coup, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, published on March 17, 2017.

(2) Houthis Create Crisis to Boost the Black Market... Economic Council: Fuel Imports Cover Yemen's Needs Until the End of October, published on Al-Masdar Online website, September 5, 2020.

controlled areas via land routes in April and May 2021, representing approximately 65% of the fuel imported to Yemen. In contrast, oil supplies between January and March 2021 amounted to approximately 6,000 tons, indicating an "upward trend" in fuel imports, which means that the Houthis are "creating an artificial scarcity of fuel to compel traders to sell it in the black market they manage and collect illegal fees imposed on sales[1]."[2]

On March 17, 2021, a spokesperson for the Houthis and prominent Houthi leaders involved in oil and the black market claimed that the areas under their control were besieged. They alleged that the legitimate government and the Arab coalition were preventing the entry of oil into these areas to incite the Yemeni people against them[3]. Meanwhile, videos circulated among Yemenis showing Houthi elements pouring gasoline and diesel on the ground at checkpoints that separate government-controlled areas from Houthi-controlled areas. The Houthis had blocked citizens from bringing petroleum products from liberated Yemeni provinces into the provinces under their control.

While the Houthi group claimed to be under siege and accused others of blocking the entry of petroleum products, they themselves prevented citizens from purchasing petroleum products sold in government-controlled areas. They threatened punishment for anyone who attempted to bring oil from legitimate government areas without their involvement and labeled them as smugglers.

The group launched intensive media campaigns and erected banners in the streets of Sana'a to urge citizens not to buy petroleum products from Al-Jawf, Marib, Aden, and the western coast at official prices, so they could sell their stock at black market prices. Moreover, they prevented the supply of petroleum products to residents in legitimate government areas but sent their elements to these areas to purchase petroleum products at official prices, which they would then sell in their controlled areas at black market prices.

In response to the statements made by black market trader Mohammed Abdul Salam, the Supreme Economic Council refuted his lies by publishing data confirming that "the quantities of fuel imported through all Yemeni ports during the first quarter of 2021 amounted to 1,053,377 metric tons, of which approximately 59% went to areas under Houthi control." The council also stated that more than 70 billion Yemeni rials were looted by the

(1) Report of the Yemen Expert Group 2022, source cited previously, page 43, paragraph 88.

(2) To reduce the smuggling of Iranian oil to the Houthis, which is often sold to citizens at black market prices, the Yemeni government, in 2021, decided to reduce the percentage of fuel ships entering through the port of Hodeidah. The percentage had reached 48% before June 2020, while intensifying the entry of petroleum products overland through liberated areas.

(3) Interview broadcast on March 17, 2021, with Al-Jazeera's "Without Borders" program hosted by journalist Jalal Shahda.

Houthis from fuel import revenues, with no humanitarian or civilian impact on the lives of citizens(1).

And it was only a few days after the clarifications of the Supreme Economic Council in response to the lies of the Houthi spokesperson that fuel was made available at all official stations, but not at its official price. It was sold for 11,500 Yemeni rials, after it was only 4,000 Yemeni rials in 2014.

To push citizens to buy from the Houthi black market, the group implemented a series of practices. One of the most prominent practices was forcing fuel station owners to operate only one gasoline pump to supply hundreds of vehicles that had been waiting for days to get fuel, even though the smallest station has at least 3-6 pumps. Additionally, the selling hours of the stations were limited to resemble half of the official working hours. Sales were distributed daily according to the militias' conditions, with four hours in the morning and four hours in the evening(2).

Black-Market Princes Assassinate the Journalist Mohammed Al-Abssi:

The Houthis assassinated the well-known investigative journalist Mohammed Al-Abssi by poisoning him on December 21, 2016, after he had proven in multiple investigative reports published on his blog on the internet that the Houthis were besieging Yemenis from within and preventing the distribution of fuel to citizens for various purposes related to psychological and media warfare.

Due to the importance of what Al-Abssi had written and the fact that it was the reason for his assassination, I have made sure to publish excerpts from his investigation published on June 26, 2015, regarding this unprecedented crime, along with a document that confirms his information. He says, "It appears that the siege imposed on the Yemeni people is more of a domestic nature than external, and it is more 'Houthi' than 'Saudi.' Here are the objective facts on which I based this accusation:

Yemenis have been without water for 80 days under the pretext of the lack of fuel to operate the water pumps.

Yemenis have been without electricity for 80 days due to the closure of the gas station and the lack of diesel and mazut.

Garbage is piled up in the streets of all cities also under the pretext of the lack of petroleum products needed by the sanitation vehicles. So, no

(1) The official page of the Supreme Economic Council on the social media platform Facebook, published on April 2, 2021.

(2) Accusations against the Houthi rebels of concealing cooking gas in Ibb and expanding the black market in Sana’a, published on July 13, 2020, in the Middle East newspaper.

electricity, no water, no gas, no cleanliness... This document in our hands reveals the daily shipping lists issued by the port of Hodeidah, showing the names, numbers, and loads of commercial ships that arrived at the port in just one day: June 16th. Only nine days ago.

According to the document, eight commercial and relief ships arrived at the port of Hodeidah nine days ago, and they are all waiting in the dock to unload their cargo at the port of Hodeidah. In addition, the authorities at the port of Hodeidah expect the arrival of seven other international ships carrying two ships with approximately 38,000 tons of food (wheat) and two other ships carrying containers and various goods within days.

The document also indicates the imminent arrival of the following ships:

1) The ship CHANG TANG TAN carries 37,000 tons of petroleum.

2) The ship CASSENRA carries 39,182 tons of mazut.

3) The ship SEA PHANTOM carries 11,874 tons of diesel.

As for the ships that arrived at the port of Hodeidah on the 16th of this month, there were two commercial ships carrying food items (wheat, legumes, and peas), in addition to three ships carrying varying quantities of petroleum derivatives, which are:

1) The ship RAMA1 carries 6,000 tons of diesel.

2) The ship COSMIC carries 8,052 tons of diesel.

3) The ship FLOK BEAUTY carries 12,977 tons of diesel.

Where does this large quantity of fuel go? The Houthis and black-market traders sell it to Yemenis at multiples of its price, while they seize as much as they want under the pretext of "war effort." Now ask Mohammed Al-Maqalih[1] why his group is torturing the Yemeni people and claiming that there is a naval blockade while ships are pouring into the port of Hodeidah every day!

The power stations in Sana'a are currently not producing more than 20 megawatts, while they can produce 146 megawatts, which is about a third of the capital's needs. Officials in the Ministry of Electricity demand the provision of mazut, but the Houthis respond by saying that they are under siege and at war, while the activity in the port of Hodeidah reveals the opposite!

The three steam power stations (Al-Mukha, Ras Al-Kathib, and Al-Hisswa) alone can produce approximately 300 megawatts of electricity and provide power to five or six provinces. However, the question arises as to why diesel fuel is not being provided to the Electricity Corporation. The Houthis' response is that they are under siege and at war, but the movement at the port of Hodeidah reveals the opposite.

Those who exploit the suffering and needs of the Yemeni people from

(1) Mohammed Al-Muqalih Al-Hakim, a member of the Houthi Supreme Revolutionary Committee.

within are even more despicable than those who kill them with missiles from the sky. Those who kill them with shells and trade their needs are twice as despicable. The group that exacerbates the crises and suffering of the people, deliberately cuts off electricity from them, will not prevail in the battle; they will be defeated, humiliated, and shown the dire consequences by God. In short, the blockade is 100% local, enforced by the Houthis for psychological and media reasons(1).

After three years of the publication of the above article, the United Nations confirmed what Yemenis have been circulating about the Houthis' relationship with the black market and their blockade of Yemenis. Journalist Mohammed Al-Abssi, who was murdered, also clarified that the UN panel of expert stated that the "distribution of fuel and oil products remains one of the main sources of revenue for the Houthis," especially after they ended the monopoly of the Yemen Petroleum Company on the importation and distribution of oil products. They orchestrated a simulated competition in the private sector to submit bids for distribution, which has now allowed them to control this sector, particularly by using distributors in a black market under their control. Furthermore, "all current oil importers are affiliated with the Houthis(2).(3)"

Choking the Hostages to Achieve Demands:

The United Nations panel of expert identified a number of companies inside and outside Yemen that operate as fictitious companies, using forged documents to conceal fuel support for an individual listed on the UN sanctions list. According to the 2019 report, the "revenues generated from selling that fuel were used to finance the Houthis' war effort." The team also concluded that the fuel was loaded from ports in the Islamic Republic of Iran using forged documents to avoid detection during inspections carried out by the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism(4)(5).

(1) An investigation published by journalist Mohammad Abdou Al-Abssi on his blog on the internet and his Facebook page titled: "With Documents Investigation: Who Is Imposing a Suffocating Siege on the Yemeni People?" on June 26, 2015.

(2) Report of the UN experts in 2018, a previous source, pages 45 and 46.

(3) The same UN experts' report indicated that the data and documents available to the team for the period between May 2016 and July 2017 (when the official exchange rate was 250 Yemeni Rials for each US dollar) confirmed that the Houthis' revenues from the black market for the sale of petroleum products delivered at the ports of Al-Hodeidah and Ras Isa on the Red Sea could reach 31.8 billion Yemeni Rials (1.27 billion US dollars).

(4) Report of the UN experts in 2019, a previous source, report summary, page 3.

(5) On June 10, 2021, the US Department of State announced the inclusion of Saeed Ahmed Mohammed Al-Jamal and other individuals and entities who were involved in an international network used to transfer tens of millions of dollars from Iran to the Houthis in cooperation with senior officials in the Islamic Republic of Iran by providing Iranian oil as support.

After the Houthis looted approximately 50 billion Yemeni rials from the dedicated account in the Yemeni Central Bank (Hodeidah branch), which was allocated according to economic agreements and the Stockholm Agreement to cover the salaries of employees in Houthi-controlled areas as mentioned earlier, the UN envoy Martin Griffiths absolved himself of responsibility for overseeing the allocated funds for salaries according to the agreement(1). Based on that, the government decided to regulate the shipments of fuel allowed to enter and be unloaded at the port of Hodeidah. These shipments are designated for the industrial, electricity, and production sectors, as well as shipments belonging to international organizations, in addition to shipments requested by the international envoy to enter, despite the customs revenues and taxes obtained by the Houthis(2).

Furthermore, the government provided facilities to receive other fuel shipments that are stalled in front of the port of Hodeidah and any shipments belonging to traders in Houthi-controlled areas, and unload them at ports managed by the government, facilitating their transportation by land to areas under Houthi control to alleviate the suffering of the citizens.

The government diverted several commercial fuel shipments from the port of Hodeidah to the ports of Aden and Mukalla and unloaded them there. The fuel is then pumped through land transportation to Houthi-controlled areas to meet the needs of the citizens in those areas through land crossings to compel them to deliver salaries to employees or at least miss the opportunity to smuggle Iranian oil, which reaches the Houthis through the port of Hodeidah in the form of commercial shipments, for them to sell it to Yemenis at black market prices and use the revenues to support military operations, thereby prolonging the duration of the war and the resulting suffering of Yemenis(3).

According to a statement issued by the Supreme Economic Council, the process of shipping and transporting oil derivatives from Mukalla and Aden to Houthi-controlled areas was carried out in quantities averaging 4,000 tons per day.

To exert pressure on the Yemeni government and force it to allow the entry of their oil shipments through the port of Hodeidah, the Houthi group employed a policy of "hostage choking." They concealed petroleum derivatives from the markets and completely blocked their entry into their controlled areas through land crossings, exacerbating the humanitarian situation. This prompted the international community to pressure the Yemeni government to permit the entry of ships loaded with Iranian oil. The Houthi group took the following steps, which contributed to the worsening

(1) Statement issued by the Higher Economic Technical Office, November 8, 2020.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.

of the humanitarian crisis, according to the statement issued by the Government's Technical Economic Office:

1) Hindering the arrival of fuel shipments that were transported to their controlled areas by land, delaying their arrival, and imposing various fees and charges on them.
2) Compelling traders to sell the transported shipments to their affiliated black-market companies.
3) Storing fuel in non-designated warehouses belonging to their supervisors and leaders, which resulted in numerous explosion and fire incidents in Sana'a, Sa'ada, and various documented and circulated locations in different media outlets.
4) Forcing industrial, production, and electricity sector companies to sell a portion of their imported quantities to enhance their commercial activity in the black market.
5) Continuously looting the funds deposited in the dedicated account for the legal revenues of fuel imports at the Central Bank branch in Hodeidah and preventing the specialists from the office of the international envoy from exercising their supervisory role over that account, as per the agreement[(1)].

The reader can imagine the situation... The group prevented the entry of petroleum derivatives through land crossings, which were sold at official prices, further subjecting Yemenis in their controlled areas to more suffering, oppression, and deprivation. This was used to pressure the government to allow companies affiliated with the Houthi leadership to import oil through the port, which is ultimately sold at black market prices.

The Houthis established an armed battalion in the Al-Bayda Governorate, concerned with pursuing citizens who attempt to transport petroleum products between provinces, under the name of "anti-smuggling." Typically, such units are deployed in border areas between countries to prevent smuggling through them. However, the Houthis established this unit in the Al-Bayda Governorate, which is in the middle of Yemen and is bordered by eight other governorates, to pursue drivers of oil tankers traveling between provinces. Residents of the governorate say that this unit is specialized in preventing the entry of petroleum derivatives into Houthi-controlled areas but oversees the entry of other prohibited items, allowing drugs, weapons, counterfeit money, and deadly agricultural pesticides to enter Yemen, among other things.

This battalion has committed numerous crimes, including murder, abduction, harassment, and burning and looting oil tankers under the pretext of combating smuggling. On October 31, 2021, Mazen Tawfiq Qasim Al-

(1) Ibid.

Sa'ani (26 years old), a young man from the Radaa District in the Al-Bayda Governorate, was killed after being stopped by a Houthi checkpoint under the pretext of smuggling diesel fuel from Al-Bayda City to the Radaa District, both of which are areas under Houthi control.

The Houthi elements also killed the citizen Yahya Mohammed Abdo Al-Jabri, a driver of a trailer carrying petroleum products from Mukalla to Houthi-controlled areas, on February 3, 2022, while his trailer was passing through the road leading to the city of Al-Hazm, the center of the Al-Jawf Governorate, where Houthi checkpoints confront citizens to prevent them from entering petroleum derivatives.

On March 2, 2022, clashes broke out between Houthi elements and the "Bani Nof" tribes near the city of Al-Hazm, the center of Al-Jawf Governorate, after the Houthi group detained a trailer carrying petroleum(1). It should be noted that what we mentioned earlier is just a few examples of many crimes committed while preventing citizens (mostly farmers and truck drivers) from transporting fuel from government-controlled provinces to areas under Houthi control.

The crime of preventing the entry of petroleum derivatives has sparked a lot of controversy, even among figures affiliated with the Houthis(2). For example, a heated debate took place between the host of the Houthi channel "Al-Sahat" (The Arenas), Abdulhafiz Muajab, and his guest, Houthi spokesperson for the oil company in Sana'a, Amin Al-Shabati. We will present a part of the discussion that took place between Muajab and the spokesperson for the Houthi oil company, and through the discussion, it will become clear to the esteemed reader who is preventing the entry of petroleum derivatives and besieging the Yemeni people.

* Houthi media host Muajab: 60 trailers at the Al-Jawf border crossing, 100 trailers at the Abar Al-Bayda border crossing, 50 trailers at the Taiz border crossing, 50 trailers at Hodeidah border crossing... Why weren't they allowed to enter? Who hindered their entry?!

Houthi spokesperson for the oil company, Amin Al-Shabati: Why don't you ask the aggression and its brokers about the reason for not releasing the detained petroleum derivative ships?

* Muajab: What does the aggression have to do with a detained trailer that paid customs and fees?!

Al-Shabati: Ask the aggression that detained petroleum derivative ships at sea for more than 80 days, totalling 15 oil ships in addition to food ships.

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(1) Al-Jawf... Clashes between Houthi militias and the "Bani Nof" tribes due to a petroleum tanker, Al-Masdar Online, March 3, 2022.

(2) The Houthi-affiliated "Al-Sahat" channel is one of the satellite channels supported by the Lebanese Hezbollah and based primarily in the southern suburb of Lebanon.

* Muajab: I agree with you, and I will ask the aggression. The question now is for you in the oil company. Why weren't the trailers loaded with petroleum derivatives allowed to enter the capital, Sana'a?!

Al-Shabati: First, you and the esteemed viewers should know that the trailers coming from the occupied provinces are not compliant with the approved specifications and allowing them to enter without inspection means exposing citizens to danger.

* Muajab: Why don't you inspect the trailers?!

Al-Shabati: Let me continue. Secondly, the transportation means present at the ports carrying petroleum derivatives, most of them are not qualified to transport and load gasoline and diesel according to the approved technical specifications.

* Muajab: Are we supposed to manage our affairs with these trailers or remain without fuel?!

Al-Shabati: Why don't we all expose the aggression, its crimes, and its brokers?

* Muajab: The aggression... the aggression... we agree on this matter, and we're done with it. Now, I'm talking to you about the petroleum derivatives present on Yemeni land!

Al-Shabati: By raising this issue and who will talk about it, it means that we are surrendering to the restrictions of the aggression!

* Muajab: I'm not raising anything. I'm just asking you. Why doesn't the oil company allow these derivatives to enter and distribute them to the stations to end the fuel crisis?! These are not justifications. Why don't you inspect them... (sarcastically) they might have COVID-19, for example?!

Al-Shabati: These derivatives will not end the crisis but will only exacerbate it and endanger the citizens.

* Muajab: You asked the trailer owners to pay customs fees, and they did. You asked for additional fees, and they paid. You claimed that these trailers would end up in the black market, but I guarantee you, on air and in front of the viewers, that the relevant authorities accompany the trailers to fuel stations. Why don't you allow them to pass? Why did you cause this crisis?

Al-Shabati: No, you're wrong in your unfortunate statement. We did not cause the crisis. Aggression is the one responsible for the fuel crisis.

* Muajab: We can't blame everything on aggression. May God bless you. Not everything is aggression’s fault. We bear responsibility as well.

Al-Shabati: Please, if you don't acknowledge that the aggression is detaining oil derivative ships and causing the crisis, then you can join the aggression's side, and we will be on the national side.

* Muajab: Fine, you're patriotic, and I'm the aggression. No problem. Tell me, why don't you allow these derivatives to enter the capital, Sana'a?

I've been asking you this question for an hour, and you haven't answered!

Al-Shabati: Please, let me finish my statement, or I will end the call.

* Muajab: Go ahead, go ahead.

Al-Shabati: If you consider yourself on the aggression's side, why are the ships being detained? Who justified detaining the oil ships, which are the lifeline? Who allowed this aggression to detain the ships and prevent them from entering Yemen, while millions of other ships roam the seas and oceans without any interference? Who allowed you to disrupt the lives of Yemenis, hinder hospitals, and healthcare centers, and suffocate them alongside the COVID-19 pandemic? Who allowed you to kill this people day and night with rockets and explosives and besiege them by land, sea, and air?

* Muajab: So now you believe that you're talking to Abdulhafiz Muajab on Al-Sahat channel and addressing me as the aggression? Are you blaming your failure on aggression?

Al-Shabati: You must take responsibility for your words[1].

And through the above discussion, it appears that the responsible person in the Houthi oil company repeatedly tried to evade the question directed at him. His focus on imported oil confirms that they deprive people of oil derivatives coming from areas under the government's control and detain hundreds of mobile tankers at land crossings to exacerbate the humanitarian situation. This helps them exert pressure on the Yemeni government to allow the entry of imported oil, which is often Iranian and provided as support to the Houthis alongside weapons.

Undoubtedly, the ordinary citizen pays the price for this inhumane process. Scenes of long queues of cars in front of gas stations are repeated. Traffic stops, manufacturing and transportation costs rise, and food items spoil in storage due to the lack of energy. Farmers are unable to irrigate their farms because they cannot extract water from underground sources, and hospitals and health centers are unable to function due to the lack of energy... and so on.

What the Houthis are doing to Yemenis in their areas is not much different from what gangs do when they invade a bank, a commercial center, or even a house, and hold the people inside hostage, threatening to kill them either by depriving them of food and water or through gunfire if the government does not meet their demands and allow them to steal money or any other demands.

The process of "suffocating the hostages" continued for a long time, and in the face of the suffering of civilians in Houthi-controlled areas, the

(1) Interview with the journalist Abdul Hafez Muajab with the spokesperson for the oil company under Houthi control, Amin Al-Shabati. The video was published on the author's Facebook and Twitter pages, citing the channel.

government had no choice but to allow entry on the first of April 2022, on the holy month of Ramadan, to avoid harming the citizens(1). However, the Houthis continued to sell it at black market prices and refused to pay salaries, despite the enormous amounts of money they obtained from fuel trade.

Regarding this issue, former President Abd-Rabbu Mansur Hadi clarified that the Yemeni government agreed to a ceasefire accompanied by measures aimed at alleviating the suffering of civilians in Houthi-controlled areas. He said, "It is true that we have made some concessions, but we make these concessions for the sake of the citizens. We all know the reality of those who besiege them, who stop oil tankers, insist on collecting revenues, burden the citizens with hardships, and refuse to fulfill their responsibilities in paying dues to the citizens. Those who insist on besieging the people of Taiz and even refuse to disclose the status of detainees. Therefore, when we make concessions, we make them for the sake of that citizen whom we have decided to confront the coup and rebellion in support of our brothers, primarily for his sake, to protect his achievements, defend his choices and interests(2)."

In a television interview conducted by Yemeni journalist Asma Rajeh on Al Arabiya Al Hadath channel with the French ambassador to Yemen, Jean-Marie, on April 6, 2022, just a few days after allowing fuel ships belonging to Houthi leaders to enter through the port of Hodeidah, the French ambassador described Yemenis residing in Houthi-controlled areas as hostages. Commenting on the step taken by the Yemeni government, he said, "The legitimate government has made the necessary concessions to facilitate matters (referring to peace and alleviating the suffering of civilians), and this is very important. We know that legitimacy facilitates matters. And we also know the situation in Sana'a. The Houthis rule by iron and fire, and the people are hostages in the hands of the Houthis, facing severe oppression(3)."

And every time the Houthis deliberately create a crisis in oil derivatives and use Yemenis in their controlled areas as hostages to pressure the international community to import Iranian oil for the Houthis, the Yemeni government allowed the entry of oil derivatives through the port of Hodeidah despite knowing that the Houthis caused the crisis, in order to prevent the continued suffering of the people due to fuel deprivation, despite its availability in the group's warehouses.

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(1) Foreign Minister: Presidential directives to positively engage in all arrangements for the release of prisoners and the opening of Sana’a Airport, Yemeni News Agency (SABA), April 1, 2022.

(2) The President of the Republic emphasizes adherence to national references and constants and the unification of ranks, Yemeni News Agency (SABA), April 4, 2022.

(3) Exclusive interview with the French Ambassador to Yemen, Jean-Marie Safa, on Al-Hadath channel on YouTube, April 6, 2022.

On September 9, 2022, the American Ambassador to Yemen, Stephen Hagen, issued a statement clarifying the cause of the humanitarian crisis resulting from depriving people in Houthi-controlled areas of fuel. He said, "We welcome the courageous and wise decision of His Excellency President Rashad Al-Alimi to facilitate the entry of oil derivative ships to the port of Hodeidah, as this decision highlights his utmost commitment to peace and his desire to prioritize the well-being of the Yemeni people. This important decision addresses the delay caused by the Houthis in allowing suppliers to follow a good mechanism that was developed in coordination with the United Nations, which facilitated the smooth entry of oil products ships since the beginning of the ceasefire in early April. The Houthi delay in allowing the entry of oil derivative ships had negative humanitarian consequences, such as raising the prices of oil products and the scarcity of their availability in the markets for public basic services, including hospitals(1)."

The British Ambassador to Yemen, Richard Oppenheim, also held the Houthis responsible for the humanitarian crisis resulting from depriving citizens in their controlled areas of oil products(2). On the same day, the French embassy in Yemen issued a brief statement stating, "We commend the brave and wise decision of President Rashad Al-Alimi to facilitate the entry of oil tankers into the port of Hodeidah. This decision demonstrates that President Rashad Al-Alimi bears a great deal of responsibility and a strong commitment to peace, and once again, his desire to prioritize the interests of the Yemeni people. The obstruction caused by the Houthis had serious humanitarian consequences, leading to an increase in fuel prices and a scarcity of oil products in essential public services, including hospitals(3)."

Damage to Farmers:

The agricultural sector in Yemen plays a crucial role in supporting food security and reducing poverty and hunger. It provides 25 percent of the food consumption(4) and encompasses 40.9 percent of the total workforce in the country(5). This includes direct involvement in various agricultural activities and indirect involvement in related services, trade, manufacturing, and transportation. The agricultural sector contributes approximately 20 percent

(1) Statement from the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen, the official Twitter page of the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, September 9, 2022.

(2) Tweet from the British Ambassador to Yemen, Richard Oppenheim, on his Twitter page, September 9, 2022.

(3) Statement on the official Twitter page of the French Embassy in Yemen, September 9, 2022.

(4) Food and Agriculture Organization and others, Integrated Phase Classification for Food Security, December 2018.

(5) Central Statistical Organization, Labor Force Survey, 2014.

of the gross domestic product[1] (GDP) and is concentrated in rural Yemen, where poverty and need are prevalent[2].

However, the escalated war since September 2014 has caused significant damage to this important and vital sector. It has resulted in substantial losses and pushed a massive number of farmers into unemployment or the front lines of the conflict. Many Yemeni farmers used to export vegetables, fruits, and grains from their farms to various Yemeni provinces and even outside Yemen. Now, they rely directly on occasional assistance provided by international organizations.

In July 2015, statistics revealed that the agricultural sector incurred losses exceeding 6 billion dollars during the initial months of the war[3]. The deliberate and periodic hoarding of fuel by the Houthis in their controlled areas has played a major role in damaging the agriculture sector and adversely affecting a significant portion of the population in Yemen. Most farmers who rely on fuel for extracting groundwater, irrigation, transportation, and storage have stopped working and sought alternative means, with the most prominent being taking up arms and engaging in combat[4].

Farouk Mohammed Qasim, the Director-General of Marketing at the Ministry of Agriculture, explained that the security disruptions and fuel crisis have caused severe losses to the agricultural sector in Yemen, leading to the cessation of agricultural product exports to foreign markets due to the war and the lack of diesel fuel[5]. In the province of Dhamar, which is one of the prominent agricultural provinces in northern Yemen, Fuad Al-Kawari, the Agricultural Guidance Director at the Dhamar Agriculture Office, listed the reasons that have caused damage to the agricultural sector, including the scarcity of fuel, which is now only available on the black market at exorbitant prices. Al-Kawari stated that the agricultural sector in Dhamar has suffered damage of approximately 80 percent, in addition to people's reluctance to engage in agriculture, resulting in damage to food security in the country and scarcity and increased prices of grains, vegetables, and fruits[6].

The matter did not remain at depriving farmers of petroleum products. The Houthi group also burned the farms of citizens who rejected their presence in the areas of Maris and Al-Fakher, which are part of the Dhalae

(1) Economic and Social Updates in Yemen Newsletter, Issue 38, November 2018, sourced from the Central Statistical Organization, National Accounts Draft, 2017.

(2) Economic and Social Updates in Yemen Newsletter, a previous source.

(3) War in Yemen costs agriculture $6 billion, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, July 5, 2015.

(4) Yemen - The toll of war on agriculture and food, Deutsche Welle (DW) Radio, September 15, 2018.

(5) Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, a previous source.

(6) Deutsche Welle (DW) Radio, previous reference.

Governorate in southern Yemen, in March 2022. More than 285 farms owned by citizens in the areas of Azila, Sawlan, Hajlan, Rafqa, Ya'is, and Ghoul Al-Hayafi were set on fire, according to testimonies I received from residents of the region. They also burned dozens of farms in the Hajur area, which is part of the Hajjah Governorate, as well as in the Arhab district in northern Sana'a, farms in Al-Bayda, and other areas that the Houthis entered.

Such practices undoubtedly remind Yemenis of the practices of the ancestors of the Houthis who used to destroy and burn Yemeni farms, led by Yahya Al-Rassi, who used to cut grapevines and destroy the farms of those who opposed him from Yemeni tribes such as Al-Ya'far, Al-Tarif, Al-Ruwaya, Al-Dhahak, and others(1).

Fighting Instead of Farming:

Yemenis have no doubt about the intentional starvation imposed by the Houthis on the society they control, especially targeting farmers, to subdue them and push them into the frontlines of the conflict. This is a recurring reality that has been practiced since the beginning of the war, and it is a method used by the ancestors of the Houthis during their periods of dominance over certain areas, especially in northern Yemen.

As we mentioned earlier, when Yahya Al-Rassi and his companions from the Tabaristanis came to Yemen, they ordered the uprooting of "crops, grapevines, palm trees, and the destruction of houses(2)." Naturally, this policy, along with the numerous taxes imposed on farmers, led to the impoverishment of wide segments of them, forcing them to sell their lands or abandon them without care, join the battles, and rely on loot as a source of livelihood.

The imams, from Al-Rassi to the Houthis, have been known for practicing a policy of "militarizing Yemenis" and turning them into elements ready to fight and engage in conflict. This direction can be understood by studying the literature, manifestos, and books of the new and old Houthis.

Through various means, the Houthis transform individuals from peaceful citizens engaged in trade, craftsmanship, agriculture, farming, or fishing into combatants whose mission is to subdue other regions and threaten public peace in Yemen and the region. They do so under different religious and political banners that change in each stage. In the past, they used to destroy and burn farms and fill wells. Today, simply depriving Yemenis of

(1) Threads of Darkness: The Era of Zaidi Imams in Yemen, a previous source, page 53.
(2) Hadawiyya: Between Political Theory and Divine Belief, a previous source, page 98.

petroleum products is enough to push farmers, who rely on groundwater for irrigation, and others into unemployment, making it easier to recruit them out of necessity and send them to the frontlines or gather them in public squares.

That's why we find that most fighters with the Houthis come from areas whose inhabitants do not rely on agriculture for their livelihoods or whose lands are unsuitable for cultivation. Farmers are often less responsive to engaging in war during the rainy season and planting season. Many residents have testified to observing the reluctance of rural populations to mobilize and fight, especially during seasons when their crops thrive, as these seasons are abundant with agricultural products for the citizens. Such seasons become periods of scarcity in the war and mobilization market for the Houthis.

In conclusion, farmers are less responsive to mobilization calls when conditions for agricultural production are present. On the contrary, war is seen as a problem and an obstacle, as their economy is built on pillars of stability and peace(1).

Damage to the Fishing and Transportation Sectors:

Fishing activities have decreased by nearly half due to the Houthi war that escalated in September 2014. According to a study by the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, fish exports have declined to less than 70,000 tons annually since the outbreak of the war(2).

According to the Ministry of Fisheries, there are approximately 90,000 licensed fishermen in Yemen, almost all of whom are traditional male fishermen. The total number of people employed in fishing activities and related industries is around 500,000, supporting about 1.7 million individuals.

There are various reasons for this decline, including armed conflicts in coastal areas, displacement, and landmines. However, the deprivation of fishermen from fuel or the high prices of fuel in the black market are considered among the most significant factors that have led to this sharp decline in the fishing sector's activities. Many fishermen and their families in Houthi-controlled areas have been deprived of their sole source of livelihood.

The importance of fuel lies in its role as the fuel for boats or the generators that power central refrigeration units, which preserve fish for

(1) Geography of War and Agriculture in Yemen, by Farah Al-Muslimi, Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, September 3, 2015.

(2) Developing the Fisheries Sector in Yemen, a study by the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, March 31, 2020.

extended periods. During my work as a journalist focused on social conditions during the war, I witnessed a significant number of fishermen in Hodeidah abandoning fishing activities and seeking other jobs due to the lack of fuel, which is essential for most boats and necessary for carrying out other fishing-related activities such as storage, packaging, and transportation.

Similarly, in the transportation sector, tens of thousands of Yemenis work in transportation, including long-haul routes between provinces, taxis, and small, medium, and large buses within cities. Many Yemeni young people see transportation vehicles of various types as suitable opportunities to earn a living. As a result, the number of individuals engaged in this profession in Yemen, especially in urban areas, has increased. However, the situation changed after 2014 when many who used to work as drivers of transportation and taxis began selling their vehicles and seeking other sources of income, including participation in the frontlines of the conflict.

The manufactured and recurring fuel crises during the years of war have led to a decline in the income level of individuals working in the transportation sector. This has pushed many of them into unemployment and facilitated their exploitation by the Houthi group militarily, politically, and sectarianly.

Gas: Black-Market and Political and Military Exploitation:

Just like gasoline and diesel, the Houthis have used cooking gas (which is also used as fuel for cars) to plunder Yemenis, subjugate them, and spread their sectarian beliefs.

With the Houthi takeover of state institutions in September 2014, the suffering of Yemenis began due to the deliberate monopolization of gas and the group's use of a new distribution policy that ensured enormous profits for them and aided them in subduing Yemenis who refused to join them and recognize their rule.

After a month of the Houthi elements' control of the capital Sana'a, specifically on October 19, 2014, around 50 armed Houthis stormed the headquarters of Safer Company, the largest producer of gas and oil in Yemen, and assaulted the guards(1). On December 17, 2014, they raided the company's headquarters for the second time, preventing employees from entering or leaving, and removed the CEO, Ahmed Kulib, and his deputy, Saif Sharif(2), appointing one of their own in their place(1).

(1) Houthis Storm Yemen's Largest Gas Export Company, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, published on October 20, 2014.

(2) Houthis Storm Yemen's Largest Gas Export Company for the Second Time, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, published on December 17, 2014.

These practices were the first steps towards subjugating the employees of the company responsible for providing oil and gas to various parts of Yemen, and then taking full control of the company. Meanwhile, they deprived Yemenis residing in their areas of gas for long periods, despite it being regularly sent from the Marib refinery.

As usual, the Houthis find justifications for their crimes and the measures through which they aim to subdue the population. They claimed that tribes in Marib prevented gas trucks from reaching Sana'a and the provinces under their control. However, during that period, Governor Sultan Al-Aradah quickly denied these lies and clarified that Safer Company in Marib sends the allocated amounts to the provinces regularly, but the Houthis hinder its distribution to the citizens(2).

On January 3, 2017, Ahmed Ali Mohsen Al-Ahwal, the governor of Al-Mahweet governorate, which was then under Houthi control, condemned the disappearance of the governorate's share of gas despite being sent from Marib to the governorate.

In an official memorandum addressed to the Ministry of Industry, which was under Houthi control in Sana'a, the governor stated that the governorate had received lists from the ministry confirming the dispatch of the governorate's gas shares during December 2016 after a six-month interruption to counter the sale of gas in the black market. However, the governorate was surprised that only seven trucks arrived in the governorate out of a total of 38 allocated for the governorate, which were supposed to be distributed in the Shabam directorate (6 trucks), Al-Tawila directorate (7 trucks), Al-Mahweet city (8 trucks), Al-Khabt directorate (10 trucks), and Khamees Bani Saad directorate (7 trucks). He pointed out that the remaining gas quantities (31 trucks) were being sold in the black market.

The Yemeni Gas Company located in Marib, under the control of the Yemeni government, used to supply all Yemeni governorates, including those under Houthi control, with gas regularly. However, the Houthis mostly sold it in the black market and deprived citizens of it at the official reduced price. This was evident in the memorandum sent by Ahmed Ali Mohsen Al-Ahwal, who was affiliated with the General People's Congress party at the time.

Throughout the years of the war, the local authorities in Ma'rib province were keen on sending gas to the citizens in the areas under Houthi control,

(1) The Houthis appointed Ameen Zabara as the General Director of the company. Within months, he left Yemen for abroad after approximately 46 million dollars disappeared from the company's bank account. He also donated 30 million dollars to support the Houthi group's war effort at the expense of employee salaries, according to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed website with the title "Yemeni Company Director Flees After Embezzling 46 Million Dollars," published on July 12, 2015.

(2) The domestic gas crisis has exacerbated the suffering of Yemenis, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, published on June 8, 2015.

refusing to deprive the residents in those areas of this vital resource as it is essential in every household, despite some demands to deprive the Houthis of the resources they use for their military operations.

The fabricated gas crisis persisted in Houthi-controlled areas for a long period, except for its sale in the black market controlled by Houthi brokers. As a result, people in cities resorted to rationing and cutting decorative trees in the streets, public gardens, and government institutions in major cities, using them for cooking in homes, restaurants, and bakeries. In rural areas, the process of rationing multiplied to meet the needs of the population density in cities, and this depletion of trees was considered a direct threat to the vegetation cover in Yemen(1).

With the aim of obtaining additional funds, the Houthis opened up the opportunity for the private commercial sector to supply gas from the Safir fields in Ma'rib, which are under government control, after weakening the gas company in Sana'a. They imposed fees on commercial transporters at the customs checkpoints they established in the middle of the country and on the outskirts of cities, in addition to the levies they imposed at inspection checkpoints along the roads, which led to an increase in the price of gas sold to citizens.

In the early years of the war, Ali al-Bukhaiti, the former Houthi leader and official spokesperson for the group in the Comprehensive National Dialogue Conference, commented on the gas looting process, saying: "The Houthis impose high customs duties on gas tankers at their checkpoints, then they blackmail wholesale traders, raising the price of a cylinder to more than 4,500 Yemeni rials while it is still in their warehouses. Then they imprison the retail merchant to sell it for 3,000 rials. After paying a bribe, he is released from prison and adds the bribe to the cost, selling it for more than 5,500 rials. And so on(2)." However, this price did not last long and later skyrocketed.

The Houthi group has made vast amounts of money from the gas trade in the black market. Furthermore, a mechanism for distributing gas to citizens at a relatively low price compared to the black-market price was introduced through "neighborhood representatives(3)," enabling them to control most of

(1) Excessive deforestation is depleting the vegetation cover in Yemen, published on SciDev.Net on April 22, 2019. The Biodiversity and Protected Areas Management Department under the Ministry of Water and Environment in Sana’a mentioned that more than 860,000 trees are cut down each year to meet the demand of the capital city, Sana’a's, 722 bakeries, where approximately 17,500 tons of firewood are burned annually.

(2) Ali Al-Bukhaiti, on his social media page "Twitter," on March 2, 2018.

(3) "Aqil al-Hara" (the wise person of the neighborhood) is responsible for providing services and solving residents' problems in the neighborhood. However, after the coup, they turned into informants monitoring the movements of citizens in favor of the Houthi group, and most neighborhood elders are affiliated with the Houthi group, making it easier to control the population in the neighborhoods.

the population in the areas under their control and politically and socially manipulate them, in addition to looting their funds.

Sometimes, one cylinder is sold every three weeks through neighborhood representatives. As for families in need of additional quantities, one of their members must stand in long queues in front of the few and rare centers where gas cylinders are sold to secure one. Alternatively, they resort to the black market or are forced to buy food from restaurants and bakeries that provide cooking gas at prices that can be as high as 20,000 Yemeni rials for a 26-kilogram gas cylinder.

Like other essential goods and services, the Houthis have used the gas commodity to control the population and force them to accept and adopt their political and sectarian positions that are fundamentally hostile to society and its inhabitants. Therefore, the process of selling gas at its official price, determined by the Houthis, is subject to many considerations. If a citizen is a Houthi supporter, they will not be forced to buy gas from the black market or stand in long queues to purchase it, and they will obtain it for free or, in the worst cases, at its official price. However, if they are known not to support the Houthis, obtaining a gas cylinder becomes a difficult task. This has led many families to engage in Houthi political activities and events and accept the indoctrination and sectarian education of their children, despite not believing in it.

While members or supporters of the Houthi group have not been affected by the aforementioned gas distribution policy, some Houthi activists and journalists have criticized it due to the negative repercussions that have affected the majority of Yemenis. One of these Houthi media figures, Ahmed Al-Kabsi, criticized it in a post on his Facebook page, explaining how gas commodity is exploited to subjugate Yemenis. He said, "We will not forget when we applauded the closure of gas pumps (BEGA gas stations) spread in every neighborhood because they used to sell a 20-liter cylinder for 4,700 rials, and today, despite the limited importation by some traders who obtained exemptions, it is impossible to obtain a gas cylinder from any pump inside the capital"... He goes on to speak about the people: "Let them fill up from the stations instead of the humiliation and queues endured by gas representatives and neighborhood representatives, getting a cylinder every month and sometimes every month and a half, and every two months, the gas representative makes a census of the family members and residents of the neighborhood to determine if there are fighters in the area or not. If this neighborhood does not participate in the mobilization and protest stands, let them deserve to be treated as enemies. Unfortunately, this is what is happening to people[(1)]."

(1) New conditions imposed by militias in exchange for obtaining household gas, Yemen Media, June 30, 2021.

As for the member of the Houthi Revolutionary Committee, Mohammed Al-Maqalih, he confirmed in his post that the Houthi "Security and Intelligence Apparatus" interferes with gas trucks distributed in rural areas, and each of these apparatuses has a share in these trucks(1).

In the context of discussing the exploitation of gas to compel citizens to participate in Houthi combat and sectarian activities, prominent Yemeni lawyer Abdulmajid Sabra says, "The gas cylinder has become a person's value. Although they sell the gas cylinder at five times its value, they sometimes impose impossible conditions to obtain it. Sometimes they ask for attendance at a specific event according to the occasion, and sometimes they demand participation in a cultural course. And it doesn't stop there. Today, a rational person asks, 'Where is the gas?' They reply, 'Join the front lines?' Meaning, they want you to risk your life in exchange for a gas cylinder that you paid for three weeks ago. I ran out of gas at home, and I had guests, so I had to borrow a gas cylinder from my neighbor to cook for everyone. The gas cylinder, in addition to its exorbitant price, has become a means of blackmail to control many aspects of your life. It has even reached the point where they ask you to go to the front lines in exchange for a gas cylinder(2)."

When some traders or citizens used to buy gas supplies from Marib at a lower price to bring them into Houthi-controlled areas and sell them at a lower price than what the Houthis imposed, the Houthis would seize them and consider them smuggled goods, even though they were entering one Yemeni city and being sold in another Yemeni city(3).

The group has always used the gas commodity to incite Yemenis against the residents of Marib Governorate who have rejected and resisted Houthi control. Every time they launch an attack on Marib, they simultaneously prevent the distribution of gas to the residents in their controlled areas. They launch a campaign of lies through their various media outlets and through the loudspeakers of neighborhoods and mosques in cities and villages to incite the locals against the people of Marib and the displaced who have fled from the Houthi hell to Marib. They claim that Marib has denied them gas as part of an organized media and psychological war to justify launching ballistic missiles at civilians in Marib and to deceive the locals into sending their sons to the frontlines(4).

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(1) A tweet from Mohammad Al-Maqalih on his social media page "Twitter" on November 12, 2012.

(2) A post by lawyer Abdul Majeed Sabrah on his social media page "Facebook" on September 12, 2021.

(3) Al-Bayda: Seizure of counterfeit and illegal currency, imported goods, gas cylinders, petroleum products, and smuggled electronics. Published on the security media website affiliated with the Houthi group on October 24, 2021.

(4) According to the local authority's website in Marib, ballistic missiles and Katyusha rockets launched by the Houthi group on the city of Marib have resulted in the death and injury of at =

In different areas under Houthi control, the process of distributing gas to households was conditional on providing support to fighters on the frontlines. Each family was given an envelope to put money in, which was presented along with the empty gas cylinder as a contribution to what is called the "war effort(1)."

Before the Houthi takeover of the capital Sana'a in September 2014, the price of a gas cylinder (26 kilograms) was 1,200 Yemeni rials. After the Houthi takeover, the price increased in Houthi-controlled areas to 2,800 rials, and it continued to rise until it reached 4,500 rials in mid-2017. In 2021, the official price of a cylinder, which is mostly distributed by neighborhood vendors, reached 5,000 Yemeni rials. However, the approved official price set by Saffr Gas Company in Marib is 2,300 rials per cylinder, and after adding transportation expenses to Sana'a and other provinces, the price does not exceed a maximum of 3,100 to 3,500 rials. The price difference is looted by the Houthis(2).

The Yemeni government in Marib, represented by the Saffr Gas Department, has attempted to refute the lies propagated by the Houthis, which they use to mobilize citizens to fight on the outskirts of Marib. They have held press conferences to specify the quantities of gas regularly sent to Houthi-controlled areas. For example, a press conference was held on March 1, 2021, announcing the quantities of gas sent to Houthi-controlled areas during the year 2020 and the first third of 2021. During this period, the group prevented the distribution of gas to citizens in their controlled areas to justify their attack on Marib and to mobilize fighters and gather support for them.

Considering these facts, there have been growing calls to prevent the sending of gas supplies from Marib to Houthi-controlled areas to force them to cease their continuous attacks on the city and deprive them of the substantial profits they make from the gas price difference. However, the Yemeni government has rejected such proposals. Dr. Abdurabu Miftah, the Deputy Governor of Marib, commented on these demands, saying, "Marib supplies gas to all provinces without exception on a daily basis. It is the wealth of Yemenis, and they should benefit from it and receive it everywhere. Of course, we know that the Houthis exploit gas for profit, to torment people, and to control them through this commodity that every Yemeni household needs."

Unfortunately, some people ask why we don't cut off gas supplies to

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= least 689 civilians, including 92 children and women, from early April 2015 to July 14, 2020.

(1) How the Houthis use gas as a means of recruitment, financial gain, and punishment of citizens. Published on the Oum Online news website on March 5, 2021.

(2) Press conference by the Director of the Safer Gas Department in Marib, Engineer Mohsen Wahit, and the Deputy Governor of Marib, Dr. Abdrabuh Miftah, on March 1, 2021.

Houthi-controlled areas and deprive them of the money they earn from it. But we say that we provide gas to the Yemeni people, and we cannot deprive them because we are simply a state. We have the ability to cut off gas supplies to rebel-controlled areas, but the people will be the ones affected. If the Houthis are making a profit of more than 4,000 or 6,000 Yemeni rials per cylinder, which they buy from Marib at a cheap price not exceeding 2,200 rials (compared to the previous price of 1,200 rials), then how would it be if they imported it from abroad? At what price would they sell it? We certainly don't want the Houthis to profit even a single rial, but the matter is not in our hands because cutting off supplies to the population under their control would harm them more than it would harm the Houthis. Therefore, we cannot deprive them of this service(1).

The situation has continued like this for years, with gas scarcity in official selling points and its availability in the black market at high prices, sold by Houthi leaders to subjugate the people. In the first third of 2022, the Houthis resumed their attacks on Marib to control it after a two-month hiatus. During this attack and Houthi mobilization, they refused to distribute gas in areas under their control, causing a crisis that led to the price of a cylinder reaching 23,000 Yemeni rials. As usual, the Houthis justify this crisis by claiming that the Yemeni government in Marib refuses to send gas to them.

Meanwhile, the executive director of the company, Engineer Mohsen Wahid, located in Marib, refuted the lies of the Houthis, who aim to mobilize citizens to fight in Marib. Wahid stated that during the year 2021, the company supplied approximately 26,687 gas trailers and distributed them to all governorates of the Republic according to population density. Out of these, around 14,739 trailers were distributed to the governorates under Houthi control, equivalent to 32,444,446 cylinders, which represents over 55% of the total production. The rest of the produced quantities were distributed to all liberated governorates. He emphasized that these numbers "refute the Houthi's fabrications and debunk their claims of not supplying gas to their controlled areas, revealing the truth of their manipulation and exploitation of it to achieve personal enrichment for their leaders and sell it in the black market at exorbitant prices(2)."

During that period, Judge Abdulwahab Qattaran, who sympathized with the Houthis in their early days, confirmed that the public sale of a gas cylinder in the streets of Sana'a at a price of 23,000 rials was an unprecedented occurrence. He said, "The term 'black market' is misleading.

(1) An interview conducted by the Owaam Online website with Dr. Abdrabuh Miftah, Deputy Governor of Marib, on April 25, 2020.

(2) Bin Waheet: More than half of the gas quantity went to the governorates under militia control during 2021, Al-Thawra Government Newspaper, March 10, 2022.

We do not have black markets for fuel and gas. They are white markets controlled openly by the power elites (referring to the Houthis) during daylight with the force of arms and the protection of authority. They hid the fuel from stations and prevented its entry from land crossings, even for the personal needs of citizens. They siphoned it off (stole it) and filed reports of confiscation and siphoning. They monopolized the white markets for themselves... Gas is available in huge quantities in warehouses, streets, and patrols, and today they sell a gas cylinder for 23,000 rials openly in the streets and patrols, just like petroleum and diesel(1)."

A few days later, Yemeni journalist Bassem Jannani revealed the arrival of the ship Gaz Energy, carrying 9,488 tons of gas, to the port of Hodeida for unloading on March 2, 2022. However, the gas crisis continues in Houthi-controlled areas. Jannani pointed out that 90% of this quantity "will go to storage in the black market in preparation for its release in the month of Ramadan and selling it at exorbitant prices, as they do every year." He also noted that the gas carrier that arrived in Hodeida and was not unloaded into the market belongs to the Houthi leader Abdullah Al-Wazir, the owner of the Sandbad Shipping Company(2).

On the 28th of the same month, just a few days before Ramadan and amid the gas crisis and people's need for it, the Yemeni Gas Company, under Houthi control, announced the start of selling "commercial gas," using the constant pretext of the blockade and the lack of gas supply from Marib (a document). They raised the price of the official gas cylinder from 5,000 rials to 8,350 rials. In other words, they welcomed the blessed month of Ramadan by legitimizing the price of the black market for gas!

Naturally, the manufactured gas crisis has had repercussions on the movement of streets, which would come to a halt from time to time. It led to an increase in the fares of internal transportation and between provinces by the owners of small buses who converted their vehicles to run on gas instead of gasoline due to the rise in its prices. This prompted drivers to go on strike multiple times(3).

The process of raising the prices of cooking gas and selling it on the black market has caused further suffering for Yemenis by depleting their savings and exposing them to the risks of hoarding and cooking with charcoal. Additionally, it has led to an increase in the prices of transportation, goods, commodities, and food sold in restaurants and other products that rely on gas as a source.

(1) A post by "Abdulwahab Qatran" on his Twitter page, March 9, 2022.
(2) A post and document by journalist Bassem Jannani on his Facebook page, March 13, 2022.
(3) Official data indicates the conversion of nearly 150,000 cars to run on gas in Yemen instead of gasoline, including only 70,000 in Sana’a.

Electricity Black Market:

Just like petroleum derivatives, electricity is directly linked to people's lives, and its interruption causes significant damage at all levels. It is unimaginable to have a human gathering today living without electricity, but that has happened in Yemen for extended periods, at the hands of a group that starves and kills Yemenis and then pretends to represent and defend them before the world.

Prior to the Houthi takeover of Sana'a, and specifically since 2011, most Yemeni regions have suffered from frequent power outages due to generation shortages or repeated attacks targeting power transmission lines coming from the Marib gas station, which supplies Sana'a and some provinces with electricity. Electricity would be cut off for short periods and then restored.

After the Houthi takeover of Sana'a and their attempt to control Marib, the Houthis clashed with the residents of Marib who refused to surrender the province and accept their rule. These armed confrontations resulted in the destruction of some power transmission towers from Marib to Sana'a and other provinces. As a result, approximately 400 megawatts were lost. Additionally, the Houthis refused to secure the fuel (diesel) needed to operate the power generators belonging to the Ministry of Electricity and Energy in the capital and other provinces, despite the availability of fuel(1).

On multiple occasions, technical teams affiliated with the General Electricity Corporation in Marib attempted to repair the power transmission lines (Marib - Sana'a) at the end of 2015. They faced numerous difficulties, including internationally banned individual anti-vehicle mines that the Houthis extensively planted near the electricity transmission poles. In December 2015, the demining team in Marib announced that they had extracted about 600 mines near the power transmission towers in the Mas area(2). Approximately ten days after the start of the tower repair operations, the Houthis targeted the team with three artillery shells(3).

In a dialogue with the local authority in Marib, the latter confirmed that the Houthis shelled the electricity towers and rejected proposals presented by the government to repair them. They even targeted the engineering teams(4).

(1) An investigation published by the journalist Mohammed Abdou Al-Abssi on his blog on the internet and his Facebook page on June 26, 2015.

(2) Technical teams begin repairing power transmission lines in eastern Yemen, a statement by a member of the demining military team, to Anadolu, December 2015.

(3) The Houthis target the team repairing electricity towers in Marib, eastern Yemen, Yemen Monitor website, January 9, 2016.

(4) An interview conducted by the Owam Online website with Dr. Abdulrabeh Miftah, the deputy governor of Marib, on April 25, 2020.

The Yemeni government has often shown its eagerness to repair the power transmission lines from the Safir gas station to the capital and other provinces. This prompted Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Civil Service Abdul Aziz Jabari to visit the maintenance teams assigned to the network repair operation in the Atif area of Marib. He directed the allocation of approximately 10 million Yemeni rials to the maintenance teams to complete their mission, ensuring that electricity would be available in the homes of Yemenis living in areas under Houthi control during the month of Ramadan that year. During the visit, the government affirmed that the Houthis deliberately targeted "electricity lines in order to cut off the energy supply to and from the provinces and worked to sabotage and prevent their repair(1)."

In an interview conducted by BBC Arabic with Sheikh Sultan Al-Aradah, the Deputy Head of the Presidential Council in Yemen and the Governor of Marib Governorate, Al-Aradah confirmed that he made intensive efforts during the years 2016, 2017, and 2018 through several neutral Yemeni figures to deliver electricity to Sana'a, "but the Houthis refused." He continued, "I now say, in front of the world, I challenge the Houthis to accept the entry of electricity from Marib, and I am fully prepared to deliver it to the outskirts of the administrative borders of Marib. I challenge them to accept it entering Sana'a and other areas(2)."

In contrast, it was supposed that the Houthi group would provide the fuel needed to operate 24 other power plants, producing around 333 megawatts of steam and 266.3 megawatts of diesel to generate electricity for the provinces as an alternative solution to the malfunctioning Marib power plant(3). However, they continued to take the allocated fuel for the Ministry of Electricity and sell it in the black market or use it for military operations. This kept most Yemeni provinces in complete darkness, establishing a new phase in which non-governmental electricity trade appeared for the first time in Yemen, with the Houthis themselves as the protagonists, in addition to using solar energy to operate electrical appliances.

The public electricity supply was completely cut off in April 2015, and nighttime light emissions from Yemen decreased by two-thirds. The largest Yemeni cities with populations exceeding two million people lived for years without electricity, in addition to other cities that could not access public electricity(4).

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(1) Jabari inspects the progress of work on the repair of gas power transmission lines from Marib, Saba Yemeni News Agency, April 23, 2017.

(2) "Without Restrictions" hosts Sultan Al-Arada, Deputy Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council in Yemen, BBC Arabic on YouTube, July 24, 2022.

(3) Electricity in Yemen... Suffering at its peak during the Houthi era, Gulf Online, published on July 26, 2016.

(4) The official website of the World Bank on December 4, 2018.

The suffering of Yemenis resulting from the lack of electricity has worsened, and vital infrastructure facilities such as hospitals, water wells, sewage treatment plants, banking systems, and telephone networks have been affected. People have lost their sources of livelihood, including agriculture, which constitutes about 80% of the Yemeni economy(1). In addition to the prohibition on the distribution of petroleum products, life can be described as nearly paralyzed for most citizens during the years 2015, 2016, and 2017. However, supporters of the Houthi group, especially those belonging to the same faction, had a different situation. Everything was available to them. They, their families, and according to the definition of the Houthi group, the "mujahideen" who should receive all services, were not treated like the rest of Yemenis who had to bear the brunt of this deliberate policy pursued by the group to achieve its financial, political, military, and cultural goals.

The damage was most apparent in hospitals and health centers that rely on electricity for many of their activities. This power outage resulted in the deaths of many patients, elderly people, and children, especially in the high-temperature areas in western Yemen(2). While patients with kidney failure were collapsing in front of dialysis centers due to the cessation of their operations due to the lack of electricity, the leaders and supervisors of the Houthi movement had their homes illuminated and their headquarters and centers functioning. The Houthis often saw the victims of the crime of depriving society of electricity as an opportunity for political exploitation and extortion of international organizations.

In short, this crime has caused Yemenis to regress to the pre-September 26, 1962, period, which is constantly echoed by the population in their gatherings and private meetings, reminding them of their renewed old tragedy at the hands of the racist Houthi faction. They often recite what their national symbol and the country's great poet, Abdullah Al-Baradouni, once said about the duality of tragedy in the illumination of the palaces of racist leaders from the fire of Yemenis' livers.

Al-Baradouni says:

"Awaken, my brother, our entire wakefulness is a funeral,
And our slumber is a silent pain.
Ask the path how we were encircled,
By wolves of people who show no mercy.
Our rulers are lost in the maze,
Like vultures hovering over our steps.
They ravage us like the army of the Mongols,

(1) Ibid.

(2) Hodeidah: More than 50 deaths among the elderly, sick, and children due to "heatstroke" and power outages, Al-Mawqea Post, June 1, 2016.

And are no better when the spoils are waved.
They accumulate thousands upon thousands,
And offer them bribes that are meager.
They build houses on the ruins of what.
They were destroyed from the people or demolished.
They erect palaces with walls.
Whitened by the wounds of our blood.
If the palaces of the prince are illuminated,
Say: Those are our livers being set on fire, my brother."

This new and tragic situation has pushed impoverished Yemeni families to resort to traditional means to compensate for the electricity shortage. For example, housewives have resorted to finding alternatives to preserve meat and vegetables in the absence of refrigerators, such as drying or using salt. They also cool water and juices by covering the containers with fabrics or using what is known in Yemen as "al-Shawal," which is a wet cloth. Some have returned to using a mortar or grinder to grind spices. Due to the suspension of water lifting pumps for apartments on higher floors, plastic containers are filled with water and stored. Women have resorted to handwashing clothes instead of using electric washing machines. Due to the inability of poor families to afford candles, small containers operating with kerosene have been used to provide light during the long nighttime hours. Men have replaced satellite channels and the internet with old battery-operated radios, which help them stay updated on world news(1).

Most commercial shops have closed, and workshops, centers, and cafes that rely on petroleum products or electricity have come to a halt. As a result, tens of thousands of Yemenis in Houthi-controlled areas have been added to the ranks of the unemployed.

On the other hand, the collapse of the electricity system in Yemen has led to severe living hardships for around 20,000 employees in the electricity sector who have not received their dues from the Houthis since April 2016.

In one evening in mid-June 2016, public electricity partially returned to the cities of Sana'a and Hodeidah after a complete blackout that lasted for over a year and a half. This came as a surprise to the people and was unexpected. The Houthis announced the operation of the "Hiziz" power station with a production capacity of 130 megawatts for five hours daily, as well as the operation of the "Al-Kathib" station in the city of Hodeidah for six hours daily, after Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, the head of the so-called "Supreme Revolutionary Committee" affiliated with the Houthis, instructed the urgent provision of two million liters of diesel fuel to the "Hiziz" station

(1) Yemenis Seek Alternatives, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, April 28, 2015.

to restore its operation and provide electricity to the city[1]. What happened? Why did the Houthis suddenly decide to generate power when they had been citing fuel shortages for over a year and a half? And why did electricity return only to the cities of Sana'a and Hodeidah while the rest of the provinces under Houthi control remained without electricity?

Certainly, this sudden move after a year and a half of complete darkness was not aimed at alleviating the suffering of Yemenis, but rather a trick to deceive citizens and institutions and encourage them to pay their outstanding debts to the electricity company, mainly monthly subscription fees despite the lack of electric power. The debts owed to the ministry reached 84 billion rials ($332.4 million at that time's exchange rate)[2]. Economist and head of the Center for Economic Studies and Media, Mustafa Nasr, commented on this move, stating that "the electricity company and the official authorities controlled by the Houthi group have directed the collection of previous bills at exorbitant prices, especially from shop owners and companies. The partial electricity supply in Sana'a and Hodeidah aims primarily to gather financial resources[3]." This situation did not last long, as after the Houthis succeeded in taking money from citizens in the hope of obtaining public electricity, it stopped again, marking the beginning of the black-market phase for electric power.

The Yemeni people in Houthi-controlled areas realized that their deprivation of electricity was a deliberate act and not just an escape from responsibility, as some believed. The Houthis, in return, launched "commercial electricity" projects, as the Yemeni population calls them. Additionally, companies emerged to import solar-powered electricity generation devices and batteries, all directly or indirectly affiliated with the Houthis. If the fuel needed for government-operated power generators was unavailable, how was fuel provided for commercial power generators that sell electricity at four times the price of public (government) electricity? And where did these commercial generators originally come from?

The Looting of Power Generators:

After the Houthi group seized control of state institutions in the provinces, Houthi leaders divided the spoils stolen from government institutions and the homes of their opponents. Among these spoils were

(1) The President of the Revolutionary Committee visits the Hiziz power station and orders it to be put back into operation, Al-Thawra Net website affiliated with the Houthi movement, June 7, 2016.

(2) Houthis Barter with Yemenis: Electricity in Exchange for Bills During the Outages, Farouk Al-Kamali, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, June 26, 2016.

(3) Ibid.

electrical power generators stolen from public and private facilities in the provinces that fell into the hands of the Houthis. One of the main figures involved in this operation was Houthi leader Abdul Hakim al-Khaywani (Al-Karrar), the head of security and intelligence in the unrecognized Houthi government. He earns approximately 13 billion and 800 million Yemeni rials annually from looting power generators and investing in commercial energy generation for the residents of the capital, Sana'a, instead of public electricity(1).

For example, the Houthis looted electrical generators from the Military Works Department, generators from the Ministry of Interior and Central Security, from the Electricity and Rural Water Authority in the city of Hodeidah, from the Safir Company, the French Total Company, the Saudi Embassy building, the UAE Embassy, the Argawan Marketing and Advertising Company, from the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh's residences and his sons, the headquarters of the Permanent Committee in Sana'a, and the generators stored in the Electricity Corporation warehouse in the central Yemen province of Ibb, among other public and private institutions.

The looting of the generators of the French Total company is considered one of the most famous operations they carried out in this field. After failing to convince the security guards at the company's headquarters in Sana'a to hand over 50 electric generators, they clashed with the security guards in early September 2016 and stormed the company, looting the generators under the direction of Abdul Hakim Al-Khaywani, according to lawyer Mohammed Al-Masouri, who defended the victims of the security guards who were killed while defending the company. They are Abdul Rahman Khairan, Ali Al-Sanhani, and Mohammed Al-Zubaidi(2).

The trade of electricity with looted generators began in early 2016 on a limited scale in Sana'a, then expanded further in 89 residential neighborhoods and continues to expand. The number of generators in the capital, Sana'a alone, is 174 electric generators, all of which are unlicensed by the Ministry of Electricity under Houthi control, according to a partial inventory conducted by the ministry in 2017(3). The Houthis were able to control most of the electricity production sources after gaining control of the fuel market.

Before the Houthi control over the cities, the Ministry of Electricity and Energy collected an amount not exceeding 17 Yemeni rials per kilowatt-

(1) Details of the Financial Empire of the Houthis from the Revenues of Commercial Electricity in Sana'a, Al-Capital Online, February 22, 2018.

(2) With Documents... Houthi Leaders Loot Generators and Convert Them into Commercial Electricity Projects, Belqees Channel News Website, May 24, 2021.

(3) Belqees Channel News Website, the same source as the previous one.

hour of electricity. In less than six years, it jumped to 300 and 400 rials per kilowatt-hour, and in 2022, it was raised to 600 rials, and the monthly subscription to 1,700 Yemeni rials, in an unprecedented move in Yemen's history. This reflects the suffering of the Yemeni people and the amount of money the Houthis earn.

Hodeidah... The Untold Story of Suffering:

The daily lives of residents in the coastal areas of western Yemen remain the worst and most miserable during the time of war compared to other provinces. They have experienced tragic conditions due to high temperatures, complete power outages, fuel shortages, which have led to their deprivation of clean water and the spread of epidemics in plain sight of the Houthis, who looted the funds allocated to government institutions to combat these diseases and epidemics.

As a journalist specializing in social and human rights issues for a long time, I can say that the residents of the western coastal areas in Yemen suffer the most among all Yemenis, especially during the years of war. There are many reasons for this, the most important of which are the high temperatures in those areas and the deprivation of residents from petroleum derivatives and electricity. Because the residents of these areas are the poorest in Yemen, they cannot access the alternatives that residents in other areas can provide. They cannot afford to buy petroleum derivatives and electricity from the black market, nor can they provide fans, clean water, or proper food. Additionally, most of them are completely deprived of adequate healthcare and educational services.

Due to the high temperatures that sometimes exceed 40 degrees Celsius, and the power outages, life has become like hell in these areas. Men would escape the high heat in their homes at night, seeking relief on sidewalks and rooftops to catch a bit of cool air that would help them sleep, despite the risks of stray bullets or falling projectiles from the sky due to nearby armed confrontations. As for women, they had to stay in their homes or thatched huts, enduring the high temperatures and the accompanying illnesses and pains, along with the lack of clean drinking water or even the ability to bathe.

Some families were forced to flee to the outskirts of Hodeidah, where there are banana, palm, and mango trees, seeking shelter under them, as the temperatures are lower there. As they moved away from the coast, the temperature decreased.

As a natural consequence of the high temperatures, lack of clean water, and proper food, diseases spread among children, women, and the elderly. These diseases include malaria, dengue fever, cholera, and various skin

diseases. As for school students, there were many images of them attending classes naked because they couldn't bear to wear clothes due to the extreme heat. In universities, students pooled their money to buy small electric generators to have some lighting, even if it was weak, to enable them to study.

This situation has resulted in the death of many citizens in those areas. Despite the Houthis' secrecy and their prevention of media outlets from publishing detailed news about these incidents, except within a framework they define for political exploitation, incitement against the Yemeni government, and extortion of organizations, local and international newspapers have revealed in some reports that more than 100 people died at Al-Thawra Hospital in Hodeidah Governorate during the period of June and the first half of July 2016 due to high temperatures, and the hospital's inability to operate medical equipment and air conditioning due to complete power outages(1). For the same reason, ten children and two elderly individuals died in a hospital in Hodeidah city in June 2019(2). However, these news reports only reveal a small fraction of the suffering. A vast number of children, women, and elderly individuals in those areas were dying without anyone knowing about them due to high temperatures and lack of electricity.

While the residents of Houthi-controlled areas were suffering from heatwaves every summer and being deprived of water, food, and medicine, the Houthi elements of the ruling family were enjoying the comfort of their air-conditioned palaces and lighting. They had access to tax funds, zakat (Islamic alms), the black market, customs duties, and international aid. It is impossible to find someone belonging to the ruling family, which claims divine right, suffering from poverty, hunger, or lack of electricity in Houthi-controlled areas in general, and Tihama region in particular.

There have been few attempts to uncover the policies of starvation practiced by the Houthis in the Tihama regions, one of the notable attempts being by the Yemeni journalist known as Saeed Al-Janani, who is from Hodeidah Governorate. He has repeatedly provided testimonies about the suffering of residents in these areas due to deliberate deprivation of petroleum derivatives, electricity, and aid. He has also provided documented evidence that the fuel designated for operating power generators enters the city but is stolen by the Houthis.

During the peak of summer, while newspapers were reporting on dozens of victims due to the heat, specifically on July 10, 2016, Al-Janani published a document on his Facebook page issued by the port of Hodeidah

(1) Heatwave in Yemen Kills Dozens, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, July 11, 2016.
(2) Death of 10 Children and Two Elderly People Due to High Temperatures and Electricity Outages in Al Hodeidah, Yafea News Website, June 29, 2019.

confirming the arrival of shipments of diesel fuel designated for electricity generation, but the Houthis were stealing it. He stated, "Imagine that some Houthis still claim that the blockade is the reason for the power outage in Hodeidah Governorate, and some of their followers echo this deception."

This document shows the movement of the port of Hodeidah for Sunday. Look at the number of vessels present at the quay and anchorage, including a significant number of petroleum derivatives. For the first time since the start of the war, this number of vessels is present, and over the past months, vessels have been flowing to the port without interruption. As a reminder, in May of last year, a tanker carrying 29,000 tons of diesel fuel designated for the electricity of Hodeidah arrived at the port of Hodeidah. The Houthi militias refused to pay for it and the tanker left the port. They then brought another tanker with a capacity of no more than 6,000 tons. One-third of this quantity was transported to Sana'a upon the directive of Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, and as you can see, the remaining quantity's results are only available for an hour or two per day, and many neighborhoods are still without electricity. These are systematic practices, subjecting citizens to search for their basic rights while they continue to be humiliated. In return, the group of deceivers continues their deceit and propaganda, and the worst among them are the hypocrites who experience suffering during the day and applaud them in their posts in the evening(1).

On July 18, 2016, a week after the above-mentioned publication, journalist Al-Janani published another document confirming that the Houthis had not unloaded the tanker carrying diesel fuel designated for electricity. He stated, "Twelve days have passed since the arrival of the tanker 'Alpha' carrying 5,825 tons of diesel fuel designated for the electricity of Hodeidah to the port's anchorage, and it is still there today without being unloaded. Perhaps it has become normal to hear such news, and it is no longer shocking. Everyone, young and old, in the Hodeidah Governorate knows well who is responsible for their suffering." In the same publication, he added, "Anyone who says otherwise is, in my opinion, a hypocrite who should continue practicing their hypocrisy in the propaganda of the group, with flattery and favoritism." He also attached a report on the movement of the port of Hodeidah for Monday, which showed the presence of the diesel fuel tanker at the port's anchorage and its arrival date on July 6, 2016(2).

On October 22, 2017, the same journalist criticized the arrival of ships loaded with diesel fuel designated for electricity, but more than a month passed, and electricity remained off and unavailable even in hospitals or the pumps that supply water to people's homes(3).

(1) Bassem Al-Jinani, Facebook post, July 10, 2016.
(2) Bassem Al-Jinani, Facebook post, July 18, 2016.
(3) Bassem Al-Jinani, Facebook post, October 22, 2017.

In November 2018, Al-Janani published photos of generators and electrical equipment being transported by the Houthi group to the capital Sana'a on large trucks. These generators were used to provide electricity to Hodeidah city. The group also set fire to one of the warehouses of the Electricity Corporation on Fifty Street, including transformers, cables, and wires(1).

From time to time, the Houthis would carry out media campaigns and encourage people to participate in events demanding the entry of fuel ships. They would recount the damage and the human tragedies resulting from the lack of electricity, especially in healthcare institutions in Hodeidah. However, once these shipments arrived, they would be stolen and sent to other provinces or provided to Houthi businessmen under various pretexts. In the summer of 2019, journalist Al-Janani published a post condemning the Houthis for stealing diesel fuel designated for electricity in Hodeidah, claiming that it was intended for the Amran factory(2).

The same crime was confirmed by the well-known Yemeni journalist and editor-in-chief of Al-Masdar newspaper, Ali Al-Faqih, who published a document on his Facebook page illustrating the entry of large quantities of oil and foodstuffs through the port of Hodeidah on August 10, 2021. However, the residents of the city do not benefit from them. He stated, "To realize how much Abdul-Malik al-Houthi is a deceiver, and how he and his gang are shameless thieves, follow the daily report on the movement of ships arriving at the port of Hodeidah loaded with oil and foodstuffs. Despite the enormous quantities of oil, Hodeidah city is drowning in darkness, while the black market thrives and the balances of the (thieving march) gang swell(3)."

The disruption of public (government) electricity has led to an increased demand for fuel to operate generators that supply institutions, hotels, private projects, and commercial electricity. This has allowed the dominant Houthi elements in the Tihama regions to engage in the trade of diesel fuel designated for the electricity institution responsible for supplying citizens with electricity at official prices. It is sold to private institutions and distributed to Houthi-affiliated companies that sell commercial electricity to citizens at inflated prices.

(1) In Pictures: Houthis Plunder Warehouses of the Rural Electricity and Water Authority in the City of Hodeidah, Tahama Region Website, November 28, 2018.
(2) Bassem Al-Jinani, Facebook post, July 24, 2019.
(3) Ali Al-Faqih, Facebook post, August 10, 2021.

Weakening the Private Sector and Establishing a Houthi/Racial Financial Activity:

The looting and blockade of the private sector in Yemen do not solely aim to collect as much money as possible for the benefit of the Houthi group. However, it can be confirmed that there is a deliberate policy to weaken Yemeni companies and businessmen who do not belong to this group and push them towards bankruptcy or leaving Yemen.

The Houthi group excels in tightening its grip, extorting, and besieging the private sector, which has led many commercial, industrial, and banking institutions to collapse and bankruptcy. In contrast, there has been a rush to establish new companies and commercial entities affiliated with the Houthis, to serve as alternatives to bankrupt or departing institutions, managed directly by the leadership of the group or by affiliated individuals.

After a few weeks of their control over the capital Sana'a, the Houthis began canceling the government institutions' dealings with several private companies. Among them, the so-called Supreme Revolutionary Committee affiliated with the Houthis canceled commercial transactions between the Ministry of Oil and the Ha'il Saeed Anam Group(1).

Then, systematic attacks on other businessmen and their affiliated institutions began. In December 2014, the businessman Tawfiq Al-Khamri was subjected to repeated attacks, most notably armed gunmen storming his house in Sana'a, assaulting him, and shooting at his private guards. This resulted in the death of one of them and the injury of three others. the Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Sana'a condemned this incident and stated in its statement that "the attack on the businessman means an attack on the private sector, destabilizing it and threatening its security. These practices have a significant negative impact on the economic situation and affect investments since businessmen need a safe environment for investing(2)."

Naturally, this statement came after a series of attacks and harassments against businessmen, the summoning of many of them by the Houthis, conducting investigations with them, and refusing to release them except after subjecting them to their direction and financial policies and their compliance with what is demanded of them.

On February 27, 2015, the Supreme Revolutionary Committee affiliated with the Houthis decided to prohibit the private sector from importing a number of consumer goods. This step was seen by politicians and

(1) Houthis: A Thorn in the Side of Yemen's Private Sector, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, December 25, 2014.
(2) Ibid.

economists as a factor contributing to the "destruction of the private sector" in Yemen[1].

Despite the apparent aim of the decision to boost the national economy by restricting imports and promoting domestic products, as per the justifications provided by the Houthis, the reality is not as feasible. The true objective behind this decision is to besiege the current private sector in the country, as it is primarily responsible for importing essential items such as foodstuffs, electronics, construction materials, and cars. The Houthi decision has sparked widespread anger as it deprives Yemenis of their basic needs and harms both the private sector and the national economy at large. Dr. Alft Al-Duba'i, a politician and social activist, expressed her views on the matter, stating, "The Revolutionary Committee's intent behind these decisions is to undermine what little is left of the state by dismantling the private sector." She further remarked that these decisions "are not in favor of the citizens and establish a new group of smugglers and traders who will strengthen their ties with these smugglers[2]."

Economists consider this decision catastrophic and anticipate that it will lead to "the cancellation of Yemen's membership in the World Trade Organization, the imposition of economic sanctions and fines, and it will result in severe and catastrophic losses for Yemeni importers[3]."

For example, Professor Mohamed Halboub, an economist at Aden University, warned that turning Sana'a into a village with a halt in business and trade due to international isolation would be a consequence if the Houthis continue to implement this decision[4].

Less than ten days after the announcement of the Houthi decision, the Ministry of Industry and Trade in Sana'a confirmed that the Houthis had reversed their decision to ban the import of several goods that primarily targeted businessmen who are not affiliated with them.

On November 17, 2015, the Houthis assassinated the seventy-year-old businessman Abdul Salam Al-Shamiri. Houthi elements stormed his house in Al-Hodeidah province, entered his bedroom, fired more than thirty gunshots at his body, and eventually stole his money, properties, and lands.

The group hid behind various justifications and lies to make their policy of targeting the private sector and subjecting it appear legally acceptable to the public. While targeting businessmen and private commercial institutions, they would announce a list of false charges to justify crimes of

(1) Yemen: Houthi Group Bans the Import of Foodstuffs and Building Materials, Farouq Al-Kamali, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, March 1, 2015.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Yemen: Houthis Backtrack on Import Ban, Farouq Al-Kamali, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, March 11, 2015.

theft, extortion, displacement, or the killing of businessmen. For example, in November 2016, the General Prosecution, which was under Houthi control, issued a decision to seize the assets of Yemeni businessman and oil trader Ammar Tawfiq Abdul Rahim after accusing one of his oil companies of smuggling an oil tanker from the port of Al-Hodeidah(1). The company denied the allegations at the time and described them as "false, fabricating facts, and misleading public opinion(2)."

The direct and rapid targeting of the private sector was notable and controversial, revealing the intentions of the Houthis to engulf this important sector. That is why the group shifted towards a gradual and slow targeting process, employing various methods such as increasing taxes, Zakat (Islamic alms), imposing additional customs duties, and imposing levies and fees on private companies and projects under different pretexts. They also deprived or delayed them in obtaining permits to conduct their activities, reduced their shares in petroleum derivatives that are essential for institutions, factories, and machinery, and implemented other measures that undermine their operations, lead to bankruptcy, or compel them to smuggle part of their funds and investments out of Yemen.

Regarding this, Abdulghani Al-Iryani, a researcher at the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, testified after his visit to Yemen in 2021: "I spoke to many businessmen in Sana'a. Small businessmen are heading towards bankruptcy and being replaced by others who have relationships with the Houthi authorities. Senior businessmen are currently in a safe position, despite paying exorbitant taxes and arbitrary fees, but many of them believe that they will not continue their businesses in the long run. The Houthis continue to impose new taxes from time to time(3)."

In contrast, the Houthi group exempts its leadership or affiliated traders from the fees, grants them permits and full authority, and provides them with all legal and illegal government facilities to ensure the success of their commercial and industrial activities and enable them to gain complete control over the markets.

For example, according to testimonies from the healthcare sector, when pharmaceutical agents request permits to register new drugs to enter the Yemeni market, the Houthis delay issuing the permits. And when they do issue them, it is usually for only one or two categories of drugs. However, when it comes to companies and Houthi-affiliated agents who belong to the ruling faction, they obtain permits for dozens of drug categories without any

(1) Yemen: Have the Houthis Started Nationalizing the Private Sector? Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, November 15, 2016.

(2) "AcroGaz Yemen Limited" Demands Concerned Authorities in the State to Compel the Oil Company to Pay Its Dues (Documents), Al-Taghyeer Net, November 11, 2016.

(3) Yemen: How the Houthis are Reshaping the Country in the Footsteps of Saada - The Essence of a Comprehensive Visit by Sana'a Researchers, Yemen Future Website, August 11, 2021.

scrutiny or review. The goal is to monopolize the pharmaceutical market and gain control over it, and they have succeeded in doing so.

The Houthis have also dominated the street advertising market in areas under their control in less than two years after taking over the capital, Sana'a. They have used it for political and sectarian purposes to promote their extremist ideas and agenda, resulting in the shutdown of most independent advertising companies, leading to their losses, and laying off their employees. In the year 2015, the advertising market incurred losses of approximately 30 million dollars, in addition to losses in assets and equipment looted by the Houthis. Furthermore, the Yemeni treasury lost an estimated 40 million dollars annually in fees for leasing advertising spaces in the Yemeni capital, Sana'a, alone(1).

In mid-December 2015, Arjwan Marketing and Advertising Company accused Houthi elements, led by Ibrahim Yahya Mohammed Abu Talib, of raiding the company's headquarters and looting all its assets, estimated at $800,000. This incident led to the cessation of the company's operations and caused harm to over thirty employees who were supporting their families(2). The Houthis often carry out such acts to establish companies operating in the same field.

By the end of 2017, the Houthi leader Taha Al-Mutawakel, who served as the Minister of Health in the Houthi government, revealed their intention to control the private sector under the banner of "declaring a state of economic emergency." He stated, "In countries around the world, in less dire circumstances than ours, they declare a state of economic emergency... and an economic emergency means that the state takes control of the private sector. The entire private sector becomes monopolized by the state. And to manage the people and the interests of the people, they take control of Al-Huthayli, Al-Mufazir, Al-Habbari(3), and others among the merchants who devour people's money(4)." This statement does not require analysis to uncover the group's intentions, as it is clear and explicit.

In May 2021, a video was leaked by a citizen showing a bulldozer belonging to a Houthi supervisor destroying one of the largest shopping malls in the capital, Sana'a, after accusing its owner of committing unlawful violations.

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(1) Houthis Monopolize Yemen's Advertisements, Inflicting Severe Losses on Companies, Farouq Al-Kamali, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, May 22, 2016.

(2) Arjwan Marketing Company Accuses Houthis of Stealing Assets and Equipment Worth $800,000, Al-Taghyeer Net, December 14, 2015.

(3) Al-Hathili: Businessman Abdullah Al-Hathili. Al-Mufazir: Businessman Hamoud Al-Mufazir. Al-Habbari: Businessman Yahya Al-Habbari.

(4) From a sermon delivered by Taha Al-Mutawakil (Minister of Health and Population in the Houthi government) on Friday, November 24, 2017, at Al-Hashush Mosque in the northern part of the capital, Sana’a.

A few days later, the Houthi leader Sultan Al-Samei visited the "Mall of Arabia," which had been attacked by the Houthi supervisors with a bulldozer. He commented on the incident, saying, "We did not find any violations by the mall management as claimed by the supervisor. It is rather shameless extortion. The governor of Sana'a attended the mall today to apologize, and it has become a duty to punish these criminals(1)."

In the face of these practices, the Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry had warned against the systematic targeting that businessmen were facing, stating that it was leading to bankruptcy and the departure of many of them from Yemen. One of the prominent positions rejecting this policy was a statement issued by the Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry on April 18, 2021, in which it condemned what it described as "arbitrary measures" against the private sector by the Houthi group, represented by the "General Authority for Zakat." Additionally, statements and positions from businessmen criticized the establishment of customs centers at city entrances and the multiplication of various fees.

Most of the practices targeting the private sector were carried out away from media attention, except for some cases that surfaced and became local and international public opinion issues. This prompted the Houthis to handle them through media containment, imposing settlements that ultimately forced traders and businessmen to comply with their demands.

The group seized the properties and companies of many businessmen, using fabricated charges such as "treason, collaboration, and profiteering from abroad." On June 20, 2021, the Houthis decided to confiscate the assets of Yemeni businessman Mohammed Yahya Al-Haifi, accusing him of "undermining the independence of the Yemeni Republic, assisting the enemy, and spying for the Zionist Mossad and American intelligence(2)."

Mohammed Al-Haifi remained in Yemen and did not leave the country, but he went into hiding after the Houthis began pursuing him due to his refusal to accept the measures that aimed to confiscate his assets. In a recorded video published days after the Houthis' decision, Al-Haifi addressed the leader of the group, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, saying, "My injustice lies in the actions of a group of Ansar Allah (Houthis), led by Saleh Jubaysh, Amin Jassar, and Abu Muaz Al-Nabhan, who invaded my house and violated its sanctity without any justification or legal order, using false pretenses and fabrications."

First, they claim that it is the house of Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar.

Second, they falsely claim that it used to be the residence of the

(1) Post by Houthi political council member Sultan Al-Samie on his Twitter page dated May 10, 2021.

(2) Document issued by the specialized public prosecution in Sana’a under Houthi control.

American ambassador and that the military side has controlled it since 2015. All these claims are lies and fabrications.

Thirdly, recently they accused me of being a spy and an agent for America and Israel and collaborating with the aggression against Yemen. I am a person who loves my country, and I cannot relinquish even an inch of this homeland. If I am a spy or an agent, would I stay in Yemen?! I am displaced in my own country, and my children are displaced everywhere. Yesterday, two days ago, we heard new allegations claiming that my house is a base for the American embassy. This is the fourth accusation, and how many false accusations and fabrications can they come up with (big lies). Why? Why do they want to demolish my beloved home? Injustice and defamation? Why? They froze my assets without any justification, without any orders. I demand justice. Now, the latest accusation they fabricated and spread to many leaders and institutions is that my house is a base for the American embassy, and that beneath my house, there are three underground floors exclusively for the American embassy. They claim that no one can enter them, they have secret codes and electronic doors, and these hidden three underground floors contain devices and equipment. If these accusations are proven, I am present in Yemen, and my wealth, my house, my property, and even my life are sacrifices for my country. Give me justice, give me justice[1].

Al-Haifi is considered one of the well-known businessmen in Yemen whose trade has grown, and their businesses have expanded during the era of the state. He worked as an agent for a mobile company, and before that, he was an agent for the global Euro Car company. He owns the Khalidoun Contracting Company and the Sam Tourist Hotel, located on one of the prominent and important streets in the capital, Sana'a. In addition to that, he owns one of the most famous palaces in Sana'a. The Houthis directed the confiscation of his properties because he did not support them, according to the testimony of the renowned Yemeni journalist Fakhri Al-Arashi[2].

After the video of Al-Haifi spread, his victimhood turned into a public opinion issue that was covered by local and international media. The Houthis succumbed to his demands and returned his looted house, but they wanted to minimize their losses. They pressured him and forced him to write a statement thanking the group and praising them for returning the house that the same looters had plundered.

Regardless of the details of the deal that ended with the delivery of Al-Haifi's palace, the incident revealed how the Houthis use the tactic of vilifying businessmen, accusing them of treason, collaboration, and working for America and Israel in order to loot their wealth or gain control over part

(1) Video posted by Yemeni businessman Mohammed Yahya Al-Haifi on YouTube, June 27, 2021.
(2) Twitter post by the journalist Fakhri Al-Arshi, dated June 28, 2021.

of it, and subject them to their policies. This is the same tactic they use to intimidate and analyze the blood of those who oppose them intellectually and politically, by accusing them of collaboration and treason with foreign powers to justify killing them, imprisoning them, displacing them, and confiscating their properties.

Financial institutions were not exempt from this deliberate targeting. This is confirmed by the Houthis' move on June 28, 2021, to issue a directive to seize all funds and balances of the Islamic Cooperative Bank in Sana'a and all provinces under their control as part of a comprehensive policy to take administrative control of it and restructure the most important banks in Yemen. The Islamic Cooperative Bank, owned by the Hayel Saeed Anam Group, is one of the largest private commercial banks in the country.

Economic expert, Wahid Al-Fawdi explained that the Houthis have gradually transitioned "from plundering public funds and controlling all state institutions to the organized looting of national capital and the destruction of the private sector, and the systematic destruction of the commercial banking system and the banking system in Yemen. These are deliberate policies adopted by the Houthis to confiscate and loot national wealth."

Al-Fawdi revealed the ultimate goals of this Houthi financial policy, including "money laundering of a significant portion of the immense funds they have gained control over through coercion or enticement, and the establishment of numerous projects in all economic sectors, most notably the banking sector, where companies with massive capital have been formed. Their mission is to integrate and launder the funds of Houthi leaders and gain control of the exchange market as key players who can significantly influence the exchange rate. They use this as leverage against their opponents at the expense of millions of Yemeni people[(1)]."

This was previously confirmed by economic expert, Mustafa Nasr, who pointed out that the Houthis began seizing oil institutions by disabling the government company and establishing parallel commercial companies controlled by loyalists. Then they moved on to telecommunications and banks, describing the series of measures and restrictions imposed by the Houthis on telecommunications companies and banks as "a deliberate policy to control all economic resources, especially sectors with significant fiscal revenue[(2)]."

It is observed that most economists initially, used phrases such as "the Houthis are working on establishing parallel commercial companies" or "a

(1) "Houthi Economic War: Extortion and Illegitimate Wealth" by Waheed Al-Fouda, Al-Amniah Net, June 30, 2021.

(2) "Houthis Face Their Financial Squeeze through Investors' Pockets and Tax Increases" by Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, April 5, 2019.

parallel economy" or "a parallel private sector." However, events have confirmed that the Houthis were actually destroying the previous economy and creating an alternative economy, not just a parallel one, as they took control of government and private economic institutions. Those remaining businessmen who cooperate with them do so entirely under their policies. Moreover, Houthi leaders have entered direct partnerships with traders and businessmen. Those who refuse face bankruptcy, and if they are lucky, they may succeed in smuggling a portion of their wealth abroad. This method of controlling both the public and private economy is also employed by the Khomeini regime in Iran.

Mohammed Al-Hakimi, the editor-in-chief of the Economy Now magazine, described this new situation that emerged in the years following the Houthi takeover of Sana'a, saying, "Hundreds of Yemeni businessmen and traders went bankrupt and ended their businesses as a result of the war. Others left Yemen, leaving their businesses vulnerable to militia extortion. In contrast, Houthi traders have risen from nothing, making investments in various activities, including new exchange companies opened in Sana'a, private power stations with giant generators, and unlicensed gas stations." The emergence of this new class of war-affiliated wealthy individuals has led to the collapse of the most important social class that contributed to the country's social stability—the middle class, which now includes employees who have become poor and without salaries(1).

It can be said that the Houthis have formed a new generation of businessmen loyal to them, who have amassed vast fortunes from state resources, looted properties of their opponents, and cash reserves in the central bank, in addition to the revenues from the black markets they have established. The number of new companies established by the Houthis in less than four years has been estimated at 1,250 companies and commercial and investment institutions. These include companies operating in the oil services, import and export, general contracting, currency exchange, money transfer, as well as institutions providing education, health services, and others. The management of these companies has been entrusted to Houthi leaders or individuals closely associated with them, with the aim of camouflage(2).

On June 9, 2022, the office of the Ministry of Industry and Trade in Hodeidah, under the control of the Houthi group, issued a circular, requiring wholesale traders, agents of imported and locally produced food items, to disclose their inventory of wheat, flour, sugar, oils, ghee, and legumes. It

(1) "Yemen: Houthis Build Parallel Entity to Benefit War Profiteers" by Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, October 30, 2016.

(2) "Report by the Regain Yemen Initiative for the Recovery of Looted Assets and Rights," published on November 12, 2020.

also included an inventory of restaurant needs and their consumption of chicken, flour, and rice. This was an unprecedented move in Yemen's history.

According to testimonies from businessmen and traders in Yemen, this step taken by the Houthi group aims to achieve two main objectives. The first is to determine the inventory and capital of each merchant, which helps the Houthis identify the funds and levies that will be imposed on each of them, regardless of whether the owners of these projects make a profit or incur losses. The second objective is to provide information to competing traders and businessmen who belong to the same faction, creating a database that helps them target traders and businessmen who do not belong to the Houthis and push them towards loss and bankruptcy.

This exhausting and oppressive situation resulted in a large number of businessmen finding themselves compelled to flee either partially or completely with their capital outside of Yemen or enter into partnerships with Houthi leaders and grant them a portion of their profits in exchange for protection and facilitation or attempt to coexist with Houthi practices in the hope of the return of the state and its institutions.

The Houthi's keenness to restrict trade to a specific ethnicity is an old Imami behavior that was widely practiced by the ancestors of the Houthis. Imam Yahya bin Hamid al-Din seized the trade of many Yemeni merchants and some of them were forced to share their trade without a legitimate reason, "employing workers from his relatives and entourage who, in turn, engaged in looting and robbery that was no less brutal than the looting and robbery committed by the Imam himself(1)."

The Russian historian and writer Elena Golubovskaya illustrated the suffering experienced by Yemeni traders during the rule of Imam Ahmed in her book "The September 26 Revolution in Yemen." She mentioned, "Yemeni traders, except for a small group close to the Imam, suffered from the oppressive injustice imposed on them. The middle and small traders were marginalized in the most profitable business deals. The Imam and those around him monopolized the profitable branches of foreign trade, while maintaining a traditional artificial form of economic patterns. All of this limited the scope of activity for the emerging bourgeoisie, and the absence of guarantees, personal freedoms, and property rights for traders exacerbated the difficulties and hindered the growth of foreign trade. As a result, major traders resorted to depositing their capital in foreign banks, and in some limited cases, funds leaked into the internal accumulation, further exacerbating the shortage of necessary resources for the growth of the

(1) "Al-Hadawiya Between Political Theory and Divine Belief," previous reference, page 85, citing the book "Revolution of 1948: Birth, Journey, and Influences," Yemeni Studies and Research Center, by a group of researchers and writers, 2nd edition: 2004, page 259.

country's economy. Traders not only sent money abroad, but most of them left the country and embarked on long migrations. In exile, they engaged in commercial activities, and only a few of them returned to the homeland in old age[1]."

The same policy is applied by the Houthis today through carrying out updates and additions to it, benefiting from technological and economic advancements. They have affiliated businessmen who control the trade of essential commodities and distribute them to Yemenis. This trade generates immense profits, such as petroleum derivatives and wheat at this stage. During Imam Ahmed's rule, there were a few traders who worked for him or partnered with him in the trade of important commodities at that time, such as coffee, cotton, and sugar. Among those traders were Ahmad Ali Al-Wajeeh, Mohammed Al-Jabali, and Sheikh Al-Zejaji[2]. They were prominent traders in the country at that time and belonged to the social class to which Imam Ahmed belonged, or as described by the Russian historian Elena Golubovskaya, the class of "the gentlemen."

Elena Golubovskaya continues her historical testimony by saying: "The commercial bourgeoisie of the 'gentlemen' class monopolized the essential goods designated for export, such as coffee and cotton, and took control of the majority of wholesale trade and the most important import trade. They represented the rights of their new partners from the royal family and the Imam's government provided them with various facilitations, exempting them specifically from paying internal customs duties. As a rule, the Imam's customs provided obligations for major traders or officials, allowing them to collect taxes freely and send a limited portion of the accumulated fees to the Imam's treasury. These obedient traders not only worked without supervision, but they also imposed fees on incoming traders, and they were able to impose severe punishments on them and throw them into prisons[3]."

The author believes that this imamate policy hindered the development of commercial capital in Yemen in general, regardless of specific privileges granted to traders by the Imam. "Among the merchant circles, there appeared material and social disparities and distinctions. The large bourgeoisie, either belonging to aristocratic families of the gentlemen or even individuals with connections to the ruling family, gathered economic and political power in their hands, while many middle and small traders did not possess such economic and political privileges[4]," she states. Isn't this what happened during the time of the Houthis under their rule?

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(1) Ibid.
(2) "September 26 Revolution in Yemen," previous source, pages 135-136.
(3) Ibid. p. 135.
(4) Ibid. p. 142.

The Judicial Guard and Legalizing Theft:

The Imams and their Houthi descendants are adept at finding justifications to legalize the looting of Yemenis' wealth, properties, and lands. In the past, they used to label Yemenis who opposed their rule as infidels, transgressors, and al-Mushabbihah (deviants)[1]. This allowed them to kill them and seize their wealth, as happened with the Al-Matrafyah group and all Yemeni tribes that rejected their rule[2][3]. Today, in addition to charges of disbelief, atheism, and immorality, they use other charges to steal property, such as working abroad, profiteering, and betrayal. Based on these charges, they conduct mock trials that were met with rejection and ridicule by Yemenis.

In December 2015, the Special Criminal Court in the capital Sana'a, under Houthi control, held its first session to try several Yemeni political, social, and military figures, including President Abd-Rabbu Mansur Hadi, on charges of high treason and other state officials. The trials took place in absentia throughout 2016 and the first quarter of 2017. On March 25, 2017, the Houthi court issued its verdict in Case No. 68, convicting most of them of high treason and sentencing them to death. It also ruled to confiscate their properties and assets[4]. This was done to many opponents of the Houthis as a means of legitimizing the looting of their assets. This approach was highlighted in the report of the "eminent international and regional panels of experts on Yemen". In their commentary on the Houthis' execution of 138 Yemeni parliamentarians who rejected Houthi control over power and stood with the internationally recognized government, they confirmed that the

(1) The term "al-Mushabbihah" is used by the Imams to refer to those who disagree with them on some religious issues (Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah), who represent the majority of the people of Yemen. This has been noted by one of their contemporary references, Muhammad Abdullah Awad, in his book "Insights into the Features of the Zaidi Doctrine and its Characteristics," published by Al-Al-Bayt Library, page 96. It is also mentioned in the book "Al-Shafi" by Abdullah bin Hamza bin Suleiman (d. 614), Part One, Al-Al-Bayt Library, page 437. The Imams of Yemen did not stop at legalizing the looting of the money, property, and lands of those Yemenis who disagreed with them, including the Sunnis and others. They also legalized the killing of their men, capturing their offspring, and women, and selling them in the markets of the Muslims, as mentioned in the book "Collected Messages of Imam al-Mansur Billah Abdullah bin Hamza (First Part)," pages 108-109.

(2) "Al- Matrafyah " is a Yemeni current that suffered systematic annihilation during the fifth and sixth centuries of the Hijri calendar in Yemen. It was considered a deviant and apostate group due to its differing views, especially their rejection of the restricted leadership and rule in Batinah. They were eventually uprooted by Abdullah bin Hamza, and all their wealth and lands were confiscated, even though they belonged to one of the factions of the Zaidi doctrine.

(3) "Al-Muhadhdhab in the Fatwas of Imam al-Mansur Billah Abdullah bin Hamza," previous source, p. 457.

(4) A study titled "The Imposition of Taxes and the Ruling: The Houthis and the Fifth Tax, Towards the Establishment of the Hashemite Elite," Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, October 8, 2020.

Houthi condemnations of the parliamentarians were "used to legitimize the seizure of their assets and properties[1]."

Initially, the Houthis' looting operations against Yemenis were characterized by randomness. Every Houthi leader, supervisor, and member looted whatever they found in front of them as soon as they took control of cities and villages. They stole money, cars, valuable possessions, occupied lands, seized homes, converted them into their private residences or prisons for their opponents. In mid-2017, the Houthi group established the so-called "Judicial Guard" to give a legal veneer to the looting and theft of Yemenis' money and properties, ensuring that it reaches the top Houthi leadership or exploiting it to buy allegiances or spread Houthi beliefs.

Originally, judicial guardianship is considered a temporary precautionary measure to place disputed funds under the control of a trustworthy person who preserves and manages them, and then delivers them to the rightful owner[2]. However, the Houthis have established a judicial guardian who works on confiscating the properties of those who oppose their political, ideological, and ethnic beliefs after levying numerous charges against them, taking advantage of their complete control over the judiciary and prosecutors, as well as other state institutions in Sana'a. Although the Houthis tried to legitimize the judicial guardian system by issuing decisions that give it legal cover, it operated outside the scope of state institutions under their control, functioning only as a parallel tool used for looting funds[3].

The funds of opposition members are subject to looting, whether they are hidden in their prisons, displaced in provinces under government control, outside Yemen, or even in cases of their elimination. On December 23, 2017, the group directed the Yemeni Central Bank in Sana'a to freeze all bank accounts owned by 2,231 individuals who refused to deal with the Houthis and recognize their authority. Furthermore, the specialized criminal court in Sana'a, under Houthi control, announced on September 14, 2019, the precautionary seizure of the assets of 35 Yemeni parliament members who did not "accompany the Houthis," according to the description of the United Nations, which considered that "illegal seizure constitutes a violation of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that must be applied[4]."

A United Nations panel of experts has uncovered a Houthi network involved in diverting funds obtained through the illegal seizure of assets

(1) "Report of the United Nations' Distinguished International and Regional Experts Team," September 9, 2020, Paragraph 343, Page 100.

(2) Law No. 40 of the year 2002 on Civil Proceedings and Execution.

(3) Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, previous source.

(4) "Expert Report," a letter dated January 27, 2020, Paragraph 86, Page 37.

confiscated from Yemenis. The network is managed by Salah Mousfer Al-Sha'er[1], a close associate of the leader of the Houthi group and arms dealer. He was appointed on September 15, 2018, as the head of the so-called "Logistics Support Authority" with the rank of brigadier general and a judicial guardian over the stolen funds and assets of Houthi opponents[2]. The responsible person for looting Yemenis' properties is estimated to have seized around $100 million, using a variety of unlawful tactics, according to the U.S. Treasury Department[3].

Al-Sha'er has established a network consisting of members of his family, as well as individuals from courts, security agencies, commercial banks, and financial institutions, all under Houthi control. This network engages in the process of "blackmail, intimidation, and unlawful detention of company directors and bank managers, threatening them with charges of cooperation and espionage for the enemy unless they comply with the judicial guardian's orders[4]."

The Houthi judicial guardian has been granted extensive powers. He directs and supervises the process of raiding and looting the properties of politicians, tribal leaders, scholars, businessmen, and other opponents, whether their assets are in the form of houses, companies, bank accounts, or even valuable possessions.

The Houthis have used the properties of Yemenis, particularly influential individuals such as politicians, tribal leaders, religious scholars, and businessmen, to pressure, silence, and suppress their opposition to the Houthis. The truth is that most of the Yemeni elites, whether they are in areas under Houthi control or outside of it, preferred to remain silent and not confront the crimes of the Houthis out of fear for their own properties, as well as the safety of their families and relatives within the country.

The Houthis closely monitor anyone who is active against them, whether inside or outside Yemen, and they identify and assess their properties. They either directly take control over those properties or send various messages aiming to intimidate and force them into silence. They may send threatening messages demanding them to stop their opposition, or else their properties will be confiscated. They may also besiege their homes or businesses and pressure the residents or employees to leave, claiming collaboration with the

(1) Saleh Masfer Al-Sha'ar, also known as Abu Yasir, born in the Razih district of Saada Governorate, an arms dealer and one of the prominent Houthi leaders who controls financial matters and manages the financial investments and activities of the Houthi movement. He is designated as number 35 on the Arab coalition's wanted list. The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on Al-Sha'ar on November 18, 2021.

(2) "Expert Report 2020," Paragraphs 87 and 88, Page 37.

(3) "Treasury Sanctions Senior Houthi Military Officer Overseeing Group’s Seizure of Opposition Property," U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, November 18, 2021.

(4) "Expert Report," same previous source, Paragraph 89, Page 38.

Yemeni government. In this way, they have succeeded in silencing most citizens who choose to remain silent to protect their properties.

It must be acknowledged that campaigns of defamation and accusations of collaboration with the coalition and the Yemeni government have been effective tools used by the Houthis to loot and extort Yemenis, compelling them to abandon their convictions, rights, and even their possessions in favor of the group's followers(1).

They pass the charges of betrayal and collaboration through the courts and specialized prosecutors under their complete control as a legal cover for looting operations. However, the law they use as a cover for looting Yemenis' assets is disabled when the affected individuals seek to resort to it to recover what was looted. On July 23, 2018, Salah Al-Sha'er, the head of the specialized criminal court, directed the prohibition of accepting any complaints filed by victims of money theft operations. Nevertheless, they back down from confiscating the properties of certain individuals who have proven their submission, loyalty, and service to them. One of the notable politicians in the General People's Congress Party was Abu Bakr Al-Qirbi, who exerted efforts to defend the Houthis by exploiting his relationships formed during his tenure as Foreign Minister with various entities and individuals in different countries. In exchange for the services he provided to the Houthis, they canceled the seizure procedures for his properties.

The Houthis hand over the management of the economic institutions they seize to their affiliated elements from the same group, granting them the freedom to deal with their revenues and contents. For example, the Houthis handed over the management of the University of Science and Technology, the largest private university, to a Houthi leader named Adel Al-Mutawakel, who, in turn, looted the furniture belonging to the female affairs department and used it in his own house. He also distributed the university's furniture to judicial security personnel(2).

Estimates indicate that the amount looted by the Houthis until mid-2020 exceeded billions of dollars in various bank accounts, in addition to private properties owned or managed by more than 1,250 individuals in the capital, Sana’a, alone. They seized more than 100 private companies(3).

The economic expert and president of the Center for Economic Studies and Media, Mustafa Nasr, commented on the seizure of economic activities owned by opponents of the Houthi rebels, stating that they are "illegal steps and a form of organized looting under a legal cover that is not based on

(1) "How the Houthis Rule Yemeni Lives," Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, December 31, 2019.
(2) "Adel Al-Mutawakil Plunders the Furniture of the University of Science and Technology," Al-Asema Online, July 7, 2021.
(3) "Saleh Al-Sha'ar: The Hidden Figure Responsible for the Financial Empire of the Houthis," Middle East Newspaper, January 19, 2021, Issue Number [15393].

genuine logical justifications, except for the open and clear seizure of others' funds. This step has significant economic effects related to exacerbating the economic contraction that Yemen is experiencing because, in the context of encroaching on private property and confiscating it, the state of economic contraction and decline in the country is multiplied. It is not logical for economic and investment growth to occur in light of this situation where funds are seized illegally and unjustifiably, not based on a constitution or law. This exacerbates the deteriorating economic situation, including the issue of the lack of job opportunities and other negative effects that lead to significant losses, whether in the private sector or in government revenues, which directly affects people's lives. This is one aspect of economic failure. Consequently, an economy specific to the group is formed, managed by this group through its investors and companies, and it works to establish an alternative economy to replace the existing one. This alternative economy does not meet the needs of thirty million Yemeni citizens, and therefore the entire population is affected by these practices [...] We are facing a real problem regarding the Houthi group because it is a group that does not recognize international conventions, and it is difficult to pressure them to adhere to certain decisions. However, this does not mean that we should remain silent about these practices. At the very least, lawsuits should be filed, and condemnation should be made against this group and these actions because they are an assault on people's rights and properties under illegal justifications. These practices harm, first and foremost, the individuals who are directly affected by these violations, their companies, and their businesses in the private sector, and they also harm the overall economic situation, affecting the Yemeni citizens. Currently, more than 85% of the total Yemeni population needs humanitarian assistance, and a large portion of the population relies on aid and lives in extreme poverty. Therefore, all of these are results of these practices that are increasing in frequency in the absence of any deterrent force to stop them at their limits[(1)]."

On February 14th, 2022, the SAM Organization for Rights and Freedoms issued a report shedding light on the Houthi rebels' looting of private properties belonging to Yemeni individuals over the course of seven years, using armed force under the guise of the judiciary.

The report, titled "The Guardian's Autocracy and the Deception Machine," documented the seizure of over $1.7 billion from the value of money imports, companies, institutions, and associations by what was referred to as the "judicial guardian." Additionally, it revealed that more than $2 billion worth of assets, real estate, and movable properties were

(1) Intervention by Mustafa Nasr on Al-Belqis TV in the program "Yemeni Evening," episode titled "The Judicial Guardian: The Latest Tools of the Houthis to Plunder Citizens' Properties," February 23, 2020.

confiscated, including funds and revenues belonging to 38 major companies, institutions, universities, and hospitals that the Houthis seized in the capital, Sana'a.

The report indicated a connection between the deception practiced by the Houthis through their media and intelligence system against their victims and the acts of looting and confiscation of funds. Thus, disseminating misleading and false news against opposing figures serves as a cover for the actions they intend to carry out or have already carried out against these individuals(1). It's worth noting that these statistics and looted numbers, according to the report, represent only minor cases and do not reflect the total amount looted by the so-called judicial guardian.

The Houthi group seeks, through their systematic looting operations targeting the properties, lands, and funds of political, religious, and social figures, as well as businesses and institutions owned by businessmen, to establish a new and significant economic system that emulates the Khomeini model known as the "Foundation of the Oppressed." This financial empire has been built on the looting of the properties of opponents and adversaries, making it the largest capital for Khamenei(2).

Theft and Exploitation of Endowment Funds and Properties:

In Islam, endowment (waqf) is defined as "the detention of the corpus of property and the dedication of its benefits, seeking reward from Allah Almighty(3)." The corpus refers to something that can be utilized while the principal remains, such as houses, lands, and other assets. The dedication of benefits means allocating them for the sake of Allah Almighty. Benefits refer to what is produced from the principal, such as rent, profit, and other advantages(4). Waqf founders seek to draw closer to Allah by dedicating a portion or all of their assets to serve the Muslim community in various fields, including cultural, educational, economic, social, and healthcare sectors, among others.

But how did the Houthis deal with endowments? How did they use the funds and properties of endowments to achieve military, political, economic, and sectarian gains?

(1) "The Guardian's Confiscation and Deception Machine," a report documenting the plundering of private properties and the concurrent deceptive narrative by the Judicial Guardian and the Houthi group from September 2014 to December 2021, Sam Organization for Rights and Freedoms, published on February 14, 2022.

(2) "Khamenei Controls a Vast Financial Empire Built on Seized Real Estate," Reuters, November 11, 2013.

(3) Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence, Muhammad bin Ibrahim bin Abdullah Al-Tuwaijri, Volume 3, First Edition, 2009, P. 684.

(4) "Rulings of Endowment," Islam Question and Answer website, May 19, 2001.

Historically, the Imams excelled in looting endowments, whether they were lands, properties, or funds. The Imams were known for their greed in looting and possessing endowment funds, transferring them from public endowments to private ownership. They also engaged in exchanges and swaps between private properties and endowment properties in areas under their control. An example of this is what Imam Al-Mahdi Abbas did when he purchased a significant portion of the endowments in Sana'a, such as "Sha'awb, As-Safiyah, and Bir Al-Azab," among other areas. This prompted the scholar Ibn Al-Amir Yansahah to advise him in a letter sent during the month of Dhu al-Hijjah, 1180 AH, stating that "endowment funds are prohibited; they cannot be transferred, replaced, or exchanged." His closest men, including his minister Judge Yahya bin Saleh As-Suhuli, also advised him similarly. Instead of accepting their advice, he threw them into prison(1).

Muthahhar bin Sharaf ad-Din also seized the endowments of the Amiriya School in Rad'a and other Mansuriya and Mujahidiya schools, confiscating their properties for his personal benefit. These endowments had been dedicated to the school since the days of the Tahirids and the Rasulis(2).

In 1928, Imam Yahya Hamid ad-Din seized the endowments of the largest religious school at that time in the Zabid region of western Yemen, known by some as the Ash'ari University, which taught various branches of knowledge. This was followed by the seizure of numerous endowment funds(3).

Naturally, throughout history, the Imams saw endowment funds as an opportunity to enrich themselves and their extended family members of the same lineage. They employed various methods and tricks to circumvent religious prohibitions and legal texts that criminalize such actions.

After the Houthi group took full control of Sa'ada Governorate in 2011, the looting of endowment funds in the province began. When they reached Sana'a, they carried out field campaigns targeting homes belonging to endowments, where residents had been paying rent to the endowments for decades. They forced them, under the terror of arms, to evacuate some of these homes. They also raised rents on endowment properties (many of which were commercial shops), reaching up to 200% in some areas. They threatened beneficiaries with confiscating their properties and shops if they refused to comply with the new pricing, they imposed on them(4).

The increase in funds collected in the name of endowments became apparent through a report issued by the Endowments Office in Sana'a,

(1) "Al-Hadawiyya Between Political Theory and Divine Doctrine," previous reference, page 91.
(2) Ibid. p. 82.
(3) Ibid. p.136.
(4) "The Houthi Plunder of Yemen's Religious Endowments: Desecrating Graves and Erasing Documents," Al-Mithaq News website.

which is under Houthi control. It was able to achieve significant revenues during the year 2020 compared to previous years.

The report indicated that the branch of the endowments in the capital city achieved revenues that exceeded the levels of the office in 2018 by 210%. The branch's revenues from building rentals, licenses, transfer fees, annual land rents, agricultural revenues, financial returns, and other sources reached 3,568,653,859 Yemeni rials, an increase of 1,531,423,319 rials compared to the previous year, 2019[1]. However, despite these substantial funds, they did not directly and positively impact the lives of Yemenis. They did not go to the state treasury and therefore did not contribute to solving the problem of salaries and services that Yemenis have deliberately been deprived of. Instead, they were used for the benefit of political, sectarian, and military operations and activities, which we will discuss later.

The revenues of the endowments multiplied, but the role of development and charity significantly declined in favor of enriching the sectarian lineage in Yemen and supporting affiliated fighters, while the material assets of the endowments, such as properties and lands, were eroded due to organized looting.

As is the Houthis' usual practice of exploiting everything at their disposal as means of pressuring and subjugating Yemenis and forcibly mobilizing them to participate in their sectarian activities, they undoubtedly exploited endowment properties to subdue thousands of families who rent houses belonging to endowments or engage in small businesses in shops or properties owned by endowments and pay rent for that. They compelled them to interact with Houthi activities, such as participating in political and sectarian marches or engaging in mobilization, incitement, and reporting on those who disagree with them. They even collected fighters in exchange for not increasing rent fees and allowing them to keep the endowment properties under their control.

According to testimonies from residents published by various media outlets, the Houthis employ various methods of extortion against business owners in general, particularly those associated with endowments. "For this reason, the group has closed many shops after campaigns carried out by their followers, who expelled the traders and re-rented the shops to individuals loyal to the group or affiliated with its leader's lineage[2]."

A farmer living in the Al-Hawari area in Sana'a says that a Houthi supervisor informed him of the necessity to hand over the farm he has been cultivating for twenty years and pay rent to the endowments. In a statement

(1) "Sana'a Endowments: Fruitful Efforts and Qualitative Successes," Official Revolution Newspaper under Houthi control, March 1, 2021.

(2) "Houthi Seizure of Yemeni Endowment Properties and Incidents of Intrusion and Eviction of Residents," Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Issue 14847, July 23, 2019.

to the London-based newspaper "Al-Sharq Al-Awsat," he said, "A group arrived and threatened me not to enter the land, and when I asked them, 'Where should I go? I have cultivated and planted this land, and how will I support my family?' One of them replied, 'Go fight with us on the frontlines[1].'"

Rereading this example, the seizure of this land provided the Houthi leadership with agricultural land that had been cultivated for years, contributing to the starvation of a family. As a result, some of its members were pushed into the battlefronts or politically and security-wise supported the Houthi group in exchange for receiving a food basket provided by organizations, whereas the family used to rely entirely on the land's produce.

In another incident, after 25 years of renting a house from the Ministry of Endowments in the "Bir Al-Azab" area in Sana'a, the Houthis came and besieged the house with armed men and demanded its evacuation. When the tenant refused these actions, they chained the door and prevented him and his family from entering or leaving. Some neighbors intervened and provided them with food through windows and over the house's roof. However, the situation ended with their forceful eviction from the house[2].

Among the methods used by the Houthis to exploit endowments to gain supporters is the distribution of endowment lands to political, military, and social figures in exchange for their media support of their crimes or recruitment of fighters. This prompted the Ministry of Endowments in the legitimate government to describe the "directives issued by the Houthi government's prime minister" for allocating endowment lands in Sana'a and Al- Hodeidah to individuals affiliated with the Houthis as "invalid measures that lack legitimacy from the issuer, and a violation of the constitution and existing laws." It considered the "distribution of lands and properties of endowments to influential individuals and supervisors of committees affiliated with the Houthi coup militia as a dangerous precedent that has not occurred in all the difficult stages and circumstances that the country has gone through[3]." Another statement was issued in 2019 condemning the looting of endowment funds[4].

The Houthi militias distributed lands through their affiliated endowment directors in the provinces to leaders and supervisors, most of whom belong to the lineage of their leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. They also sold large areas of land to influential individuals and loyal leaders for symbolic

(1) Ibid.

(2) "Lawless Thieves... Endowment Lands and Properties within Houthi Plunder," Al-Islaah Net, Osama Al-Layth, November 7, 2019.

(3) Statement by the Minister of Endowments and Guidance, Dr. Ahmed Attia, Saba News Agency, April 21, 2017.

(4) Ministry of Endowments Warns against Tampering with its Properties and Lands, Saba News Agency, November 30, 2019.

amounts and seized lands in vital areas belonging to endowments under the pretext of granting them to the families of their affiliated martyrs(1).

In addition to gaining loyalty, the Houthis sell endowment lands to enrich members of their lineage. In the central Yemen province of Dhamar, Houthi supervisors have sold endowment lands for exorbitant amounts, including the Al-Ayn Market located in the city center, which is designated for livestock sales(2). The residents of Dhamar staged a protest in front of the Endowments and Guidance Office in the province, demanding the release of lands that were seized by Houthis working in the Endowments Office(3).

The province of Ibb (central Yemen) can be taken as an example of the magnitude of the looting operations that have targeted endowments, as Ibb is one of the largest Yemeni provinces where endowment properties exist.

According to the journalist Ibrahim Hamoud Asqain, who is one of the sons of Ibb who witnessed the looting of endowment properties in the province, a large portion of Ibb province "has been designated as endowment since the time of Queen Arwa bint Ahmad Al-Sulayhi. Throughout the ages, the lands of Ibb were allocated to private (family) and public endowments." Official sources in the Survey and Real Estate Authority and the Endowments Office indicate that the total area of endowment lands in Ibb constitutes about two-thirds of the province's area(4).

Once the Houthis took control of Ibb province, pro-Houthi families in the province took over the endowment file and focused on "looting and confiscating large tracts of land in the name of endowments." Meanwhile, extensive lands and mountains were distributed to influential Houthi figures under various justifications, including rental and investment purposes. Other lands were granted as gifts to supervisors and officials, coinciding with extensive looting of endowment funds and their diversion to purposes other than their intended use. The endowment fund in the province turned into a reserve fund for Houthi officials in the province and other provinces, designated for implementing sectarian activities related to events such as the Ghadeer Day, religious celebrations, and commemorating the death of the founder of the Houthi militia, knowing in advance the large financial revenues of the province's endowments.

To ensure the loyalty of the endowment’s director, the Houthi militia appointed an outsider who directly pledges allegiance to the Houthi leader.

(1) "Houthi Plunder of Yemen's Endowments: Desecration of Graves and Document Destruction," Al-Mithaq News, December 5, 2019.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Dhamar: Protest by Citizens in Front of the Endowments Office Demanding their Plundered Lands, Akhbar Al-Youm Newspaper, November 16, 2019.

(4) "Houthis in Ibb: Plundering Endowments and Erasing Identity," Ibrahim Hamoud Asqeen, Al-Minbar Al-Yemeni Magazine, Issue 22, May 18, 2020.

Since assuming the position, he has been dissipating endowment funds and redirecting them to the accounts of Houthi leaders and supporting combat fronts(1).

Even the lands designated for cemeteries in Ibb were not spared from looting. The province witnessed over 100 Houthi raids on cemeteries, and the locals resisted some of them, while most of these operations were carried out by force of arms(2).

After four years of tampering with lands, properties, and endowment funds, specifically on August 22, 2018, a massive fire broke out in the warehouses and archives of the Ministry of Endowments and Guidance in Sana'a, causing damage to documents and records related to endowments. It later became clear that the crime was committed by an unknown perpetrator(3). In response to this incident, the Yemeni government accused the Houthis of burning the Endowments building in Sana'a, stating that the militia had previously been involved in manipulating and looting Endowment properties and documents in areas under its control. The Ministry of Endowments and Guidance also ordered the cancellation of any funds and lands that the Houthi group had benefited from, whether through construction or any other form of utilization by entities, companies, or individuals, deeming it legally, constitutionally, and religiously invalid. It further stated that decisions related to Endowment funds after September 21, 2014, have no legal effect against the Endowments Administration and the General Authority for Lands, Survey, and Urban Planning(4).

On October 24, 2018, the second-ranking official in the Ministry of Endowments and Guidance under Houthi control revealed the extent of the large-scale and organized corruption in the Endowments and lands of the Yemeni Republic by the Houthi group. Deputy Minister Houthi, Fuad Mohammed Hussein Naji, published his resignation in the media, citing major corruption, looting of Endowment lands and properties, as well as financial and administrative corruption. The resignation letter reads as follows:

Subject: Resignation from work at the Ministry of Endowments and Guidance.

With reference to the above subject, I hereby submit this request to you, causing this resignation from my position as Deputy Minister of Endowments and Guidance appointed by Revolutionary Committee

(1) Al-Minbar Al-Yemeni Magazine, same source.
(2) Al-Minbar Al-Yemeni Magazine, same source.
(3) "Deliberate Fire Consumes Documents of the Ministry of Endowments in Sana'a," Al-Mashhad Al-Arabi Website, August 23, 2018.
(4) "Government Statement," Yemeni News Agency (SABA), August 24, 2018.

Decision No. (86) issued on February 23, 2016, as follows:

The massive corruption, administrative irregularities, and financial misconduct in the ministry, from the highest to the lowest levels, except for those whom God has mercy upon, have been repeatedly brought to your attention. We have raised significant corruption cases concerning Endowment funds and lands, supported by documents and records, but we have not seen any response or action taken regarding these issues.

Additionally, the role of the ministry in confronting the aggression is weak due to the minister's negativity and his taking the seal to his home and conducting work from within it, which is a clear violation of the law. We have presented many suggestions and plans to improve the ministry's work in general and the guidance and guidance sector in particular, but we have not seen any responsiveness. Imam Ali, peace be upon him, said, "There is no opinion for someone who is not obeyed."

I came to the ministry based on a difficult assignment, and we accepted this assignment out of a sense of responsibility. We tried during the past period to fix what we could and stop the corruption that we could stop, but the breach widened on the surface, and I fear that I will bear the burden of what is happening before God.

Therefore, I request the acceptance of my resignation so that I can return to the field of jihad from which I came and let those who can remain silent on falsehood and accept it bear the responsibility for the corruption and disruptions in the ministry.

May Allah guide and lead us to the path of righteousness.

Your brother,

Fuad Mohammed Hussein Naji.

A few months after publishing this resignation, the case of plundering the endowments of Al-Firdous Mosque emerged. It is the second largest mosque in Sana'a, and involved converting its properties into commercial stores and residences for Houthi supervisors who belong to the same tribe claiming divine selection and righteousness in Yemen. As usual, I will make sure to include testimony about this case from someone who has long defended the Houthis in the media.

On December 19th, 2020, Mohammed Al-Masmari, an activist on social media platforms, published a video revealing details of the plunder of Al-Firdous Mosque's endowments in Sana'a and names of involved Houthi leaders. He said: "We recorded a year ago about Al-Firdous Mosque and no one listened. I record it for you and what held me back here - and God is my witness what held me back here" - pointing to his throat.

Al-Firdous Mosque is the second largest mosque in the republic,

accommodating more than 25 thousand worshippers. Its plan included a full complex, hospital, charity institution, laboratory, Quran memorization centers, and scientific centers etc. Before a year we told you, your friends plundered it (stole from it). Before a year we told you they closed the women's prayer area on the third and ground floors, closed the women's prayer area and expelled them to the street. Fahd Al-Ayani and Ahmed Al-Shami closed the women's Quran memorization center and expelled the women to the street, and no one listened or cared.

The Al-Fardous Charitable and Developmental Institution along with its laboratory were converted by supervisor Ibrahim Al-Sharafi into a private residence for him and his sister, and no one listened or spoke up. Don't say we are liars, investigate the place oh Hussein Al-Ezzi, oh Mohammed Ali[1], oh Khubra I will provide you evidence with clips (video clips as evidence), before and after... Ibrahim Al-Sharafi converted the Al-Firdous Charitable and Developmental Institution and its charitable laboratory that used to examine people for free into a private residence for him and his sister. We complained but no one spoke... they usurped the institution's name, and no one spoke, they plundered the mosque's land, and no one complained referring to the Houthis. Ahmed Al-Shami and Fahd Al-Ayani forged the name of the charitable institution and rented the land to Saddam Al-Yateem for 30 years with a 50 million bribe given by Saddam Al-Yateem, and no one listened, complained, or spoke up...

From whom do these predatory supervisors derive their strength to plunder God's mosques... You saw the mosque and how the women used to pray? Imagine this entire land completely plundered by Saddam Al-Yateem, supervised by who? Supervised by Fahd Al-Ayani, by the pressure and signature of who? Supervisor Ahmed Al-Shami...

How oh servants of God? Is this Islam? Is this religion? Where is the call/march? Where is Abd Al-Malik? Where is Al-Khubra (the Houthis)? What have you read in the barracks (Houthi barracks)? We have tired and wearied, and this issue has been a year (we have tired from pleading). And who is the guard protecting the construction workers following Saddam Al-Yateem? Ibrahim Al-Muhattour, director of the Unity district police department in Saawan. An ignorant (child) who was lost and unknown[2].

It is a miniature example of a larger crime that confirms the tribal dimension of the systematic plundering Yemenis face. All heroes of this incident (Al-Ayani, Al-Yateem, Al-Sharafi, Al-Shami, and Al-Muhattour)

(1) Hussein Al-Azzi, a Houthi leader, was appointed as the Deputy Minister of their Foreign Affairs. Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi, another Houthi leader, serves as the head of what they call the Houthi Revolutionary Committee.

(2) A video was posted on YouTube titled "Houthi Supervisor in Sana'a Converts a Mosque into a Private Residence for Himself and His Friend," published on December 19.

belong to the same tribe that controls several Yemeni governorates, claiming it has the right to rule Yemenis and possess their lives and properties by force and in the name of religion(1).

The matter was not limited to the Houthis plundering endowment properties, but they also plundered citizens' lands after claiming they were endowments, and through endowments departments in governorates under their control, selling or renting them to their followers. For example, in March 2019, citizen Abdulrahman Abdulrahim complained that the endowments department in Ibb governorate (central Yemen) under Houthi control had rented his land in "Jabal Al-Mourm on the 30th parallel west of Ibb city" to senior security leaders in the group, despite the judiciary proving he owned the land(2).

The Houthi group also seized a vast tract of land and a house belonging to Al-Sabahi family in the city of Ibb, capital of the governorate, claiming they were endowment properties, in one of the biggest plundering operations witnessed by the governorate. This confiscated property is in the city center and exceeds five billion Yemeni rials in value(3).

Given the large sums of money generated through these operations, the Houthis established a special agency for endowments to organize the plunder of endowments' lands and funds, and their subsequent economic and sectarian investment. Similar to what is called the General Zakat Authority, the group established the "General Endowments Authority" on January 30th, 2021(4) and appointed Abdul Malik Al-Houthi as its president(5), a step the Yemeni government considered a new means to plunder Yemenis "extending a series of decisions aiming to monopolize the state's endowments and lands in the hands of the Al-Houthi family to plunder and exploit them for their interests." In addition, establishing such entities seeks to "impose more taxes on citizens and plunder the state's capabilities and resources, mobilizing them to finance its war effort and escalate its war on

(1) Such practices have been repeated on lands and mosques that were dedicated by their owners to be used as mosques and graves. For instance, in the Dhamar Governorate, the Houthi's Grand Mufti issued a fatwa allowing the construction of commercial projects on land located along the Sana'a-Taiz Road, which was dedicated by its owner, Abdullah bin Mohammed Al-Amoudi, who hailed from Hadhramaut Governorate and lived and died in the city of Dhamar, to serve as graves for the city's residents. This constitutes a religious violation and goes against the will of the person who dedicated the land.

(2) Ibb: The Endowments Authority leases citizens' lands to Houthi leaders under the protection of security (documents), Yemen Youth Net website, March 7, 2019.

(3) The looting march continues: The Houthi militia in Ibb seizes lands belonging to the "Al-Sabahi" family, valued at over 5 billion Yemeni rials, Al-Masdar Online, March 9, 2022.

(4) Website of the Yemeni News Agency (SABA), which is under the control of the Houthi group.

(5) Abdul Majeed Abdul Rahman Hassan Al-Houthi, a relative of the Houthi leader Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, was born in Dhayan, Saada Governorate, on 21 Jumada Al-Akhira 1393 AH. He did not receive formal education in schools but received religious teachings from his father, in addition to attending courses in Shiite seminaries in Iraq.

Yemenis[1]."

There was another important reason prompting the Houthis to establish what is called the General Endowments Authority. They faced various obstacles reducing their ability to arbitrarily manipulate endowments' funds and lands and exploit them for their war against Yemenis. The Ministry of Endowments was still staffed by civil servants from various factions and components not supporting the Houthis. For this reason, any measures to plunder funds and distribute lands to Houthi group members would be exposed, condemned by employees, and publicize such practices and theft through media. Therefore, they resorted to creating a new entity staffing with trusted supporters, mostly from Abd Al-Malik Al-Houthi's tribe, to carry out seizure operations and direct and utilize funds without oversight or impediments.

The Houthis pay great importance to the Endowments Authority given the huge funds and opportunities it provides to control many Yemeni families, prompting the group's leader Abdul Malik Al-Houthi to dedicate a lecture calling on residents to cooperate with the authority they established. He urged "feeling responsible before God" and "earnestly discharging their obligations and liberation from these injustices" by giving their endowment shares under his supervision. He added that some only give through "excruciating efforts, extreme demands and continuous pressure as if the collector will strip their souls from their bodies" or having no choice but to unlawfully take portions[2].

No official entity possesses accurate statistical details of the funds and lands the Houthi group has been able to confiscate since 2014. However, various media sources have indicated that around 1670 properties in Sana'a's administration alone were seized by the Houthis through their appointed leader as director of the Endowments Authority's bureau in Sana'a's administration, Abdullah Aamer, from mid-2019 until June 2021. These properties varied between privately owned lands belonging to citizens and merchants, others owned by the state, and others which were endowments by legal rental contracts. Additionally, there was appropriation of 4 hotels, 23 commercial stores, a business facility and 7 towers and business buildings[3].

During this same period, Houthi Abdullah Aamer issued 663 rental contracts for the plundered lands and facilities as well as others that were rented out, though they were government facilities occupied by the group.

(1) Minister of Information, Culture, and Tourism, Maamir Al-Aryani, SABA news agency, February 2, 2021.

(2) Abdul-Malik al-Houthi calls on society and state institutions to cooperate with the Endowments Authority, a Ramadan lecture published on the official Houthi website, May 11, 2021.

(3) The criminal endowment thief "Abdullah Amer"... the long arm of the Houthi family for looting and seizing lands and properties in the capital Sana’a, Al-Masdar Online, June 17, 2021.

The total area reportedly rented over two and a half years exceeded 5.2 million ten-square meter properties, generating over 2.4 billion Yemeni rials for the militias from this process(1).

The Houthis aspire to control up to 70% of Sana'a's lands, confirming between instances that endowments' lands in Sana'a reach this percentage and that they work to tighten control over them(2). Regardless of the precision of this statistic, it indicates their desire to dominate and control the residents benefiting from these endowments. Despite the relevant entities dealing with endowments' properties not being concerned with citizens' detention, the Houthis authorized leaders overseeing endowments' funds to punish anyone disagreeing with the legality of their actions. One of the most prominent aggressions of the Endowments Bureau appearing in media was Houthi Abdullah Aamer's assault on the well-known iron merchant Abdullah Al-Qas in Sana'a in early June 2021. Without prior notice, he demolished the wall of one of the merchant's rented lands through official contracts for a long period and built on it.

In a recorded statement, Abdullah Al-Qas addressed citizens complaining about what he faced from the Houthis, confirming he tried negotiating with Abdullah Aamer but was surprisingly jailed along with relatives arbitrarily in a humiliating manner without cause. Had prominent figures and sheikhs not intervened, he would've remained in the Endowments prison without reason or crime. He added, "My land, blood and right are with this arrogant, tyrannical plunderer Abdullah Aamer, who oppresses people—small and big. The big can defend their rights, but what about one's rights, money, and tribe?" Pleading by God and His greatness, he asked them to remove this man for the sake of the poor, needy and weak(3).

Based on the above, the procedural practices implemented by the Houthi group after controlling the Ministry of Endowments and its departments in governorates under their control can be summarized as follows:

- Raising rents of endowments whether houses, lands, private or public facilities and small or large commercial stores.
- Exploiting endowments' properties officially owned by citizens as a means of pressure over them to mobilize to fronts or squares or transform them into tools serving the group within cities and villages.
- Distributing endowments' lands and properties to Houthi leaders, especially those belonging to Abdul Malik Al-Houthi's tribe.
- Selling endowments' lands and properties at low prices to Houthi

(1) Ibid.

(2) 70% of the lands in the capital Sana’a belong to the endowments, and looting and forgery have affected vast areas, the newspaper Al-Thawra, under Houthi control, March 13, 2020.

(3)A video on YouTube titled: "Businessman Abdullah Muhammad Al-Qass complains about what he suffered from Abdullah Amer, the director of the Endowments Authority in Sana’a," June 10, 2021.

leaders, especially from Abdul Malik Al-Houthi's tribe by reaching private documents proving their belonging to endowments and destroying them.

- Investing the endowments' funds collected in coordination with the General Authority for Investment for the benefit of the group's leaderships[1].

This way, the Houthis earn huge sums significantly prolonging the war and exacerbating human suffering, simultaneously creating a vast network of interests primarily based on tribal ties, with beneficiaries from these funds coming from the same tribe as Abdul Malik Al-Houthi.

Without any shame as usual, the Houthis claim through Abdul Malik Al-Houthi that endowments' funds are spent on "constructing houses of God, students of knowledge, scholars, learners, poor and needy in all fields of good to earn God's pleasure and for people to benefit from this endowment and the donor to be rewarded by God..." How can we today plunder and unlawfully consume these funds[2]?

But the truth that Yemenis see clearly is that most of what the Houthi group accumulates from endowment funds goes to enriching the Houthi tribal elements first and foremost. It is then used to finance their wars, in addition to supporting and sponsoring activities of cultural annihilation and targeting Yemeni identity under the guise of what is called "faith-based identity[3]."

The writer and researcher Mustafa Al-Jabzi commented on this disastrous reality, saying: "The Houthi group lays its hand on endowments and implements a silent nationalization policy on real estate in areas under its control. The Houthis will absorb people's wealth in every way possible to impoverish them and redistribute the wealth in favor of a specific group, excluding others. Soon, Sana'a will be divided between a ghetto of wealthy limited racial individuals and many poor[4].”

(1) Discussion of areas of cooperation between the Investment Authority and the Endowments (a meeting with a representative of the Endowments Authority and the Deputy Head of the General Investment Authority, Houthi official Khalid Sharaf al-Din), Saba Yemeni News Agency, under Houthi control, March 16, 2021.

(2) Abdul Majid Abdul Rahman Al-Houthi, head of the General Endowments Authority, in a video published on the Twitter account of "The General Endowments Authority - Yemen," which is affiliated with the Houthis, on July 15, 2021.

(3) Reference can be made to the news published by the Houthis on their official websites regarding the contributions and support of the General Endowments Authority for the mentioned activities.

(4) A post on the Facebook page of the writer and researcher Mustafa Naji Al-Jubzi, on January 4, 2022.

The Appropriation of State and Citizens' Lands

It is a well-known fact about the families of the Imams that they possess a relentless desire to acquire and seize Yemeni lands through various means, dating back to the arrival of the founder of the Hadawi dynasty, Yahya Al-Rassi bin Tabataba, in Yemen.

Following each conflict, they wage against Yemenis who resist their racial rule, these racial group engage in the plunder of lands, properties, and wealth after either killing or displacing the inhabitants. Subsequently, these lands and wealth are transformed into private inheritances for these families, documented in written records as the rightful possessions of the initial looter and their descendants(1).

Just as the Houthi group legitimized plundering properties of Yemenis rejecting its control over Yemeni cities by force, describing them as agents, mercenaries and traitors, appointing what is called a "judicial guard" to plunder their properties, the Imams would issue legislations and justifications for plunder operations, foremost declaring Yemenis as "forsakers of the faith" (Al-Mujabarah)(2) and "assimilationists" (mushabbiha), as disbelievers in legal interpretation (kuffâr at-ta'wîl), making their war, killing and funds appropriation legitimate under the pretext of jihad for God's sake.

The Imam Al-Moutawakel Ala Allah Ismail bin Al-Qasim bin Muhammad replied to one asking about the legitimacy of plundering inhabitants of "Lower Yemen" lands: "The legal doctrine of people of justice - may God increase them - is that forsakers of faith and assimilationists are disbelievers...if disbelievers take control of a land, even if (originally) belonging to Muslim and justice adherents...he who allies them and is proud of them is judged likewise, even if his doctrine differs from theirs...a land in which disbelief becomes apparent is considered a land of disbelief, even if inhabited by those who do not profess disbelief or utter the words of its people..." and so on concluding "So if the Imam conquers part of lands under their control, he may impose upon it whatever he likes, whether its inhabitants adhere to that doctrine or not(3)."

The Imam Al-Mahdi Abbas seized two famous wells in Sana'a called Al-Aswad Well and Al-Barmki Well after renovating and re-extracting them.

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(1) "How Did the Secret Houthi Organization Deceive the State for Compensation in the Largest Real Estate Operation in 2008?" by the researcher and writer Tawfiq Al-Samai, published on Al-Islaah Net, October 4, 2020.

(2) "Al-Mujabarah" is a term used by the imams to refer to those who oppose them in some religious matters (Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jamaa), who represent the majority of the people in Yemen. This was mentioned by one of their contemporary authorities, Muhammad Abdullah Awad, in his book "Nazarat fi Malamih al-Madhab al-Zaydi wa Khisasihi" (Insights into the Features of the Zaydi School), published by Al-Al-Bayt Library, page 96.

(3) "History of Sweet Dishes and the Press of Mann and Salwa," from a previous source, p. 121.

He then claimed the renovation expenses came from his personal account, not public funds, sparking wide controversy at the time.

The official responsible for extracting these two wells, Ali bin Abdullah Al-Amri strongly opposed this, prompting the Imam to imprison him, confiscate his home and private properties. He remained in prison until dying in 1183 AH[1].

Specifically plundering lands or purchasing public lands after impoverishing and starving people faced widespread denunciation even from those working with the Imams, often being victims themselves. Russian researcher Elena Golubovskaya says in her book "The September 26 Revolution in Yemen":

"The middle and small feudal landlords represented the administrative apparatus of the Imamate state in local areas, performing duties of state employees in collecting taxes from villages and villages. The middle and small feudal landlords did not possess the economic privileges found among the big feudalists (the sayyids class). The absolute oppression by the Imam and sayyids class made these two factions of the feudalist class feel dissatisfaction. It happened that Imam Ahmed seized cultivated lands owned by landlords (the confiscated plots belonged to big or small landlords) and communal lands... chieftains of Hamiqan and Nawafiy mentioned to an Al-Ahram newspaper correspondent that the Imam took two-thirds of cultivated lands area for this tribe numbering 5,000 people without paying, considering them his property[2]."

In another place, the Russian historian refers to the plundering of Yemenis' lands by the Imamate families, saying: "Socially, many who were part of the sayyids class until the revolution were among the big feudal landowners and large merchants and money lenders. Many did not own the wealth they had during the 40 years they ruled the country in the first years of the Moutawakeli Kingdom of Yemen. Imam Yahya himself did not many estates even at the start of his rule, though during the rule of Al-Hamidi dynasty whose members became big landowners, the same applies to many who attained positions in the state like Al-Jabali and Haidi Haij and many others[3]."

This situation continued for long periods until Yahya Al-Rassi's descendants became among families owning the most lands in the best Yemeni sites after arriving with nothing. When the September 26th, 1962, revolution toppled the Imamate rule represented then by who they described as "the ruler by God's command" Ahmed bin Yahya Al-Hamidi, the republican system returned vast tracts of plundered Yemeni lands and

(1) "Al-Hadawiyyah Between Political Theory and Divine Belief," from a previous source, p. 91.
(2) "September 26 Revolution in Yemen," from a previous source, p. 126.
(3) "September 26 Revolution in Yemen," from a previous source, p. 147-148.

properties to the state and public. Until the Imamists returned in their new Houthi form bringing systematic, wide-scale land plunder crimes again.

After the Houthis took control of Yemeni cities and Al-Rassi families tightened their grip over security, military, and civilian institutions in the capital Sana'a, many of these families (the sayyids class according to Golubovskaya) returned to seizing lands the republicans had reclaimed for the state and all Yemenis after the September 26 revolution. Claiming these vast tracts were private inheritance of their ancestors, in addition to many families claiming ownership of private lands in other families' possession, especially after the Houthi group seized wide areas and started disposing them, opening the door to increased population disputes over lands(1).

The stay of some former officials and employees (appointed during presidents Hadi and Salih's rule) in their positions for two years following the Houthi takeover of state institutions before replacing them somewhat contributed to emerging opposition to the group's widespread plunder acts. The Al-Thawra newspaper under Houthi control published an investigative report on February 12, 2016, supported by official documents shedding light on plunder operations, dereliction of duty and overlooking crimes regarding state-owned lands in Al-Hodeida governorate.

For that, I try to pen down the important points from the report:

- Since the 1970s, neither the Central Control and Accountability Bureau, the National High Authority for Combating Corruption, nor the Public Funds Prosecution nor the General Authority for Land, Surveying and Urban Planning have recorded crimes of corruption, dereliction of duty and negligence regarding state-owned lands, as occurred in 2015, specifically the last two months of that year when compensation contracts were signed and registered in the real estate registry under names of individuals while originally state-owned.

- Most violations relate to unlawful compensations contrary to active expropriation, lands and planning laws and contrary to established procedures for examining ownership claims, entitlement, valuation and compensation; as well as determining imaginary compensation sums then compensating in-kind without legitimate cause or authority to compensate.

- Al Hodeidah Lands Bureau issued on October 20th, 2015, a compensation contract worth 1,470,000,000 Yemeni rials for an individual over 65,340 square meters of land. Preceded by a compensation contract by the same bureau on September 6th, 2015, worth 652,912,000 rials; as well as four subsequent partial in-kind compensation contracts over 8,484 square meters. On June 8th, 2015, it issued an 87,120 square meter in-kind

(1) "Land Disputes in Yemen Ignite Tribal Conflict and Drive Investments Away," Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, September 9, 2016.

compensation contract across scattered sites in Hodeidah city worth over 700,000,000 rials.

- Land owned by the state totaling over 2 million square meters and exceeding 2 billion rials was registered under the names of individuals and commercial entities. At that time, they were working to process the registration of two plots of public land as private property totaling 875,556 square meters exceeding 1 billion rials in value.

- Registration procedures were passed for vast areas of state land in the Dharihmi and Al-Antariya regions and the perimeter of Hodeidah Airport under the names of the occupiers in three cases valued in the billions.

- Surrendering the "Industrial Zone" land reserved since 2002 by registering an area of 653,400 square meters exceeding 450 million rials in favor of a private commercial entity, despite objection from the Ministry of Industry over the encroachment during 2014.

- The Central Organization for Control and Auditing warned the General Authority for Lands, Surveying and Urban Planning and its branches across provincial governorates against laxity and leniency regarding state lands and property, and not adhering to regulations and laws, and stressed halting procedures for disposing of and registering state properties under others' names in land registries.

- The Central Organization for Control and Auditing issued an official memorandum No. 1307 dated December 13, 2015, holding the Authority and its offices accountable for any damages incurred or to be incurred to state interests and property. It stated the issuance of several material compensation contracts for large areas violated Law No. 21 of 1995 regarding state lands and property and its executive regulations and Law No. 1 of 1995 regarding public utility expropriation.

- The National Commission for Corruption Control issued a decision on May 10, 2015, to reclaim state lands confiscated in the port of "Ras Isa" by influential figures with the connivance of the Hodeidah Lands Office leadership for the benefit of individuals and businessmen. However, according to confirmations from anti-corruption commission officials, the decision received no response from the General Authority for Lands and Surveys.

- Dr. Abdullah Al-Fadli, Chairman of the General Authority for Lands, Surveying and Urban Planning, confirmed there are violation cases regarding state property in Hodeidah and indicated they will be referred to specialized prosecution offices "so that encroachers and those who connive with them receive legal punishment...stressing that as head of the Authority,

he will not allow any harm to state lands and property[1]."

It appears that Dr. Abdullah Al-Fadli, Chairman of the General Authority for Lands, Surveying and Urban Planning appointed by President Abd-Rabbu Mansur Hadi, leaked these documents after failing to stop land confiscation operations that occurred since the Houthis took control.

Directives issued by the Central Organization for Control and Auditing and the Anti-Corruption Commission originally go to the Authority Chairman to address irregularities. Since he failed to curb these practices, he resorted to the media to turn it into a matter of public opinion, forming social pressure on those overseeing land plunder.

Expectedly, after publishing this investigation, Houthi leadership were confirmed to systematically plunder state lands.

Around three months later May 15, 2016, specifically, elements affiliated with the Houthi group led by Muin al-Mu'tawakkil and Ahmed Mufteh stormed the General Authority headquarters in Sana'a, forcing Chairman Abdullah Al-Fadli to resign at gunpoint and hand over the premises to Houthi delegated Ahmed Mufteh, launching systematic state land plunder[2][3].

In mid-2016, the Houthi group began procedures to sell large areas of state-owned lands in areas under their control through public auctions. Their pretext for plunder was ready as always - claiming land sales aim to establish residential cities and investment areas, with 70% of revenues going to public treasury and 30% financing activities of the state lands authority under their control[4].

The Yemeni researcher, Yassin Al-Tamimi commented these procedures have "no relation to solving the housing crisis, nor is there an environment to market investment projects in a dangerous situation. The main motive is obtaining money by any means (...) Houthi sale of state assets comes in the context of trading all wealth that fell into their hands since controlling Sana'a in September 21, 2014 - a black market not serving citizens but overburdening and depleting their savings, boosting militias' financial capabilities and financing their war on Yemenis[5]."

Former Yemeni Prime Minister Ahmed Bin Dagher warned in statements

(1) Investigation titled "Influential Figures Exploit the Circumstances of the Aggression on Yemen to Seize State Properties" by journalist Wael Sharhah, Al-Thawra newspaper under Houthi control, February 12, 2016.

(2) "Houthis Storm the Office of the Head of the Authority and Appoint a Replacement by Force of Arms," Yemen Press News website, May 15, 2016.

(3) Ahmed Mufatah, a Houthi leader, and the brother of Mohammed Mufatah, a member of the so-called "Supreme Revolutionary Committee" of the Houthis.

(4) "Houthis Sell State Properties at Public Auction" (documents), Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, October 20, 2016.

(5) Ibid.

the Houthi group against tampering with state lands in areas under their control, affirming all procedures taken have no legal effect and they will bear the consequences[1].

Ironically, public land sales take place amidst war when millions of Yemenis lack food. The aims aren't only collecting funds for Houthi leadership, but giving state lands to figures ethnically tied to the group.

Houthi land sale announcements saw no response from merchants or investors, with purchases limited to insiders and traders loyal to the group, as per Yemeni observers[2].

In June 2016, various media revealed secret documents on Houthi land plunder, appropriating tracts for elements. Document no.26 of 2016 references memo 16/14/74 of 13/4/2016 by acting Prime Minister's Office secretary appointed by Houthis. Decisions included distributing large areas in Sana'a governorate, Amran and Raymah to group members and fighters[3].

Lands Plundering: (Samples from four Governorates):

- Ten sites in Sana'a capital totalling 637,143 decares equalling 28,314,635 square meters
- Two sites in Sana'a governorate totalling 25,000 decares equalling 1,111,000 square meters.
- One site in Amran governorate at 15,148 decares equalling 673,177 square meters.
- One site in Raymah governorate at 17,600 decares equalling 782,144 square meters[4].

Among the decisions revealed in the document is the directive for the Houthi officials in the provinces of Sa’ada, Hajjah, Amran, Al-Mahweet, Taiz, Raymah, Ibb, Al-Bayda, Hodeidah, and Dhamar to oversee the process of identifying and confiscating state-owned lands and delivering them to the offices and representatives of the Houthi Martyr Institution in these provinces.

Journalist and researcher in Iranian affairs, Adnan Hashem, explained that the process of looting lands under the pretext of distributing them to the families of fighters is part of the Houthi group's eagerness to seize state properties, which they claim as their private ownership. He further clarified that these measures are not sudden, stating, "When the Houthis invaded the

(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid.
(3) "With Documents: How Did the Houthi Militias Confiscate State Lands and Seize Them for Their Members?" Yemen Youth Net, June 11, 2016.
(4) Ibid.

Amran province in 2014, they claimed that Dar Al-Hajar, the historical landmark[1], belonged to their family (Hamid Al-Din), the last Imamic family that ruled the country[2]."

The above-mentioned is a small-scale example of the systematic looting operations carried out by the group, using state institutions as a cover. In addition, there are individual looting operations through forceful occupation, extortion, and coercing residents into selling their properties under pressure, intimidation, and impoverishment.

Discussing the size of state land plunder in Hodeidah governorate alone from 2014 to 2017, we find the Houthis seized 70% of state-owned lands, building new structures there for Houthi leaders based on testimony from a judge in Bajil District of Hodeidah to independent news site Yemen Monitor.

The site's land theft report cited a judge's testimony plus document submitted to Hodeidah Appeal Court President clearly indicating Houthi involvement in pillaging lands belonging to government agencies with Bajil Court assistance, and inability of relevant entities to stop encroachment on state properties.

The news site based its land theft report on a judge's testimony plus document submitted to Hodeidah Appeal Court President clearly indicating Houthi involvement in pillaging state-owned lands with Bajil Court assistance, and inability of relevant entities to stop encroachment on state property[3].

During the years following the Houthi takeover of Sana'a, despite the muzzling of voices and the siege imposed on media outlets, media platforms, social media, and news websites have been filled with news, posts, videos, and leaked audio recordings that recount numerous cases of looting state and citizens' lands in areas under the control of Houthi families. The looters have relied on state institutions under their dominance and judges affiliated with the dynasty to forge ownership documents[4]. What remains undisclosed and unpublished is even greater, broader, and more dangerous.

It was difficult concealing private and public land theft including schools, parks, sports fields, camps, markets, and other government agency

(1) Dar Al-Hajar: One of the historical buildings in Sana'a in the Wadi Dhahr area. It was built during the 18th century AD by Ali bin Saleh Al-Ammari and was named after the granite rock on which this house was constructed.

(2) Yemen Youth Net, the previous source.

(3) "The Houthis Loot 70% of State Lands in Al Hodeidah, Western Yemen (Document)," Yemen Monitor, April 21, 2017.

(4) "The Houthis and Land Plunder... Militias' Plan to Humiliate and Impoverish the Population," The Arab Scene Website, August 6, 2020.

properties across governorates[1]. This prompted the standing Parliament Services Committee in Sana'a to issue a report noting Houthi disregard of memos demanding an end to land seizures and residential building on public utility lands, with punitive action against perpetrators - to no avail[2].

With the increase in looting operations and the number of looters, disputes have arisen as is customary among members of the same gang after carrying out a theft operation. Disagreements have emerged between families and factions supportive of the Houthis, including disputes that have arisen over the looting of lands owned by the General People's Congress Party, which led to armed clashes between Houthi groups[3]. Additionally, disputes have arisen between Houthi leader Ahmed Al-Washah, commander of what is known as the "Ghamaadan Brigade," and Houthi leader Mohammed Al-Ghumari, who took charge of the file to seize the largest possible area of state-owned lands under the pretext of using them for investment projects[4].

The group formed a team under the name of the "Committee for the Investment of Armed Forces Lands," supervised by Houthi leader Mohammed Al-Ghumari and Houthi leader Abu Hayder Juhaf, tasked with surveying, demarcating, and confiscating large areas of lands owned by government institutions, housing associations, unions, citizens, members of the House of Representatives, and politicians who were displaced from provinces due to the war or forcibly displaced[5].

The Houthi committee-initiated operations, seizing vast lands in Naqim, Saa’wan, Saraf, Shuman, Ataan, Hodaa, Al-Ashash, Aser, Al-Khamseen, Bait Bous, Bait Sabtan, Haziz, Omada, Al-Aljam and Raymah Hamid and Hamaadan.

It also appropriated 1500 decares of agricultural lands in Bani Hushaish area owned by Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, previously rented to farmers on the Ministry's behalf before being seized and sold to land traders.

It also imposed restrictions on large tracts preventing owners and beneficiaries from construction or imposing fees claiming Armed Forces ownership[6] despite contracts showing ownership including an area belonging to Air Force Officers' Society, witnessing armed clashes as

(1) "A New Houthi Wave for Property Looting," The Middle East Newspaper, April 14, 2020.
(2) "The House of Representatives Listens to the Report of the Services Committee Regarding State Lands and Endowments," Saba News Agency, which is under Houthi control, December 15, 2020.
(3) "Imminent Street War in Sana’a between Rebel Factions," The Middle East Newspaper, June 12, 2020, issue number 15172.
(4) "State Lands and Housing Associations in Sana’a... Houthi Plunder and Pillaging," The Capital Online Website, August 19, 2020.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid.

Houthis confronted families refusing handover, notably battles between Houthis and Fadhl Al-Saidi family on August 31, 2021.

The affected individuals have previously attempted to protest through various means. For example, on August 12, 2020, the residents carried out a protest in the western Khamsin line above the Saneenah area(1). On September 12, 2020, the residents of the Al-Riyadh residential city in the Sawaan area in northern Sana'a staged a protest to reject the committee's encroachments on their lands(2). Furthermore, on August 15, 2021, residents of Al-Fawaris neighborhood in the Shu'ub district of Sana'a conducted a protest in front of the office of the presidency, which is under Houthi control. The protest was a rejection of the actions of the committee, represented by Houthi leader Abu Hayder Abdullah Juhaf, who prevents citizens from managing their homes and lands, prohibits construction and finishing works, carries out raids on lands and houses, destroys buildings, loots construction equipment, and imprisons property owners for the past five years(3).

Land plunder extended beyond random and organized seizures to targeting legal notaries responsible for property sale-purchase contracts, replacing them with loyalists - termed “Houthification of legal notaries” - ensuring control over land transactions and manipulation through forged ownership or registration under element names plus citizen land interference.

As usual, the group levied numerous accusations, using them as justifications for the abduction and disappearance of hundreds of legitimate officials after accusing them of corruption, eviction from their positions, betraying their profession, and serving "external aggression"!

This operation began under the direct supervision of Mohammed Ali al-Houthi in October 2020 and continued for several months during which many officials were hidden and replaced with loyalists aligned with them on a tribal basis. Some of them were released after being forced to pay no less than three million Yemeni rials per person(4) and commit to cooperating with the Houthi supervisors in each region and seeking their approval before any sale, purchase, or documentation, in addition to confiscating registration documents, records of sale, purchase, and ownership(5).

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(1) "Houthi Committee Seizes Citizens' Lands and Farms in the Capital and Its Outskirts," Yemen Today Channel Website, August 14, 2020.

(2) A news post on the Al-Manar News page on Facebook, September 12, 2020.

(3) A news article and video on YouTube titled "Protest in the Capital Sana’a against Abdullah Juhaf, Alias Abu Haydar Juhaf" showing the protest and banners, August 15, 2021.

(4) "Encircling Real Estate and Its Revenues... The Houthis Arrested Hundreds of Legal Notaries and Seized Their Documents," December 2 Agency, June 7, 2021.

(5) "Behind the Houthi Militia's Campaign against Legal Notaries in Sana’a and Seizure of Their Documents," The Capital Online Website, June 9, 2021.

It can be said that the Houthis, with this step, tightened their control over land and private property sales and purchases, and imposed strict restrictions on the activities of real estate offices. No sale or purchase can take place without notifying the Houthi supervisors, not to mention the imposition of a percentage of sales and purchases and facilitating the process of land seizure.

In May 2022, Houthi elements carried out a military campaign to seize control of lands belonging to the Al-Hamdi city, which is adjacent to the US Embassy in Sana'a. They clashed with the city's residents because the lands are public green areas and are part of the city. The looting operation was widely condemned on social media, prompting some Houthi supporters, including the journalist Mona Safwan, to denounce the land seizure. She wrote the following post on her page:

"No country steals from itself... No country builds at night like thieves. The protector of the land does not steal it. And no country respects its people by shooting and arresting residents and youth of the area simply because they refused...! This is what is happening now in Al-Hamdi city in Sana'a, by the Houthi authorities who claim to be liberating Yemen while being the first to plunder and loot public funds. Al-Hamdi city, was built according to a well-known plan by the Construction and Development Bank, and no government or authority dared to change it or seize its parking lots and green spaces, except for the Houthi authority."

She also said, "Before you liberate Yemen from aggression, liberate it from your ambitions. No one builds at night except thieves, as is happening in these hours in the city established by Al-Hamdi, named after him, and inaugurated during the era of Ali Abdullah Saleh as a model for peaceful cities for state employees."

It was supposed to build dozens of similar cities, not turn them into random areas and seize them. There is a great sense of anger and resentment, despite the objection of the bank that owns this land... It's like digging one's own grave, to the extent that even those who were with the Houthi authority have turned against them. The matter was enforced by force, and there were cases of arrests of young people and gunfire.

This is an example of many cases of looting public funds in schools, such as the private school on Agriculture Street, which was established four decades ago in the 1980s as the first private or cooperative school between private and government funds. I have been in contact with its founders and owners who are politically affiliated with the Houthi authority, and they complain that the school has been looted for the past three years by an illegal order issued by Minister Yahya al-Houthi.

In addition to the endowed houses and parks, from the private school to the endowed houses and even the lands... and the modern Azal School that

was affiliated with Sana'a University and has now become a private sector entity, as well as the Police College Club and the Army Officers Club, and nearby is the Revolution Hospital...!!

So how can you claim to liberate Yemen while being the first to plunder it!? Ibn Khaldun says that the collapse of states begins with extortion, and this looting is evidence of collapse... They are like those who work to leave, not to stay(1).

Despite widespread condemnation of the organized land seizure operations, the group continued to engage in the crime at a high pace.

In August 2022, the group used excessive force against the residents of Al-Ara village in the Hamdan district, north of the capital Sana'a, after the villagers staged a peaceful sit-in to reject the looting of their lands for the purpose of distributing them among the Houthis' supporters.

The American Center for Justice (a civil society organization) addressed this crime, confirming that the Houthi group has been committing several violations against the village residents who refuse the seizure of their lands for over two weeks. The violations included attacks on the protesters and opening fire at them, resulting in the injury of six of them. Additionally, the Houthis carried out arbitrary arrests of dozens of people from their homes and workplaces, as well as imposing sieges, road closures, and chasing the residents, forcing them to stay in their homes.

The center added in its statement that the Houthi group seized a piece of land with an area exceeding 66,000 square meters located in the "Al-Makhlabah" area before the villagers obtained a judicial ruling confirming their right to this land and invalidating the Houthi control over it. However, the group continued with the confiscation procedures(2).

Within less than half a month, the Houthis abducted a large number of village residents, including Sheikh Abdulhamid Kathir, Sheikh Mahmoud Daghish, Sheikh Yahya Yassin, Sheikh Ahmed Musleh, Al-Aqil Bakil Kathir, Sheikh Ali Saad Al-Khaqar, Sheikh Saddam Ayed Al-Khaqar, Sheikh Mohsen Ali Qaid, Al-Aqil Abdullah Mohammed Thabet Al-Khaqar, Mohammed Naji Mqbil Kathir, Abdul Karim Ali Mohammed Kathir, Hamdan Abdullah Ali Kathir, Abdulaziz Mahdi Thabet Kathir, Hamed Mohammed Ahmed Kathir, Ahmed Mansur Al-Badawi, Al-Aqil Hamoud Mohammed Ahsan Abdullah, Qahtan Ayed Ahsan Mazhar, Rashid Ali Rashid Mazhar, Mohammed Shaif Naif Sari, Sheikh Fares Saleh Ahmed Awadah, Essam Mohsen Hazaa, Mohammed Mohammed Abdo, Mahmoud

(1) A post by the journalist who supports the Houthis, Mona Safwan, on her Facebook page, May 22, 2022.

(2) The American Center for Justice (ACJ) condemns the actions of the Houthi group against the residents of Al-Arah village and calls for their protection from the violations of the Houthi group, August 15, 2022.

Mohsen Yassin, Sheikh Ahmed Musleh Jaarah, Ali Ahmed Musleh Jaarah, Saleh Thabet Saleh Jaarah, Sam Saleh Thabet Jaarah, a blind man named Ali Hussein Hayder, Jubran Ahmed Musleh Jaarah, and Mohsen Mohammed Ali Qaid Al-Adwar, Bashir Ahmed Thabet Al-Katheeri(1).

A few days after this operation, the Houthis stormed areas in the Bani Matar district, located in the province of Sana'a (west of the capital), and began constructing a fence on agricultural land with the intention of looting it. This led to confrontations between Houthi elements and the local residents. Parliament member Mohammed Ali Ahmed Swar condemned the crime during one of the sessions of the parliament, which is under Houthi control. He stated, "The ongoing looting of lands in the Bani Matar district by the so-called Abu Hayder Juhaf (a Houthi leader), and the presence of equipment, materials, and more than 100 workers for land demarcation. The lands being demarcated now are 20,000 by 20,000, agricultural lands owned by the people of the villages of Beit Al-Maqla, Quba, Beit 'Abid, Shu'ban Al-Burwaya, and Beit Radam. These citizens have been cultivating these lands for hundreds of years. These are agricultural lands that are currently cultivated, and they have been confiscated without any legal basis. I urge the Council to urgently seek justice for the citizens of the Bani Matar district and protect them from arbitrary actions and encroachment on their lands(2)."

At the same time, the Houthis carried out one of the largest land seizure operations in the Hodeidah Governorate, west of Yemen. Approximately 30 vehicles loaded with armed Houthi militants and eight bulldozers invaded villages in the coastal area of Al-Qasrah in the Beit Al-Faqih district, south of the Hodeidah Governorate. The Houthi elements forcibly confiscated lands belonging to the citizens, most of which were agricultural, amid heavy gunfire to disperse protesting locals, resulting in casualties and the abduction of dozens of residents.

The Houthis have seized an area of land totalling more than 10 square kilometers, including farms, irrigation channels, and grazing lands that have benefited over 5,000 citizens for hundreds of years in that region(3). Sheikh Yahya Mansur, the leader of the Zaraniq tribe residing in the area, considered these practices as part of the discriminatory actions carried out by the Houthis against the members of his tribe. He stated that the confiscation of citizens' lands along the coastal strip with the aim of converting them into investment sites for the benefit of the group after the

(1) Published by Judge Abdulwahab Qattan on his Facebook page, and Qattan is a resident of the Hamdan region where Al-Arah village is located.

(2) A statement by the parliamentarian Mohammed Suwar during one of the parliamentary sessions held in Sana’a under the control of the Houthis on September 8, 2022.

(3) About 70 residents were kidnapped. The Houthi militia stormed villages in the Zaranik coast south of Hodeidah and seized the lands and homes of the residents, Al-Masdar Online, September 13, 2022.

war is a racist act[1].

Dr. Essam Shurim, a member of the Shura Council, also commented on these crimes, clearly indicating the racist dimension of the land seizures. He said, "What is happening in Al-Qasrah, Beit Al-Faqih district, to the sons of Tihama from the Zaraniq tribe, is injustice, transgression, looting, and encroachment on their properties under the pretext of the lands of the imam, who are their descendants (and the Houthis are also his descendants) at times when Allah has stopped them from being the sons of his prophet." Shurim, who belongs to the Tihama region, then raises the question, "So the sons of Tihama? Their land, their ancestors' land, their tribes, their birthplaces, their agriculture, and their lives are all under the control of the owner of Sa'ada (the Houthis)?"

In another post, he says, "The group has completed the looting of the lands of the Hamedan tribe in Sana'a and moved on to their next targets. It seems to be a settling of scores with anything non-Hashemite or anything that could be related to the era of the imamate[2]."

Despite the protests rejecting the looting operations carried out by the Houthi group in Hodeidah, and the United Nations' condemnation of these practices at that time, the group continued to expand its looting circle every day, increasing its pace[3]. At the end of September 2022, the Houthis conducted campaigns of control over vast lands in the villages of Al-Qabasiyah, Al-Mawahib, and Al-Mashaheer, located west of the city of Beit Al-Faqih in Hodeidah. This was accompanied by the abduction of dozens of individuals from the families of these villages. The looting operations extended to Sana'a, specifically to the isolation of Sarf, which is part of the Bani Hashish district north of Sana'a, where the group looted tens of thousands of al-Lubans[4], according to the parliamentarian Yahya Al-Qadi, who condemned the Houthi raids on citizens' lands in Sarf isolation. He revealed this during a session of the parliament under Houthi control, saying, "No one has stopped them (land looting campaigns), and no one will stop the Ministry of Interior (Houthi-controlled) that carries out abuses and mistreats citizens... They engage in looting and violation of dignity. I want the President of the Council to address the Ministry of Interior to stop the campaign and form a committee to look into the grievances of the people of Sarf. They cannot say they killed the military... because they are looting

(1) Ibid.

(2) A post on the Twitter page of Dr. Essam Shareem, a member of the Shura Council, on September 13, 2022.

(3) Disturbing reports about the confiscation of civilian lands in areas controlled by the Houthi group in Hodeidah, United Nations Official News, September 15, 2022.

(4) The "lubna" is a singular form of Al-Luban, it is a unit of area measurement used in many regions of Yemen, and the area of a "lubna" varies by region; in Sana'a, it is equivalent to 44.44 square meters.

lands everywhere, in thousands of Al-Lubans and tens of thousands of Al-Lubans. And they continue to violate their dignity until today[1]."

Mohammed Al-Maqalih, a member of the Houthi Revolutionary Committee who has become a critic of the Houthi policy from within the group, sums up this situation by saying, "It is a phase of collecting insights and the assets of people. It is a comprehensive authority that is not satisfied with controlling state institutions and their joints, but also controls the joints of society and the foundations of relationships among its people, their sources of livelihood, the assets of their properties, and their rights[2]."

Deprivation of Citizens from Services:

In February 2015, approximately four months after the Houthi takeover of state institutions in Sana'a, Ali Al-Hashidi, an advisor to the General Manager of the Al-Thawra Hospital in Sana'a and the head of its workers' union, warned of the collapse of the hospital and its inability to provide services to patients due to various factors. The most important of these factors was its inability to fulfill its obligations and repay its debt, which amounted to one billion Yemeni rials (more than five million dollars at that time).

The Al-Thawra Public Hospital in Sana'a is considered the largest and most important institution in the Republic[3]. Such news was shocking to Yemenis. How could the largest and most important institution providing healthcare services to citizens suffer from various financial and technical problems that could lead to its inability to provide medicines and food to patients? Al-Hashidi stated in an interview with Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed newspaper on that day: "The hospital's management is considering several solutions, including burdening citizens with the full cost of treatment, which is difficult for the citizens. About 90% of the medical devices in the hospital, including the MRI machine, are out of order and need repair... The Al-Thawra Public Hospital in Sana'a is in a critical stage and may go bankrupt and be unable to provide medication to patients in the coming months." He attributed the reasons for this to the lack of independence of the center's resources, in addition to insufficient credits for medicines and

(1) Parliamentarian Yahya Al-Qadi speaks in the Sana’a Parliament about Houthi violations against the people of Saref, YouTube, October 22, 2022.

(2) A post on the Twitter page of Revolutionary Committee member Mohammed Al-Muqalih on September 5, 2022.

(3) The Al-Thawra Public Hospital Authority is considered the largest government hospital in Yemen, with thousands of Yemeni patients visiting it daily from various parts of the country. In 2015, the number of inpatient cases in the hospital ranged from 120 to 130 daily, and the number of medical cases arriving at the hospital's emergency department ranged from 800 to 1000 cases per day around the clock.

solutions[1].

Previously, Dr. Abdel Karim Al-Kholany, Director-General of the hospital, submitted his resignation at the end of January of the same year due to the Houthi-controlled Finance Ministry's failure to support it, in addition to violations committed by Houthi elements after taking control of the hospital[2].

In mid-March 2015, around ten days before the launch of the Arab coalition's operations, the general authorities of government hospitals in Sana'a, Hodeida, Hajjah, Marib and the capital appealed to the Houthi Finance Ministry to provide financial allocations for the authorities on a quarterly basis as usual without delay, to enable the authorities to provide Yemenis with medical services.

This appeal came in an expanded meeting of the five authorities' representatives held by Al-Thawra Teaching Hospital Authority in Hodeidah chaired by its head Dr. Khaled Suhail, stressing the Central Bank's obligation not to delay or fragment disbursements and addressing authority debts to others for medical supplies and equipment raised to the Finance Ministry[3].

It was clear the Houthis refused supporting health institutions by withholding funding from Yemen's most important and largest public hospitals despite revenue collection. But this did not stop there - the Houthis legislated depriving service bodies of finances through the aforementioned "general mobilization" decision redirecting all state resources and budgets including education, health, food support and environmental sanitation to war operations in Al-Bayda, Taiz, Aden plus loyalty payments and enriching clan leaderships.

Three days after this announcement, on March 24th, i.e. two days before the start of the Arab Coalition's operations, the Yemeni Ministry of Public Health and Population in Sana'a received a notice from the Houthis imposing the suspension of support for any activities implemented by the Ministry of Health in its four sectors (planning and development, primary health care, therapeutic medicine, population), except for the delivery of monthly salaries as with other service institutions, rendering the Ministry of Health unable to provide its services to more than eight million Yemeni citizens in need of health care[4].

Therefore, during the years of war, the Houthis did not only deprive

(1) Warnings of the collapse of the largest government hospital in Yemen, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, February 23, 2015.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Warnings of a health disaster in government hospitals in 5 governorates, published on the Yemen News website citing the Yemeni News Agency (Saba), on March 14, 2015.

(4) The Houthi rebels suspend "health support" in support of the war, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, March 24, 2015.

employees of their salaries, but they were also collecting state revenues and doubling taxes on citizens, but in return they did not commit to providing integrated services to citizens. They refused to fulfill their duty as a de facto authority, as they did not care about the patient who dies and does not belong to them, as their death is ultimately a means of political exploitation, and through it the Yemeni government and the world are held responsible for that, because local, regional and international parties did not recognize their authority. This was a form of punishment for Yemenis because they do not support them. They watched patients with kidney failure die in front of dialysis centers due to the unavailability of "diesel" powering the electricity, despite its availability in their large stockpiles, and their use of it to run the machinery of war and their luxurious cars, or light up their homes.

The question that arises here is: how did health institutions continue to perform their duties during the years of war, even at a minimum?

The Houthi group relied heavily on international organizations to provide part of the budgets and needs for health, educational, environmental sanitation, and food services (food aid), and even road construction, transportation services, rehabilitation and construction of some facilities and other services and works that any de facto authority must provide, in return for collecting taxes, zakat, communication revenues and fees for imported petroleum derivatives.

Health-related organizations, led by the World Health Organization affiliated with the United Nations, provided part of doctors' and health workers' salaries (incentives) and petroleum derivatives operating power in hospitals and health centers, medicines for chronic diseases, medical supplies, vaccines, ambulances, and other requirements.

However, this organizational support did not prevent the Houthis from raising the prices of health services provided to citizens. For example, Mohammed al-Mansur, the general manager appointed by the Houthis, imposed new prices - reaching about three times - for most health services (emergencies, free operations, medicines, lab tests, etc.) provided by the hospital, which contributed to exacerbating the suffering of patients and their families(1).

The workers in the authority rejected the new pricing as it violates the laws, as such a step can only be taken by a board decision, not an individual appointed by the Houthis. Based on that, the emergency department staff gathered signatures denouncing the new pricing, affirming that it will turn the hospital from a public one that provides free or symbolic services to a private one, depriving poor citizens, especially since Houthi elements obtain all services for free through direct coordination with their representative in

(1) "Al-Thawra General Hospital in Sana'a... Another example of the abuses and violations practiced by the militia. The website Post, March 28, 2017.

the hospital at the time[1].

What happened at Al-Thawra Public Hospital was applied to all public hospitals in Houthi-controlled areas, as health service fees were doubled despite international organizations covering most of the hospitals' operational expenses. In return, salaries and bonuses were limited to the leaderships of government health institutions under the Houthis and left doctors, health workers and other administrative employees in poverty and want[2].

The same occurred in the water and environmental sanitation system. Instead of the de facto Houthi authority providing budgets and allocations for sanitation and environmental hygiene work, given the huge amounts it collects from state revenues, this group relied heavily on donations from international organizations. "The Joint Humanitarian Response was able to rehabilitate thousands of damaged water networks, build huge solar-powered electricity grids to address fuel shortages for water pumps, and provide clean water daily to up to 12.6 million people[3]."

International organizations provide petroleum derivatives to operate cleaning trucks that roam the streets daily and water pumps that deliver water to homes. However, streets are filled with waste from time to time, and water cuts off for long periods in cities, then the Houthis respond to this situation by imposing exorbitant fees for water and accompanying services that were not originally obtained. And if found, it is in small proportions, as most Yemenis depend on purchasing water sold in mobile tanks, while poor families rely on community initiatives or philanthropists' aid.

During 2019, 2020 and 2021, the Public Corporation for Water and Sanitation under Houthi control carried out field campaigns to force populations to settle water bills despite its unavailability. Those who refuse to settle are having their household sewage discharge outlets blocked or are jailed[4], as happened in Dhamar governorate where the Houthi group designated a special prison for those who refuse to settle water bills called "Water Prison[5]".

Community testimonies confirmed that the Houthis did not just demand

(1) Ibid.

(2) Shocking corruption figures and employees begging... The corruption that "Jahaf" managed to commit at Al-Thawra Hospital in Sana'a. Al-Asema Online, November 17, 2021."

(3) A joint statement from the agencies working in the field of water and environmental sanitation in Yemen, UNICEF Yemen's website, June 16, 2020. It is worth noting that the mentioned statistics indicate the provision of water to up to 12.6 million people in various parts of Yemen, not just areas controlled by the Houthi rebels. However, most of this support goes to areas under Houthi control due to the large population.

(4)The Houthis impose water bill payments on the population despite continuous water shortages. Al-Mawqea Post, July 4, 2019.

(5) The Houthis open a 'water prison' for the delinquent residents of Dhamar who fail to pay their water bills. Al-Mushahed Al-Yemeni, December 24, 2020.

monthly subscription fees, but settlement of water bills in large sums reaching 300 thousand Yemeni Rials in some cases, after raising the price per unit to 430 Yemeni Rials(1), an increase of up to 300%(2).

These tax collection campaigns came in conjunction with international organizations taking on the costs of rehabilitating the Sana'a water project since early 2019, providing water pumps, salaries and the solar power system ensuring water access for populations(3). That is, instead of distributing water freely to populations or at least with symbolic fees especially since government employees have been without salaries for years, the group doubled the price of water and forced populations to pay bills for years during which they did not receive water.

In addition to community initiatives and expat donations, international organizations contributed to fully supporting the construction and repair of long roads between villages(4), rehabilitation of government buildings, schools, digging of wells and provision of water pumps in rural areas among many other jobs the Houthis should have done as they obtain billions of dollars annually according to international reports. But worst of all, the Houthis imposed percentages on philanthropists and businessmen from donations made to implement these projects and halted some after locals refused to hand over these percentages, as well as imposed percentages on any relief aid shipment arriving through Sana'a airport under the pretext of "Sana'a airport operational costs", despite donations and aid being tax exempt worldwide.

This rentier behavior of taking but not giving reminds of what used to happen during the rule of the Imams. They would excel in collecting money, taxes, and agricultural crops, but they did not perform their role in serving society, neither education, health nor food aid to the poor. They would sleep on treasures of gold and silver and control grain stores, but they would only distribute from it within limits of what serves their battles and control. Poet Mutahar Al-Iryan mentioned in his epic poem of glory and sorrow that Yemenis used to die in the streets of famine and epidemics during the time of Imam Yahya in the mid-1940s, while the Imam's stores were full of various types of grains and fruits that he allocated only for himself and his

(1) The Houthi militia demands that the residents of the capital pay twenty years' worth of water service bills. Al-Mashhad Al-Oun, August 1, 2021.

(2) The city has been without services for years. The Houthis force the residents of Ibb to pay water and electricity bills. Nafath Al-Yemen Website, July 14, 2021.

(3) International organizations have resumed the project for free. Houthi campaign to forcibly collect water bills in Sana’a. Yemen News, July 16, 2019."

(4) For example, in 2022, philanthropists and expatriates from the Ba'dan - Al-Shu'ar area, part of Ibb Governorate, funded the paving and asphalting of the 8-kilometer road from Beit Al-Sayyadi Al-Radhayi at a cost of 1.6 million dollars. Additionally, the residents of Wadi Al-Shanasi area undertook the construction of a bridge at a cost of 360 thousand dollars to avoid flood channels during rainfall.

entourage[1].

The Imam Yahya's son Al-Hassan Ibn Hamid Al-Din used to send money abroad for his personal account due to its abundance. When one of the notables presented a memorandum to Imam Yahya explaining the people's situation that reached the point of death by hunger, he replied: "Whoever lives is freed, and whoever dies is a martyr[2]."

Education Allocations:

Historically and presently, the Imamate feared education, as the beliefs of the dynasty were based on a large foundation of historical and contemporary lies and priestly superstitions. Naturally, education takes charge of dissipating these lies and myths. This is a reality well known to Yemenis, and this fear and hatred of education is what pushes the new form of the Imamate (the Houthis) to clandestinely confront education and educated people, just as their ancestors who limited knowledge to families affiliated with them only and ignorant the rest of Yemenis.

The ancestors of the Houthis took care to tighten the noose on Yemenis and place obstacles before those who wanted to learn. The situation reached the point that the Minister of Education, Ismail son of Imam Yahya, did not dare to enrol anyone in schools, few as they were, without the Imam's personal permission[3].

Egyptian thinker and university professor Mostafa Al-Shikaa, who was knowledgeable about the state of education at the time, says that by the end of Imam Yahya's rule there was not a single person in all of Yemen who had memorized the entire Quran, nor did students ever study the English language in existing schools[4]. As for the number of schools at the time, there were said to be five primary schools, but education level did not reach kindergarten standards, located in Sana'a, Hodeidah, Taiz, Zabid and Dhamar. And three preparatory level schools called secondary, as the actual education level did not exceed primary schools in Egypt[5].

As for the rest of Yemen's governorates and villages, there were no

(1) The Glory and Pain, a poetic epic composed by the renowned Yemeni poet Muttahar Al-Iryani, may he rest in peace, in 1967 during the peak of the Republican Imamate conflict, which was at its fiercest during that time.

(2) Psychology of the Hadawi Theory in Yemen... A reading of the psychological structure of the theory, by Thabit Al-Ahmedi, Nashwan Al-Hamiri Center for Studies and Media, page 47.

(3) "Abdullah Al-Bardoni, Yemeni Issues, page 301."

(4) "The writer Mustafa Al-Shuk'a pointed out in his book that when they asked Saeed Al-Islam Al-Hasan, in a statement to the Egyptian press, about the percentage of education in Yemen, he boldly and shamelessly said: it is 100 percent. This lie was a source of ridicule and laughter in the Egyptian newspapers at that time."

(5) "Adventures of an Egyptian in the wilderness of Yemen, previous source, page 105."

schools. Typically, the family keen on educating its children would rely on itself without waiting for support from the Imam's government and would fund what was called "al-Ma'alimah" or Qur'anic schools where children would learn the Quran, writing, recitation, and religious sciences. After establishing the Teachers' College, it began supporting these Qur'anic schools to provide religious sciences education for free(1). Education during the Imamate era often focused on religious sciences, as the Imams sought to cultivate a unique religious culture based on glorifying their dynasty to maintain control as the Houthis do today.

Dr. Abdulaziz Al-Maqalih pointed out that the total number of students enrolled in education across Yemen during the September 26, 1962, revolution was only six thousand, while by the mid-1980s it reached nearly one million students(2). In fact, previous and present Imamate (Houthis) found in ignorance of a large segment of Yemenis a fertile ground to spread their lies to subsequently use and push them into wars, meaning ignorance was one of the most important factors from which they derived their power, and thus they worked to spread ignorance among common people through various means, most of which today are no longer as overt as in the past.

Before delving into Houthi practices that targeted educational institutions, it bears mentioning the qualitative leap in education following the September 26, 1962, revolution that ended Imamate rule before they returned in their new guise in 2014.

One of the most important achievements of the September 26, 1962, revolution was building thousands of schools within a short period and enhancing the education process with the aim of achieving the third goal of the Yemeni revolution, which is "raising the people's economic, social, political and cultural level", after the number of schools in Northern Yemen did not exceed fingers, and the education level was akin to medieval times. The matter did not stop here, but the Republic contributed to breaking the monopoly of education on ethnic and economic classes and depriving the general public, as part of Yemenis' efforts to achieve the first goal of the September 26 revolution "liberation from despotism and colonialism and their remnants, and establishing a just republican rule, and eliminating differences and privileges between classes", after educating the sons of the general Yemeni public was difficult and expensive, as sending children to the few education places meant parents bearing living and education costs in addition to losing a family member who could contribute to agriculture and work(3).

(1) "My Journey to Yemen, Ahmed Wafie Zakaria, Dar Al-Fikr for Printing, Distribution, and Publishing, First Edition 1986, page 157."

(2) "Al-Hadawiya Between Political Theory and Divine Creed, previous source, page 134."

(3) "Maisaa Shuja' al-Din, On Free Education and the Formation of the Middle Class in Yemen, an article in Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, October 9, 2020."

With the start of republican rule, the era of free education for all sectors and segments of society[1] began, which contributed to the most prominent social rise for the sons of tribesmen, farmers and other classes that had been deprived of education according to Yemeni writer Maysa Shujaa al-Din's expression. "Through education, the professions of individuals in these families were no longer limited to agriculture or other economically limited and narrow-horizon activities, but they included doctors, employees, engineers and others who contributed greatly to raising their awareness and aspirations[2]."

When the Houthis took control of Sana'a, they appointed the brother of the group's leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, Yahya Badr al-Din al-Houthi, as Minister of Education in their unrecognized government, despite him never entering school, not obtaining any educational certificate of any level worth mentioning, and his only qualification being receiving a permit in religious sciences from his father Badr al-Din al-Houthi, in an unprecedented precedent that indicates this group's insistence on tightening its grip on educational institutions to achieve various goals, but the most prominent remains turning schools into child soldiers recruitment pools, spreading their sectarian ideology that deifies the Houthi dynasty, uprooting Yemenis' history and identity as part of what is called cultural genocide, and depriving as many students as possible from education to ultimately facilitate their exploitation and direction.

The Houthis use multiple means to achieve the three aforementioned goals, but in this context, I will only talk about plundering educational institutions' budgets and employees' salaries, in addition to raising tuition fees at private and public schools.

Many teachers believed that appointing Yahya Badr al-Din Al-Houthi as the Minister of Education in the Houthi government would contribute to meeting the needs of the employees in the Ministry of Education. The minister is the brother of the founder and leader of the Houthi movement at the same time, and everything he requests for his ministry and its employees would be provided due to his position and authority. However, what happened was different. The teachers starved, and the educational institutions were completely deprived of their budgets and funding, just like other institutions under Houthi control.

The Houthis have deprived approximately 160,000 teachers and

(1) "Article (8) of the Yemeni 'Public Education and Teaching Law' stipulates: Education is free at all its stages, guaranteed by the state, and the state gradually implements this principle according to a plan approved by the Cabinet, as stated on the National Information Center's website."

(2) "Maisaa Shuja' al-Din, same source."

employees in schools of their salaries since 2016[1], despite their contribution to the state's revenues and their ability to pay salaries, as mentioned in previous sections.

This deliberate action and intentional starvation have been met with repeated calls to deliver the employees' salaries. The most prominent of these calls was a joint statement issued by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in which they stated: "Teachers and school staff play an extremely important role in providing continuous education and learning services to every child in Yemen. Further delays in paying teachers' salaries are likely to lead to the complete collapse of the education sector and affect millions of Yemeni children, especially the most marginalized groups, such as girls. Leaving these children out of school exposes them to significant risks, such as engaging in child labor, recruitment by armed groups and forces, early marriage, trafficking, and other forms of exploitation and abuse[2]." The Norwegian Refugee Council also confirmed that the non-payment of salaries to education workers affects approximately 10,000 schools and about 4 million students[3].

The education process suffered a form of paralysis, and teachers carried out repeated strikes and protest sit-ins, but they failed and faced extreme brutality, with teachers accused of espionage for foreign countries[4]. Thousands of them sought other jobs, leaving students without teachers, and making them easy prey for recruitment to battlefronts. As for the Houthis, in addition to obtaining new fighters, they exploited the absence of teachers unable to go to schools due to lack of salaries or even transportation fees in many cases, replacing them with Houthi elements working to spread their racist ideology through schools. This was in the early years of the coup, but after solidifying control over government institutions following the assassination of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in late 2017, they fully subjected the education sector workforce.

Most of the teachers have persevered in their schools for a long time despite their difficult living conditions. Regarding this matter, Yahya Al-

(1) "Joint statement issued by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) on the occasion of World Teachers' Day, UNICEF - Yemen website, October 5, 2020."

(2) Ibid.

(3) "Yemeni Teachers: Years of Hardship and Suffering Are Not Over Yet, Yemen Monitor, October 6, 2019."

(4) "On October 8, 2017, hundreds of female teachers gathered in a protest in front of the Sana'a Municipality building to demand their salaries from the Houthi authorities. They chanted slogans like 'We want our salaries,' but the Municipality's deputy appointed by the Houthi authorities, Ali Al-Suhaif, responded to the protesters over a loudspeaker, saying, 'Those who want a salary should go to Salman,' referring to Saudi Arabia's King Salman bin Abdulaziz. (There is a video published on YouTube)."

Yanai, the media spokesperson for the Teachers' Union, said, "In previous periods, we called on teachers to be diligent in going to schools, even though they do not receive their salaries, in order to protect millions of children and their right to education, and to prevent elements of the Houthi militia from replacing the teachers, who would then influence these children according to the wishes of the Houthi group. But unfortunately, the duration has been prolonged, and the teachers have not received any salaries. The government and the international community have not realized the sudden and complete impact of salary cuts on the most important and influential workforce in the present and future generations of Yemen. They have failed to comprehend that ensuring teachers' ability to perform their duties and providing their salaries regularly helps students choose education instead of joining the armed Houthi militias... They have failed to understand that the deterioration of educational opportunities will motivate many students in Houthi-controlled areas to join the ranks of the Houthi militias[1]."

According to Save the Children UK, this dire situation has pushed "over half of the teachers and workers in the field of education in Yemen, or about 190,000 people," to work in other professions that can provide for their needs and their families, including working on the streets[2]. Many pictures have circulated showing teachers carrying stones or selling goods on sidewalks.

The Houthis have consistently prevented the legitimate government from transferring to the central bank. However, these justifications collapse in the face of any objective discussion. What was transferred were banking transactions, not funds. The Houthis collect the state's revenues, as mentioned before, and UN reports have confirmed that the Yemeni government is unable to effectively collect revenues. Meanwhile, the Houthis impose taxes, extort traders, and seize properties in the name of the war effort. Therefore, they are obligated to deliver salaries as they represent the de facto authority, and because they have the capability to do so, especially since they have prevented the circulation of the new currency that the Yemeni government used to pay its employees in their controlled areas.

On October 23, 2018, the United Nations announced Saudi Arabia and the UAE would provide a $70 million grant for Yemeni teachers whose salaries stopped in Houthi-controlled areas to resolve the issue of repeated teacher strikes and ensure continued education[3]. This support would be

(1) "Yahya Al-Yanai, the Media Officer of the Teachers' Union, made an intervention on the Belqees Channel in a program titled 'Layoffs for Teachers and Distortion of Curricula... Militias are reshaping the community's identity,' August 22, 2021."

(2) "190,000 Yemeni teachers pushed by the Houthi forces into other professions to support their families, Middle East, November 13, 2021."

(3) "Statement issued by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), organization's website, October 23, 2018."

provided as monthly incentives to teachers in coordination with the Yemeni government and UNICEF, benefiting 130,000 teachers contributing to education services for 3.7 million Yemeni children inside Yemen(1).

Like other grants and aid, Houthi attempts to seize these grants and aid contributed to delaying their disbursement to teachers. The Houthis conditioned UNICEF to disburse incentives according to recent registers adding names of their elements, in addition to delivering the financial grant in hard currency to the Central Bank account in Sana'a, then to the ministry managed by Yahya al-Houthi to distribute it to teachers in Yemeni rials after deducting the exchange rate difference in their favor, which the Yemeni government and UN rejected to protect teachers' rights(2).

Since the Houthis dealt with teachers as hostages, their incentives would either be delivered to their appointees in educational institutions after controlling them, or all teachers would be deprived, forcing the government to enable UNICEF to disburse incentives according to new registers imposed by the Houthis. This did not stop here, as the Houthis deducted portions of tens of thousands of teachers' incentives.

In mid-May 2019, social media sites and Yemeni news sites overflowed with posts and news of protesting teachers against deductions UNICEF implemented under Houthi pressure. According to testimonies published by Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper alongside a written complaint from teachers in one school to the Education Office of the capital secretariat, teachers were surprised on Sunday May 12th by deductions from their cash incentives.

One testimony stated it was scheduled to disburse two delayed monthly incentives of 61,800 Yemeni rials (124 dollars at the time) for each teacher, but most teachers received only 10,000 Yemeni rials (20 dollars), with the remainder 27,000 or 34,000 Yemeni rials (54-68 dollars)(3).

Due to these deductions depriving teachers of their rights, donor countries stopped supporting this sector, and Houthi-controlled education and training offices began imposing fees on parents for their children's education. However, education continued nominally, as those going to public schools did not receive proper education and spent mornings playing in classrooms or schoolyards, or receiving Houthi sectarian lessons, prompting many families to enrol children in private schools whose numbers greatly increased at the expense of free public education. In pursuit of education, many families were forced to sell valuable possessions to

(1) "Representative of UNICEF for the Gulf Arab States, Tayeb Adam, Saudi Press Agency (SPA), May 15, 2019."

(2) "Houthi Conditions Hinder the Payment of Teachers' Salaries in Yemen, Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, January 2, 2019."

(3) "Yemeni Teachers Complain About UNICEF Deductions from Their Cash Incentives, Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, May 14, 2019."

educate their children[1].

Regarding imposing fees on parents for enrolling children in public schools, amounts varied between schools, but rural residents suffered most as the poorest, forcing many parents to withdraw children unable to afford imposed fees[2], in addition to some schools expelling or preventing students from exam rooms unable to pay new fees[3], returning the situation to pre-September 26, 1962, revolution.

The issue did not stop at obliging parents to pay study fees under the pretext of paying teachers' salaries, but most schools imposed providing supplies like stationery, chairs or contributions for school furniture repairs, sanitation tools and other requirements on families, given the Houthi-controlled Ministry of Education and Training's refusal to provide school needs, so these were burdened on students and their families.

When the Ministry of Education under Yahya al-Houthi's control received support from international organizations to provide incentives or school operational allowances, the group attributed these aids to itself and showed it provided these funds from the state budget, but in reality it was external support provided by organizations and countries, while they have continued since the war began to plunder public funds and international aid without providing citizens any deserved services.

In August 2021, Houthi media celebrated a statement by Yahya Badr al-Din al-Houthi noting his ministry's intention to disburse a monthly 30,000 Yemeni rials incentive for teachers, staff and school employees starting September of that year, without mentioning these incentives were provided by international organizations[4]. It was only days later that Yahya al-Houthi's ministry announced its inability to disburse these incentives after disagreeing with UNICEF[5].

Concurrently, the Houthis raised taxes and fees imposed on private schools in areas under their control. In many areas, they imposed financial

(1) "Due to the lack of attention to education in government schools, private school students topped the list in the results of the Basic Education (Ninth Grade) Examinations in Sana'a and its neighboring provinces in the academic year 2020-2021. This prompted the Assistant Professor of Curriculum and Teaching Methods at the Faculty of Education (University of Sana'a), Suad Al-Saba, to state that the decline of government schools from the list of top performers in the Basic Education Certificate results indicates that 'education, which was once free for all citizens, is no longer available.'"

(2) "From Robbing Teachers' Salaries to Imposing Fees on Students, Al-Islaah Net, October 30, 2019."

(3) "Mandatory Fees by the Houthis Threaten to Deprive Thousands of Students of Examinations, Al-Muqal Post, April 13, 2018."

(4) "The Ministry of Education adopts a monthly incentive for teachers in the amount of 30,000 rials starting from September, controlled by the Houthis, August 14, 2021."

(5) "UNICEF refuses to pay incentives to teachers in Sana'a and several provinces for the current year, Yemen Scene, August 25, 2021."

amounts on each student, in addition to other collections the group periodically imposes under various pretexts and to cover numerous Houthi occasions, turning these collections into additional fees heavily burdening parents, prompting many to withdraw children from private schools and enroll them in barely functioning public schools unable to provide required educational services(1).

We return to writer Maysa Shujaa al-Din who summarized this situation in her article: "With the Houthis rise to power, Yemeni education began facing major challenges, from teacher salary cuts to politicization of education, but the gravest challenge was privatization of education formally, which the Houthis called 'community contribution.' Like all misleading Houthi terms, 'community contribution' seems an equivocal word intended to mean the opposite - it means privatization, while the Houthis attempt to present it as a community contribution to providing teacher salaries, as if the community's responsibility is to perform state duties they control."

The Houthis' desire to keep society ignorant is not a hypothetical or deductive claim by their opponents, as they intensely recruit children and adolescents to battlefronts, making schools an obstacle to recruitment processes. It is also a reality evident in their literature embodied by sermons of their founder Hussein al-Houthi, who considers any book besides the Holy Quran worthless, including books on Islam and Sharia like jurisprudence fundamentals. Here, no one exaggerates describing the Houthi group as the sacred ignorance group, as this characterization accurately applies to them. When they spoke about their Sa'ada model, they never mentioned education or health - security was always their foremost alleged achievement, according to their propaganda(2).

Community Initiatives to Save What Can Be Saved:

Faced with this difficult reality, Yemeni expatriates abroad and prosperous citizens within rallied to contribute to reducing suffering in Houthi-controlled areas after depriving people of basic needs. Various community initiatives emerged to provide food to poor families, initiatives focused on road construction to facilitate transportation, and some initiatives centered on education - building and renovating schools and providing teacher salaries especially in rural areas to ensure continued education after the Houthis refused to disburse them.

Yemeni citizens abroad in Gulf countries, the United States and European nations launched initiatives to support the education process

(1) "The Houthis impose exorbitant taxes on private schools and 5,000 rials on each student in them, News Yemen, September 16, 2018."

(2) "Maisaa Shuja' al-Din, previous source."

through fundraising, but these initiatives were not spared from Houthi practices, extorting organizers, or hindering implementation and plundering budgets.

In Al-Mahweet governorate - as one example among others - a subsidiary report by the National Commission to Investigate Claims of Human Rights Violations clarified that the Education Office in the governorate under Houthi control prevented implementing a project to install roofs on four classrooms villagers of Bait Al-Siliehi, Al-Safaiynah and Bait Al-Kardi had donated to build at the 26 September Primary and Secondary School located in Bait Al-Sulaihi area.

Villagers resorted to voluntarily funding and building these classrooms due to overcrowding in the small, few classrooms at the school. When work reached roofing the classrooms in mid-2020, villagers could no longer fund remaining construction so turned to international organizations for aid. The International Committee of the Red Cross responded, undertaking - through the Yemeni Red Crescent Society - a tender to complete roofs for 26 September School classrooms and build bathrooms for Al-Saleh Girls School in Al-Safaiynah area. After finishing the tender and beginning implementation, the Education Ministry in Houthi-controlled Sana'a halted the project under the pretext any such projects must be designated from Sana'a, depriving residents of these projects leaving classrooms without roofs or bathrooms(1).

Early in the 2022-2023 academic year, the Houthis halted approximately 23 voluntary initiatives led by youth groups and charities aiming to provide stationery to impoverished students in Sana'a Old City, Ma'een, Bani Al-Harith, Sho'oub directorates of the capital secretariat, and Sa'afan, Manakha, Jihana and Arhab directorates of Sana'a governorate, plundering that stationery(2).

These deliberate practices aim to deny as many children as possible from families not belonging to them their right to education, helping the Houthis spread their ideology and turn children into fighters - especially as they exploit all resources and capacities to run closed summer centers for children to disseminate beliefs and recruit them, providing all centers' needs from stationery to food and printed materials and clothing.

(1) "Report on the monitoring and documentation of human rights violations and the activities of the National Committee for Investigating Human Rights Violations Claims within the geographical scope of Al-Mahweet Governorate during the first half of 2022 (documents)."

(2) "Rebels prevent 23 Yemeni initiatives from providing school supplies, Middle East, August 22, 2022, issue [15973]."

Extorting Expats:

While public sector employees lacked salaries, remittances from Yemeni expats living and working in various parts of the world contributed to alleviating the harsh living conditions most Yemeni families have endured due to war, in addition to aiding maintaining some economic balance in the country(1).

Houthi leaders considered expats abroad and their families as an additional opportunity for plunder and extortion through various means. According to testimonies I received from Yemeni expats living in the US and Gulf states, Houthi leaders and supervisors extorted, threatened, and stole from them, leaving most no choice but submission and surrender.

Naturally, extortion operations were done indirectly out of fear media would report the Houthis compelling expats to pay. Expats or family members were requested to "contribute" funds supposedly for supporting families of slain group members or treating their wounds, providing fighters weapons and food, or sponsoring a fighter under the guise of "war effort" - but these funds mostly benefited Houthi leaders and supervisors as no mechanism or safeguards regulated collection, leaving it subject to each leader and supervisor's discretion in each region and enabling them to pilfer it.

Those refusing Houthi demands faced a series of harassment and pressure, starting with incitement claiming they were agents, mercenaries, and traitors for foreign countries, or Daesh and takfiris, then threatening children within Yemen, attempting to take expats' children to battlefronts, or notifying expats of taxes or "service fees" owed including protecting property in Yemen or raiding homes under pretext of search for wanted individuals(2).

Many US and Gulf expats specifically paid sizable sums periodically, forcing most into silence out of fear for property or relatives in Yemen. Personally, I met many Yemeni expats in the US who repeatedly affirmed Houthi supervisors in Ibb extort them periodically under different names and pretexts, leaving no choice but compliance to prevent looting homes and property, harming family or barring the expat from visiting home in milder cases.

The Houthis fail in solely extorting some expats financially, but most

(1) "According to a report issued by the World Bank in May 2018, the volume of remittances from expatriates in hard currency to Yemen in 2017 amounted to 3.4 billion US dollars, equivalent to 13.1 percent of the GDP. Source: Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, Expatriates Save Yemen, February 27, 2019."

(2) "Expatriates' Properties... Victims of Houthi Militia's Plunder and Addiction to Looting, Al-Watan Al-Ikhbari website, November 1, 2019."

Yemeni expats prefer silence and avoiding mentioning Houthi crimes and violations on social media or any media or rights outlet for the reasons. Thus, the Houthis succeed in stealing from and silencing Yemenis within and many expats abroad.

Early 2021, the Houthi group carried out a wide campaign to record information and data on expats and their families in Ibb governorate as many expats hail from there, notably in the United States. Houthi committees implementing the campaign requested residents register comprehensive details including full names of expats, personal photos and passport photos, financial accounts, resident countries, phone numbers, family member names and reasons/duration of expatriation, monthly remittance averages to families(1).

As usual, the group used this data for security and financial aims, confirmed by many expats later.

As for the second step in this context, which the Houthis worked to implement, it is the process of data collection and raising the costs of transactions for those wishing to emigrate and work outside of Yemen. In December 2020, the Ministry of Expatriate Affairs under Houthi control imposed new conditions for approving any citizen obtaining a permit to process their paperwork, which is required for a work visa in Saudi Arabia. Among these conditions is providing information about the passport holder, data on five relatives in Yemen, data on relatives in Saudi Arabia, sponsor information, and more. After that, a paper can be obtained for the relevant authorities to complete the procedures(2).

In addition to these conditions, exorbitant sums were imposed on those wishing to travel, whether directly or through brokers distributed to places of transactions, in addition to other complexities and conditions for approving the completion of visa procedures involving medical examinations, security procedures, and travel agencies. This makes citizens wishing to emigrate wait three to five months to get a travel visa, compared to two weeks before the militias took control of the capital Sana'a(3). After the Yemeni is allowed to emigrate, the second part of the extortion begins, some aspects of which we pointed out earlier.

The process of extortion and intimidation against emigrants is practiced as soon as the Houthis gain control over their areas or the areas where their families reside. However, the media has not adequately covered this type of violation due to the victims' fear of Houthi retaliation, and because the

(1) "Ibb... Houthi Campaign to Collect Expatriate Citizens' Data for Security Purposes, Yemen Youth website, March 3, 2021."

(2) "Collecting Data and Increasing Transaction Costs... How the Houthi Militia Exacerbated the Suffering of Yemenis Heading to Foreign Countries, Al-Masdar Online website, June 10, 2021."

(3) Ibid.

looting often happens indirectly. The Houthis disguise most of their operations with seemingly legal justifications, such as taxes, duties, services, and more. But this does not mean that there have not been direct looting incidents targeting Yemeni emigrants in Houthi-controlled areas. For example, in November 2019, Houthi gunmen in the city of Dhamar looted the contents of the house of emigrant Fadl Akrout, and stole his car parked in front of his house in the Customs neighborhood of Dhamar, in addition to looting other homes in the city(1).

This kind of looting and theft was not new to Yemenis, as the Houthis' ancestors had done the same to those who worked outside of Yemen and returned to their homeland. Dr. Mustafa Mohammed Al-Shakaa explained this in his book "Adventures of an Egyptian in the Wilds of Yemen," where he said:

"If you are Yemeni and hate the rulers in your homeland so you travel or flee to another country and work in trade and freelance, you will undoubtedly succeed and acquire tremendous wealth, because Yemenis are naturally intelligent, trustworthy, and well-mannered. Many Yemenis emigrated to Sudan, Eritrea, and even England and acquired tremendous wealth, earning abundant money.

Despite the poor conditions and corrupt governance in his country, a Yemeni is bound to yearn for his beloved homeland, so he returns with all his wealth to his family and home, buys properties and orchards, and builds himself a large house, just as Lebanese emigrants do when they amass their fortunes abroad and then return to their countries to settle."

But there is a terrible difference between the situation of a Lebanese person returning to his homeland and his Yemeni counterpart returning to his country. The Lebanese person lives safely and comfortably, spending his old age in comfort and prosperity, and may engage in some activity that adds new profit to his wealth. As for the Yemeni, it is completely the opposite. He hardly returns to his homeland, yearns for stability, and barely gets to enjoy the fruits of his long struggle before he is surprised by a summons from the Imam calling on him to relinquish half of his property to the state (meaning the Imam and his swords). Woe to him if he refuses, as the poor man is forced to comply with the Imam's request. The following year, he is surprised by the same summons from His Majesty the Imam, who harshly demands that he relinquish the remaining half, or else the rest of his property will be confiscated, and he will be imprisoned. So, the man chooses the lesser of two evils and relinquishes without documentation, and this continues year after year until the struggling poor man becomes destitute, like the rest of the people. I know specific names of these stricken

(1) "Houthis Plunder Yemeni Expatriates' Homes in Gulf Countries, Al-Ayyam Newspaper, November 13, 2019."

individuals, but I am prevented from mentioning their names due to potential harm or damage that may befall them.

Therefore, the Yemeni emigrant yearns for his homeland and longs for it intensely, but fears the violation of his most sacred freedoms, the confiscation of his property, and the looting of the money he struggled his whole life to attain. So, he remains happily wealthy yet sadly afraid to return to his beloved homeland(1).

Corruption:

Some people say that poverty drives some people to corruption, but this is not always true. The issue is relative, as most people who engage in corruption are not poor. In addition, the corruption that is practiced by the poor is not enough to eliminate poverty and hunger in any society.

Without a doubt, corruption contributes to the spread of poverty. According to the World Bank, corruption is the biggest obstacle to poverty reduction efforts. Transparency International, for its part, says that corruption is a tax that the poor pay, as resources are stolen from families who are already under severe financial pressure, for the benefit of those who do not suffer from any financial pressure(2).

Corruption has a negative impact on society, especially the poorest groups. It increases costs and reduces the opportunity to access health, education, and judicial services. When corruption is practiced by businesses and state institutions, for example, this means that the prices of goods in general will rise, including food, medicine, medical equipment, and vaccines. Consequently, each purloined dollar, euro, or rial becomes a purveyor of injustice, a theft from the destitute, depriving them of an equitable shot at life's opportunities. Furthermore, numerous studies have laid bare the harsh reality that the impoverished bear the brunt, parting with the highest proportion of their meager income as bribes to secure essential and rightfully deserved services(3).

Efforts to Combat Corruption in Yemen:

I worked for years with the Yemeni Group for Transparency and Integrity; a Yemeni organization established to be the national branch of

(1) "Egyptian Adventures in the Yemen Highlands, Previous Source, Page 94."
(2) "Poverty and Corruption, a working paper prepared by the Poverty Programme of the General Secretariat of Transparency International."
(3) Combating Corruption ،The World Bank ،Symposium on Data Analytics for Anticorruption in Public Administration ،October 25-28,2021.

Transparency International (TI) in Yemen[1]. In addition to my work as the media unit manager, I was a coordinator and responsible for some of the projects that the organization was implementing, including the project to recover looted funds in Yemen, which TI was implementing in several Arab countries.

After the Houthis took control of the capital Sana'a, TI decided to reduce its activities in Yemen until they stopped completely, as it is an organization that does not operate in unconstitutional environments. Naturally, the Houthi group is an armed ethnic/sectarian group that is not recognized, which seized power through violence and excluded the rest of the national components.

It was necessary to narrate this introduction as an introduction to the topic of corruption in Yemen, as I worked as a specialist in the field of combating corruption in a national branch of the most important international organization concerned with combating corruption. I witnessed many activities and achievements in this field.

Yemen, like other countries in the world, especially developing or transitioning countries, has suffered from financial, administrative, and political corruption in different fields and at varying levels. However, on the other hand, this corruption was going on in a low key and often happened in the dark, because the corrupt knew that they were being pursued, and that there were a huge number of members of society who were active in order to hunt down the corrupt through many activities, especially after the emergence of social media and the speed of the spread of information through video, sound, image, and word.

There was something like a competition between independent and partisan media in hunting down corruption cases and publishing about them, which would enhance some of the community oversight, especially after Yemen ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption and then worked to align Yemeni laws with the Convention, starting with Law No. (47) of 2005[2].

After that stage, Yemen began to enact a package of laws and regulations and establish many units and bodies to reach formulas in Yemeni legislation and laws that would match and facilitate the process of combating corruption and implementing the United Nations Convention. Among the most prominent are the National Authority for Combating Corruption, the

(1) "Transparency International: It is an international non-governmental organization dedicated to combating administrative, financial, and political corruption worldwide. It is globally known for its annual 'Corruption Perceptions Index,' which is a comparative list of countries based on the prevalence of corruption. The organization's headquarters is located in Berlin, Germany, and it has branches in many countries around the world."

(2) "The Republic of Yemen signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption on December 9, 2003.

Supreme Authority for Monitoring Tenders and Auctions, the Supreme Committee for Tenders and Auctions, the specialized prosecution for combating corruption, corruption units in the Prime Minister's Office and the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, the money laundering unit at the Central Bank of Yemen, and others. concerned with combating corruption.

The Anti-Corruption Authority began implementing its establishment law and required state officials to submit their financial disclosure statements. This was one of the most important practical steps in combating corruption, and it is the basic building block on which the Yemenis will build in their battle against corruption(1).

In July 2012, two years before the Houthis took control of the capital, President Abd-Rabbu Mansur Hadi of Yemen signed a law on the right to access information. After that, on May 6, 2013, he issued a decision appointing Engineer Samir Amin Noman as the General Commissioner of Information. These are practical steps that help to promote the principle of transparency and combat corruption in the country, after much social and human rights debate and demands for its implementation(2).

At the same time, civil society organizations were waging another battle to push the government to enact laws and regulations that would facilitate the process of combating corruption, such as a law or regulations for the recovery of looted funds, a law for the protection of whistleblowers on corruption cases, and the dissemination of regulations and concepts about the code of ethics for public office, and the rules of conduct for public officials.

In general, it can be said that Yemen was a large workshop that discussed and worked to establish a new phase based on confronting corruption that has been entrenched for a long time in a scientific and organized way, albeit slowly. Of course, any specialist in this field knows that confronting the phenomenon of corruption that is widespread as a culture is not an easy matter, and it takes time. Although media openness and the diversity of opinions have opened the way for discussion of corruption and the exposure of many of its forms and those involved in it, but the general situation did not help to hold accountable the "big fish" or "the big corrupt" due to the weakness of the legislative system, and for this reason a social movement emerged that works to correct it, as a basic step preceding the comprehensive confrontation process.

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(1) "The National Anti-Corruption Authority, a paper titled: 'Alignment of Yemeni Laws with the United Nations Convention against Corruption,' by Dr. Mohammed Hamoud Al-Mutary, a member of the National Anti-Corruption Authority and Head of the Financial Integrity Sector in the period from 2007 to 2013."

(2) "Presidential decree appointing Engineer Samir Amin Numan as the General Commissioner for Information, Yemeni News Agency SABA, May 6, 2013."

The Houthis and Corruption:

As part of several political and religious slogans, the Houthis raised the slogan of "combating corruption" as a justification for their storming of the capital Sana'a and taking control of state institutions, exploiting the society's raging desire to confront corruption, and the community's psychological readiness to wage a battle against the corrupt, especially after the Yemeni government partially lifted subsidies on petroleum products, which led to an increase in the prices of some food items and services.

The goal of the Houthis' siege of the capital Sana'a in August 2014 was to seize power, based on a religious belief that gives them the absolute right to control the power, wealth, and necks of Yemenis, according to the so-called "wilayat" theory mentioned above. But going back to the active elements in this group, we will find that most of them are involved in corruption and criminal cases in recent decades. From the first leaders of the group who were known to be involved in smuggling and the trade of prohibited goods, through opportunist and corrupt figures who joined the Houthis after their control of the capital, ending with thieves, bandits, and criminals in the neighborhoods and villages, to the extent that the Houthis released many prisoners held on charges of criminal cases.

Some media outlets have addressed the issue of releasing prisoners and attaching them to the group, either on the fronts, or turning them into supervisors in their areas. An official document issued by the Attorney General's agent in the district of Al-Makhadir in Ibb governorate, central Yemen, explained that the Houthis released suspects of theft by force. In his memorandum dated December 29, 2014, addressed to the Attorney General, the Attorney General's agent in Al-Makhadir district, Fouad Al-Hamiri, said that armed men affiliated with the Houthis released suspects of theft by force, after the prosecution refused to release them(1).

In June 2016, the satellite channel Belqis published documents confirming the release of 82 criminal prisoners from the Central Prison in Sana'a, who were involved in various criminal cases ranging from drug trafficking, house theft, murder, banditry, kidnapping, bombing of bombs and oil pipelines, by directives from the leader in the group, Yahya Badr al-Din Houthi(2).

This practice was repeated in different governorates controlled by the Houthis, most notably Ibb, Amran, Sana'a, Sa'ada, and Hajjah. Fahd Talib Al-Sharf, an advisor to the Yemeni Minister of Information and a native of Sa'ada (the Houthi stronghold), commented on the Houthi behavior by

(1) "The Houthis release criminals in Yemen, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, December 31, 2014."
(2) "The Houthis release 82 prisoners in Sana'a, including drug and arms dealers, Yemen Monitor, June 19, 2016."

saying that the release of prisoners, "especially those accused of drug trafficking, is a routine operation carried out by the Houthi group to finance its military operations and disturb neighboring countries, since it was in the city of Sa'ada and before its control of the capital and the rest of the Yemeni governorates. This group is keen to build extensive relations with drug traffickers instead of punishing them, and it has attracted drug traffickers to become leaders in the group, as it also releases those involved in criminal cases, in order to push them to the fronts of fighting in different areas(1)."

In this context, it is important to know that Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and his brother Yahya never obtained a scientific degree, but rather learned extremist religious lessons from their father. And that the Houthi leader Abu Ali Al-Hakim was imprisoned in Sa'ada on criminal charges before escaping from it in 2004(2). And that the Houthi leader Faris Mana'a is a weapons dealer(3). And that the spokesman for the Houthi group Abdul-Salam Fleeta is a black-market dealer in gas and oil. And that Daghsan Ahmed Daghsan is a smuggler of internationally prohibited agricultural pesticides. And that most of the leaders of this group were and still are smuggling qat and hashish to neighboring countries. And that most of the thieves and criminals in the neighborhoods and villages of Yemen, and even those convicted in criminal cases, work for the Houthis, and rely on them to a significant extent, as we mentioned earlier.

In mid-September 2020, media outlets affiliated with the Joint Forces in the western coastal region of Yemen broadcasted confessions from a Houthi cell operating within the network of Iranian weapons smuggling belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, including individuals named Ali Al-Halhali, Alwan Fatin Ghayath, and Mohammad Abdul Jneed. On that day, Colonel Yahya Abu Hatem, an advisor to the Ministry of Defense, revealed

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(1) "The Houthis release suspects involved in drug and arms trade, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, June 19, 2016."

(2) "Abdullah Yahya Al-Hakim (known as Abu Ali Al-Hakim) is considered one of the key Houthi leaders. He was included in the United Nations Security Council's sanctions blacklist on November 7, 2014, under Resolution 2216 issued under Chapter VII, on charges including 'involvement in acts that threaten peace, security, and stability in Yemen.' The United States also placed him on the 'International Terrorists' list alongside Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and his brother Abdul-Khaliq."

(3) "Fares Mohammed Mana'a is a Yemeni arms dealer. The United Nations listed him in the sanctions list on April 12, 2010, in accordance with paragraph 8 of Resolution 1844 (2008), as he directly or indirectly participated in the supply, sale, or transfer of weapons to Somalia, in violation of the arms embargo. The Yemeni government had published a blacklist of arms dealers in October 2009, with Mana'a at the top. According to a report published in June 2009 by an American journalist specializing in Yemeni affairs, 'Fares Mana'a is one of the top arms dealers, and this is well known.' He was also referred to as 'Sheikh Fares Mohammed Mana'a, arms dealer' in an article published by the 'Yemen Times' in December 2007. He was also mentioned as 'Sheikh Fares Mana'a, an arms dealer' in a report published by the same newspaper in January 2008. Source: United Nations website."

through his Twitter account that these cell members were wanted by security agencies before the war, in cases related to smuggling prohibited items through the areas of Mokha, Ghalebqah, Al-Jah, Khobat Al-Bakr, and continuing to Hays and Al-Jarahi in western Yemen. He confirmed that they had been apprehended on July 14, 2010, while he was serving as the security commander in the western coast and an officer in Khawkhah, and they were handed over to the security administration in Al-Hodeida at that time.

Since the Houthi belief is based on usurping the rights of others, they have no qualms about using and empowering thieves, criminals, and opportunists based on fatwas issued by their authorities, starting with the group's founder, Yahya Al-Rassi, who stated in his book "The Rulings... in Halal and Haram": "It is permissible to seek the help of wrongdoers and sinners against disbelievers at dawn when they are subjected to the rulings of those who restore justice, and the limits of the Lord of the Worlds are established upon them, and they are not reluctant to do so. There were with the Imam a group of those who restore justice, enjoin good and forbid evil, and intimidate those who oppose it among those in the military. If it were not permissible, the victory of the truth and those who restore justice would not be pleasing to the Lord of the Worlds over the sinful transgressors, and jihad is the best of the obligations of the Lord of the Worlds. If the obligation of jihad were lifted from the wrongdoers with the righteous Imams, what is less than that would be lifted from them, such as the actions of the people, including prayer, fasting, and other actions. Rather, the obligations of the Most Merciful are obligatory on every individual in the state of sin and virtue, and the judgments of God are applicable to all of them, and the Imam should urge them and command them to obey the Lord, and jihad is the best of His obligations. Therefore, he should order them to it and encourage them even if they are in opposition to the truth, guiding them along the path of righteousness when they are subjected to judgments, and raising the light of Islam above their falsehood[1]."

The Houthi rebels reinforced their entity with elements of criminals, thieves, corrupt individuals, and opportunists because this group essentially lacks societal cover and does not have any support beyond the framework of the sect from which they originated. Therefore, they turn to this deviant faction to help them subdue society, and they have largely succeeded in doing so.

So, the slogan of "fighting corruption" that the Houthis used to raise on every occasion became their means to seize power and, subsequently, to engage in corruption in all its forms, even legitimizing it. The results of the

(1) "Judgments... in Halal and Haram, previous reference, page 347."

Houthi's control over Yemeni cities have been disastrous from both an administrative and financial perspective, contributing significantly to the spread of crime, particularly financial and administrative corruption, as corrupt individuals, thieves, killers, highway robbers, drug traffickers, and opportunists transformed into "revolutionaries," "fighters," "believers," "Ansar Allah," and "allies of God," according to the descriptions applied by the Houthis to themselves.

After September 2014, corruption escalated dramatically. What used to be practiced in the shadows and with some level of shame came out into the open during the time of the Houthi movement, and we witnessed "blatant corruption" and "armed corruption" as our national resources were exploited under the banner of the "Quranic March."

Unprecedentedly, minor corruption, also known as low-level bureaucratic corruption, which is practiced by individuals or groups, particularly involving bribery, became widespread. Moreover, major corruption, perpetrated by high-ranking officials and employees within institutions, most of whom were appointed by the Houthis or were part of the previous regime but later joined the Houthis, also grew. Many of these individuals were from the sect that claimed divine entitlement to govern Yemen through force.

Bribery, embezzlement of public funds, favoritism, nepotism, intermediation, exploitation of positions for extortion, forgery, corruption in tenders and procurement, land corruption, and more became rampant. It's worth noting that the Houthis looted the foreign currency reserves at the central bank, leading to a severe economic crisis that had a significant impact on the Yemeni economy.

In a press interview, journalist Najib Al-Adwofi asked Dr. "Bilqis Abu Isba," the former Deputy Head of the National Anti-Corruption Authority, about corruption after a year of Houthi control over state institutions in the capital, Sana’a, where they started making decisions instead of the government. She replied, "During the recent period and due to the disruptions, the country is experiencing, the scope of corruption has expanded, with various channels, methods, and forms of corruption being practiced[(1)]."

Renowned Yemeni journalist Mahmoud Yassin affirmed that corruption after the Houthis' takeover has reached an unprecedented level in the history of authorities. He stated, "It goes beyond what is known about corruption to a state that has no parallel in the history of established authorities, revolutions, or even monarchies. There are no accounts at the central bank in Sana’a for tax, customs, zakat, and other financial details. Only private

(1) "Belqis Abu Asba: Militant control over Yemen has expanded the scope of corruption, a dialogue with Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, July 8, 2015."

accounts exist. According to Yahya al-Houthi's statement in the House of Representatives, the situation has reached a stage where there is only one person left who wishes they would seize power as a state, not just as a gang on the run. Concrete walls, security institutions, and the military. This is your definition of building a state, relying on a relationship of fear rather than trust between you and the citizens.

If a village road was cut off, he would assume the role, seek to solidify the reasons for his continuation in office, and push people to forget the image of the past. He would work tirelessly to gain their trust. Even Iran has provided you with nothing more than rhetoric about the rule of the jurisprudent, while it, despite its suppression and iron grip, is trying to fulfil all the functions of the state economically, and it does not cease to seek to attract the Iranians."

One of the most challenging experiences in human history, and one of the most audacious and costly, was marked by the actions of a mysterious group that seized whatever they could lay their hands on, all while causing chaos and rushing through their plans before seizing everything and moving on(1).

In less than two years, Yemen's position in the Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International declined from a score of 19 out of 100 in 2014 to 14 in 2016. This means that Yemen's position deteriorated by five points within two years of Houthi control, making Yemen one of the most corrupt countries in the world.

What happened is that the Houthis in Yemen doubled taxes, duties, service fees, customs, and zakat, and they collect them by force. However, in return, they do not pay the salaries of government employees, nor do they provide any services to the citizens. They increased the costs of electricity, water, and gas, yet they do not comply with what any recognized authority worldwide provides. They rely on international organizations to provide food aid, healthcare services, environmental sanitation, road maintenance, and most educational and healthcare projects.

During my research for this study, I consulted anti-corruption experts I've collaborated with previously to discuss the state of corruption in contemporary Yemen. Their consensus? They believe the term "corruption" falls short of capturing the extent of the plundering plaguing the country. For them, it's not mere corruption, but rather a systematic looting of Yemen's resources, a catastrophic plundering of funds and assets.

Extreme Poverty and Extreme Wealth:

Despite the extreme poverty and hunger resulting from the catastrophic policies of the Houthis, the real estate and land markets in their controlled

(1) "Posted on the Facebook page of the journalist Mahmoud Yassin, October 11, 2021."

areas saw a surge. Property and land prices significantly increased, and these areas witnessed intense competition among Houthi leaders to construct buildings and massive commercial projects. This reflects the extent of their obscene wealth, which transformed them from ordinary individuals to magnates.

Researcher Abdulghani Al-Iryani comments on the obscene wealth resulting from corrupt practices by saying, "The astronomical rise in real estate prices in the current dire economic circumstances reflects the grand corruption practiced by influential Houthis. Prices have risen by 200% and 300%, largely due to tax collection and the accumulation of immense wealth among senior figures from the Houthi group(1)."

Legitimizing Theft:

As they began legitimizing the use of thieves, criminals, and corrupt individuals and handed over institutions to them to subdue Yemenis, they also initiated a process of looting citizens to enable these delinquents to perform their duties without hindrance. They achieved this by using government institutions under their control to enact new regulations and laws that allowed them to steal money based on their own religious texts. They sanction fighting against the corrupt and establish their rule on the pretext of not enabling wrongdoing(2). They then justify the actions of the "corrupt" individuals they used to steal people's money, as documented in their famous book "The Blossoms of Politics." The author said, "The scholars - may Allah have mercy on them - have acknowledged the importance of safeguarding the interests of the masses, and when they fear the misappropriation of the wealth of Muslims by the aggressors and the like, it is permissible for those in authority to take half of the money of the Muslims to prevent it from falling into the hands of those who would take it all. This is explicitly stated in the chapters and elsewhere(3)."

In the same book, the author quotes Abdul Aziz Al-Hamawi, saying,

(1) "Yemen: How the Houthis are reshaping the country following in the footsteps of Saada... Here's a summary of an in-depth visit by researchers from the Sana'a Center, Yemen Future website, August 11, 2021."

(2) "The Lush Branches with the Evidence of Political Judgments, by Ahmed bin Abdullah Al-San'ani, Introduction and Verification: Ayman Abdel Jabbar Al-Buhairi, Al-Afak Al-Arabiya, The First Branch, Page 39. This book is considered one of the most important books relied upon by religious scholars in elaborating and explaining certain disputed matters related to governance. It has placed significant emphasis on issues related to collecting and levying funds from loyal and dissenting Muslims."

(3) "Same reference as above, Page 40. When it says, 'explicit in the chapters,' it means that it is mentioned in the book 'Selected Chapters and Doctrinal Models' by one of their sources, Muhammad Abdullah Al-Wazir."

"The later imams realized that religion cannot be supported, and the rulings of the Lord of the Worlds cannot be enforced, except with wealth that is used to assist and support those in need, or to fill a gap that is necessary to be filled (...) So the later imams approved the path of following the unjust rulers in known laws, differences, and favors, and similar actions that resemble the practices of the oppressors. They did so only to acquire what would support their armies, or to fill their gaps, or to unite them in order to prevent the corruption that arises from their abandonment (...) These actions, although they may appear corrupt and have no apparent justification from the Book of Allah or the Sunnah of His Prophet, are indeed minor acts of corruption intended to prevent greater and more significant corruption or harm[1]."

This means that it is permissible for the Imam (who is currently Abdel-Malik al-Houthi in the eyes of his followers) to give money or benefits, regardless of what they may be, to those whom he fears may become a cause for the collapse of his rule if they are denied these benefits, even if this is contrary to Islamic teachings.

The Houthi ideology and corruption have a symbiotic and complementary relationship, just like their forefathers, the Imams. Their religious ideology, which concentrates absolute authority in a specific lineage and subjects it to no oversight, legitimizes accepting a corrupt ruler and forming alliances and dealings with the corrupt through religious texts and fatwas, which contribute to cementing corruption as a culture. They are keen on ensuring the condition of absolute loyalty and obedience among their associates and employees in institutions, even if they are corrupt and thieves.

Muhammad Al-Maqalih, a member of the so-called Supreme Revolutionary Committee of the Houthi movement, has previously described those who govern Sana'a as "the corruption and mafia lobby." He has expressed no surprise about the appointment of major corrupt figures to ministerial, governor, and director positions by the Houthi group to which he belongs[2].

The Houthis lack popularity among the Yemeni population, and they cannot become a force and succeed in subduing a society that rejects them except by using illegitimate methods, including attracting "the deviant class" (elements of the tribal lineage supporting racial superiority, opportunists, thieves, corrupt individuals, highway robbers, smugglers, and those with criminal records), as well as exploiting many victims, innocents, and the vulnerable due to ignorance and poverty. When they succeed in seizing

(1) "The Lush Branches with the Evidence of Political Judgments, The Thirtieth Branch, Page 169."
(2) "A member of the Houthi Revolutionary Committee talks about unprecedented corruption practiced by the Houthis in Sana'a, Yemen Press, December 24, 2017."

power, the deviant elements in society turn into leaders and officials in institutions and regions, resulting in the spread of crime and the rampant financial and administrative corruption under their control. Even if we assume that any Houthi leaders attempted to confront this blatant corruption to maintain the image of the group in front of the Yemeni society and non-Yemeni observers, they will find themselves forced to confront their own constituents and their army of criminals and thieves who were the reason for their rise to power. This inevitably leads to their collapse and downfall.

That is why the imamate was established from the beginning - as we mentioned earlier - to justify coexisting with the corrupt and the sinful, as described by their imams, and to give them functional roles in governance, distribution of wealth, lands, favors, and interests, while turning a blind eye to their corruption. They employ various justifications and slogans, primarily deflecting the greatest and most dangerous corruption. This is evident in their statement: "They do so only to acquire what would support their armies, or to fill their own gaps, or to unite them in order to prevent the corruption that arises from their abandonment." This approach aligns with the justifications of some Houthi leaders when the public demands that they fight corruption today. Confronting corruption means confronting themselves, and that is why they tell their supporters that prosecuting the corrupt "will cause a rift in the internal front," according to Mohammed Al-Maqalih, a member of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee affiliated with the Houthis, who has criticized the corruption of the Houthis on multiple occasions and mocked those who claim that fighting corruption will cause internal strife within the group(1). This is understandable because the Houthi group is built on corruption and corrupt individuals, and if they fall, they fall with them.

In my opinion, the great Yemeni poet Abdullah Al-Baradoni understood this reality when he described the rule of the Imamate dynasty in Yemen before the September 26, 1962, revolution as being based on a group of thieves and criminals. He said:

"The people suffer injustice knowingly,
And it angers them because they are aware.
Can it be hidden from them when they know?
They feel it in the depths of their hearts.
Their noblest is a thief,
Their finest is a criminal."

(1) "An interview with Mohammed Al-Maqalih with Al-Masirah channel, the text of which was published on the Yemenat News website, January 31, 2016."

Corruption and the Rule of the Sanctified Lineage:

The nature of the governing system, whether it is a republic or a monarchy, is not inherently linked to the prevalence of corruption. There are European countries with both republican and monarchical systems where corruption levels are very low. The success or failure of systems in combating corruption is tied to political will. However, the problem lies in when corruption becomes a part of your identity and makeup, and an integral part of the governance system, as is the case with the Imamate system, which the Houthis are a cruder and more thieving version of.

But why is the Imamate system in Yemen considered a fertile environment for corruption? In addition to the Houthis accommodating opportunists, criminals, thieves, highwaymen, and smugglers to increase their ranks and expedite the subjugation of people, they have been supported by many belonging to the lineage that came to Yemen long ago and claimed to be the rightful rulers of the Yemenis, whether these families reside in the north, south, east, or west, regardless of their Zaidi, Shafi'i, Sufi, or non-religious affiliations.

The Imamate rule is based on a lineage/racism that sees itself as distinctive based on a specific religious theory (Walayah). Accordingly, Yemenis are required to revere this lineage, and they will only gain God's satisfaction by loving its members, obeying them, and favoring them over everything around them. This lineage holds absolute power over Yemen's wealth, resources, and revenues, and Yemenis are expected to venerate them in meetings and gatherings. Those who do not belong to this lineage are not allowed to marry into it.

The Imamate rule differs from the monarchical system because it governs the Yemenis in the name of religion and the deception of divine truth. Secondly, the Imamate is based on the rule of the racial lineage rather than a family. In different countries, specific royal families govern with a very limited number of family members holding high positions within the monarchy. In these cases, the rest of society and its components participate in managing and running the country's institutions. However, in Yemen, the Imamate means the rule of the racial minority without exception.

According to the Imamate's Batnain theory in Yemen, every individual from this lineage is a king, ruler, president, leader, manager, wealthy person, and authority in the place where they are situated, according to their religiously discriminatory beliefs. If, for example, this lineage consists of 200,000 people, then each of them is considered a king over the region in which they reside, or the institution they work for, to exclude the rest of the Yemenis to ensure they remain mere subjects with no influence or impact.

To simplify the matter further, before the Houthi takeover of the capital,

Sana'a, this lineage, like all other Yemenis, was present in all state institutions. They held ministerial positions, acted as agents, managed departments, and held military leadership roles. They did not face exclusion; in fact, they may have had better chances of obtaining positions due to their higher education levels in earlier stages. However, as soon as they militarily took control of Sana'a, they systematically dismissed those who did not belong to their lineage from high and mid-level civilian and military positions. They targeted businessmen systematically and established a private sector of their own, as discussed in previous sections. They also targeted local media organizations and civil society institutions whose owners did not belong to the same lineage in one of the ugliest forms of racial segregation today.

For the Houthi movement, high-ranking positions such as the presidency, ministerial roles, deputy positions, general management, department leadership, military command, trade, and culture must be reserved primarily for their lineage. Those who come from outside their lineage must have a close kinship or unwavering loyalty as a cover for their empowerment, nothing more.

You can find those who belong to the lineage and live in city capitals, the towering mountains of Al-Mahweet, the valleys of Taiz, Ibb, the distant remote areas of Al-Jawf, are the ones with status, authority, power, wealth, land, positions, and commerce. They control everything, big or small, while most Yemenis, who have no circle of influence or power, live off the scraps tossed to them. This cannot be observed in any monarchy. The number of ruling families in monarchies is very small, and they have a limited number of tasks and positions. The rest of the country's institutions are left to the remaining components of the population.

Because the authority granted to this lineage is considered divine and derived from religion according to the Houthi belief, their followers are not subject to any accountability. Transparency is not accepted, and they are immune from prosecution, despite their repeated talk about fighting corruption, oversight, and accountability. Criticism against them is seen as treachery and betrayal. Due to the sanctification of certain individuals who hold the reins of power, combating their corruption becomes heresy and deviance, even a confrontation with God according to their followers.

This reality, which has repeated itself since Yahya al-Rassi arrived in Yemen with the Tabaristanis army until today, is one of the main reasons for the instability of the periods under Imamate rule. Citizens might bear the corruption of political elites and governments for a while, but they cannot coexist with an entire racial hierarchy of corruption that continues indefinitely, backed by arms and religious exploitation. Government employees watch as ministers, deputies, heads of departments, and senior

military and security positions are all occupied by members of one lineage. Soldiers watch as ministers, military rankings, intelligence, and security positions, as well as significant and minor leadership roles, all go in favor of the lineage. People in the neighborhoods and villages watch the local leaders, the neighborhood elders, the religious guardians, the police department managers, and detectives, all belong to the same lineage or those close to it. Businesspeople and traders witness the systematic targeting of their interests by this group, pushing them toward bankruptcy, exile from Yemen, or entering an unfair partnership with them. At the same time, Yemenis belonging to the same lineage receive all privileges, support, facilitation, and loans to develop their multiplying business activities. Likewise, rights activists and journalists see this racial power systematically closing civil society organizations and media outlets led by Yemenis not belonging to the same lineage, establishing organizations and media outlets of their own.

Historically, these racist practices and the systematic looting of Yemenis' resources have been one of the main reasons for repeated public anger that has turned into continuous uprisings against the racially discriminative Imamate rule, which is why Yemen has not seen stability for a long time. Russian historian Elena Golubovskaya briefly pointed out this issue in the context of her discussion of the motives behind the Yemeni people's accomplishment of the September 26, 1962 revolution against the racially discriminatory Imamate rule, saying, "One of the reasons that led to the revolution in the country was the aspiration of various Yemeni society strata to uproot the autocratic feudal power of the religious imams, who obstructed the development of economic and social life, keeping the country at the level of the most underdeveloped countries and ancient states in the world[(1)]."

Corruption of Hamid al-Din Family:

Over half a century, the Imamic propaganda machine failed to hold the republican system responsible for the spread of corruption within state institutions in Yemen. This view was prevalent among Imamic families who perceived the republican regime as an enemy rather than the ethnocentric sectarian system.

Those familiar with Yemen's history recognize that corruption is one of the negative legacies left by the Imams, and they made it a prevailing culture in the country, according to the accounts of many Arab and Western writers who visited Yemen during the rule of the House of Hamid al-Din.

(1) "September 26 Revolution in Yemen, previous source, page 150."

This culture persisted even after their rule collapsed.

For example, Yemenis frequently complained about the corruption within the judicial and legal institutions and the delay in handling citizens' cases. When examining the state of the judiciary during the House of Hamid al-Din's era, we find that corruption dominated the judiciary. Golubovskaya, in her documented book about that period, states, "It was common for judges to delay the consideration of cases, especially concerning property division, water rights, and more. Delays in resolving cases could sometimes extend to several years, forcing the disputing parties or their representatives to stay in the city during this period, either pleading with or bribing the rulers to expedite the handling of their cases(1)."

Regarding the use of the judiciary for the enrichment of judges and those working in this field, the Russian historian says: "Illegal orders were not only practiced in isolated areas away from the centers but also in the capital. For example, the head of the Court of Appeals in Sana'a significantly expanded his real estate holdings. Such actions were only possible after issuing incorrect judgments related to the seizure of lands owned by small and medium landowners(2)."

Regarding the exploitation of influence, the spread of the black market, and enabling the corrupt individuals in society to exploit the interests of citizens for extortion and theft, thus ensuring the loyalty of the corrupt to the Imam, the Russian historian mentions another example: "A prominent member of an aristocratic family and a high-ranking official obtained thousands of passports from the Imam as a gift. He sold these passports to Yemenis intending to travel abroad for work at a price ranging from 60 to 100 rials per passport, while the official price of a passport was 17 baiza(3). This means that they sold one passport to citizens at more than 180 times its official price. I do not believe that there is any authority in the world that practices this kind of corruption. The Imam used to buy the loyalty of influential figures in society by granting them opportunities to engage in corruption and enabling them to plunder society. This is exactly what the Houthis are doing."

Similarly, regarding the influence for enrichment and illicit gains, Gulubovskaya states in her testimony: "Senior government officials received high salaries ranging from 100 to 120 rials, but their salaries were not the source of their wealth. What mattered to the princes was granting them unlimited authority by the Imam in economic, political, and administrative matters in their regions. A prime example of this is the person appointed as a judicial officer or district governor, who becomes a

(1) Ibid. p.148.
(2) Ibid. p.149.
(3) Ibid. p.149.

feudal ruler in his area. Under his leadership, all economic functions (tax collection, state treasury disbursements, trade, etc.), administrative functions (appointing individuals to positions in his region), and judicial practices (resolving various social problems and sometimes personal issues of the population) are consolidated. The feudal governance system in Yemen was considered a source of enrichment for many individuals who utilized all non-economic coercive means throughout their tenure in these government positions. This was done in various forms and through different methods. For example, Hadi Hayj imposed a fee of 850 baiza, equivalent to more than 21 rials, on every marriage contract in the region where he held office. He often issued orders for the arrest of individuals (the guilty ones) and threw them into prison or subjected them to restraints and exposed them to scorching sunlight. In order to avoid this punishment, the guilty party was willing to redeem themselves by any means[1][2]."

As for bribery during that era, it was quite common, primarily due to the prevailing corruption within the government. Egyptian writer Dr. Mustafa Mohamed al-Shakaa testified about this form of corruption during the rule of the House of Hamid al-Din. He stated, "In Yemen, bribery was so widespread due to the government's corruption that it almost became an accepted norm. Yemeni employees were compelled to bribe to survive because the highest salary in Yemen did not exceed the equivalent of ten Egyptian pounds. The salaries of junior employees barely exceeded one Egyptian pound per month, and they had to provide for an average family of at least six people. This pushed them towards practicing bribery. Therefore, anything in your favor or any document in a government office would not move from one official to another without a known tax, repeating the famous story of 'Illuminating the City of Beijing[3].'"

This is consistent with Golubovskaya's account, where she explained that all senior, intermediate, and junior employees were considered representatives of the Imam's authority and acted as intermediaries between the Imam and the general population, all facilitated through bribery. She noted, "Without orders from officials, it was impossible to resolve any issue. Even when someone submitted a request for the Imam's approval, they had to collect additional signatures from official figures. This task was challenging without giving bribes to the officials. Naturally, this situation

(1) Ibid. p. 148.

(2) "In fact, the Imamate rule cannot be compared to any other governing system because it is based on traditional mechanisms that were only used in past centuries and are not significantly different from the organizational style of groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda in managing the areas they control. However, the Houthis go beyond other traditional extremist groups in that the practice of corruption is part of their identity, while at the same time, they claim to have established themselves as rulers to uphold justice and reduce corruption among the people."

(3) "Egyptian Adventures in the Yemen Highlands, previous source, page 95."

led to widespread public discontent with the corruption and decay within the government's various agencies[1]."

Bribery was deeply rooted in the society during the Imams' era to the extent that it was referred to as the "Right of Ibn Hadi" during the reign of Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din in 1926, according to the testimony of the prominent Yemeni poet Abdullah al-Bardouni[2]. After the September 26 revolution, the republican regime found it challenging to address this pervasive phenomenon, except to some extent over the decades. Bribery continued to exist in Yemen, like in any other Arab country, but it was considered a criminal act and was not socially acceptable as it had been during the Imam's rule. It was practiced discreetly, and there were ongoing efforts to combat it. With the advent of mobile phones equipped with cameras, people began documenting bribery incidents, publishing them as a means of protest and resistance. Recording traffic officers accepting bribes, civil government employees, and numerous similar cases became common, as society rejected this practice. Civil society organizations also initiated activities to combat it. However, the Houthis reintroduced the culture of bribery within institutions, like how it was during the time of the Imamic rule.

Unbounded Corruption:

The financial and administrative corruption committed by the Houthi rebels is so extensive that it cannot be comprehensively and accurately documented. What takes place in this realm defies description and the ability to monitor and grasp it. Gathering revenue without paying salaries is more than just corruption; it's a form of theft. The same applies to the squandering of cash reserves, raising taxes, zakat, customs duties, and other obligations on citizens without providing them with any deserved services, looting aid, increasing fees for healthcare and education, appointing individuals belonging to a specific group and empowering them in institutions while excluding other Yemenis, depriving Yemenis of gas, electricity, and oil, and selling these resources on the black market at inflated prices, looting citizens' lands and state property, misappropriating religious endowments (waqf), tithes (khums), extorting the families of the abducted, extorting international organizations, looting expatriates, and looting under the guise of religious and political events. All these Houthi practices are considered corruption, as I mentioned earlier. What's

(1) "September 26 Revolution in Yemen, previous source, page 150."

(2) "The Story of Changing the Name of Bribery in Yemen to 'The Right of Ibn Hadi'... from an evening with the great Yemeni poet Abdullah Al-Bardoni at the Jisrah Cultural Club in Doha in 1993, YouTube website."

happening is systematic looting and deliberate deprivation of Yemenis in favor of a particular group, rather than just financial, administrative, or political corruption.

After the Houthi takeover of Sana'a in 2014, they appointed representatives of the so-called Houthi Revolutionary Committee within state institutions and made their authority the highest within those institutions. However, they did little except to remove the previous leadership and appoint alternative figures loyal to them, who carried out the most severe forms of corruption in Yemen's history.

In one widespread form of looting documented in international reports, the UN panel of experts found evidence of public money being transferred to the benefit of Houthi leaders through fake supply contracts. The report stated: "The team possesses documents demonstrating that the Central Bank of Yemen in Sana'a (under Houthi control) transferred over 4.8 billion Yemeni rials (22 million USD) to an account at a private bank in Sana'a owned by a company called 'Levante Vision' for the supply of flour to the Revolutionary Committee. The cash flows to 'Levante Vision' do not show any payments for purchasing goods, but they show cash transfers directed to three individuals, who are not known to be traders. The cash flows also indicate that, within a week or two from the date of the transfer from the Central Bank of Yemen to the Yemen Kuwait Bank (YKB), an amount of 4,559,000,000 Yemeni rials was withdrawn, with 370,100,000 rials from Abdullah Abbas Abdullah Juhaf, 2,098,900,000 rials from Ali Qasim Mohsen Al-Amir, and 2,000,000,000 rials from Muhammad Abdullah Muhammad Hassan Al-Mouayad[(1)]."

What the UN report highlighted is just one small example of the extent of looting practiced by the Houthi rebels over the years, during which corruption expanded in an unprecedented manner in Yemen's history. This prompted former President Ali Abdullah Saleh to say, just hours before his death at the hands of the Houthi group, that the injustice, looting, and corruption practiced by the Houthis in a short period surpassed the level of corruption during the rule of both Imam Yahya and Ahmed Hamid al-Din combined. He said, "The Houthis have unjustly ruled over the past three years more than Imam Yahya and Imam Ahmed did. They plundered the institutions, emptied the public treasury, took it to their private coffers, bought the consciences of the weak, the poor, and the needy, who seek prestige and wealth and diverted state funds to them. The army without salaries, the civil service without salaries, education and healthcare without salaries, the health ministry without medications, everything has dried up

(1) "Panel of Experts' Report, dated January 27, 2020, Paragraph 86, Page 36."

because of this unaccountable authoritarian regime that only seeks to rule the Yemeni people with iron and fire[1]."

In one night, state properties, including lands, assets, equipment, and facilities, were transformed into the private property of commercial entities, individuals, and Houthi leaders. As an example, what was documented involved looting of Yemen's Economic Corporation, as Houthi leaders seized the organization's transportation fleet, consisting of hundreds of trucks, tractors, tankers, and smaller vehicles, leasing some of them to some of Al-Houthi members[2]. This pattern unfolded in all state institutions, including those related to sanitation and agricultural enterprises. All the vehicles intended for supporting agricultural operations and environmental conservation were plundered. Subsequently, international organizations were requested to provide alternatives to what had been looted.

The Yemeni, regional, and international media have published a massive number of daily corruption incidents committed by the Houthi group, in addition to what is regularly posted on social media platforms. This has led some Houthi figures, such as Abdulrahman Al-Mouayed, Saleh Hubra, and others, to launch scathing criticisms against their group due to the unprecedented spread of corruption, looting, and seizure of private and public properties in Yemen's history. Many political figures who sympathized with the Houthis at some points have taken an early stance against the group's corruption, including Judge Abdulwahab Qatran, parliamentarian Abdo Bashir, parliamentarian Ahmed Saif Hashed, and activist Mohammed Al-Maqalih. This dire situation has pushed the leader of the group, Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, to acknowledge the corruption of his group in a failed attempt to exonerate himself from the futile situation[3].

Abdo Bashir was one of the boldest parliamentarians who exposed some aspects of Houthi corruption despite being in Sana'a. In one of the sessions of the parliament under Houthi control in Sana'a, Bashir commented on the deliberate practices of looting and starvation, saying, "There are wasted revenues that do not reach the public treasury despite being collected from citizens. Why does the government and the Ministry of Finance allow the forgery of official bonds and the receipt of unjustified amounts? What justifies them? Where do the revenues from oil derivatives go, including electricity and the cement industry? Where do the revenues of the Land,

(1) "Speech by former President Ali Abdullah Saleh on YouTube under the title 'Recorded Speech of the Martyr Leader Ali Abdullah Saleh before his martyrdom,' December 4, 2021."

(2) "The War Economy... An Opportunistic Method Mastered by the Houthis Skillfully, Bilal Al-Shaqqi, Al Jazeera Blog, July 28, 2019."

(3) "Abdul-Malik al-Houthi pointed out that his men receive support from the people to supply the war fronts, but they engage in the personal sale and use of these donations, including the purchase of qat and other items. Watch... Abdul-Malik al-Houthi admits to the corruption of his group and the theft of the people's money, YouTube website, January 19, 2021."

Survey, and Urban Planning Authority go? During these lean years, we see the construction of buildings and structures. Where do these fees, which are incalculable, go? Where are the revenues of the telecommunications sector? Where are the revenues from the endowments' investments, which were estimated at about 360 billion? We hear every day that the corrupt individuals in the endowments attack individuals, neighborhoods, lands, and lands owned by housing associations for employees, soldiers, and low-income people without any legal justification. They do not recognize the judiciary or any pending case in the judiciary. And they are being prepared to transfer them to an authority. Mr. President, where are the revenues of the Kamaran Company, which used to contribute 36 billion to the state's public treasury? Where are they? Where are the revenues of the cement industry? Why hasn't the Bajil factory, which is ready and has no problems, been operationalized? And what about oil, gas, customs control points, and the levies and taxes collected in the presence and knowledge of everyone? We have said it more than once: what is it for the Mujahideen and the fronts and for paying employees' salaries, we are with it, but not for anything else. Is what we have mentioned logical? Isn't it considered evident corruption and waste that deserves to be held accountable and prosecuting those who commit it and those who support them? Shouldn't we alleviate the burdens on those whose options have been cut off, namely, the employees and the Yemeni people? Is silence required in the face of these violations?[(1)]"

Around a year after posing these questions, Bashir published a post on his Facebook page where he condemned the ongoing corruption, looting, and silence. His statement was as follows: "We were hopeful for the Teacher and Education Support Fund, which would provide 30,000 Yemeni Rials monthly for teachers and the education sector. However, despite this small amount not being enough to stave off hunger, it turned out that this summit gave birth to a mouse. This waste is a clear conspiracy against the teacher and education in general.

We suggested paying salaries from oil revenues, domestic gas, and price differentials, but the authorities preferred to fill their own bellies and the pockets of war profiteers and corrupt individuals rather than providing the most necessities of life for teachers, employees, and the Yemeni people.

We raised the issue of insane price hikes, but the authorities failed to take any actions or provide clarification regarding the corrupt elites who are thriving at the expense of the citizens' livelihoods. On the contrary, they fixed prices without any study or clear justification, simply saying that those

(1) The parliamentarian Abdo Bashir exposes the Houthi group during his intervention in the session of the House of Representatives in Sana'a, on the Yemeni Republic channel on YouTube, dated July 27, 2020. In this lengthy speech, MP Abdo Bashir revealed many aspects of corruption practiced by the Houthis in their controlled areas.

who protect them are their accomplices. Now, a new wave of skyrocketing prices adds to the previous ones, and the authorities either watch from the sidelines or participate in cutting off the last lifeline for the citizens.

Indeed, there's a saying that pride and freedom are in looting public and private funds and enslaving the people. Those who seek taxes without rebuilding the nation will ruin both the country and its citizens. Their rule can't be upright unless they follow a just path. They keep adding burdens, fees, and taxes, whether they are fair or not, without any concern for the suffering of citizens due to poverty, illness, and hunger, as well as the non-payment of salaries. Their focus is solely on satisfying the ruling elite and those of their kind, along with those who share their interests(1)."

Additionally, Parliament member Ahmed Saif Hashed, who initially supported the Houthis, attacked the group's corruption on multiple occasions. He said, "O those who rule us! You have stolen, you are corrupt, and you are oppressive, just like those who ruled before you. But we have never seen or heard anything like your corruption and your oppression, and there won't be thieves like you after you, until the end of time if there is an end. Therefore, I say that the corrupt and the thieves of the East and the West are you. We say that you are the ones who are stealing and corrupting the entire land(2)."

From time to time, and with the aim of appeasing the anger of Yemenis, the Houthis have announced measures to combat corruption and punish wrongdoers. However, these efforts have been met with widespread ridicule because Yemenis understand corruption is deeply rooted within the Houthi movement. Parliament member Abdu Bushr criticized the announcement made by the head of the so-called Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat, regarding their intention to combat corruption and bribery. Bashir expressed his skepticism by saying, "I have a comment on the meeting of the head of the Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat, who stated that they are establishing an entity or unit to combat corruption and bribery. My dear brother, there are decisions issued by the head of the Political Council in favor of corrupt individuals. There is protection from the presidency for corrupt individuals. There's no use in approaching me after all of this. And he opens a door and says, any citizen who has a complaint about corruption should inform someone... Isn't the House of Representatives responsible for monitoring the executive authority, its entities, and institutions? Don't we have a Central Control and Auditing Organization? Don't we have a National Anti-Corruption Authority? You are the ones challenging the authority of these institutions and asking citizens to provide you with someone to hold accountable. I believe that those who lack something

(1) A post by the parliamentarian Abdo Bashir on his Facebook page, November 18, 2021.
(2) A post by the parliamentarian Ahmed Saif Hashed on his Twitter page, January 31, 2022.

cannot provide it. If we appoint a corrupt person, and we tell the citizens to complain about corruption, this is not right... We have issues, for example, including 27 billion in oil price differentials with the Attorney General, and to this day, nothing has been done about this matter. We have what the Central Control and Auditing Organization has raised, stating that these are corrupt individuals, and the issue remains unresolved instead of asking them to raise corruption cases(1)."

Parliament member and member of the Houthi political council, Sultan Al-Samai, has also repeatedly highlighted the crimes of looting and corruption committed by the Houthis in various areas and fields. In a televised interview with the Houthi-affiliated Suhail TV broadcasting from Lebanon, Al-Samai said, "The cup has run over... corruption has exceeded all limits, more than the citizen can imagine under these circumstances. There is a group in power, I call them those who serve the enemies. They have taken control of state resources and have not allowed the state to function. They stopped the funds... legal funds like the Disabled Fund, Youth and Adolescents Fund, Agricultural Fund, and Tourism Fund. Of course, Ahmed Hamed now heads this group, and he holds over 70 positions in addition to the position of the President's office director. He interferes in the Shura Council, and he stopped the Shura Council for four months due to imposing those he wants. He is the one who has now suspended the Anti-Corruption Authority because he imposed undesired individuals. He is the one who has halted the state's functions. He behaves with a group of corrupt individuals as if the state is their own personal store(2)."

In a Twitter post on his official page, Al-Samai raised questions about a Houthi member who claims to combat corruption, saying that he had purchased properties worth six million two hundred thousand dollars, questioning the source of this money when this individual was "barefoot" before.

Both Shur and Al-Samai received some protection due to their positions, despite the threats they faced. However, the activist Abdul Rahman Al-Mouayad did not enjoy the same level of immunity. He was repeatedly hidden and tortured because of his writings and publications on corruption issues on his social media page and through recorded videos where he criticized the leader of the Houthi group and accused him of protecting corrupt individuals. In one of the recorded messages, he stated the following:

(1) Parliamentarian Abdo Bashir mocks the Houthi anti-corruption campaign and presents a list of the group's corruption, published on the Yemeni Republic channel on YouTube.

(2) A television appearance on the Al-Sahat channel, published on the Yemeni Republic channel on YouTube, titled "Sultan Al-Samei Once Again Attacks the Houthis and Reveals Some of Their Corruption," in May/March 2019.

Abdul Malik Al-Houthi urged people to expose corruption issues, but when Abdul Rahman did so and criticized the corrupt individuals appointed by Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, he faced persecution and targeting, with no one to protect him.

Abdul Rahman documented the corruption, exploitation, and bribes of the Houthis within the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, led by Ahmed Hamed and Abdel Ghani Al-Mudani. He personally sent this documentation to the office of Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, but the corrupt individuals continued to gain more power and engage in further corruption.

The Houthis accuse anyone who speaks out against corruption of being an "agent of America and Israel" or a supporter of the "aggression" (the Arab coalition supporting the legitimate Yemeni government).

Due to his publication of documents condemning Houthi leaders for corruption, the Houthi security apparatus abducted Abdul Rahman, kept him hidden, and told his family that he was attending a cultural event. Meanwhile, he was imprisoned and subjected to various forms of torture.

The Houthis sought to obtain the password for his phone to access private photos of his family to use as a means of humiliating him after his release from prison, and to compel him to remain silent and not write about corruption.

The corrupt officials within the Houthi ranks, such as Ahmed Hamed, Abdel Mohsen Taous, and Abdel Ghani Al-Mudani, engage in corruption with the personal protection of Abdul Malik Al-Houthi.

What the Houthis are doing is characterized as "racism, discrimination, and complex corruption that is not acceptable to God and His Messenger." Corruption is corruption; don't permit it among our own people and don't mix it with jihad. Fear God.

He raised the question: Is the Houthi movement a Quranic march, as they claim, or a march to protect the corrupt?

He stated: "Any fight against corruption is forbidden and, according to the teachings of the leader (Abdul Malik Al-Houthi), anyone who fights corruption will face woe and damnation. They will be threatened with re-arrest and enforced disappearance, and any corrupt individual is known by the leader, and you have no right to fight them. Moreover, the leader is the one who fights anyone who fights corruption and reveals its facts."

People are always urged to speak out against any injustice and corruption, but all of this is just media talk because there is no real fight against corruption, and there is no justice for the oppressed.

He concluded his speech addressing the leader of the Houthi group, saying, "I believed in you in the fight against corruption. The response to that was arrest, threats, and cutting off livelihoods because there was no support or backing for me. I relied on the sincerity of your direction in

fighting corruption, and that you were the support and backing for those who had no support. But I see that the biggest deception and fraud in history has occurred. You deceived us in the name of Allah and the Ahl al-Bayt, and you disgraced us in front of people. You have brought us into conflict with the Yemenis in the name of the Ahl al-Bayt. I beg you to leave the Ahl al-Bayt alone. Enter under a different name, and by God, we have not seen anything from you except nonsense speeches. Deception and anything that happens to me and my children, I hold you responsible, Oh Sayyid[1].

The conclusion reached by Al-Mouayad, a well-known Houthi leader, that Houthi corruption is protected by the founder of the group, is the same conclusion reached by many who supported the Houthi project, such as Mohammad Al-Maqalih, who said: "When the leaders of the people come out to defend a corrupt person, it is the head that is corrupt, not the body[2]."

Racist Appointments:

Prior to the Houthi takeover of Sana'a, certain Hashemite families in Yemen asserted that they were not adequately represented in the state's institutions. However, it is widely acknowledged that the majority of these families occupied prominent and influential positions, spanning ministers, governors, military and security leaders, agents, directors, judges, journalists, and more. Their presence is pervasive, extending across various fields, specialties, and political parties in Yemen, with leadership roles in each. As descendants of leaders within the imamate system preceding republican rule, they benefited from superior educational opportunities, contributing to their prevalence in high-ranking positions across all state institutions. Nevertheless, some of their elites claim that they feel "oppressed," according to Dr. Yahya bin Yahya Al-Mutawakil, the former Minister of Industry and Trade, in an article in the first official newspaper in the country, attempting to justify the rebellion of the Houthi group in Sa'ada during that period[3].

Yahya Al-Mutawakil held multiple positions at the top of the state's institutions, but he still believes that the lineage to which he belongs feels oppressed and needs to be included in decision-making. When you return to the beliefs of the lineage, you will understand that they find themselves wronged if they are not in complete control of governance, considering it as

(1) YouTube channel of the Houthi leader Abdul Rahman Al-Muayyad, titled: "A Message to the Revolution Leader Abu Jibril (The Complete Story from A to Z) - Video 6," December 30, 2021.
(2) A post by the member of the Revolutionary Committee, Mohammed Al-Muqalih, on his Twitter page, July 21, 2021.
(3) The article was published in the first official Revolution (Al-Thawra) newspaper in November 2012.

part of their religion, or what is called the "Wilayah" theory. For a deeper understanding of this issue, you can refer to the previous passages.

On more than one occasion and in various speeches, the Houthi leader stated that he and his group were not seeking positions in the state's institutions and that they only wanted reform. He reiterated that his group would not participate in any government and had no ambitions, saying, "We have dedicated ourselves to serving our people, their just causes, and concerns, and we will never deviate from this... We have no ambitions, and I told the government delegation that we will never be part of any ministerial formation in any future government... We do not want your ministries." However, as soon as they entered the capital, Sana'a, they carried out extensive operations to lay off employees and appoint their ideological followers, the majority of whom belonged to the same racial group(1).

The Houthi group can be divided into two parts. The first part consists of elements of the group living in rural areas, primarily in the provinces of Sa'ada, Amran, Hajjah, and Dhamar. They make up the armed wing of the group, responsible for invading areas and eliminating the opposition. The second part is the civilian wing, living primarily in Sana'a and the major provincial capitals. Most of these individuals work in government institutions (military and civilian), private businesses, embassy offices, international organizations, local civil society organizations, and political parties. The role of this civilian wing was to provide political, civil, and informational cover to the armed wing led by the Houthi group. After taking control of the cities, the civilian wing's mission was to inherit state institutions and work to manage them alongside the complete dominance of the armed elements.

What's important to note here is that the Houthi group was represented within state institutions, including both the administrative and military bodies of the state, and they were not operating from outside the state. When the Houthis took control of the capital, they promoted their followers and empowered them with high-ranking positions. They also recruited others into these institutions after purging those who did not belong to their group. Additionally, they introduced both senior and mid-level leaders and employees from the armed wing originating from rural areas like Sa'ada, Amran, and others.

Nevertheless, at every stage in 2014 and the first quarter of 2015, the Houthis were keen to establish understandings with the Yemeni government and political parties, a process referred to during that time as "absorbing Ansar Allah (Houthi supporters) into state institutions" in exchange for evacuating their military presence in Sana'a(2).

(1) Speech by Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi before the storming of Sana'a, August 26, 2014.

(2) The Houthis stipulate their inclusion in state institutions to evacuate their military presence in Sana'a, Kuwaiti Al-Anbaa newspaper, January 7, 2015.

Two days after the Houthi group's entry into Sana'a and placing President Hadi and his government under house arrest, the President issued a presidential decree appointing Houthi leader Saleh Ali al-Sammad as an advisor to the President(1). This marked the beginning of the process of appointing Houthis from the rural military wing to high-ranking positions, along with the promotion and appointment of those Houthis already working in both civilian and military institutions. These appointments were made through what was known as the "Supreme Revolutionary Committee."

They didn't stop there, but they also demanded President Hadi, while besieging the Presidential Palace in Sana'a, to grant them sovereign positions in all state institutions, as highlighted in a report published on the "Al Jazeera Net" website:

- The presidency of the state, the prime minister, the government ministers, the General Secretariat of the House of Representatives, the audit, and finance sector in most ministries, including the positions of vice president, deputy prime minister, the presidency of the Central Authority for Monitoring and Accountability, deputy director of the president's office, and the head or deputy head of the Political Security Apparatus.

- The positions of deputy or assistant director of the National Security Agency, the president or deputy president of the Shura Council, the head of the Border Committee and the supervisory committees, and all departments of inspection and auditing in all ministries, institutions, and organizations.

- The position of deputy governor of the Central Bank, deputies in other government banks, and the deputy secretary-general of the Council of Ministers.

- The position of the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, heads of financial and administrative departments, with the possibility of adding the Shura Council.

- The position of deputy minister in most ministries, in addition to the heads of the finance and control departments in each ministry, the presidency of the General Authority for Insurance and Pensions, Yemeni Airways, and the General Authority for Pharmaceutical Industries(2).

The Houthis presented lists of names for the positions and positions that should issue decisions in favor of the Houthis to occupy them. These lists were published on social media platforms after the president himself handed them to some of his advisors. Eventually, the besieged president was forced to submit his resignation to escape the Houthi pressures, but it was rejected

(1) Presidential Decree No. (54) of 2014, published on the website of the National Information Center under the presidency of the republic, September 24, 2014.

(2) The Houthis demanded sovereign positions from Hadi during his siege, Al Jazeera Net, January 26, 2015.

by the Yemeni Parliament[1].

After about two weeks, the then Yemeni Defense Minister, Mahmoud Al-Subaihi, was forced to appoint military leaders in the Yemeni army who were loyal to the Houthis because they belonged to the same clan. These leaders were placed in sensitive and important positions in the Ministry of Defense. Among the notable appointments were Brigadier General Fouad Abdullah Al-Imad as the commander of the Presidential Protection Brigade, Abdullah Abdul-Malik Abbas as the commander of the 314th Armored Brigade, Colonel Ali Mohamed Al-Kahilani as the head of the Logistics Support Authority, and Colonel Mohamed Ali Hashem Al-Awami as the director of the Supply and Provisioning Department[2].

These appointments continued under Houthi pressure until President Hadi managed to escape their siege in Sana'a and reach Aden. Subsequently, the Arab coalition-initiated operations to restore legitimacy in Yemen. The Houthis then moved on to a new phase in their takeover of positions within government institutions.

Abdul-Malik al-Houthi took the helm as the leader of the Houthi movement, holding the ultimate authority in the areas under Houthi control. He was followed by Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, who assumed the role of the head of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee, a pivotal body responsible for governing Houthi-controlled areas. Mohammed Ali al-Houthi also served as a member of the Supreme Political Council and the head of the judicial system, which encompasses the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Judicial Council, the Public Prosecutor's Office, and specialized criminal courts. His status was more significant than that of the Minister of Justice, the head of the Judicial Council, and the head of the Supreme Court. Abdel Karim al-Houthi was appointed as the Minister of Interior, responsible for suppressing any protests within Yemeni cities against the Houthi group. Yahya al-Houthi was tasked with cultural change and "Houthization" of society through his appointment as the Minister of Education. The General Authority for Endowments, which controls the revenues, lands, and buildings of religious endowments (awqaf) worth billions of Yemeni rials, was handed over to Abdel Majeed al-Houthi, while Ali Hussein al-Houthi was granted the rank of general, despite being in his early twenties, and was appointed as the head of the Traffic Police.

Under the banner of "confronting external aggression," the Houthis almost completely took control of high, medium, and low-level positions in state institutions, with nominal participation from the General People's

(1) Resignation of Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansur Hadi and Parliament's rejection, France 24 website, January 22, 2015.

(2) The Houthis appoint their loyalists to important positions in the army, Al Jazeera Net, February 19, 2015.

Congress Party. In the middle of 2016, the former Minister of Culture and well-known figure in Yemen, Khaled Al-Ruwaishan, published a statement condemning the seizure of public office, saying:

"The new bramkas... Houthi appointments! The people are dying while they issue employment decisions for their followers every day and every hour. By God, if they were colonizers, I would feel sorry for the country... The country has no income, and there is a failure to pay salaries... yet they issue employment decisions. I'm not surprised by the Houthis' decisions, but I am surprised by the eagerness and rush of those appointed to these positions."

Legally, there is no legitimacy to any appointment. What happened and is happening is that those who do not have the right to appoint give it to those who do not deserve it.

Someone might ask: Why don't they deserve it?

And I would answer: They don't deserve it because they sought it from someone who doesn't have the right to appoint.

Those who respect themselves do not accept this and do not seek it... Shameful!

If there is no position, it should be for the sake of the oppressed people.

The new bramkas apply to positions, forgetting that the people see and observe(1)."

After their assassination of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh on December 4, 2017, it can be confirmed that a new phase began, characterized by absolute power for the dynasty and very few loyalists from outside due to religious beliefs or kinship ties. They took control of all areas, political, economic, military, and social. The Houthis launched a comprehensive substitution policy based on ethnic affiliation and some marginal followers in January 2018, with a series of appointments that were the broadest, including dismissals and appointments within civil and military institutions(2).

The new Houthi leadership in government institutions began by removing Yemenis who had been displaced from their positions and replaced them with Houthi elements. This applied to those working in civil institutions, including teachers, academics(3), judges(4), and members of the Shura Council, as well as those working in military institutions, security

(1) A post by the former Minister of Culture, Khalid Al-Ruwishan, on his Facebook page, May 28, 2016.

(2) The Houthi group carries out the widest campaign of appointments for ministers, governors, and various positions, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, January 1, 2018.

(3) The Houthis dismiss 51 members of the faculty at Dhamar University, Al-Muqarrar Post, May 28, 2018.

(4) The Houthis tighten their grip on the judiciary by appointing 106 part-time judges, November 15, 2017.

agencies, and intelligence agencies[1].

In June 2018, the then-Houthi Minister of Civil Service and Insurance, Talal Aqlan, announced the elimination of 25,000 cases from the payroll of government employees in the civil sector. During the same month, Hasan Al-Mouayad, the Deputy Minister of Information within the Ministry of Civil Service under Houthi control, stated that the second phase would target 50,000 cases for elimination, justifying this step by claiming that the targeted individuals had been disconnected from work and were cooperating with the Yemeni government and the Arab coalition[2].

Then, on August 12, 2018, the Ministry of Civil Service, and Insurances under the control of the Houthis issued Circular No. 28 to government institutions, directing them to provide the names of employees who had been forcibly displaced by the Houthis, as a prelude to their complete termination[3]. In October, the same ministry issued a press release published by the Yemeni News Agency "Saba" in its Houthi version, addressed to ministers, governors of provinces, and heads of government sectors under their control, demanding them to provide the names and data of the disconnected employees who had collaborated with the "aggression" and were no longer working, as part of what is called the "Salary Disclosure Cleaning Project" for all public service units[4].

Conversely, after the separation and dismissal of civilian and military employees, loyalists to the Houthi group were appointed and promoted. In November 2019, the group promoted 65,605 soldiers and non-commissioned officers from the Ministry of Interior, who were affiliated with it, in a single batch[5].

The journalist, researcher, and expert in Iranian affairs, Adnan Hashem described the Houthis' actions as "systematic replacement in positions, from the presidency to the janitors and security personnel, ensuring future control over all military and security institutions. This is quite similar to the Iranian model of governance with its parallel institutions[6]."

(1) Continuous "Houthization" of the Shura Council, Al-Yawm Al-Thamin, June 11, 2018.

(2) The Houthis decide to terminate government employees in their controlled areas in Yemen, Debrief website, October 22, 2018.

(3) The Civil Service reveals irregularities in the second batch of the salary disclosure project, Saba News Agency under Houthi control, October 21, 2018.

(4) The Civil Service urges the prompt submission of lists of absentees and those who participated in the aggression, Saba News Agency under Houthi control, October 21, 2018.

(5) Decision to promote 65,605 employees of the Ministry of Interior, the security media website affiliated with the Houthis, November 24, 2019.

(6) With documents: How did the Houthi militias seize and exploit state lands for their members? Yemen Youth Net website, June 11, 2016.

Ethnic and Sectarian Political Cleansing:

The process of separation and replacement continued gradually, with different justifications being used each time. In July 2021, the Ministry of Civil Service under Houthi control expressed its intention to terminate tens of thousands of government employees. It called on government institutions to provide data about individuals reaching one of two retirement terms, a move met with strong opposition from the "Union of Employees in the Administrative Apparatus of the State in Sana'a." This union rejected the Houthi Civil Service's approach, describing it as "lacking legal, ethical, and humanitarian responsibility" and having "serious and catastrophic consequences by increasing poverty, destitution, and need among the population(1)."

The Sam Organization for Rights and Freedoms considered the Houthi's intention to take this step as revealing "the revengeful and exclusionary behavior of the Houthi group against its opponents, showing their lack of concern for the humanitarian situation that such practices will exacerbate." The organization stated in a significant release: "We view with great concern the decision of the Houthi group's Council of Deputies in Sana'a to appoint thousands of Houthis instead of the employees appointed for years, which means giving the head of the Houthi group's governing council the authority to appoint substitutes for those who have not received their salaries for the fifth year in a row. The real goal of these decisions is revenge against opponents and exploiting the lack of real legal oversight over the actions of the executive entities affiliated with the Houthi group to settle political scores at the expense of basic individual rights, including the right to hold public office, financial entitlements, and job security(2)."

On the military side, the so-called Supreme Police Council affiliated with the Houthi group approved the completion of the dismissal procedures of 904 officers from the Ministry of Interior. Additionally, the council assigned another committee to compile the names of remaining officers and personnel for dismissal(3).

As usual, the same justifications are used by the Houthis in implementing ethnic, political, sectarian purges, and racial segregation within government institutions. The Houthi Deputy Interior Minister, Abdulmajeed Al-Murtadha, stated that these decisions "translate the directives of Abdulmalik

(1) Houthi plan to lay off 160,000 Yemeni employees and replace them with loyalists, Al Arabiya Net, July 8, 2021.

(2) "Houthization of jobs"... a Houthi plan to replace 160,000 Yemeni employees, Middle East and North Africa Media Observatory, July 8, 2021.

(3) Yemen: Houthis decide to dismiss more than 900 officers in the Ministry of Interior on charges of treason, August 11, 2021.

Badr al-Din al-Houthi to purify state institutions from what he described as infiltrators and traitors[1]." Anyone who does not belong to their ethnicity, rejects working according to their theory of "divine right to rule," or opposes their crimes is considered a traitor, infiltrator, agent, ISIS member, or extremist, among other descriptions they use as a pretext for killing, displacement, looting, and racial segregation.

This move in the Ministry of Interior came after direct instructions from the leader of the group, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, in a speech he delivered to his supporters on the Prophet's migration in 1443 AH. He stated, "In the same context, regarding state institutions, the process of purifying state institutions must continue, saving state institutions from all the embedded individuals in them who work for the enemy's benefit and seek to obstruct every genuine effort to serve the people and carry out vital tasks in confronting aggression. In the same context, we praise the independent and important stance of the parliament in Sana'a and that of the freemen within it, and their recent move to purify the parliament from the traitors who joined the ranks of aggression. This is an important and courageous step, and we must continue to purify state institutions of all traitors and agents[2]." Mohammed Al-Maqalih, a member of the Houthi Supreme Revolutionary Committee, commented on the leader's directives the following day, stating, "The speech will be translated by expelling the remaining honorable individuals, considering them hypocrites, revilers, troublemakers, and obstacles to the path of the faith-based identity[3]."

Despite the Houthis' awareness that many government employees left their areas due to being deprived of their salaries for years and sought other employment, they intentionally dismissed them and replaced them with their own supporters. For example, the British Save the Children organization confirmed that over half of Yemen's teachers and education workers, around 190,000 people, have resorted to working in other professions to meet some of their needs and those of their families, including working in construction or selling goods on the streets[4]. This dire situation has driven many of them to leave Houthi-controlled areas to receive salaries in areas under legitimate government control or to search for work. However, the Houthis saw this as an opportunity to dismiss them and hire their supporters in their place.

The group has laid off approximately 8,000 teachers and educators without legal justification, which was considered by the Sam Organization for Rights and Freedoms as a "serious violation of human rights, with

(1) ibid.

(2) Speech delivered by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi to his supporters on the 1443 AH anniversary of the Prophet's migration, August 9, 2021.

(3) A post by Mohammed Al-Muqalih on his Twitter page, August 10, 2021.

(4) Teachers in Yemen take to the streets to work with more than half of them without regular pay, OCHA Services website, November 10, 2021.

unknown social and humanitarian consequences."

The organization stated in a press release that "the arbitrary discriminatory dismissal decision included five thousand teachers in the capital Sana'a and three thousand others in other provinces. This was part of a plan approved by the so-called Educational Office, which is affiliated with the Houthi group, aiming to tighten control over the education sector. The dismissal process targeted teachers who had migrated to seek job opportunities after their salaries were cut, replacing them with individuals of both sexes who are affiliated with and loyal to the Houthi group to address the existing shortages in schools, as a first step to consolidate their positions." This action came about a week after the Houthi militia's leader, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, spoke about purging state institutions of those loyal to the legitimate government. Over the past three years, the Houthi group has made significant changes in the educational administration, removing many competent educational leaders who were not loyal to them, especially those who were forced to leave their homes for fear of arrest. Instead, they appointed their own affiliates, which led to a decline in the educational standards for most students(1).

In contrast to the policy of ethnic, sectarian, political cleansing, and "job massacres" that state employees faced, the Houthis worked to embed their supporters in these institutions until they gradually transformed themselves from just one faction participating in Yemen's governance to absolute power holders.

Yemenis regularly share on social media the Houthi appointments that enable these families to control state affairs after excluding other components, whether they are based on political or social affiliations. It has been said that there are no longer any Houthis who are not in official positions, leaders, merchants, heads of civil organizations, or decision-makers in international organizations. Even the young and the illiterate have become officials in civil institutions, supervisors in neighborhoods and villages, and military leaders in the Houthi forces. What was particularly notable was that the Houthis would publish news about their daily activities on their official websites, listing the names of those present, making it clear to people that all the leaders of the mentioned institutions were from the same lineage, which sparked significant controversy on social media and in the media in general, as it was seen as evidence of this group's racism and exclusion of the Yemeni population as a whole. For example, on October 14, 2022, the Houthis published a news article on their official news agency's website titled "The Minister of Health Inspects the Conditions of Sick Children at the Leukemia Center at Kuwait Hospital." This news

(1) Statement by the Sam Organization for Rights and Freedoms published on the organization's website, August 26, 2021.

discussed a visit by Houthi officials in the Ministry of Health to Kuwait Hospital in Sana'a following a mass tragedy involving children suffering from cancer. What stood out in this news, as with the rest of the news published in Houthi-affiliated media, was that the individuals appointed by the Houthis to hold government positions all belonged to the same lineage. This news mentioned individuals such as Taha Al-Mutawakil, the Minister of Health; Ali Juhaf, the Deputy Minister for Medical Treatment; Mohammed Al-Mansur, the Deputy Minister for Care; Ali Al-Mudawi, the Ministry's consultant; Mutahar Al-Marwani, the Director of the Health Office in Sana'a; Ameen Al-Janaid, the Director of Kuwait University Hospital; Osama Al-Sharafi, the Director of the Emergency Department; and Ali Al-Mufti, the Director of Services(1). All these individuals belong to the same lineage and were mentioned in one news article. Following this news, a list of Houthi appointments in the Ministry of Health circulated on social media, confirming the racial bias in the Houthi appointments.

Things went so far that the Houthis issued a decree appointing a young man named Hashem Ahmed Al-Haifi, who was not even 19 years old, as an advisor in the Office of the Republic's Presidency solely because of his affiliation with the mentioned lineage. This resulted in ridicule from Yemenis on social media at the time. They also granted a Houthi leader who belongs to the same lineage the rank of brigadier in the Ministry of the Interior after working as an Arabic language teacher at Sana'a University. These are just simple examples illustrating the extent of the chaos that the group caused in state institutions due to racist motives(2). In Hodeidah, they issued a decree appointing Bandar Al-Mahdi as the director of the Sanitation and Improvement Fund in the province, and his brother as the director of the central workshop of the fund, which was an unprecedented event in the history of the Yemeni Republic, where two brothers were appointed to the rank of director-general in a single institution(3). This was because they belonged to the ethnicity that claims that Allah favored them over the rest of Yemenis and that they are the first in their rule and control over the government. In such cases, you may find the father is the deputy minister, the son is a camp commander, the brother is a department head in a different institution, the sister is the head of an organization, the uncle is a judge, the uncle-in-law is a businessman and a merchant, and the cousin is the director

(1) The Minister of Health inspects the conditions of sick children at the leukemia center in Kuwait Hospital, Yemen News Agency (Saba) affiliated with the Houthis, October 14, 2022.

(2) The Houthi leader, Ibtisam Al-Mutawakil, a poet and an academic at Sana'a University, formed what was called the "Cultural Front" after the Houthi group took control of Sana'a. She aligned herself with the Houthis, being from the same lineage, and was eventually granted the rank of dean in the Ministry of Interior.

(3) This information was posted by the well-known Yemeni journalist Saeem Jannani on his Twitter page on October 28, 2021. The mentioned institution did not deny this news.

of a school, and so on. Meanwhile, most Yemenis can barely secure low-paying jobs and marginal positions that have no real impact. Most of them turn to crafts, small businesses, join the fighting on the frontlines, or emigrate to other countries to earn a living or seek refuge in more stable nations.

As reported by the media at that time, the group appointed eight individuals from the Al-Mutawakil family in the Ibb Governorate (central Yemen). These individuals included Ashraf Al-Mutawakil as the Deputy Governor of Ibb, Marwan Al-Mutawakil as the Director of Nasser Hospital, Ammar Al-Mutawakil as the Deputy Director-General of the Health Office in the governorate, Mohammad Al-Mutawakil as the Deputy Director-General of Education in the governorate, Anwar Al-Mutawakil as the Director-General of the Immigration and Passports Department in the governorate, Mohammad Al-Mutawakil as the Deputy Head of the Criminal Investigation Department in the governorate, Hamid Al-Mutawakil as the Director of Al-Zahar Directorate, and Mohammad Al-Mutawakil as the Director of the Education and Teaching Office in the Jabla Directorate(1). This is what became evident, as the rest of the family members would hold significant positions, although these were not disclosed or covered by the media. This is how they control every aspect, big and small, in the governorate.

During the period in which the Houthis seized control of state institutions, they issued thousands of decisions to appoint their supporters to high, middle, and low-ranking positions. The high and middle-ranking positions' decisions were issued by the Political Council and the Houthi Revolutionary Committee. The other type of decisions involved appointing their elements to lower-ranking positions, such as department directors, section heads, some military and security positions, neighborhood heads, supervisors, and other positions that allow them to directly exert control over society.

Upon examining the records of these decisions and their issuance dates, their frequency on a yearly, monthly, and weekly basis, one can see that the group was not primarily focused on the war and expanding its influence. Instead, their main objective was to seize power, paint state institutions with a sectarian brush, and take control of political, military, administrative, educational, and service positions. They aimed to achieve their old and new ambitions by dominating Yemen through the exclusion of Yemenis.

Reading the content of the decisions issued during the mentioned period, the following observations can be made:

The high frequency of decisions regarding appointments and

(1) Eight local officials in the Ibb Governorate from a single Houthi family, reported by the Yemen Republic website on October 15, 2017.

substitutions for individuals belonging to the mentioned ethnicity, excluding others, within a very short period. For instance, in July 2016 alone, more than 190 promotion and appointment decisions were issued in various ministries, including Interior, Justice, Defense, Health, Higher Education, Scientific Research, and Foreign Affairs. Some of these decisions included a significant number of individuals in a single decision, especially for the appointment and promotion of judges and individuals in the military with high ranks, such as decision number 32 issued by the Houthi Political Council appointing 474 graduates of the College of Aviation and Air Defense to the rank of Second Lieutenant, with the majority of them belonging to the Hashemite families. Also, decision number 68 for the year 2017 issued by the Houthi Political Council appointed and promoted 467 individuals within the Interior Ministry to Second Lieutenant, with approximately 70% of them bearing surnames from the same ethnicity.

The comprehensiveness of the decisions, reaching all ministries and diverse departments. For example, appointing two deputy ministers at the Ministry of Finance in decision number 83 for the year 2017: Abdul Salam Yahya Al-Mahjoury and Akram Al-Mawshaki. In addition, Houthi Prime Minister's decision number 2 for the year 2016 appointed 16 individuals as heads of legal affairs departments, with the majority having surnames from the ethnic group, including Al-Wadai, Al-Madan, Al-Shami, Al-Mutawakil, Al-Wazir, Al-Warit, Al-Azzi, etc. It also included the appointment of the head of the Ceremonies and Honors Department in the General Secretariat of the Presidency with the rank of a minister, from the Al-Shami family.

Even the deceased individuals who belonged to the group were appointed. For instance, deceased individual Abdul Karim Al-Khaywani was appointed with the rank of a minister and referred to retirement according to a decision issued by the head of the Houthi Revolutionary Committee, number 39 for the year 2016, dated April 6, 2016.

The group made sure to have individuals from the mentioned ethnicity in leadership positions in the Ministry of Defense and military divisions. For example, presidential decree number 58 for the year 2017 appointed and promoted 21 individuals to the rank of colonel, with most of them being from the same ethnicity, including Al-Khaywani, Al-Murtadha, Al-Delmi, Al-Muayyad, Al-Mutawakil, Al-Juhafi, Al-Mahjoury, and others.

The utilization of the judicial system and legitimizing the confiscation of the properties of those opposing the group, establishing control over this significant institution. The head of the Houthi Revolutionary Committee issued decision number 123 for the year 2016 appointing Abdul Aziz Diaa al-Din Mohammed Al-Baghdadi as the Prosecutor General, and another decision, issued by the head of the Houthi Political Council in 2017,

appointed Ahmed Yahya Mohammed Al-Mutawakil as the President of the Supreme Judicial Council. Subsequent appointments were made in other positions within the judiciary by those belonging to the ethnicity.

The group relied on individuals from the ethnic group to rewrite the educational curriculum to align with the group's policy and ideology, emphasizing "racial discrimination" or the "sacred lineage" religiously and culturally. For example, decision number 22 for the year 2016, issued by the head of the Houthi Revolutionary Committee, appointed Mohammad Latif Al-Saqqaf as the Deputy Minister of Education for the Curriculum and Guidance Sector, Radwan Al-Azzi as the Director-General of the School Mapping Administration, and Ahmed Abdul Qader Shraf al-Din as the Deputy Minister of Education for Training and Qualification. The appointees carried surnames like Al-Mahdi, Al-Sharaf al-Din, Al-Shami, Al-Mutawakil, Al-Wazir, Al-Warit, Al-Azzi, and more. These appointments were made in decision number 191 for the year 2016, issued by the head of the Houthi Revolutionary Committee.

These are passing observations regarding a very limited number of decisions made by the group during the mentioned period. They highlight the reality of the racial policy adopted by the group towards public positions, usurping them for the benefit of their own ethnicity, empowering their members, and not respecting even the most basic human rights and equal citizenship.

The Ma'ad Karb Forum has compiled a small portion of the names of individuals belonging to this ethnicity who have come to dominate the most important and prominent positions in the country after excluding other Yemenis, illustrating one of the most deplorable forms of racism in our modern era. The forum pointed out that around 1003 individuals belonging to this ethnicity have gained control over key civilian and military positions(1).

Not only that, but this group has appointed a huge number of "supervisors" who belong to their own ethnicity, making them the authoritative figures in every region and institution. In the capital city alone, their number reached 869 supervisors(2).

Based on this data, many working in the field of human rights believe that the exclusion and replacement operations carried out by this group in recent years constitute a form of racial segregation and are punishable as outlined in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Segregation(3), given that those being excluded are political

(1) Website: Ma'ad Karb Forum.

(2) More than 850 Hashemite supervisors manage the neighborhoods of the Capital Municipality, as an initial statistic published by Ma'ad Karb Forum on May 22, 2022.

(3) The term "crime of racial segregation" in the mentioned international convention applies =

dissidents and ethnically different from the group, which negatively affects their lives and creates difficult circumstances preventing the full development of this group.

A Pure Feudal Approach:

The Houthi group takes the worst aspects of various bad governance systems, such as "oligarchy" or rule by a minority(1), monopolizing power, interests, and benefits in the hands of a few whiles ignoring the rest of society. What's even more dangerous is that this sectarian minority in Yemen surpasses traditional oligarchies by presenting itself as a sacred lineage with divine entitlement to control and dominate.

The behavior of the Houthis, as described, involves the exclusion of anyone who does not belong to the same ethnicity and the concentration of positions and commercial and social interests in favor of their followers. This approach is not new to Yemenis and can be seen as an extension of practices by the Imams who adopted a similar policy in previous centuries.

Russian historian Elena Golubovskaya, in her important book "The September 26 Revolution in Yemen," touched upon this issue, stating: "Imam Ahmed took this stance in 1960, in his decree to reopen the military school in Sana'a (where teachers from friendly countries taught), to educate the fourth batch of Yemeni officers. The students at this school were selected from among students of high religious schools (Dar Al-Ulum) in Sana'a, and the Imam himself approved anyone who applied for nomination. The social composition of these students was different from the previous three groups. Regardless of whether most of them did not belong to the landowning families or major merchants, they all belonged to the class of the nobility, which indicates that the Imam and the nobility tried to place the military under their control before the revolution. The intellectual class before the revolution was the cornerstone of the Yemeni opposition movement against the oppressive imamate system and Sayyids(2)."

= to policies and practices of racial isolation and discrimination similar to those practiced in South Africa, including subjecting a category or categories intentionally to living conditions meant to lead to their physical destruction, entirely or partially. It also includes taking any legislative and non-legislative measures intended to prevent a racial category or categories from participating in the political, social, economic, and cultural life of the country and deliberately creating conditions that prevent the complete development of this category or categories, especially by depriving members of a racial category or categories of their human rights and basic rights, including the right to work.

(1) "Oligarchy" is the rule of the few, or the government and state where real power is in the hands of a few members of society. Source: Political Encyclopedia, Dr. Abdulwahab Al-Kayali and others, p. 415.

(2) September 26 Revolution in Yemen, previous source, pp. 145-146.

In the section titled "The Imam and the Rule of the Asada Class" from the same book, it explains the control of the "Asada" Hashemite class over the leadership of the provinces, stating: "Each province's governor (Amir) headed the formal administration and had administrative, legal, and military authorities. They constantly turned to the Imam for guidance in resolving the province's issues. The early princes were typically brothers of the Imam or individuals closely related to the royal family. The Imam appointed deputies for the governors in the provinces who performed the duties of the princes in their absence. The official in charge of the jurisdiction or district had the primary responsibility of collecting taxes and maintaining order in their area. These officials were appointed by the Imam and formally answered to the prince. They were in constant contact with the Imam, receiving his instructions through telegraph. These officials were usually from Asayyid Hashemite class.

From 1918 and until the revolution, the Imam would form the government with his close relatives and loyal supporters. The Yemeni historian Al-Jrafi provided information about the 1949 ministry, summarized as follows: Prince Hassan was the Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, Prince Abdullah was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Qasim was the Minister of Information, Prince Ismail was the Minister of Education, Prince Yahya was the Minister of Health, and Prince Mohammed Al-Badr was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. In this way, the 1949 government was primarily composed of members of the Hamid ad-Din family[1]."

The writer adds, "The class of large landowners (primarily the Asada Hashemites) represented the top echelons of the autocratic regime and acted as intermediaries between the vast majority of Yemeni people and many social aspects of life. This class exploited the labor of small farmers and employed semi-feudal exploitation methods. The large landowners did not only seize the surplus produced by the farmers but also a portion of their necessary production. These large landowners earned substantial profits from land exploitation. Simultaneously, the large landowners were often significant merchants or financiers and held government positions. They typically lived in cities, where they also possessed various income sources, such as participation in service and non-productive facilities companies."

The Imam often appointed the leaders of the provinces and judges from the large landowners. Their duties included overseeing the collection and tax collection for the state treasury. The economic centers were not solely in the hands of large landowners but also the political life of the country. They advocated for medieval principles and religious rigidity and opposed any

(1) Ibid. p. 146-147.

reforms in Yemen during the period of autocratic rule[1].

The Syrian writer and traveller و Ahmad Wassfi Zakaria also highlighted the dominance of the self-described "Sada" class over all administrative, military, and social dimensions of the state in his book "My Journey to Yemen". He said: "All princely governors, high-ranking positions, statuses, and administrative jobs in Yemen from the very beginning have been monopolized by the Sada, regardless of their competence or qualifications. Additionally, all alms for Eid, gifts and religious endowments during holidays, seasons and other occasions are collected exclusively for them, no matter their wealth or prosperity.

You can see after this extreme spiritual prestige and dominance, how much influence these Sada could have helped the wretched Yemeni people, they have ruled for eleven centuries. In fact, they don't feel attached to or belong to the nation even though all conditions were prepared for such uplift and support. Furthermore, the custom among the Sada is to intermarry among themselves. A Sayyid does not wish to marry his daughter except to another Sayyid. Nor does the son of a Sayyid aspire to pair except with a "Sharifa" - the title for daughters of Sada. A Sayyid may pair with a non-Sharifa, and their son would be a Sayyid, but if a Sharifa pairs with a non-Sayyid, their son would not be a Sayyid[2]."

Plundering in the Name of Religious and Political Events:

While the Houthi group refuses to pay government employees' salaries, intensifying its efforts to collect money and support from the population in areas under its control, it organizes numerous events, seminars, political and religious activities, but at the expense of the citizens and state funds. These funds should be used to provide services to the public and pay the employees. The Houthi group ignores the suffering of the population resulting from its destructive economic practices, imposing additional burdens on them, including fees and contributions from citizens and merchants, as well as the looted state revenues to support mostly its own ethnic group. Among the prominent activities are the following:

(1) Ibid. p. 125.
(2) My Journey to Yemen, previous source, p. 123.

Number	Occasion	Date in Hijri Calendar
1	Anniversary of the Prophet's Migration	1 Muharram
2	Anniversary of the Martyrdom of Imam Hussein (Ashura)	10 Muharram
3	Anniversary of the Martyrdom of Zaid bin Ali	25 Muharram
4	The arrival of Yahya Al-Rassi to Yemen	6 Safar
5	The Prophet's Birthday (Mawlid al-Nabi)	12 Rabi al-Awwal
6	Anniversary of the Martyr's Day	13-19 Jumada al-Awwal
7	Birthday of the Prophet's daughter Fatimah al-Zahra	20 Jumada al-Thani
8	Rajab Friday	First Friday of Rajab
9	Anniversary of the Death of Hussein al-Houthi, Founder of the Group	27 Rajab
10	Anniversary of the Great Battle of Badr	19 Ramadan
11	Anniversary of the Martyrdom of Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib	21 Ramadan
12	International Day of Al-Quds (Jerusalem)	Last Friday of Ramadan
13	Anniversary of the Cry (Al-Sarkha)	Last Friday of Shawwal
14	Anniversary of Their Invasion of the Capital Sana’a	21 September
15	Anniversary of the Day of Allegiance (Al-Ghadir)	18 Dhul-Hijjah
16	Day of Steadfastness	26 March
17	Anniversary of the Martyrdom of Qassem Soleimani, Leader of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard	3 January

Most of these events and concepts that are being promoted on these occasions have been imported from Iran and are foreign to the Yemenis. They contribute to fueling sectarian and regional divisions and igniting violence within Yemeni society.

Perhaps the most prominent event exploited by the Houthi group is the "Celebration of the Prophet's Birthday," which they turn into a season for collecting funds and looting money, while also propagating their theory of

racial exclusivity and mobilizing fighters for the front lines, capitalizing on the Yemeni people's love for the Prophet, peace be upon him.

Many Yemenis used to celebrate this occasion by holding "Mawlid" gatherings in mosques and sometimes at homes, creating a spiritual atmosphere that reminded them of the greatness of the Prophet, his character, and humanity, far removed from politics. This is in line with the celebrations held in many Arab and Islamic countries, where sweets and gifts are distributed to children, promoting values of coexistence and love. However, with the arrival of the Houthis, they brought with them foreign Iranian rituals, ceremonies, and concepts, which amplified and expanded the celebration of the occasion, not out of respect for the Prophet but as an opportunity to loot money. The group harnessed every aspect of this event for their own benefit, exalting and sanctifying their lineage, to which the group's leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, claims to belong, alleging that their lineage traces back to the Prophet's family. This has contributed to the outbreak of the war that began in 2004.

The goals of the Houthis in focusing on sectarian events and exaggerating the celebration of the Prophet's Birthday, which they turn into a season of looting, can be summarized as follows:

1) To loot as much money as possible from citizens and traders for the benefit of the leadership and supervisors of the group who see these events as a fertile season for collecting funds and gifts.
2) To secure income for many affiliated members (Mutahawwaths[1]) through organizing these events. Those affiliated with the group benefit from the money collected from citizens, traders, or allocated from government institutions, thus making these events a means to ensure the loyalty of many of their supporters, who are dependent on the sectarian and tribal events for their livelihood.
3) To deprive citizens of their savings, keeping them in a state of poverty and need, which ensures the compliance of many of the poor and helps spread their sectarian beliefs among the people.
4) To emotionally mobilize people, convincing them to participate in the war and go to the front lines by depicting this as part of their faith and by claiming it is an obligation placed on Yemenis by the Prophet.
5) To serve as a continuous measure of people's loyalty to the group. Attendance and participation represent the renewal of allegiance and obedience, while those who refuse to support these events or participate are classified as enemies.
6) To mislead the international community by showcasing the crowds,

(1) Yemenis refer to those who do not belong to the tribe and support the Houthis for their own interests and to meet their livelihood needs as "Mutahawwath," not out of belief in the Houthi ideology.

most of whom do not attend due to their belief in Houthi ideologies, but rather out of concern for their interests and needs, which the Houthis control.

7) To promote their sectarian and political beliefs within the community, while minimizing the celebration of recognized national occasions in Yemen, such as the anniversaries of September 26 and October 14.
8) The most important goal of the Houthi celebration of the Prophet's Birthday is to exalt the leader of the group, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, and present him as the heir of the Prophet, asserting that he belongs to the Prophet's lineage. Anyone who obeys Abdul-Malik from the Yemenis is considered obedient to God and His Prophet, entering heaven. Anyone who opposes him is considered an infidel and deserves punishment, including torture, starvation, displacement, and imprisonment in this world, as well as punishment in the hereafter.
9) To impose a new identity based on the glorification and sanctification of a lineage and imported beliefs foreign to Yemen, erasing the historical and cultural heritage of Yemenis.

What matters here is shedding light on the looting of money and causing the suffering of the Yemeni people. The Houthis organize events that require large sums of money, at a time when Yemen is going through its worst economic and living conditions. According to international organizations, more than two-thirds of the population suffer from famine and poverty, living without basic health or educational services.

The Houthis force every ministry and its branches in the provinces, along with schools and universities, to hold extensive events to celebrate their sectarian/tribal occasions. Each authority spends millions on food, banners, posters, slogans, fabrics with the images of Abdul-Malik, Hussein, and their father Badr al-Din al-Houthi, along with statements from their followers and speeches. All of this has no connection to the personalities being celebrated.

On every occasion, a vast number of sectarian publications and racist propaganda signs are printed and distributed in the streets of cities, remote villages, and institutions. Additionally, a large number of flags and green fabrics, which the Houthi rebels consider their own symbol, are distributed. Billions of rials are spent each time. As soon as one event concludes, preparations for a new one begin, and each event requires the same millions that are taken from the mouths of the hungry and the poor in Yemen. These funds are used to promote the images of Houthi leaders and the leaders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, as well as their sectarian slogans, in addition to the costs of events and conferences in the areas under their control.

Various methods are employed to collect money from citizens and merchants, but intimidation and threats of depriving people of necessities

and harassing them are among the most prominent. Before major Houthi events, the group's members approach companies, hospitals, private schools, banks, exchange offices, civil society organizations, small and large businesses, and street vendors, demanding money to support the event. Moreover, they are required to paint their shop doors and establishments with a specific type of green paint, change their lighting to green, and hang green fabrics. Those who are late or reluctant to do so often face harassment, such as being denied access to the gas cylinders sold through their neighborhood.

Owners of commercial establishments who delay providing support or fail to paint their storefronts or hang green fabrics are subsequently targeted by tax offices, customs authorities, health agencies, and other pressure and blackmail tactics, according to numerous reports in recent years.

The group distributes vouchers and coupons bearing the event's logos, which can be redeemed for financial support. Support is not limited to money; these events are also exploited, especially the Prophet's birthday, to collect various types of food in large quantities, as well as livestock, Yemeni honey, furniture, and more, in the name of supporting Houthi fighters. However, most of these items end up benefiting Houthi leaders and supervisors, as claimed by Mohamed al-Muqalih, a member of the Houthi Revolutionary Committee, who stated that "the largest corruption is done in the name of military effort, and hardly 30% of these massive amounts go to the military effort, if not less than that(1)." On another occasion, he said, "Billions upon billions have been taken by the Wali [Houthi leader] in the name of military effort, but only 20% or even less reaches the military effort(2)." All of this happens at a time when international organizations confirm that the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is the worst in the world(3).

Many writers and intellectuals have condemned the crimes of plundering Yemeni people's wealth, including Yemen's ambassador to UNESCO, Dr. Mohammed Jameeh, who said, "The Houthis steal from Yemenis in the name of the Messenger of Allah. Even the receipts for this illegitimate income have verses from the Quran written on them, such as 'The Prophet is more worthy of the believers than themselves, and his wives are [in the position of] their mothers.' However, they don't complete the verse, so they can have exclusive control over their theft. How repulsive to use a verse as a

(1) A post by a member of the Houthi Supreme Revolutionary Committee named Mohammed Al-Muqalih on his Twitter page, November 5, 2021.

(2) A post by Mohammed Al-Muqalih, Twitter, December 29, 2017.

(3) You can refer to the Houthi channels' websites like "Al-Masirah Net" and follow the reports that broadcast recorded scenes of huge quantities of money, food, and supplies being collected in Houthi events under the banner of "war effort."

cover for their theft... It reminds us of the deeds of corrupt priests[1] about whom Allah said, 'They exchange the signs (verses, evidence) of Allah for a small price.'" (Quran 9:9).

Writer and journalist Salman Al-Humaidi also highlighted some of the Houthi practices in these events in one of his articles, stating, "Since the rise of the Houthi militia and its leadership in the path of massive destruction, they have adopted the color green as their symbol. On every religious occasion, those under their control are forced to pay tributes, robbing some merchants and looting others, spending what they have plundered from the state treasury. They collect jewelry, earrings, and rings as donations from charitable women, all to adorn the devastated streets with cut green fabrics, paint the walls with green paint, and attempt to disguise the harsh reality for the destitute with this false greenery. During the Houthi era, camels adorned with green curtains were seen on the capital's streets, racing to the Bedouin lands with the speed of an eager horse. After any religious occasion, tall buildings, luxurious cars, and profitable projects appear for Houthi leaders[2]."

As for leftist journalist Nabil Sabei, he wrote a short piece that reflects what the Yemeni people endure due to this systematic policy that exacerbates the humanitarian crisis. He stated, "The Houthis use the Prophet's birthday as an opportunity for collecting taxes, taxing people's money and livelihoods."

They force all merchants, businessmen, and store owners, both large and small, to pay money in the name of the Prophet's birthday. Furthermore, they compel them to bear the expenses of celebratory banners and hang them above their shops and in the streets! In fact, they have even coerced civil organizations into celebrating the occasion. They have turned the Prophet's birthday into a compulsory celebration, or rather, into something even worse: a gross humiliation over the heads of Yemenis, an occasion for collecting their money. As the Prophet's birthday approaches, Yemenis feel the weight on their heads and in their pockets, and they grieve for what befalls them.

But what saddens them even more is what the Houthis do to the Prophet, peace be upon him, on every Prophet's birthday and every day. They use his name to shed Yemeni blood, steal their wealth, detonate their homes, and commit the most heinous crimes against them! In the name of the Prophet, they govern Yemenis... and in the name of the Prophet, they kill them, arrest them, steal from them, and violate their sanctities. Have a little mercy on the

(1) A post by Yemen's Ambassador to UNESCO, Dr. Mohammed Jumaih, on Twitter, November 1, 2019.

(2) An article by the writer Salman Al-Humaidi titled: "Why the Green?" published on the Yemen Youth website, November 23, 2018.

Prophet, you who claim to be his descendants.

Show some mercy, even just a little, towards the people and their wealth that you shed and plunder in his name, without compassion or restraint. We stand in solidarity with every Yemeni living in areas under Houthi control. But our greatest solidarity is with the Prophet, peace be upon him, against all kinds of insults and harm inflicted upon him and his name by the Houthis and those like them in the entire region(1).

Racial Collection of Al-Khums:

At a time when peoples are rising to curb racial practices, the Houthi group announced a money collection regulation based primarily on racial discrimination against Yemenis. They granted those they describe in Yemen as "Bani Hashem" (the Hashemite descendants) 20% of the country's wealth, whether on land or in the sea, private or public, based on sectarian and ethnic considerations.

The Houthis made changes to the executive regulation of the Zakat (alms) law issued in 1999, imposing a 20% tax on various assets, including treasures and minerals extracted from the earth or the sea, whether in liquid or solid form, such as gold, silver, copper, diamonds, agate, emeralds, turquoise, oil, gas, bitumen, water, salt, mercury, stones, krypton, neon, marble, and any other valuable minerals. Furthermore, everything extracted from the sea, such as fish, pearls, amber, and more, must also be subject to the tithes, allocated for the benefit of the Hashemite families under the title of "the fifth (Al-Khums)."

According to the Houthi amendments to the Zakat law, the first share goes to God Almighty, meaning it is to be spent for the public good. Naturally, those who control this matter are the Hashemite leaders of the Houthis. The second share goes to the Prophet, peace be upon him, and is intended for the ruler or governor. In this case, according to the Houthis, it is the leader of the group, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, who has full authority to dispose of Yemen's money and wealth in general, not just the fifth. The third share goes to "those close to them" (their kin), the fourth to the "orphans of the Muslims," the fifth to the "poor among the Muslims," and the sixth to the "wayfarer." In each share, priority is given to the Hashemite class, whose percentage in Yemen does not exceed 1% of the total population(2), in one of the ugliest racist acts in modern history.

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(1) A post by the writer and journalist Nabil Sabea, published on the News Yemen website, citing the author's Facebook page, November 1, 2019.

(2) The percentage was determined by Mohammed Azan, one of the founders of the "Believing Youth" organization, which was the first building block for the emergence of the Houthi group, Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper, June 12, 2020.

The Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies states that the Houthis have copied the system of the fifth that was previously used in Iran in some respects. The fifth used to be a significant source of income for Iranian clerics, and following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Supreme Leader was given absolute responsibility for religious and political affairs, with the fifth becoming a resource concentrated in the hands of the Supreme Leader. In Yemen, the sectarian political economy gradually emerged to solidify the Hashemites as dominant actors in the country since the Houthi takeover of Sana'a[1].

This racist decision has sparked a wide wave of anger among Yemenis, and there have been various official and popular reactions and positions against this step. It began with the Ministry of Human Rights, which issued a statement describing the Houthi law as "the most dangerous racist document in the modern era," as it "societally segregates exploiters from the exploited and will have catastrophic consequences for the future of rights and stability in Yemen as a whole." The ministry pointed out that "the law issued by them constitutes a serious precedent in Yemen's and Islam's history, a flagrant violation of human rights, divine laws, and contemporary universal values (...) They have divided society into Hashemites and Yemenis, allowing the Hashemites to take 20% of the wealth and possessions of Yemenis and what they earn through the sweat of their brows, in addition to 20% of the sovereign wealth, along with allocating 25% of the zakat funds to the 'for the sake of Allah' category, i.e., to fund the military and security activities of the group directed against Yemenis[2]."

Condemnations and warnings about the danger of this racial step continued, including:

- Yemeni Prime Minister Dr. Ma'een Abdulmalik: "The publication of what the Houthis have termed the Zakat law based on lineage and racial discrimination not only reveals the depth of this group's commitment to tearing apart the fabric of society and its rejection of equal citizenship values but also illustrates the extent of its contempt for the people, the world, and all opportunities and calls for peace[3]."
- Chairman of the Yemeni Shura Council, Dr. Ahmed Obaid bin Dagher: "The fifth law is a clearer expression of a disgusting sectarian and racist lineage. I do not know how advocates of rights and freedoms among Yemenis and Westerners who fervently defend the Houthis can describe this law as anything other than racist. If this law is not racist, then what is

(1) "They imposed taxes and ruled: The Houthis and the Fifth Tax," towards the establishment of the Hashemite elite, a study by the Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, October 8, 2020.

(2) "Human Rights Calls on Parliament and Popular Institutions to Confront the New Militias Law Regarding Zakat," Saba Yemeni News Agency, June 9, 2020.

(3) Post by Prime Minister Dr. Maeen Abdul-Malik on his official Twitter account, June 8, 2020.

racism?[1]"

Yemeni Minister of Information, Ma'mar Al-Eryani, stated: "They did not suffice with looting the treasury, cash reserves, and public revenues; they went on to enact racist laws to legalize the plundering and sharing of the country's wealth and the citizens' properties under the name of 'the fifth,' in a dangerous targeting of national identity, civil peace, and the incitement of ethnic tensions among the components of Yemeni society[2]."

In another statement, he said, "The recent issuance of the sectarian 'Zakat' law by the Houthi militia in the section related to 'the expenses of mines and minerals' designates the first share to 'the interests of Muslims and fortifying their ranks with weapons and supplies,' without specifying this within Yemen. This means directing the country's resources and wealth, as well as the properties of Yemenis, to finance Iranian expansionist wars and ambitions in the region and the world[3]." This is an additional indication that expanding the circle of beneficiaries of the 'fifth' revenues includes all Hashemites without specifying a branch or region or country, and this may be aimed at attracting a greater number of Hashemite families in Yemen and beyond with their various affiliations and regions.

The Yemeni House of Representatives condemned this step, stating: "What the Houthi coup militia has embarked on, with the announcement of unprecedented rules and procedures allowing them to deduct 20% of all the revenues of the Yemeni people and their natural wealth, under the name of 'the fifth' for the benefit of what they call 'the sons of Hashem,' represents a systemic racist behavior, a flagrant insult to the Yemeni people, a blatant breach of all international covenants and the values of equality and social justice, foremost among them the United Nations Charter and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination[4]."

The Yemeni Scholars' Association, the largest entity encompassing scholars and preachers in Yemen, issued a lengthy statement. Key points include:

- The Houthi group's executive regulations for the Zakat law, known as 'the fifth,' are legally and religiously invalid. They represent an abuse of the wealth of the Yemeni people.

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(1) Post by the Chairman of the Shura Council, Dr. Ahmed bin Daghr, on his official Twitter account, June 8, 2020.

(2) Al-Eryani: The Houthi Khums Law is the Worst Model of Racial Discrimination in the Modern Era, Saba Yemeni News Agency, June 8, 2020.

(3) Minister of Information: The Houthi Fifth Project Enables Iran to Access Yemen's Wealth and Resources, Saba Yemeni News Agency, June 13, 2020.

(4) "Presidency of the House of Representatives: The Name (Fifth) is Considered a Systematic Racist Behavior and a Violation of International Agreements," Saba Yemeni News Agency, June 13, 2020.

- These regulations have no basis in the Quran or the Sunnah of the Prophet, in addition to contradicting the Yemeni constitution and the laws derived from constitutional institutions.
- The Houthi group uses this regulation to "illegally consume the people's wealth, aiming to enable a clan to monopolize the wealth of the Yemeni people, and it is well known that what is built upon falsehood is false[1]."

The National Alliance of Yemeni Political Parties and Political Forces, an alliance uniting Yemen's major political parties[2], issued a lengthy statement rejecting the racial measures. Key points include:

- The steps taken by the Houthi coup militias towards imposing their sectarian racial project represent a blatant declaration of racial discrimination against Yemenis, in favor of the Houthi lineage, with the aim of reviving the Imamate system and its hateful history.
- Imposing such taxes constitutes another crime added to the list of crimes committed by the Houthi militias against the Yemeni people and their national gains, which affirms that these militias would not have taken such a step without international negligence towards their daily crimes and destructive behavior. This also highlights the international community's neglect of the cultural and intellectual dimension of these militias in their war against Yemenis, which is based on supposed concepts of selectivity and sectarian discrimination, wherein they grant themselves the exclusive right to rule over Yemen without the Yemeni people.
- Throughout the years of its coup, the militia has deliberately revived these backward racist concepts on various levels, even going so far as to issue decrees for their implementation, taking advantage of the preoccupations of Yemenis facing humanitarian crises resulting from the war imposed on them for the past six years[3].

A group of Yemeni intellectuals and writers issued a statement condemning these measures, even though they live in areas under Houthi control. The statement reads: "Our Arab and Islamic region has not

(1) "Yemeni Scholars: The Houthis Confiscate Money Under the Name of (Fifth)," Arabi 21 Website, June 12, 2020.

(2) The National Alliance for Yemeni Political Forces brings together the prominent Yemeni parties and new components, including the General People's Congress, the Yemeni Reform Party, the Yemeni Socialist Party, the Nasserite Organization, the Peaceful Southern Movement, Justice and Building, the Yemeni Shura Union, the Movement for Peaceful Change Renaissance, the National Solidarity Party, the Union of Popular Forces, the Yemeni Unity Rally, the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, the Peace and Development Party, the Republican Party, the Democratic People's Party, and the National Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party.

(3) "Political Parties and Forces Condemn the Houthis' Imposition of the So-Called (Fifth) and Consider It a Dedication of Their Sectarian and Racist Approach," Saba Yemeni News Agency, June 11, 2020.

witnessed a religious reform movement that touches the essence and reconciles between the values of justice and the texts that are manipulated for the benefit of a thought that elevates the importance of the ethnic group at the expense of society and elevates the sect at the expense of justice and the values of equality. In this context, the ongoing debate in this blue space concerning the alleged Zakat law failed to gain approval from the House of Representatives. They resorted to imposing it through the majority logic at the expense of equality... The Zakat law project exclusively grants the fifth of the minerals to a specific racial classification, a fact that grants this system, which we are experiencing in Sana'a, the distinction of racism. It contradicts the values of equality and justice and violates the constitutional texts that place what lies beneath the earth and the national wealth as the exclusive property of the people. The strange thing is that all these racist practices pass without objection from within the ruling system. This means that we are living in a situation worse than ever in Yemen's history. Thus, we strongly condemn any approach that seeks to diminish the values of justice and call on the wise among the Houthis to initiate a review of the legal system that diminishes the values of justice and equality, working against the constitution and human achievements in this context, especially international agreements related to human rights(1)."

The Arab Parliament also issued a statement condemning the 'fifth'(Al-Khumas) document, describing the actions of the Houthi group as "systematic and rejected racist behavior," as it impairs the dignity and humanity of the Yemeni people and constitutes a blatant violation of the constitution, international covenants, and the values of equality and social justice(2).

The American lawyer and human rights activist, Irina Tsukerman, considered the imposition of the 'fifth' tax as "the first step toward organizing land ownership, properties, and natural resources to support Iran's geopolitical agenda." She pointed out that there is another political dimension to this move, aimed at "reviving the Hashemite origin concept of rulers and religious authorities in an attempt to remove Arab governments that stand in the way of the Islamic Republic's domination and control over the ultimate prize: Mecca and Medina(3)."

The widespread rejection of this discriminatory decree was not just about the Yemenis objecting to the estimated 20% levy. The Houthi rebels have naturally taken everything, leaving the Yemeni people with nothing, and the

(1) "Statement by Intellectuals on the Ongoing Debate about the So-Called Zakat and Fifth Law," Yemenat News Website, June 11, 2020.

(2) "The Arab Parliament Condemns the (Fifth) Document Issued by the Houthi Militia," Saba Yemeni News Agency, June 25, 2020.

(3) "Houthi Tax in the Iranian Geopolitical Strategy Center," Irina Tsukerman, The Nator for Studies and Research Center, July 20, 2020.

purpose of the Houthi's fifth law is to create a new pretext for looting. But the heart of the criticism for this decree lies in its racist dimension, as it invokes class and ethnicity within society, which the Yemenis had overcome over half a century ago. In practice, the decree divides citizens into Sayyids (masters) who possess high social status and immense wealth and "slaves" who can barely meet their basic needs by serving the "Hashemite masters." This is the essence of the Houthi ideology based on distinguishing the Hashemites in Yemen according to fabricated religious texts. This distinction leads to additional political, economic, and social privileges for a specific ethnicity, which completely contradicts the principles of the noble Islamic faith and clashes with the universally accepted values of equality, freedom, and justice. All humans are equal in their rights and responsibilities.

In the face of strong rejection of this Houthi decision, the Houthis were forced to justify this step by using some religious texts, which they interpreted in a way that portrays Islam as a racist religion that distinguishes and venerates a specific lineage over the rest of humanity.

In an interview with BBC, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, the head of the so-called "Supreme Political Council" affiliated with the Houthis, responded to critics of the khums decree by saying, "Khums is a jurisprudential matter related to the jurisprudential and Islamic aspect. What was approved is the same as the law approved in 1999, and no other law was approved. It exists in the Republic of Yemen and in Arab and Islamic countries. If the khums mentioned in the Quran is racist, then you are criticizing the Holy Quran and criticizing the true Islamic teachings. I do not advise the BBC to be a platform for such criticism(1)."

Likewise, the Houthi mufti, Shams al-Din Sharaf al-Din, likened the families claiming to be Hashemite in Yemen to "Salih's she-camel," which he said was given a special portion of water every other day as a test from God for the Yemenis, not out of racism. He claimed that handing over these resources under the banner of "khums" to the Hashemites, excluding others in Yemen, is "submission by the order of God, a test, not racism." He argued that opposing the khums is due to missteps and lack of divine guidance(2).

The statements of the Houthis and Sharaf al-Din do not refrain from excommunicating Yemenis who reject this racist use of religion to justify the looting of Yemenis' wealth by an ethnic group. This has led many Yemenis to respond to these claims, starting with a statement from the

(1) "Unrestricted" with Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, a Leader in the Houthi Ansar Allah Movement, BBC News Arabic, June 14, 2020.

(2) Friday Sermon at Shawkani Mosque by the Houthi Mufti Shams al-Din Sharaf al-Din on the Fifth Law and Its Consideration as a Right of the Hashemites in Yemen, Broadcast on Al-Masirah Channel, the Houthi-affiliated news site Nashwan News, June 15, 2020.

Yemeni Scholars Association, which affirmed that the Houthi decree is void in terms of Sharia and law, and it has no basis in the Holy Quran or the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), in addition to contradicting the Yemeni constitution and laws.

The Houthi rebels lie by claiming that the Yemeni Zakat law for the year 1999 mentions that the 'fifth' belongs to them. In fact, the 'fifth' is mentioned in the Quran and as practiced during the era of the rightly guided caliphs after the Prophet Muhammad's (peace be upon him) time, where it went to benefit the state. It is not as interpreted by the Houthis in this decree, where they allocate this portion of wealth to the Hashemites. This claim implies that these families represent God and His Prophet, which is an affront to the Islamic religion and a distortion of its teachings.

If the Houthi interpretation of the 'fifth' in the 1999 Yemeni law, which they are trying to impose on the Yemeni people today, was what they claim it to be, why did they make changes to the decree? If it was an existing law, they would have left it unchanged.

This Houthi move has been shocking to many Yemenis because it is both embarrassing and illogical to assert currently that a particular lineage has rights and a share in the various wealth of Yemen based on their faith and the opinions of their ancestors. This approach contradicts the principle of equitable economic and social balance in the state, where wealth is redistributed between the rich and the poor. The Houthi interpretation of the 'fifth' undermines the principle of wealth distribution justice, as defined in the current Yemeni constitution, which regards all wealth as state property, meaning it belongs to the people and must be distributed equally among all Yemenis, without exception, to achieve justice(1).

Despite the strong opposition to this move, the Houthi group has already enforced the 'fifth' collection on many traders and private businesses without announcing it, in addition to other taxes and levies imposed on them. For example, owners of rock quarries and producers of 'Nis and Kari'(2) products, as well as owners of water pumps, mineral water companies, and poultry farms, were surprised by the financial charges imposed on their products and operations. This directly led to an exorbitant increase in the prices of these products(3).

As per what was published on the Al-Masdar Online website, a well-known Yemeni news source, the Houthi rebels have placed their elements

(1) Article (8) of the Yemeni Republic Constitution states: "All types of natural resources and energy sources existing in the earth, above it, in the territorial waters, continental shelf, and the exclusive economic zone are the property of the state, and they are to be exploited in the public interest." From the website of the National Information Center under the President of the Republic.

(2) Nis and Karri is a term for graded sand particles (raw materials) used in construction.

(3) The Houthis imposed the fifth (tax) in areas under their control on crushers' owners, water factories, even stone quarries and chicken farms. Source: Al-Masdar Online, June 12, 2020.

within large factories to monitor and determine the total production and the proportion of the 'fifth' imposed on them. In return for this, they distributed a sum of 200,000 Yemeni rials to everyone, regardless of age, from those belonging to the Hashemite families who support them during the month of Ramadan. The website noted, citing its sources, that these amounts are part of the 'fifth' mentioned in the decree issued by the Houthis, which they imposed through the Council of Representatives under their control(1).

At the beginning of the year 2022, owners of rock quarries in the Beni Jarimuz area of the Beni al-Harith directorate, located north of Sana'a, went on strike for several days in the stone quarries(2) and 'Nis' (sand) after continuous demands by the Houthis to hand over the 'fifth' from inside the quarries. This extortion continued and affected many private enterprises and projects, including steam baths in Sana'a, which were forced to deliver the 'fifth' of their revenue at the end of each year. This is a strange occurrence that had not happened until this group came into power.

In October 2022, a video of the parliamentarian Yahya Al-Qadi was circulated, showing him presenting a protest during a session of the parliament under Houthi control against the Houthi's looting of citizens' money under the name of the 'fifth' in the Beni Hashish directorate north of Sana'a. On that day, he said, "The General Authority for Zakat imposes the 'fifth' on the drivers of 'Niss' trucks, quarries, and the Mufti gives fatwas as they want (referring to the Houthi Mufti) ... he has no integrity. On the tractor (truck), 12,500 Yemeni rials, and there are a thousand tractors... so they want 25 or 30 million rials a day, and this will ultimately affect and be passed on to the citizens. Today it is Nis, Kari, stones (types of aggregates), and tomorrow it might be water, and the day after, petroleum derivatives, and so on(3)."

In the Dhamar Governorate, which is about 100 kilometers south of the capital Sana'a, the Houthis have devised more than one method to collect the 'fifth' from farmers, and this has become a widespread and well-known phenomenon. The journalist and media personality Abdullah Al-Sanami summed up the suffering of the people in his village due to the Houthi 'fifth' collection, saying, "Amid the Houthi savagery over the Yemenis, starting with property and ending with thought, there is a systematic Houthi continuation of taking the 'fifth' from the people's crop, using made-up names, including 5% instead of the 'fifth.' In our village, Sanam, which relies on the production of the Modarar Valley water, drilling for water

(1) Sana'a... Crusher owners go on strike in protest the Houthi militia's taxes. Source: Al-Masdar Online, January 15, 2022.

(2) The Houthi militia imposes the fifth (tax) on public baths in Sana'a. Source: Yemeni Scene, January 4, 2021.

(3) Parliament member Yahya Al-Qadi speaks in the Sana'a Parliament about Houthi violations against the people of Sarf. Source: YouTube, October 22, 2022.

gradually stopped since 2011. People resorted to digging hand wells to extract water to irrigate their crops, despite the high psychological and financial costs, and the scarcity of water that doesn't meet their needs. Then, two days ago, people were surprised by Houthi groups roaming the village, abducting 20 citizens without any charges, and taking them to prison. In the prison, they were given a choice: pay 5% of the crop produced from these wells or stay in prison. The Houthis consider the underground water to be their property, and if you want to irrigate, pay the 'fifth.' At a time when logic tells you to deter them from such actions, you remember that they consider religion their right, acting as agents of heaven. At that moment, you realize it's foolishness and the very thing that exhausts those who try to deal with them. Treating the Houthis as human beings or reformable is like turning a massive rock from the bottom of a mountain to its top(1)."

The Houthi rebels had executed a mass abduction campaign in the past against the residents of the village of Al-Sunam, which belongs to the Juhran district, to force them to pay the fifth on their agricultural crops in exchange for irrigating their farms from their private hand-dug wells(2).

As is evident, the Houthi imposition of the fifth isn't limited to deductions from the wealth of Yemenis; it contributes to raising product prices. This is due to the obligation placed on factory owners to pay the fifth to the Hashemites. This step is one of the reasons for the exacerbation of the humanitarian situation in Yemen.

Illegal Collections of Fees:

In addition to the systematic and organized looting operations carried out by the Houthi rebels, there is random looting carried out by armed elements loyal to the Houthis. They exploit the state's security, judicial, influence, power, and status that anyone associated with this group enjoys.

This type of looting depends on the mood and dominance of influential Houthi elements and the awareness and ability of victims to defend their rights, properties, and protect them. The forms and methods of this looting vary, and the victims vary as well. Examples include land seizures in remote areas benefiting armed Houthi elements, imposing various taxes or arbitrarily confiscating goods from small and medium-sized shop owners with or without reason, but by force and superiority. This also includes imposing money at checkpoints, especially on long-distance roads between provinces, as well as looting the furniture of opponents' homes and their valuable possessions, along with confiscating the properties of private and

(1) A post by journalist Abdullah Al-Sanami on his Facebook page, October 20, 2022.
(2) A post by the "Yemeni Network for Rights and Freedoms" organization on its Twitter page, October 22, 2022.

public companies and institutions.

Houthi elements and supervisors impose payments on citizens who are constructing their private homes. Additionally, they pay official institutions controlled by the Houthis in exchange for construction permits. The Houthis increased these fees by 500%.

A truck driver who transports construction rocks, "Nis," "Gravel," "Cement," or sometimes furniture from one province to another, informed me that they are now required to pay unofficial taxes to each armed checkpoint affiliated with the Houthi rebels along the roads they traverse, even though these checkpoints lack any services and are semi-destroyed. It has become a belief that traveling on public roads now comes at a cost that they must pay to Houthi elements, a situation that has never occurred in Yemen's history.

This extortion that this driver faces applies to the rest of the truck drivers who transport goods and agricultural products from one province to another. It negatively impacts the prices of these goods and products. All the funds taken from traders and drivers turn into operational expenses that are added to the prices, contributing to the worsening of the humanitarian situation in Yemen over the years of the war.

These random looting operations are carried out under the supervision of Houthi leadership. They consider these practices as a means of imposing the authority of the ruling group and their iron grip. It also eases the burden of providing for the needs and requirements of their elements scattered everywhere.

Like other Houthi looting methods, we can find references to them in historical accounts that document the suffering of Yemenis during the reign of the forefathers of the Houthi movement. The Yemeni poet and historian Abdullah Al-Bardoni described some of these practices, saying, "Imam Yahya [historical Yemeni Imam] would never stay away from any village or region for long. His officials and soldiers would sweep through the country, feeling what was happening and gaining the fruit of what grew and moved. The tax collector would arrive when the crop ripened, followed by the confiscator at harvest time. He would be followed by the investigator on the confiscator, and then the military officer to collect the rest. This continuous contact with the people by the Imam lasted throughout the year through officials and soldiers. It became more intense if events occurred or conflicts escalated[(1)]."

He further described the Imam's method of collecting taxes from Yemenis as one of the harshest forms of oppression and persecution against the farmers, "Not only due to the pre-estimation of the yield before harvest

(1) Abdullah Al-Bardoni, Yemeni Issues, p. 64.

or the necessity to cover the expenses of the mission members but also due to their exposure to psychological and sometimes physical oppression from the Imam's soldiers. Just hearing about the arrival of this mission to any area would stir fear and panic among its residents[1]."

(1) Traditional Social Strata in Yemeni Society, Modern Printing, Publishing and Distribution House, in collaboration with the Yemeni Center for Studies and Research, Sana'a, First Edition, 1986, p. 218. Quoted from the book "Al-Hadawiyya: Between Political Theory and Divine Belief" by the author and researcher Thabit Al-Ahmadi.

Chapter Three
The Crime and Suffering of Forced Displacement

There is false information circulating among many media agencies and international organizations regarding the war in Yemen. One of the most prominent claims is that the war began in September 2014 when the Houthis took control of Sana'a, or in March 2015 following the intervention of the Arab coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These claims are contrary to the truth, as the war began on June 18, 2004, after the Houthis killed three soldiers(1) in clashes between local authorities in Sa'ada Governorate and the supporters of "Believing Youth Forum" led by Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi(2).

As a result of these confrontations, a series of displacement and migration of residents from the districts of Haidan and Saqin in the governorate began out of fear of shelling, injuries from the confrontations, or due to retaliatory actions carried out by the Houthi group against tribes and individuals who refused to support them and stand with them in these confrontations.

When discussing the war in Yemen, it is essential to point out the systematic and forced displacement of Yemenis based on sectarian motives. The victims of this crime are often those who refused to submit to the Houthi group politically and culturally. They are displaced directly or indirectly, not necessarily because they fought against the Houthis, but mostly as civilians who were displaced due to their religious beliefs and their rejection of the Houthi's racist ideology(3).

The term "forced displacement" is usually absent from the discourse of the media and international organizations, even though the majority of those who left their areas were forcibly displaced, either through the forced deportation of residents from their residential areas directly or indirectly, by pressuring, intimidating, oppressing, and depriving people of their rights, which led them to leave their homes and migrate. These individuals

(1) Before the Houthi takeover of Sana'a, the group viewed the Yemeni army as working for a puppet and treacherous regime on behalf of America and Israel. Due to continuous incitement in the group's rhetoric against Yemeni soldiers, friction began with elements of the army at security points in Saada, and the first victims occurred, igniting a war that lasted for many years.

(2) Source: "The Six Wars of the Houthis... A Historical Perspective," Al Jazeera Net, October 21, 2009.

(3) Forced displacement is defined as "a systematic practice carried out by governments, quasi-military forces, or fanatical groups towards racial, religious, or sectarian groups with the aim of evacuating specific territories and replacing them with other population groups." Forced displacement can either be direct, such as forcibly relocating residents from their areas, or indirect, by pressuring and intimidating people to leave and migrate using coercion and persecution. It falls under the category of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. Source: Al Jazeera Net.

represent the majority.

The waves of displacement and forced migration were limited in the first, second, and third wars. However, the Houthis moved into the areas of Matra and Naqah, which border the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. These areas are desolate, uninhabited, fortified by a series of mountains, and have access to water. The Houthis stationed themselves there for a period and used these areas as camps to train their armed elements. When they returned to populated areas, many families were forced to leave the Houthi-controlled areas after those who refused to support them in previous wars were subjected to executions, assassinations, abductions, and enforced disappearances. The Houthis also imposed levies and zakat (Islamic alms) on the residents of the areas where they were present, including Razih, Ghamr, Maran, Fawt, and Majz. Among those who were targeted during this period were Salem Darham, Abdullah Ali Qasim (known as Al-Mu'allem), Mohammed Shaie Qasim, Faiz Ali Dhafar Hadi, and citizens from the Qashqash and Hamati families in the Zoor Falah area. Yahya Qaroush and his family were also annihilated in the Riba Al-Hudud area. In addition, numerous members of the Walad Amer tribes, led by Sheikh Ali Dhafar, were assassinated, and they experienced mass displacement after being besieged with force and subjected to months of war, according to testimonies obtained from some of the displaced residents of Sa'ada Governorate.

During this period, many families were displaced from the villages and districts where the Houthis were present in Sa'ada to the center of Sa'ada Governorate (the city) and its surroundings, which was under the control of the Yemeni government during that time. After the Houthi group took control of the center of the governorate on March 19, 2011, they targeted all the families known for not supporting their ideology. They destroyed 43 homes in the city, including the Al-Habishi family's home in Sa'ada, where 16 women and children were inside. This attack resulted in the deaths of 14 people, including five women and seven children(1). These crimes forced many families to leave Sa'ada out of fear of being targeted or having the Houthi ideology forcibly imposed on them through the power of arms.

Similar experiences were faced by residents of some areas in the Amran, Al-Jawf, and Hajjah governorates during the same period when the Houthis entered those areas.

When the displaced individuals from Sa'ada and the neighboring governorates arrived in the capital, Sana'a, they began demanding the return of state institutions in Sa'ada and the disarmament of the Houthis, so they could return to their homes that the Houthis had seized or destroyed. They

(1) Yemen: House Explosions as the Houthi Method of Revenge, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, February 21, 2016.

issued several statements emphasizing the need to "address the situation of the internally displaced people from Sa'ada and Harf Sufyan, especially citizens who face procedural abuses and cannot return due to their initial national stances[1]."

These displaced people from the mentioned areas, who settled in Hajjah and the capital, Sana'a, faced difficult living and psychological conditions due to the government's negligence in fulfilling its duties towards them. However, the situation did not stop there. The Houthi group began carrying out assassinations of tribal, media, and human rights figures who were prominent residents of Sa'ada in Sana'a, known for their opposition to the Houthis in the media and human rights institutions. They assassinated Abdulrahman Thabit and attempted to assassinate Ghayeb Hawas and Sha'iq Al-Marani.

According to a study by the Executive Unit for Camp Management in Yemen, the displacement and forced migration were associated with the Houthi's control over areas in Sa'ada, Hajjah, Amran, and then Sana'a, culminating in their arrival in Aden in March 2015[2]. In other words, what happened in Sa'ada and its surroundings occurred in all the governorates the Houthis passed through, causing the displacement and forced migration of hundreds of thousands.

On March 21, 2015, the Houthi rebels declared what was called "general mobilization," thereby diverting all state funds for the benefit of their military operations in Taiz and the south. On March 26, the Arab coalition intervened, and the confrontations expanded to liberate the country's capital from Houthi control. As a result of the war's expansion, the number of displaced and forcibly displaced people increased, reaching 4.2 million individuals, according to the United Nations[3]. Yemen was considered the fourth-largest country experiencing displacement in the world during 2021. The Republic of the Congo was ranked first, followed by Syria in second place, and Ethiopia in third[4].

The Houthis displaced Salafis from the city of Damaj in Sa'ada and forced most leaders and activists from the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, the General People's Congress Party, the Nasserite Unified Organization, and the Yemeni Socialist Party, among other Yemeni parties and independents. This displacement continued for seven years of war, in

(1) Statement issued during a protest in front of the Prime Minister's office building in Sana'a, carried out by the residents of Saada province and its neighboring areas in Amran and Al-Jawf directorates.

(2) Multisectoral Study on Internally Displaced Persons in Yemen (Baseline Study), Executive Unit for the Management of IDP Camps in Yemen, December 2021.

(3) Tweet from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Yemen on their official Twitter account, January 2, 2022.

(4) "Number of IDPs in the world reaches record high of 55m," AL JAZEERA, May 20, 2021.

addition to the forced exile of Jews and Bahá'ís and the looting of their properties.

The destruction of opponents' homes is one of the prominent methods used by the Houthi group to displace Yemenis. The Houthis impose the departure of those whose homes were destroyed, thus frightening the rest of the population, and pushing many of them to leave their areas to avoid suffering the same fate. According to the Yemeni Alliance for Monitoring Human Rights Violations (Rasd Alliance), the number of homes and facilities that have been destroyed since 2014 alone exceeds 922 homes and facilities in several Yemeni provinces, with the highest numbers in Taiz, followed by Al-Bayda and Ibb(1). These destroyed properties include the homes of tribal, political, and military leaders, as well as journalists and human rights activists. However, this statistic does not include homes destroyed before the period between 2007 and 2014 when hundreds of homes were destroyed.

It is essential to note that those who flee towards Houthi-controlled areas to escape the conflict zones where they face bombings have the option to return to their homes located in government-controlled areas. Many have returned during ceasefire periods or when hostilities ceased because their displacement was voluntary, driven by the fear of conflict and bombings in areas known to be Houthi strongholds. However, the majority of those who left their homes located in Houthi-controlled areas, whether to government-controlled areas in Yemen or abroad, are considered forcibly displaced. They were compelled to leave their homeland not due to natural disasters, missiles, or armed confrontations but because of the presence of an ethnic sectarian group imposing its ideology using force, causing hunger, persecution, enforced disappearance, torture, incitement, and other means. This explains why the majority of those who fled from their homes in Sa’ada since the beginning of the war in 2004, up to the time of writing this text, have settled in government-controlled areas, not Houthi-controlled areas, even though the war and conflict have expanded beyond the borders of Sa’ada Governorate.

What confirms this is that many displaced families have been forced to move more than once. During the Sa’ada wars, they moved from their villages to Sa’ada city. After the Houthi takeover of Sa’ada city, they moved to the governorates of Amran and Hajjah. This did not last long before they relocated to Sana’a following the Houthi advance into these governorates. They then left Sana’a for Ma'rib or Aden, and so on, all to escape Houthi oppression. Each time they are displaced from their homes, they lose their belongings and are forced to sell their valuable possessions to secure their

(1) "Houthis demolish the homes of their opponents... A Crime from the Era of the Coup," Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, July 29, 2021.

basic needs, such as food and medical supplies[1].

The largest concentration of internally displaced people in Yemen, in terms of the number of displaced and forcibly displaced individuals, is in Marib Governorate (Eastern Yemen), followed by Taiz Governorate (Central Yemen) and Hodeidah Governorate (Western Yemen), all of which are areas under the internationally recognized Yemeni government's control. As for the displaced individuals in areas controlled by the Houthi rebels, there are no accurate published statistics indicating the actual numbers. When inquired about the reasons for withholding this information, sources working in United Nations organizations explained to me that the Houthis exaggerate the numbers of displaced people in their areas to increase the aid they receive. Due to the situation of these organizations' offices in Sana'a, where they are essentially held hostage, they cannot verify the statistics provided to them in the field, just as they cannot confirm the fate of the aid they provide to institutions under Houthi control. This was previously discussed in the section on the work of international organizations.

For example, the Houthis provided statistics to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) claiming that the number of displaced individuals from Marib Governorate, which is under the Yemeni government's control, who have fled to Houthi-controlled areas, reached 1,026,732 people. This number cannot be logical, considering that the original population of Marib Governorate is estimated to be around 376,086 people. How could the number of displaced people from there exceed one million people? OCHA also relied on data provided by the Houthi group, claiming that the number of people leaving the districts of Dar Saad, Al-Buraiqah, and Al-Makha amounted to 26,157, 36,180, and 28,049, respectively. These numbers are unrealistic and inaccurate. According to the Houthi statistics used by OCHA, the number of people displaced from areas controlled by the Yemeni government to Houthi-controlled areas reached 2,712,770 individuals, which is also an untrue number. The Houthis constantly present this number to increase support from organizations in the name of the displaced. The Yemeni government has filed an official protest this misleading information and has confirmed that the data it provides is backed by the existence of displaced camps, unlike the Houthi group, which cannot substantiate the data it presents[2].

To illustrate the suffering resulting from displacement and forced migration, I will focus on the internally displaced people (IDPs) in the city of Marib as a model for data, statistics, and information that can be used.

According to a document issued by the Central Statistics Organization in Marib Governorate on December 21, 2021, the number of internally

(1) Endless Displacement in Yemen, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed Newspaper, July 17, 2020.
(2) Official government document.

displaced people in the governorate is 2,212,992 individuals. The document also noted that approximately 350,000 people moved to the governorate due to economic conditions rather than forcibly. In addition, there are around 35,000 people who are illegal migrants from African countries. These are very large numbers compared to the resources and capacities of the governorate.

Originally, the infrastructure in Marib Governorate (electricity, water, roads, healthcare institutions, education, and more) was extremely weak before the war, and it could not meet the needs of half of the original population. With the influx of IDPs and forcibly displaced individuals, the burdens on the governorate increased significantly, resulting in many IDPs and displaced individuals being deprived of most of their basic needs.

I personally spoke with the responsible authority for the camps in Marib, Khalid Al-Shujni, and he confirmed that all the forcibly displaced individuals, numbering over two million, were displaced due to Houthi persecution, threats, incitement, or some of them were forcibly hidden, or at least one family member. They also left their homes in Houthi-controlled areas because they refused to accept the ideology that the Houthis are forcibly propagating. As for those displaced or migrating due to economic conditions, their number does not exceed 350,000 individuals.

The number of IDP and forcibly displaced camps in Marib is 183. The percentage of those present in these camps is 11% of the total displaced population within the governorate. This means that approximately 89% of IDPs are dispersed throughout the host community in neighborhoods, districts, farms, and rural areas.

Since the infrastructure in Marib cannot accommodate these staggering numbers, as mentioned earlier, the suffering of IDPs and forcibly displaced individuals continues to worsen, especially with their increasing numbers due to the ongoing Houthi attempts to control Marib City and the continuous attacks on the adjacent directorates.

One can imagine the immense suffering of these large numbers of IDPs and forcibly displaced individuals in a governorate where about half of its original population before the war already suffered from the lack of schools, electricity, clean drinking water, healthcare, environmental sanitation, and other necessities. This is undoubtedly boundless suffering.

International organizations provide only a small portion of the basic needs for IDPs and forcibly displaced individuals in the camps, while the vast majority in Marib are ignored. This has led hundreds of thousands of IDPs and forcibly displaced individuals to be deprived of comprehensive food security and healthcare. Many children remain outside of schools, and many of them have suffered various damages due to the disasters caused by seasonal rainfall floods and severe cold waves. The lack of resources to

provide them with warmth has resulted in the deaths of numerous displaced children.

According to reports and publications from the Public Health Bureau and Protection Management Unit in Marib Governorate, several deaths and health consequences due to severe cold and the lack of necessary resources were recorded among internally displaced people (IDPs) during November and the first half of December 2021. This included three child deaths and 12,602 individuals suffering from cold-related illnesses(1).

Moving to the western regions, the conditions, reasons, and motivations for the displacement and forced migration of Yemenis who choose to stay away from Houthi-controlled areas, especially in liberated regions like Al-Makha and Ad Durayhimi, are similar. However, the sources of suffering and challenges may differ slightly.

While the IDPs and forcibly displaced individuals in Marib suffer due to severe cold, along with the lack of access to food, healthcare, and education, those in Hodeidah face similar poverty and needs for essential services. The high temperatures in Hodeidah pose a significant health risk, especially for children, women, and elderly people who live in makeshift shelters, tents, and open spaces in these areas.

Severe cold contributes to the spread of diseases, especially among these vulnerable populations. High temperatures also lead to various health issues, including heat-related illnesses and skin problems.

The conditions in IDP camps in these areas, which lack basic safety measures, have also resulted in multiple fire incidents that destroyed many of the IDPs' tents and shelters(2).

Since the escalation of the war in 2015, thousands of families have been displaced from different areas along the western coast, from Hajjah in the north to Al-Makha in the south. The most recent displacement occurred in March 2022. According to the Mwatana Organization for Human Rights, there have been reports from residents in the Al-Jarahi district, which is under Houthi control south of Al Hodeidah, confirming cases of forced displacement for the residents of villages such as Al-Ghushwa, Bani Shuaib, Al-Akda, Bani Al-Khaloof, and Al-Khobat. These violations have added new suffering for families forcibly displaced from their homes and increased the burden on host communities and humanitarian organizations already suffering from a lack of funding(3).

(1) Report titled "Cold as the Cause of Death... Freezing to Death in the IDP Camps, with Children as Victims of the Disaster," issued by the Executive Unit for IDP Camps in Ma'rib Governorate, December 2021.

(2) Fire breaks out in a displaced persons camp in the city of "Al-Khokha" in Al-Hodeidah, western Yemen, Yemen Monitor, April 8, 2021.

(3) Miun: Houthi Forced Displacement of Civilians from the Villages of Al-Jarahi in southern Al-Hodeidah, West Coast website, March 15, 2022.

Forced Displacement Abroad:

The systematic displacement carried out by the Houthi forces during the years of the ignited war has driven hundreds of thousands to settle in various Yemeni governorates, such as Marib, Taiz, Aden, Hadramout, Al-Mahra, Shabwa, Abyan, and Dhale. It has also compelled a vast number of Yemenis to leave Yemen altogether, with many of them settling in various Arab, Islamic, and Western countries. Among these countries are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Oman, Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Somalia, Ethiopia, various European countries, and the United States.

The reasons for fleeing Houthi-controlled areas have not been limited to intimidation, incitement, harassment, targeting, and the imposition of their beliefs. Deliberate starvation, non-payment of salaries, and the humiliation of the Yemeni people have also driven many to risk their lives to reach Europe in search of a dignified life.

Media outlets have documented painful events that have revealed some of the suffering experienced by young Yemenis in their journey by land and sea to reach European countries, including the Netherlands, Germany, France, Belgium, and Sweden. Some of these journeys have ended in tragedy, with individuals drowning in the Atlantic Ocean, succumbing to freezing conditions at the Polish-Belarusian border, or falling victim to criminal gangs operating in the deserts of Libya.

The case of the Yemeni Olympic champion, Captain Hilal Al-Hajj (may he rest in peace), can be seen as a glaring example of the policy of starvation practiced by the Houthi group against Yemenis to push them to the frontlines of the conflict or to promote their ideology within the community.

Hilal Al-Hajj was a member of the Yemeni national Kung Fu team from 2010. He won the Republic Championship consecutively until 2017, the Arab Championship from 2012 to 2018, and several Asian and Olympic championships.

According to a personal testimony provided by his brother, Saeed Al-Hajj, who resides in France, Hilal returned to Yemen after winning a bronze medal in the Islamic Solidarity Games in Azerbaijan. He was contacted by Houthi leader Hassan Zeid, who was then the Minister of Youth and Sports in the Houthi government(1). Zeid requested that he come to the Ministry of Youth and Sports to receive his dues and be honored as an international

(1) Previously, Houthi leader Hassan Mohammed Zeid publicly called for the closure of schools, the recruitment of children, and sending them to the frontlines to settle the battle. The United Nations considered this as an indication of the Houthis' continued recruitment of children and their use in the conflict. The UN expert team in Yemen in 2018, a previous reference, paragraph 126, page 350.

champion. However, when he arrived at the ministry, he was not given any recognition or financial compensation. When he met with Hassan Zeid and requested his financial dues to support his sports career representing Yemen, the Houthi leader refused to release these dues and threatened to take him to the battlefront.

After this encounter, Hilal Al-Hajj found himself with no options, and there was no future for him in Yemen unless he became loyal to the Houthis or participated in the fighting with them. He decided to travel to Europe by sea, passing through Morocco, and tragically drowned off the coast of Melilla, Spain, on September 16, 2019.

What the international champion Hilal Al-Hajj experienced was endured by millions of Yemenis during the years of the war. Most opportunities for young people were systematically closed off, unrelated to the consequences of the war, and the only choices offered were to join the battlefront or accept cultural genocide in exchange for promoting the Houthi ideology. This has driven many to leave their regions.

As for those who remained, they chose not to engage in contentious issues, whether political or religious, to preserve their lives and meet their basic livelihood needs. They live in coexistence with the harsh and difficult reality. These individuals pay the price in various and multiple ways, with the least of these being sending their children to schools to be indoctrinated forcibly with the Houthi beliefs. Consequently, they are deprived of their right to their beliefs and are subjected to what we previously described as "cultural genocide."

Forced displacement and exile are considered characteristics of the rule of the imams in Yemen. The imams were known for punishing Yemenis who rejected their rule by exiling them from Yemen or forcing them to leave indirectly. Many Yemenis historically faced these tactics by this dynasty, which sought support from the Tabari and Daylam forces from outside Yemen to suppress any Yemeni uprisings.

In the year 1101 AH - 1690 CE, Imam Muhammad bin Ahmed, known as "Sahib al-Mawahib," tortured the Hamdan al-Sughra tribe after their sheikh, Jaber bin Ali Khalil, refused to submit to him. When the pressure on them increased, they declared a revolt, with the support of the Bani al-Harith and Bani Hashish tribes. This led to the defeat of Sheikh Jaber and the execution of him and several tribal elders. Part of the Hamdan tribe was exiled to India after their wealth and property were looted. Mohsen bin Hassan al-Qasim, known as Abu Talib[1], described the events: "The imam mobilized his

(1) Muhsin bin al-Hasan al-Qasim (Abu Talib) is an Imamite historian who belongs to the same lineage, thereby confirming the commission of this historical crime against a portion of the Hamdan tribe in Yemen. This incident was presented in the context of boasting about what Imam Muhammad bin Ahmed (the owner of talents) had committed.

armies and filled the areas with his troops, and by spilling their blood, he established his authority." He added, "After taking control and winning the valuable pot, the Imam expelled Hamdan from their land and sent them over the sea. They reached India and China, and he ordered the waste of their blood and the destruction of every fortress they had[1]."

Captives and Human Trafficking:

This process can be described as civilian hostage-taking for ransom, a crime that occurs in many countries around the world. In Yemen, it is practiced in a more hideous and complex manner, often under political, sectarian, and ethnic banners. Perpetrators claim that such crimes against Yemenis are committed in the name of "liberating Jerusalem," fighting "America and Israel," combating corruption, promoting "faith-based identity," and other slogans.

While some authoritarian regimes worldwide may simply hide and possibly torture their opponents, the hidden and kidnapped individuals in Houthi prisons since the emergence of the group in Sa'ada are subjected to enforced disappearance, continuous torture, and extortion of their victims' families.

Families of the forcibly disappeared and kidnapped individuals in Yemen suffer from difficult living conditions, much like the rest of the Yemeni population, due to the natural consequences of the war and practices of starvation. What makes the situation catastrophic for most of these families is that they have lost their breadwinners who were responsible for providing the family's basic needs, including food, medicine, clothing, and other necessities. Despite the challenging economic and psychological conditions, these families face extreme poverty and continuous extortion, as the Houthi group has turned their relatives into hostages, seeking substantial amounts of money for their release, along with other political, military, and social objectives.

The Houthi group was initially known for kidnapping politicians and opinion leaders as hostages for extortion or to force their political opponents to exchange them for captives taken during battles. However, after their takeover of Sana'a, they started kidnapping people from wealthy families who own properties or businesses without specific reasons, except for the fact that these families would be willing to pay any amount to secure the release of their loved ones. This method became a way for certain field leaders within the group to accumulate wealth or a daily source of income

(1) From the perspective of some Hamdan: History repeats itself, Bilal al-Tayeb, Nashwan News website, August 1, 2020.

for lower-ranking members.

According to testimonies from previously released hostages during different periods of the war, the Houthis kidnapped them from their homes, workplaces, or the streets and held them in prisons and detention facilities, usually undisclosed locations initially. During this time, the victim's family searches for the kidnapped person for a period that can last up to two months, all without any information about their whereabouts. During this period, the family members pay significant sums to Houthi brokers in exchange for information about their loved one's location.

During this period, Houthi elements look for any justification to support their kidnapping of the victim. They might find a social media post or tweet criticizing the group on platforms like Facebook or Twitter or a photo on the victim's phone, a conversation with someone, or public statements against the Houthi policy during a public meeting. They have a knack for finding justifications.

After a period of no less than two months and when the family is anxious and fearful about the unknown fate of their loved ones, news of the victim's presence in a particular prison or detention facility leaks. This marks the beginning of a ransom negotiation process, a series of continuous extortions under different pretexts, or taking money from the kidnapped individual's family to allow them to have a phone conversation and confirm that they are still alive.

The militia exploits the family's anxiety and desire to secure the release of their loved ones from detention, forcing them to pay substantial amounts for their release or even just to hear their voices over the phone.

Negotiations are conducted through Houthi leaders and supervisors, with the release of the kidnapped person contingent on financial payments that vary depending on the importance of the abducted individual and their family's financial situation.

The process doesn't end with taking a ransom for the release of the kidnapped in Houthi prisons. Throughout the period of kidnapping, various means are used to extort the family of the kidnapped. According to testimonies from many of them, in addition to information provided by the Association of Kidnapped Persons' Mothers, the methods of extortion can be summarized as follows:

- Financial extortion begins from the first days of kidnapping when the family starts searching for their kidnapped family member. They are extorted and asked to pay a sum of money only to know the location of the abducted person.
- Families are informed that their son is in danger, either by being targeted for airstrikes by the group or by facing harsh legal actions against them. This pushes families to offer money in the hope of saving

their sons or at least easing their conditions.

- Houthi brokers claim to have the ability to secure the release of the kidnapped and take money from families, but they do not fulfil their promises or return the money.
- Houthi brokers take money in exchange for allowing a conversation with the kidnapped to ensure their well-being.
- Although the food for prisoners is entirely provided by international organizations, Houthis in the prison offer poor-quality food to the kidnapped to force families to pay for acceptable meals for them.
- Financial extortion occurs if visits to the kidnapped person are denied.
- Poor prison conditions have led to various illnesses among the kidnapped, and when families offer money to help provide medicines and medical treatment for their loved ones, the Houthis in the prison take it.
- With every opportunity for the release of kidnapped individuals, which may be for various reasons, some of which are political, they are required to pay financial amounts for their relatives to be included among those released.
- Extortion sometimes involves local mediation efforts to secure the release of the kidnapped in exchange for money paid by the family.

I've obtained many firsthand testimonies from former hostages who were released from Houthi prisons in exchange for a ransom, with the following being the most prominent:

Former Kidnapped Journalist, Essam Belghaith:

"The process of extortion begins during the period of abduction when I was hidden, and my family did not know where I was for a long time. They only found out about my location through Houthi supervisors, and my family received this information after a payment was made to the supervisors. Because they often leak information about the kidnapped person's location for money. My family was forced to pay 2000 Saudi Riyals to visit me in the Revolution Section in Sana'a.

When we were taken to the Criminal Investigation Department, the Houthi supervisors in prison refused to allow my family to hand me money directly (expenses), and my family was compelled to hand it over to them. However, I never received any of it. My family told me that they paid money from time to time, but I never received any of it. This happened in some other prisons we were transferred to.

Throughout my period of abduction, many individuals contacted my family by phone, chastising them and saying that they had thrown their son in prison and were not making any effort to search for him, claiming that

they were heartless, etc. In the end, it became clear that these individuals were offering to help my family by working on my release in exchange for money. Because my family did not have enough money, they couldn't pay, but some of my journalist colleagues and non-journalists who were kidnapped with me would pay these individuals. However, in the end, they did nothing; everything they did was for extortion purposes.

They claimed that they wanted the money to hand it over to the supervisors. The higher the position of the supervisor, the larger the required amount. It can be confirmed that many of those who were kidnapped - not all for the sake of justice - only came out after paying varying amounts of money."

As for the issue of investment inside the prison, our families come to visit us in prison, bringing money for us. However, the money inside the prison is not given to us in cash. The prison supervisors take the money, and some of it never reaches us at all. The portion that does reach us is given in the form of cards (vouchers) instead of cash, with denominations of 1000 and 500 Saudi Riyals. These cards help us purchase our basic needs, but at three or four times the official price outside the prison. Although international organizations provide a budget for food in prisons, it never reaches us. This way, the Houthis in prison accumulate substantial amounts of money from the prisoners. The money that our families provide to meet our basic needs goes into the pockets of the supervisors.

Houthi supervisors in prison placed significant emphasis on any prisoner known to have wealth or from a wealthy family. They systematically and relentlessly targeted owners of exchange companies when we were in prison, extorting them heavily. These individuals were not released without paying a large sum of money, and this money would go into the pockets of those who kidnapped them. This made various security entities under Houthi control, such as National Security and Preventive Security, compete to kidnap money exchangers and traders for extortion, even if they were not guilty of any political involvement or connection to the war. The money they took, including money from their workplaces, homes, cars, or any belongings (referred to as "confiscated items"), was never returned when they were released. This was another avenue for profiteering. Sometimes, the supervisors in prison shared cells among themselves. They would say, "This cell is mine, and this prisoner is mine." When the supervisor brought food for the kidnapped individual, who was usually a money exchanger, he would pay around 50,000 Rials or more. The "shoosh," who worked inside the prison, would extort them, forcing them to write a letter to their exchange office stating to give a certain amount, such as 100,000 Rials, to someone, giving different amounts to different people, and all of this in

return for their release. And sometimes, the administration allowed phone calls. The Houthi Shawish [jailor] would come, give them the phone, and demand a sum of money in return."

Former Kidnapped Journalist Akram Al-Qudami:

"I was abducted from in front of my house in 2015 and spent almost a year in the Habra prison in Sana'a, where many journalists, politicians, and hundreds of innocent people who had no political involvement or connection to the current events in the country were detained. My family tried to secure my release through various tribal and civilian mediations and directions from influential figures in authority, but these attempts failed, including orders from the prosecution, local authorities, and the security police. Unfortunately, we were subjected to repeated extortion. About four million Rials were taken from my family, and my family also gave family gold as a ransom in one of the attempts."

In the same cell where I was imprisoned, they brought in Mohsen Al-Shaddadi, who is a merchant and money exchanger with no political activity or opposition to the Houthis. Initially, they demanded a ransom of 12 million Rials, but through negotiations, they raised the ransom amount to 20 million Rials. If my memory serves me correctly, when he initially refused and expressed his willingness to hand over half of the amount, they brought in his elderly father, who was over eighty years old, and was crying in prison. They pressured his son into paying the full amount.

Among the kidnapped individuals was Samir Al-Hajaji, who was asked to cooperate in facilitating his release for a sum of 400,000 Rials. Similarly, Abdul Khabeer Al-Salehi was forced to pay around 4 million Rials, and they confiscated his possessions during the abduction.

Also, the kidnapped individual Abdul Qader Al-Qadi, the owner of Al-Qadi Exchange Company, remains in detention for the third year because of his refusal to pay monetary amounts. He was previously kidnapped, paid the demanded ransom, and was released. However, they re-kidnapped him, and when he refused to pay, they fabricated charges against him.

Unfortunately, these were deals made to secure the release of some of the kidnapped individuals, most of whom had no political or military affiliations. Some might have engaged in peaceful political activities against the Houthis through expression of their opinions only."

Former Kidnapped Journalist Haitham Al-Shihab:

Haitham Al-Shihab stated, "Often, judicial investigators would request from the families of the kidnapped individuals, before or after the verdict, two or three million Rials. If the kidnapped person was a merchant or a money exchanger, they would ask for more. There are judges who have acquired vast lands in the Airport District in Sana'a through agreements with the families of the kidnapped for exorbitant sums.

Usually, this type of extortion is random, depending on one's position and authority. Some people would stand in front of the Political Security Gate dressed elegantly to present themselves as influential individuals within this security apparatus. As the families of the prisoner seek any opportunity to secure the release of their sons, they deal with anyone and pay them money—200,000, 500,000. In the end, they do not release anyone.

There was a person imprisoned in Political Security named Walid Al-Yafei, whom the prison director Abu Aqeel hid for over a year and some months. He was surprised when his family visited him on the day of his release. He asked them how they were allowed to visit him. His wife told him they paid the prison director 10,000 Saudi Rials. When Walid protested and shouted because he was imprisoned in the basement and not given food, the prison director returned him to solitary confinement and treated him extremely poorly.

The prison supervisors exploited the prisoners' illnesses. There were patients, and their conditions were critical. They were not allowed to be examined or treated until a payment was made. For example, the kidnapped individual, Rafea Al-Daous, was on the verge of losing his eyesight due to solitary confinement in darkness and torture. He had been requesting treatment for two years and was not taken for treatment or surgery until he paid around one million Rials, along with attendants, as they claimed.

The International Committee of the Red Cross covered the treatment costs for many prisoners, but they denied it and claimed that the organization did not accept their treatment."

Former Kidnapped Journalist Hisham Turmum

Journalist Hisham Turmum emphasized that his family paid substantial amounts of money to the Houthis throughout his period of abduction in exchange for his release or to provide for his needs. Initially, his family paid 100,000 Saudi Riyals to a Houthi supervisor from Hajjah less than a month after his abduction. Less than a year later, they paid 100,000 Yemeni Rials to another supervisor from Sana'a. After a year and a half, his family paid 150,000 Rials to a different supervisor from Hajjah to secure his release

from prison. Then, they paid 150,000 Rials to two Houthi supervisors in Sana'a in exchange for a guarantee of his release after the Houthi court issued a verdict for his release under house arrest. After the Houthi court issued a verdict for his release under house arrest, his family paid 500,000 Rials for a commercial guarantee to other Houthi supervisors.

Former Kidnapped Journalist Hisham Al-Yousfi

Former kidnapped journalist Hisham Al-Yousfi said that his journalistic work led Houthi elements to abduct him on Tuesday, June 9, 2015. He was released as part of a United Nations-brokered deal between the Yemeni government and the Houthi group on October 15, 2020.

Hisham Al-Yousfi's family paid money on multiple occasions in exchange for his release, but ultimately, he was only released through a deal mediated by the United Nations in exchange for the release of Houthi prisoners of war who had been captured by the Yemeni army during the conflict(1).

Based on the above, one can imagine the extent of money extorted from the families of the abductees, estimated to be in the tens of thousands since the appearance of the Houthi movement in 2004 to this day. This has increased the suffering of their families, as many of them had to sell their valuable possessions (such as cars, jewellery, traditional Yemeni clothing, lands, etc.) to raise the required ransom to free their loved ones(2).

These crimes have gone beyond reason and logic, as they have become systematic. Some politicians who supported the Houthis began to denounce these actions and tried to distance themselves from them. One of them was Sultan Al-Samei, a member of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee affiliated with the Houthis. He said at a public event, "Many of them have turned into roadblock operators, some into land dealers, and some into plunderers of others' rights, imposing levies at various points. We reject such foolish actions. These people should be held accountable. If they are not held accountable today, they will be held accountable tomorrow, and you will see. They detain people and prevent them from their work... When we intervene to release some prisoners, they like it because they extort some of the inmates... Yes, extortion... They say someone committed a major

(1) The Dutch-based human rights organization, Rights Radar, has affirmed that the Houthi group topped the list of entities responsible for violating press and media institutions, committing 211 incidents. These incidents affected 20 press and media institutions, 27 satellite channels, 26 print newspapers, 93 online news websites, and 35 radio stations. Furthermore, the group bears responsibility for the killing of 40 journalists in Yemen.

(2) The Yemeni Alliance for Monitoring Human Rights Violations documented the arrest and abduction of 16,565 individuals, including 368 children, 98 women, and 385 elderly individuals, during the period from September 2014 to December 2018.

crime. This person is being monitored, this one is with the enemy, and he is released from prison two days later. How can one person be monitored and another, who is with the enemy, be released? Because he paid a large sum of money[1]."

Likewise, member of the Revolutionary Committee affiliated with the Houthis, Muhammad Al-Muqalih, confirmed the motives of the Houthis in abducting their victims by saying, "Some people get arrested and are falsely accused of 'Abu Asad' (a term used to falsely accuse someone of committing a major crime) just to appoint one of their relatives (relatives of those who carried out the abduction) in their position or to loot their wealth. Don't deny it... this has happened a lot, and the issue is that your associates have developed a taste for it (they enjoyed the practice of this crime and its repetition) after indulging in their appetite for everything[2]."

This type of looting, which thousands of Yemeni families have suffered from throughout the years of war, was investigated by the United Nations Panel of Experts. In their report released on January 26, 2018, regarding these violations, it stated:

"These violations committed by members of the Political Security Apparatus based in Sana'a, the National Security Bureau based in Sana'a, and other relevant Houthi authorities included the following: arbitrary detention and deprivation of liberty; torture (including the torture of a child); denial of timely medical assistance; enforced disappearances for extended periods; disregard for legal norms; and the death of three individuals while in detention. Over the past year, the Group noted that some individuals within the detention authorities are now profiting from detention cases. It was revealed to the Group that one detainee was released after his family paid 4,000 Saudi Riyals (equivalent to $1,000 at the exchange rate at that time) to officials in the Political Security Apparatus based in Sana'a."

This kind of looting, which has affected thousands of Yemeni families, has undergone investigation by the United Nations Panel of Experts. In their report released on January 26, 2018, regarding these violations, they stated:

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(1) YouTube video titled: "Sultan Al-Samai Breaks His Silence and Describes the Houthi Supervisors as Roadblocks," August 27, 2018.

(2) Post by Houthi Revolutionary Committee member Mohammad Al-Muqalih on his Twitter page, February 4, 2022.

disregard for legal norms; and the death of three individuals while in detention. Over the past year, the Group noted that some individuals within the detention authorities are now profiting from detention cases. It was revealed to the Group that one detainee was released after his family paid 4,000 Saudi Riyals (equivalent to $1,000 at the exchange rate at that time) to officials in the Political Security Apparatus based in Sana'a."

The team also investigated the detention of individuals at the Dhamar College, an unofficial detention facility. One of the main reasons for the continued detention of individuals in this prison is the inability of the Houthi forces and the "resistance" leaders to agree on the exchange of local prisoners. Some detainees were informed that they would be released either (A) after paying a ransom or (B) during an exchange operation. Any detention of civilians, as a means for the sole purpose of future prisoner exchanges, is considered hostage-taking, and this is prohibited under international humanitarian law(1).

Blackmailing African Immigrants:

Economic migrants are those who migrate from one region to another, including crossing international borders, in search of improving their living standards due to the lack of suitable job opportunities in their home countries. Often, thousands of migrants from African countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, and others migrate to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia through Yemen.

Thousands of economic migrants traverse long distances from their African countries to Yemen on dilapidated boats, some of which are thrown into the seas, leading to their demise. Those who reach the coasts of Yemen embark on a new phase full of difficulties and challenges, but the worst part is when they arrive in areas under Houthi control, where many of them are pushed to the frontlines through coercion and inducement or subjected to looting and torture.

In one of the worst crimes committed during the years of the war in Yemen, the Houthi forces fired projectiles that caused dozens of migrants,

(1) The panel of expert concerned in Yemen in 2018, a previous reference, paragraph 126, page 59, paragraphs (174-175-176). Article 34 of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, dated August 12, 1949, affirms that "the taking of hostages is prohibited." Likewise, Article 175, paragraph 2/c of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, 1977, prohibits the taking of hostages at any time and place, whether committed by civilian or military personnel. According to Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, actions related to persons not taking direct part in hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and those who are incapable of fighting, are prohibited. These actions include attacks on life and physical integrity, especially murder in all its forms, mutilation, cruel treatment, torture, taking of hostages, and outrages upon personal dignity.

mostly of Oromo nationality from Ethiopia and from the Republic of Somalia, to be burned. These migrants were in an official detention center under the Immigration, Passports, and Nationality Authority after many of them refused to join the war fronts or pay a ransom for their release.

Human Rights Watch accused the Houthi group of launching "unidentified projectiles" at an African migrants' detention center in Sana'a during a protest demanding improved living conditions, resulting in the deaths of many of them(1).

According to the testimony of the Ethiopian journalist and human rights activist Gemeda Soti, head of the Oromo Future News Network, the Houthi group exploited the suffering of the Oromos, many of whom have been living in Yemen for decades and arrested them. Most of these detainees were subjected to attempts at conscription into combat fronts, and those who refused were subjected to another form of extortion, requiring them to pay substantial sums of money. Those detained outside Sana'a had to pay around 150,000 Saudi riyals to secure their release, while those detained within Sana'a had to pay around 70,000 Saudi riyals or similar amounts. However, the hostages, as we call them, refused both forms of extortion, which led to them being physically assaulted(2).

The lawyer and president of the Oromia Human Rights Organization, Arfata Jibril, also confirmed that African migrants in Yemen were turned into hostages and forced to participate in the fighting against the Yemeni government or pay a ransom that varied from time to time. Jibril stated in her testimony that since the beginning of the war, the Houthis have been kidnapping migrants and demanding money in exchange for their release or sending them to the frontlines. Those who refused to comply were kept in detention and treated badly.

Arfata Jibril worked as a lawyer for prisoners in international organizations specializing in refugee care in Sana'a until she left Yemen in March 2020. She witnessed the inhumane practices of the Houthis against African migrants. She said, "The Houthis used to force African migrants arriving from Africa to communicate with their families outside of Yemen, in countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to provide the required amounts of money and deliver them to the Houthis in exchange for their release."

These testimonies have been confirmed by a human rights organization affiliated with the Houthis. They stated, "One of the migrants who were

(1) Human Rights Watch accuses Yemeni rebels of causing the death of dozens of migrants in a fire, Swiss Broadcasting Corporation (SBC) International Unit, March 16, 2021.

(2) Statement by Ethiopian journalist and human rights activist Jemal Sotie, President of the Future Oromia News Network, news report on Yemen Shabab channel titled: "What Happened to the African Refugees Burned by the Houthis in Sana'a... An Ethiopian Journalist Narrates the Story," March 10, 2021.

detained in the facility explained that Ansar Allah (the Houthis), in addition to detaining migrants in horrific conditions, also extorted them and demanded fees in exchange for their release." They also quoted one of the migrants as saying, "Some of them paid money and were already released, but most of us had no money to pay. I stayed in this detention center for 15 months until the fire broke out[1]."

Taiz and the Deadly Siege:

Throughout their expansive wars that have persisted for nearly two decades, the Houthi rebels have resorted to besieging numerous Yemeni regions to subjugate their residents and gain control. This has led to an exacerbation of the humanitarian crisis. Some of the most notable of these regions include the Walad Ammar tribe in the Al-Ghayl district of the Sa'ada Governorate (north of Sana'a). There were repeated sieges of the city of Dhamar in the same governorate, the Al-Abdiyah district in Marib (east of Sana'a), Haradh in Hajjah (west of Sana'a), the Al-Qudmah area in Atma, part of the Dhamar governorate (central Yemen), and various other Yemeni areas. These sieges ended with the Houthi rebels assuming control over them, subjecting their residents to persecution, displacement, looting, destruction of homes, and properties.

However, the siege of the city of Taiz remains the worst and most dangerous in terms of the scale and types of violations. It is also the longest-lasting, as it began in March 2015 and continued until August 2016. Since then, there has been an ongoing almost complete siege due to the resilience of the city's inhabitants and their rejection of the Houthi control over it. We will delve into the details of this siege and its heinous aspects, supported by testimonies from residents and reports from local and international human rights and news organizations that have shed light on this crime.

Taiz Governorate is located 256 km south of the capital, Sana'a. It ranks first among Yemeni governorates in terms of population. It used to be well-connected to other parts of Yemen due to its dense population and numerous factories and economic institutions, with an efficient and active road network linking it to other regions. However, since the escalation of the war and the Houthi declaration of general military mobilization, it has been cut off from the rest of the country. The Houthis have imposed a suffocating siege on Taiz, depriving the city's residents of food, medicine, and their right to free movement. This siege is often compared by Yemenis to the

(1) The Houthi Ansar Allah group is responsible for the killing and injuring of dozens of African migrants in Sana'a, a human rights organization, March 9, 2021.

famous Leningrad blockade[1].

After the Houthi rebels declared what they called a "general mobilization" on March 21, 2015, which involved the harnessing of all state resources and funds for the purpose of the war in central and southern Yemen under their pretext of combating ISIS and Al-Qaeda, as emphasized by the group's leader in an inciting speech broadcast the day after the declaration and just days before the start of Arab coalition operations[2], Houthi fighters headed to the city of Taiz. At that time, the city was a hub of peaceful student and civil society gatherings conducting protests and civil demands to prevent fighting and evacuate state institutions from armed groups. However, the Houthis opened fire on the protesters, resulting in the death of one demonstrator and the injury of five others. On March 24, the Houthis killed five protesters and injured 80 more. In the city of At Turaibah, which is part of the governorate, located 80 km southwest of Taiz, three protesters were killed, and 12 were injured[3].

After civilian protesters suffered casualties in their resistance against Houthi control of the city, peaceful demonstrations evolved into a mode of community resistance. Some military groups supported these protests. The Houthi group intensified its military presence and bombardment of the city, imposing a suffocating siege beginning in early October 2015.

The Houthis almost surrounded the city, setting up over 26 checkpoints, preventing residents from moving, and blocking the entry of food, drinks, and medicine.

Taiz Governorate is bordered by Ibb to the northeast, Hodeidah to the northwest, Lahij to the south, and the Red Sea to the west (Al-Mukha, Dhubab, and Bab-el-Mandeb). The city itself is a large population center located on a plain or nestled between the slopes of a mountain range. It has two major gateways:

1. The primary gateway, Al-Huban, is located to the northeast of the city and branches off into two directions: south (to Lahij), connecting Taiz to Aden, and the other to the west, in the direction of Ibb, Dhamar, and Sana'a. The Houthis control this gateway entirely.

2. The second primary gateway leads westward, connecting Taiz to Hodeidah and Al-Mukha, and it is also controlled by the Houthis.

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(1) On September 26, 2018, a documentary film titled "Longer Than Leningrad" was presented at the Human Rights Council in Geneva, Switzerland. The film captured a portion of the suffering of the residents of Taiz city due to the siege. The film was produced and directed by Yemeni journalist Abdullah Ismail, and the title was inspired by the Nazi siege of Leningrad, which lasted for 900 days, while the siege of Taiz has exceeded this number, in addition to thousands of crimes.

(2) Excerpt from the speech of Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi at the launch of general mobilization on March 22, 2015, Hadi Al-Quran website.

(3) A report issued by the Human Rights Information and Training Center (HRITC) entitled: Taiz, one hundred and one hundred days of siege and continuous killing.

In addition to the main gateways mentioned above, which accommodate the movement of trucks and ships, there are secondary roads to the north towards the areas of Sharab Al-Salam and Makhlaaf, all of which are controlled by the Houthi rebels as well. To the south of the city lies Jebel Sabr and its adjacent areas. Parts of the mountain are under the control of the Yemeni government, while others are held by the Houthis. There is no main road through it, but rough roads used to smuggle medicines and foodstuffs via donkeys and camels, avoiding Houthi inspection points. These routes lead to areas beyond Al-Dhabab, notably the southwest road that serves as the sole lifeline helping the city's residents endure throughout the years of war.

The Houthi group surrounded the city from its main gateways, and its armed formations were deployed there. Simultaneously, community resistance emerged within the city. At that time, the road to Al-Dhabab was completely under Houthi control, leading to a prolonged period of suffering for the city's residents before government forces took control of this gateway. It eventually became the city's sole vital lifeline. The Houthis sought to sever this lifeline by capturing Jebel Han.

Another key route extended towards Turaibah, which is located south of the city. Before its liberation, it was referred to by Taiz residents as the "Death Gateway." Residents were unable to pass through it due to Houthi snipers who targeted and killed even children and livestock passing through it.

The Houthis maintain a strict siege on the city by controlling the roads and entry points to the north, east, and west, connecting it to the rest of the Yemeni governorates. To grasp the enormity of the blockade's impact on Taiz and its horrifying nature, it's important to note that anyone seeking to travel from the Al-Huban area to the east of Taiz, to the city center requires approximately eight hours. This is a stark contrast to the mere 15-minute journey on the regular road before the war.

At checkpoints, the Houthis prohibit the movement of people, and even if they allow some to pass, they do not permit the entry of essential citizen requirements such as water, food, cooking gas canisters, medicines, and other necessities(1). This blockade has led to a significant rise in the prices of foodstuffs and petroleum products, coupled with the government's inability to pay salaries to its employees.

In June 2015, more than 50 relief organizations declared Taiz a "disaster area" due to the imposed blockade(2). Approximately one month after this

(1) Ibid.

(2) More than 50 relief organizations declare Taiz a “disaster” governorate, Yemeni News Agency (Saba), June 9, 2015.

announcement, the Houthi rebels prevented the entry of twenty trucks loaded with food provided by the World Food Programme for the affected areas in Taiz(1). There was an official governmental declaration of Taiz as an afflicted area(2).

On July 19, the Houthi rebels bombarded liquid fuel and cooking gas reservoirs west of the city, resulting in the destruction of 65,000 cylinders of household gas and depriving the city's residents of this essential commodity(3). In mid-August, the local water authority completely stopped pumping water to the population, unable to provide fuel due to the blockade imposed on the city, thereby depriving 300,000 citizens of drinking water(4). Furthermore, the Houthis prohibited the entry of mobile water tankers into the city.

A resident of Taiz reported that at one of the Houthi inspection points in the Al-Dhabab area, the rebels only allowed people to carry more than one daily meal or extra provisions, seizing anything beyond that. Additionally, a local human rights organization affiliated with the Houthis reported a testimony from one of the victims of the Taiz blockade. This testimony confirmed that the Houthis had halted a drinking water truck at one of their inspection points in the Bier Basha area, a southern-western crossing point of the city. The rebels emptied the water from the truck onto the ground after one of the armed men urinated inside the water tank on board the vehicle(5).

Originally, the city of Taiz has been suffering from a chronic water crisis for a long time. However, the Houthi rebels refuse to cooperate with the government's water and sewage institution and have denied providing water to the residents in areas not under their control. Most of the wells that supply the city are located outside the control of the water institution and are situated in areas like Al-Houban, Al-Hayma, Habir, Al-Hawjela, and Al-Dhabab, all of which are under their control. This has forced citizens to seek alternative ways to obtain water through difficult and very costly means.

Humanitarian activist Yassin Al-Qubati described the situation of civilians during that period, saying, "Taiz is besieged; there's no fuel to run its well-pumping stations, and water tankers are not allowed to enter the city. Women cry when they see water trucks sneaking into the

(1) Houthi and Saleh militias detain 20 locomotives loaded with food supplies in Al-Mukha, Taiz Governorate, Yemeni News Agency (Saba), July 6, 2015.

(2) The government declares Taiz a disaster city and calls on the international community to stop the Houthi massacres, Yemeni News Agency (Saba), August 24, 2025.

(3) Yemen: The Houthis destroy cooking gas stocks in Taiz, Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, July 19, 2015.

(4) The Houthis besiege Taiz... and deprive it of water and goods, Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, August 2015.

(5) The name of the witness is “Haroun Murshid,” and it occurred on October 7, 2015, quoting a report by the Mwatana Organization for Human Rights entitled “The Siege is Preparing for the Last Breath of Life in Taiz,” published on: October 15, 2015.

neighborhoods, and children scramble to get a little water."

Al-Qubati was involved in providing drinking water to those affected as part of his voluntary relief efforts. He stated in his testimony to an international newspaper, "Today, the Houthis stopped two trucks carrying water belonging to our neutral humanitarian organization in Bier Basha, the western entrance to Taiz, and they emptied the water from the trucks, pouring it onto the ground. One of them (referring to Houthi members) jumped onto the truck's roof and swore that not a single drop of water would reach the Dawaesh residents of Taiz(1)."

These practices led the Yemeni Red Crescent Society in Taiz to completely suspend its operations. The association's premises in the Al-Ashraf basin and the Tha'bat neighborhood were looted, and buildings were set on fire. Furthermore, six association vehicles, all marked with the Red Crescent emblem, were stolen. Additionally, two ambulances came under fire, resulting in the death of a wounded person and his companion, rendering the vehicles out of service(2). In the meantime, the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross's sub-delegation in Taiz, Olivier Shasou, called on the warring parties "to allow safe passage for ambulance vehicles and medical and relief personnel to save lives and provide urgent humanitarian aid(3)."

Of course, international organizations and relief institutions were cautious not to mention the Houthi rebels in their statements and media releases to protect their workers from being targeted and subjected to Houthi reprisals. However, everyone was aware that during that period, the Houthi group decided to impose a siege on Taiz, preventing the passage of food, water, and medicine to intimidate the population. This is why they hindered the relief operations of international and local organizations.

The siege on the city intensified in mid-October 2015, causing Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) and the International Committee of the Red Cross to suspend their activities in the city temporarily due to ongoing clashes and the obstruction of humanitarian aid from entering the besieged city(4). Human rights activist and photojournalist Mohammed Al-Yemeni(5) explained the plight of the residents at that time, stating, "The situation for civilians worsens as the siege of Taiz continues from all sides.

(1) The Houthis are besieging Taiz... and depriving it of water and goods, a previous source.

(2) A statement by the Red Crescent Society published in Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed entitled “The Red Crescent stops its services in Taiz, and the Red Cross is concerned,” August 29.

(3) Ibid.

(4) The siege of Taiz stops “Doctors Without Borders” and the “Red Cross,” Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, October 20, 2015.

(5) Muhammad Ghaleb al-Majidi, known as “Muhammad al-Yamani”, a well-known photojournalist and human rights activist in Yemen, was killed by Houthi sniper bullets on March 21, 2016, AD while he was carrying out his journalistic work in the Al-Dhabab area in Taiz Governorate.

Some traders resort to smuggling essential food items into the city despite the risks. One citizen was killed at the city's entrances when he attempted to bring a shipment of chickens for the residents. Most food items and many medicines are unavailable in the markets, and if found, they are sold at high prices that most residents cannot afford. This is compounded by the fact that salaries have not been paid for five months, and currency exchange offices, money transfers, and banks have been closed. As for drinking water, the population revives some old wells and obtains water from Jebel Sabr (Sabr Mountain) within the city(1)."

During the siege period, there were numerous humanitarian initiatives aimed at breaking the blockade of the city. One of the most prominent of these initiatives took place in October of the same year when the journalist and writer Mahmoud Yassin called for a march known as the "Water March" along with other activists and journalists. Its main objective was to bring water into the besieged city. Novelist and journalist Yassin wrote on his Facebook page: "It's just an attempt to preserve our humanity and speak the language of water instead of blood(2)."

A group of Yemeni journalists and activists, led by Yassin, agreed that the Water March would start from the neighboring Ibb Governorate to Taiz city. However, the Houthi rebels preempted them and ambushed the preparatory meeting for the activists' march, kidnapping around 30 people who had planned to travel to Taiz with the aim of delivering water to its besieged residents. The captives were released in subsequent periods, with the most recent being activist Amin Al-Shafaq, who was released in February 2017 as part of a prisoner exchange deal with the Yemeni government(3)(4).

The Houthis justified the blockade of the city by describing the people of Taiz, known for their strong culture and extensive education, and the limited prevalence of arms before the war, as "Daesh," in one of the most ludicrous lies used by the Houthis to justify the blockade and gain control of the city. These narrative contradicted statements made by figures associated with this group, who belittled the inhabitants of the province and their peacefulness by claiming that the province could be taken with a single military vehicle or even with sticks, not weapons(5).

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(1) The siege of Taiz stops “Doctors Without Borders” and the “Red Cross,” a previous source.

(2) The plight of Yemeni journalists: disappearance and torture, Al-Masdar Online, October 26, 2015.

(3) History of initiatives to “open ports” in Taiz during 4 years of siege, Al-Jand Post, November 3, 2019.

(4) The Houthis were known to kidnap civilian citizens, whether they were (politicians, clerics, journalists, activists, intellectuals, or relatives of political and military figures who are not loyal to them) from their homes, business offices, or the roads, in order to exchange them for Houthi fighter members who were captured by the Yemeni government on the fighting fronts.

(5) Houthi leader Sadiq Abu Shawarib said in one of his statements that his group can enter Taiz =

On October 25, 2015, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) stated that they had failed to deliver medical supplies to hospitals in the besieged area after the Houthi-controlled checkpoints prevented this, "despite weeks of ongoing negotiations with Ansar Allah/Houthis officials[1]."

A few days after the organization's statement, Dr. Sadeq Al-Shuja', the director of the field hospital and the secretary-general of the Doctors' Union in Taiz, issued a plea to international and local organizations, urging them to swiftly address the healthcare crisis. This crisis emerged after the Houthi group prevented the entry of medicines, medical supplies, and oxygen cylinders.

Al-Shuja' explained in a written memorandum that patients in hospitals such as the Thawra, Republican, Rauda, and others were "threatened with death due to this measure that contradicts all international laws and norms[2]."

The Houthis prevented the contractor responsible for supplying oxygen from delivering the necessary cylinders to save patients in the hospitals. They even abducted some citizens at the checkpoints when they attempted to bring in medicines. This situation led hospitals to resort to smuggling medicines and oxygen cylinders via camels or on the shoulders of citizens through difficult and remote dirt roads, but in very small quantities[3][4].

Al-Jazeera aired a live broadcast of the smuggling journey of oxygen cylinders and medicines provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross to the besieged hospitals in Taiz, as the Houthis refused to allow their entry. Citizens carried medicines and oxygen cylinders on their shoulders over long distances, crossing rugged and difficult roads. This broadcast can still be found on Al-Jazeera's "Al Jazeera Live" channel on YouTube[5].

Despite the repeated efforts of the local population to break the siege through smuggling, the situation continued to worsen. The lack of medicines and medical supplies, including oxygen, led to numerous

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= and control it easily since its residents are civilians and that they will be defeated with the stick and do not need weapons to defeat them.

(1) Press release issued by Doctors Without Borders, the organization’s official website, October 25, 2015.

(2) Yemen: Houthi militia prevents oxygen from Taiz hospitals, Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, October 30, 2015.

(3) Activists smuggle oxygen to besieged Taiz, Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, November 10, 2015.

(4) According to the testimony of the director of Taiz Field Hospital, Dr. Sadiq Al-Shuja’, to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper, the Houthis imprisoned the oxygen contractor for Al-Rawda Hospital more than once in the city of Al-Saleh in Taiz after he tried to bring oxygen into the governorate, where they accuse him of bringing oxygen to “ISIS.”

(5) The video is titled: “Al Jazeera Live accompanies Yemeni activists in the process of introducing oxygen tubes to Taiz hospitals,” Al Jazeera Channel, Al Jazeera Channel, November 10, 2015.

deaths[1], including preterm infants. During the first half of January 22 people from Taiz, including six preterm infants, died due to the absence of oxygen cylinders and medicines in hospitals, along with the closure of 37 out of 40 healthcare facilities[2]. The number of deaths continued to rise due to the lack of oxygen, reaching 31 people by early March 2016. This information was documented by a single organization during that period, "Witnesses" organization for defending rights and freedoms[3].

At the beginning of the year 2016, the World Health Organization (WHO) broke its silence with a cautious statement, urging the Houthi rebels to lift the siege on Taiz after they had blocked the entry of five trucks carrying medicines, medical supplies, and five hundred oxygen cylinders since late 2015. They expressed deep concern over the deteriorating health situation in the besieged city, where more than a quarter of a million people were living[4].

On January 31, 2016, Human Rights Watch released an important report on the Taiz siege titled "Houthis Block Vital Goods to Taiz." The report highlighted the following points:

- Houthi forces have restricted the entry of food and medical supplies to civilians in Taiz for months.
- The Houthis prevent essential goods for civilian populations and humanitarian assistance from entering, constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law.
- The Houthis loot life-saving oxygen cylinders and kidney dialysis machines.
- Joe Stork, the Deputy Middle East, and North Africa Director, stated that the Houthis are blocking "vital supplies from Taiz residents simply because they live in areas under opposition control. Seizing civilians' property is unlawful, but taking their food and medical supplies is beyond the pale."
- The population of Taiz was around 600,000 before the war, but the intense ground fighting during the armed conflict that began in March 2015 led to the displacement of two-thirds of the population.
- Houthi forces besiege Taiz and set up security checkpoints at the city's main entrances.
- Since at least September 2015, Houthi guards at security checkpoints have confiscated water, food, and cooking gas that residents of Taiz attempted to bring into residential neighborhoods.

(1) Five victims due to lack of oxygen in Al-Thawra Hospital in Taiz, Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, December 29, 2015, AD.
(2) Preterm infants are victims of the siege of Taiz, Al Jazeera Net, January 17, 2016, AD.
(3) 31 people died due to lack of oxygen in Taiz, Arabi 21, March 4, 2016, AD.
(4) The Health Organization calls for the immediate lifting of the siege of Taiz, Al Jazeera Net, January 7, 2016, AD.

- International and humanitarian organizations have also faced difficulties in delivering food and medicine to civilian populations in Taiz.
- In October 2015, the Houthis seized medical drugs that were sent aboard three trucks by the World Health Organization to hospitals in central Taiz.
- The Houthis did not allow officials from the Health Ministry in Sana'a and Taiz to provide medical supplies to hospitals and clinics in areas not controlled by the Houthis.
- On October 22, 2015, the International Committee of the Red Cross stated that around half of Taiz's hospitals stopped working due to shortages of supplies, fuel, or damage to facilities during the fighting.
- On October 24, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator stated that an unspecified quantity of commercial goods and relief supplies entered the city center, implying that the Houthis had either confiscated aid or prevented most of it from entering.
- The Houthis seized shipments of life-saving oxygen from suppliers at security checkpoints and forced them to commit not to bring more oxygen into the besieged city.
- Preterm infants were dying because the hospital did not have oxygen or fuel to operate the generator for incubators.
- Due to security concerns, it became challenging to assess the extent of the Houthis' violations regarding the food and medical supplies sent to the civilian population.
- The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights stated in a statement dated January 5 that Taiz was suffering from a "scarcity of food and other essential goods necessary for people's survival. Basic services are in short supply, including water and fuel."
- The health situation in Taiz deteriorated, with Al-Rawda Hospital no longer able to admit patients due to a shortage of medical supplies.

The international report included several community testimonies that illustrated the scale of violations experienced by the city's population during that period. It is important to document these testimonies as historical evidence of one of the worst crimes in our modern era:

- Heba Ahmed Saeed (23 years old) passed through the Al-Dahi security checkpoint into the part of Taiz controlled by the Houthi rebels on December 13, 2015, accompanied by her mother and younger siblings. They approached the security checkpoint on foot because the Houthis did not allow buses to cross.

We walked for about 10 minutes to the security checkpoint, which was guarded by at least 11 armed men in civilian clothing, some of them wearing military vests. They had Houthi Ansar Allah logos on their rifles. Five of them were clearly not younger than 25, but the rest were

undoubtedly under 18 years old. One of the young guards pushed the lady standing at the security checkpoint who was carrying an empty cooking gas cylinder, hoping to fill it and return. He pointed his rifle at her and said, "If you return with this cylinder, I will shoot it."

- I witnessed another guard forcibly taking a bag of clothes from an elderly man who was on the other side of the security checkpoint and begging for mercy. He aimed his weapon at the man and shouted, "You are not allowed to take the bag with you, and if you try to come back tomorrow, we won't let you pass. Come back, or I swear I'll shoot you."

Heba said that she tried to pass through the Al-Qasr security checkpoint, which was controlled by the Houthis, to reach the area they did not control four days later, around 10:00 AM. She stated that a guard seized two plastic bags filled with vegetables and fruits that belonged to a lady standing next to her. The guard accused the lady of supporting ISIS and carrying an explosive belt. Heba saw the guard taking the bags to a truck and handing them to other guards who were dressed in a mix of civilian and military attire. While waiting to cross with around 100 other people, according to her, the guards, at least four times, sprayed water on women and elderly men in a humiliating manner and prodded the crowd with thin sticks, as if they were a flock of sheep, as she described.

- Ahmed Al-Shuja (32 years old), an accountant at a government medical facility in Taiz, told Human Rights Watch that on December 24, at 10:30 AM, he passed through the Al-Dahi security checkpoint with around 150 other people. There were 10 armed Houthi guards at the security checkpoint. He saw a guard approaching a woman and forcibly taking two plastic bags filled with vegetables that had fallen to the ground from her. Then he pushed her off his shoulder and said, "We told you it's not allowed." Al-Shuja stated that the lady gathered the vegetables from the ground and left the line. He also said that on December 31, he saw guards doing the same to a 10-year-old boy who burst into tears when he was mistreated.

Al-Shuja said, "I always go through security checkpoints empty-handed to avoid trouble and to maintain my dignity without humiliation. But people continue to try to bring food because prices inside the city sometimes reach three to five times higher."

- A woman, who requested not to be named, said that on January 9, around 10:30 AM, she saw three guards at the Al-Dahi security checkpoint confiscating a cooking gas cylinder from an elderly man.

Preventing the Entering of Civil Medical Supplies:

- Ilan Abdel Haq, the director of the Yemeni Ministry of Health's office in Al-Muzaffar district in Taiz, told Human Rights Watch that in mid-

December, two employees attempted to bring in 600 doses for polio and measles vaccinations. A Houthi guard found these doses at a security checkpoint while inspecting the two colleagues. When they explained what the packages contained, he threw them on the ground and prevented the employees from collecting them, ordering them to leave. Iln Abdel Haq stated that many children and adults were suffering from malnutrition. Those most affected were patients in need of kidney dialysis and diabetes patients, especially during periods when the Houthis closed entry points to the city for periods approaching four days. She also said that the government typically distributes insulin to state-level healthcare centers, and in Taiz, the monthly needs amount to 4,800 packages. She mentioned that until January 23, 2016, no insulin had been delivered to the central distribution center in Taiz at Al-Muzaffar Hospital since December.

- Nadim Al-Hakimi, the field coordinator for the Qatari Red Crescent in Taiz, said that in September, the Yemeni Ministry of Health arranged for the delivery of 1,500 kidney dialysis solution bags to Taiz Governorate. The Houthi guards halted the truck at the Al-Huban checkpoint for inspection. Al-Hakimi stated that he spent more than 12 hours negotiating with several leaders for the release of the shipment. After three days, the Houthis allowed only 500 bags to enter. One of the leaders informed Al-Hakimi that the rest of the bags were sent to Sa'ada and Dhamar, areas in northern Yemen under Houthi control. Al-Hakimi mentioned that a doctor he knows in Dhamar confirmed receiving some of the bags in his health center.

- Nashwan Al-Husami, the deputy director of the surgical department at Al-Thawra Hospital in Taiz, told Human Rights Watch that the last time oxygen cylinders entered the hospital was in the first week of November. He stated that under normal circumstances, the hospital uses about 40 oxygen cylinders daily. Houthi guards at the Palace Roundabout put pressure on the oxygen cylinder delivery driver and seized 40 cylinders from him in mid-December. They made him commit not to deliver any more shipments to the hospital.

- Dr. Fares Abdulghani Al-Abssi, the head of the Supreme Medical Committee in Taiz, an entity formed with the support of the Yemeni government by anti-Houthi forces in the city, said that before the war, hospitals in Taiz used to consume between 200 to 250 oxygen cylinders per day. Hospitals used to pay $7 to $9 per cylinder, but due to its scarcity and the difficulties in smuggling it, the price increased to $60.

- Ishraq Al-Maqtri, a human rights activist from Taiz, stated that to avoid the confiscation of food and medicine by the Houthi forces, smugglers and others bring supplies through the mountainous road. She mentioned that she and ten others embarked on a 10-hour journey to Aden on January 4th, including a 3-hour hike through mountains reaching an elevation of 2000

meters, to bring food and oxygen cylinders.

- A man working for a medical supply company that provides medicines and hospital equipment in Taiz said that since May, the Houthi guards at the security checkpoints have prevented their trucks from bringing in new supplies. Since then, drivers have been forced to change routes every few months. He stated that the road now takes 10 to 12 hours from Aden, including a phase where they carry the supplies on foot through the mountains(1).

In February, the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, Ismail Weld Cheikh Ahmed, mentioned that the continued Houthi blockade of Taiz was hindering progress in the peace negotiations(2). Despite social, political, and international pressure on the Houthis to lift the siege, it remained in place until government forces partially broke it in August 2016 from the southwestern side, following an extensive battle to secure some routes connecting Taiz to the southern provinces, including the interim capital, Aden.

Despite the opening of the southern/southwestern entrance to the province, the closure of other outlets continued, resulting in various forms of suffering. Most notably, the closure of the largest vital outlet in the eastern side connecting the city to the Al-Houban area, which hosts factories and commercial establishments. This outlet links Taiz to northern provinces, including the capital, Sana'a.

The Taiz Rights Center issued a concise report documenting some cases of Houthi obstruction of aid entry into Taiz since the beginning of the siege until 2018, with the intention of preserving it as a historical document demonstrating the commission of war crimes, according to international law, which should not fall under the statute of limitations.

Date	Location where aid was confiscated	Event
December 2, 2015	Eastern checkpoint of Taiz City	The Houthi group seized a large shipment of medicines provided by the World Health Organization to aid patients with chronic diseases in the city, especially kidney failure patients.

(1) A report issued by Human Rights Watch entitled: "Yemen - The Houthis prevent the entry of vital goods into Taiz," the organization's website, January 31, 2016.

(2) Weld Sheikh: The siege of Taiz hampers the resumption of peace consultations, Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Anbaa, February 9, 2016.

Date	Location where aid was confiscated	Event
December 10, 2015	Al-Damnah City, Khadir Directorate	(31) trucks loaded with food and humanitarian supplies provided by the World Food Programme for the residents of Taiz were confiscated through the Hodeidah port.
January 4, 2016	Northwestern checkpoint	According to relief coalition officials, they were informed that (12,500) food baskets would enter the city, but the next morning, only (400) baskets were delivered.
January 19, 2016		A representative of the World Food Programme in Yemen accused the Houthi group of confiscating (286) trucks loaded with food supplies intended for Taiz Province.
November 15, 2016	Houban and Beit Basha	Minister of Local Administration and Chairman of the Supreme Relief Committee, Abdul Raqeeb Fatih, during a press conference, confirmed that the Houthi group had detained (100) trucks operated by the World Food Programme and the International Organization for Migration to aid the residents of Taiz City.
December 2, 2016	Rubai'i and Al-Wazi'iyah in western Taiz	Minister of Local Administration and Chairman of the Supreme Relief Committee, Abdul Raqeeb Fatih, accused the coup militia of preventing (64) trucks carrying relief supplies from entering the city. The detained trucks had left Hodeidah port at

Date	Location where aid was confiscated	Event
		the beginning of November 2016, carrying relief aid for the directorates of Sharab, Jabal Habshi, Maqbanah, and Khadir, surrounding Taiz City. However, Amin Hamidan, one of the Houthi leaders, detained the trucks along with their drivers and refused to release them.
February 3, 2017	Al-Barih checkpoint	Minister of Local Administration Abdul Raqeeb Fatih confirmed that the Houthis had detained (13,000) food baskets coming from Hodeidah port, intended for the directorates of Jabal Habshi and Al-Mawasit.
February 16, 2017	Houban area	The Houthis detained (2159) food baskets designated for the directorates of Mashra'ah and Hudaydan in Sabr. These food aid supplies were sufficient to feed more than (145,000) people for one month.
April 20, 2017	Confiscated in Al-Hodeidah	Coordinating Council of Civil Society Organizations confirmed that the Houthis had detained a convoy of aid intended for Taiz Province. The convoy consisted of (200) trucks carrying supplies for (12) directorates in the province.
April 23, 2017	Confiscated in Sana’a	The Houthis confiscated a shipment of medical supplies and equipment intended for the Revolution Hospital in Taiz, which included (1800) dialysis solution bags, (200) bags of

Date	Location where aid was confiscated	Event
		sodium bicarbonate, and (200) filters for sterilizing kidney dialysis machines.
June 16, 2017	Seized in Sana'a	The Houthis confiscated medical aid from international organizations meant for Taiz city, and then sold it to pharmacies in Sana'a. This aid included medications for "cholera," which had spread significantly in Taiz during that period.
October 10, 2017	Confiscated in Al-Hodeidah	Minister of Local Administration in Yemen, Abdul Raqeeb Fatih, confirmed that the Houthis had detained (10) trucks loaded with relief aid coming from the Hodeidah port in the west of the country, heading to Taiz Province.
December 23, 2018		Al-Houthis group prevented the delegation from the World Food Programme from entering the province, Al-Hodeidah to assess the humanitarian situation in the city.

The crime of besieging Taiz did not receive its fair share of monitoring, coverage, and documentation. The reports issued by civil society organizations and media coverage were not able to track and document all the violations accompanying the siege due to the systematic targeting of human rights activists and journalists during the siege period. This was not just a blockade imposed on the city, but also a systematic targeting of anyone attempting to expose the images of the siege and highlight the suffering. Between 2015 and 2018, many journalists and human rights activists who were trying to highlight the suffering of the people in Taiz due to the siege were killed and injured by the Houthi group.

Journalists and Human Rights Activists: Direct Targets for Killing

The names of journalists and human rights activists who were assassinated by the Houthi group through sniping or shelling while carrying out their work in covering the humanitarian situation resulting from the war and the siege or monitoring and documenting violations are:

Name	Occupation	Date of Targeting
Ahmed Al-Shaibani	Television Photographer	February 2016
Mohammed Al-Yamani	Journalist and Photojournalist	March 2016
Awab Tariq Al-Zubairi	Journalist and Photographer at Taiz News Network	November 2016
Taqi Al-Hudhaifi	Photographer for Saudi News Channel	May 2017
Wael Al-Abssi	Television Photographer and Channel Yemen Correspondent	May 2017
Saad Al-Nazari	Private Photojournalist	May 2017
Mohammed Galib Al-Qudsi	Television Photographer and Balqees Channel Correspondent	January 2018
Reham Al-Badr	Human Rights Activist	February 2018
Osama Salam	Journalist and Human Rights Activist	February 2018

The names of the journalists and human rights activists who were injured (by snipers or shelling shrapnel) while carrying out their work in covering the humanitarian situation resulting from the war and blockade or documenting and reporting violations:

Name	Profession	Date of Injury
Naif Al-Wafi	Al Jazeera Channel Photographer	May 2015
Taha Saleh	Photojournalist and Balqees Channel Correspondent	July 2015
Bassam Al-Sayani	Photojournalist	September 2015
Abu Bakr Al-Yousfi	Yemen Shabab Channel Photographer	September 2015

Name	Profession	Date of Injury
Walid Al-Humairy	Humanitarian Activist	October 2015
Mohammed Al-Hadhifi	Al-Ikhbariya Saudi Channel Correspondent	January 2016
Haikal Al-Areiqi	Al-Ikhbariya Saudi Channel Photographer	March 2016
Abdulqawi Al-Azzani	Yemen Shabab Channel and Website Correspondent	March 2016
Akram Al-Rasni	Photojournalist	March 2016
Mohammed Tahir	Photojournalist and Sharjah Channel Correspondent	April 2016
Mohammed Youssef	Photojournalist and Suhail Channel Correspondent	August 2016
Walid Al-Qudsi	Photojournalist	May 2017
Abdulaziz Al-Dhuhaini	Yemen Shabab Channel and Website Correspondent	May 2017
Bashir Aqlan	Photojournalist and Russia Today Correspondent	| January 2018

Besieged Taiz, forgotten internationally:

The siege continued, and social and political activities calling for the lifting of the blockade persisted. However, the Houthi rebels ignored all local and international appeals and mediations demanding the opening of the crossings and ports they control to alleviate the suffering of the citizens.

On December 13, 2018, an agreement was reached in Stockholm, the capital of Sweden, between the Yemeni government and the Houthi group under the auspices of the United Nations. According to this agreement, a comprehensive ceasefire was to be implemented, military withdrawal by all parties from Hodeidah province, the release of abductees and prisoners, and the lifting of the siege on Taiz. However, much of this did not happen. The Houthi forces did not withdraw from Hodeidah, they continued their expansion attempts, and they did not release the abductees. Instead, they intensified their operations of abducting and hiding civilians, and they did not lift the siege on Taiz.

In April 2021, political parties in Taiz sent a letter to the UN Special

Envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, demanding the lifting of the siege on Taiz. They considered the UN's disregard for the suffering of Taiz residents as "alignment and encouragement for the Houthi terrorist militia to persist in their crimes against civilians and the blockade." They emphasized that the humanitarian demand to lift the siege must take precedence over any negotiations(1).

Despite these appeals, UN envoys limited their response to the suffering of Taiz residents to brief statements that did not change the situation. In one of his briefings, UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths stated, "Taiz has suffered from the war for six years. We have seen brave media reports that show the repeated shelling of their homes and landmines hindering their access to schools, places of worship, and work. No one should have to live that way. It is shameful for all of us that the understanding on Taiz agreed upon in Stockholm did not lead to any results(2)."

As for the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, who took over after Martin Griffiths, he managed to visit Taiz from its southern entry point at the end of 2021. This visit marked the first time a UN envoy visited the besieged city. During his visit, Grundberg remarked, "We passed through the road to Taiz, and I witnessed the suffering and saw different forms of expression of the great hardship related to movement, access to services, and obtaining goods, even more than what we see elsewhere in Yemen(3)." However, like previous UN efforts, this visit did not change the challenging reality that Taiz residents continue to endure due to the closure of several vital routes by the Houthi forces.

Multi-Faceted Siege:

The Houthi group did not miss any opportunity to tighten the siege on Taiz province and city. They repeatedly attempted to cut off the only road that connects the province and the city to Aden in the south(4). They did this through frequent targeting of the Hegah Al-Abad Road, launching shells, missiles, or gunfire from positions near this narrow mountain pass. Despite being the only passage so far, it does not allow the passage of large trucks or the arrival of goods that truly meet the needs. Transporters are forced to use smaller delivery vehicles that can navigate it without tipping over.

(1) Taiz parties demand that Griffiths lift the siege and operate the port of Mokha, Taiz Time, April 3, 2021 AD.

(2) Briefing by UN Envoy Martin Griffiths before the Security Council, the envoy's official Twitter page, June 15, 2021 AD.

(3) Grundberg: Taiz's suffering is greater than what we see in all of Yemen, Yemen Shabab.net, November 8, 2021 AD.

(4) The Houthi militia fails to target the "Taiz-Aden" road with an unexploded missile, Al-Ain Al-Akhbariya, August 2, 2018.

As for the road that links the province to the country's largest ports, Hodeidah Port, in addition to being under Houthi control, the road leading to it lies during military clashes in the western Tihama region. It is riddled with Houthi-land mines without maps, making it unsuitable for the passage of trucks carrying goods. It was replaced by more convoluted, rugged, and perilous routes through the eastern mountains of Taiz, where multiple Houthi checkpoints are stationed. This increases the cost of goods in Taiz, making them more expensive compared to areas under the authority of the legitimate government(1), due to the diverse costs and difficulties in delivering them as it was in the past.

Additionally, the Houthi group shelled the Mokha Port in September 2021. This port is the province's lifeline(2), and it had undergone a period of rehabilitation. The shelling specifically targeted humanitarian relief warehouses, resulting in the destruction of port infrastructure. This action deprived the province of its nearby port and a new entry point in addition to the isolated southern land route.

Depriving Civilians from Water:

As a natural consequence of the war, many vital institutions and projects that provide essential needs to the population have been damaged. However, for the Houthis, it's different as they deliberately target these interests to starve the population who refuse to accept their political and ideological beliefs.

For example, from 2015 to the time of writing this text in 2022, the Houthi group has consistently deprived the residents of Taiz of access to the "wells" controlled by the government's water institution within the group's territory. They refuse to allow these wells to operate or transfer water from them to the city, exacerbating the water crisis within the city and rural areas of Taiz province, which were already suffering from water shortages prior to the war.

The Houthi group leaves its clear mark on many vital interests, such as water tanks, water ferries, or bridges, which have not been spared from intentional explosions in many areas under their control. They resort to blowing up water tanks before their withdrawal as a retaliatory action against the populations in areas that either stood against them or did not fight alongside them.

In one of the battles that took place in Hajjah province (northwest Yemen), a special camera belonging to the Houthi fighters' war media

(1) Economic indicators in Yemen, September 2018, Center for Studies and Economic Media.
(2) The Houthis target the port of Mokha in western Yemen, the official Chinese News Agency of the People's Republic of China (Xinhua), September 11, 2021 AD.

contained a video showing a discussion among Houthi fighters in Hajjah. They were talking about blowing up water tanks and schools.

A Houthi explosives expert named; "Abu Hussein" appears in the video attempting to detonate a remotely controlled explosive device. Another armed fighter boasts of blowing up schools and water tanks using a wireless device. He concludes his speech by giving advice to the surrounding fighters on how to follow his new steps in blowing up targeted facilities(1).

It is difficult to enumerate the number of water tanks that the Houthis have blown up during the war, but there are some notable cases reported in the media, including:

- The Houthis detonated water tanks belonging to the sole water project in the Hayis district, Hodeidah province, in a retaliatory operation against the city's residents(2).

- The Houthis blew up the central water tank that supplies the city of Al-Tuhayta, Hodeidah province, after their defeat in the battle(3).

- The Houthis exploded the essential artesian water tank west of the city of Al-Durayhimi, which provides drinking water to several residential neighborhoods(4).

- On Sunday, January 20, 2019, the Houthis detonated an artesian well that approximately 6,000 people in the Al-Durayhimi district of Hodeidah province depended on for water. Eyewitnesses told the "News Yemen" news site that a citizen was killed while trying to prevent them. According to the testimonies of residents of the villages of "Al-Munqim Al-A'la and the surroundings of Wadi Naba," the Houthis had repeatedly tried to persuade them to leave their homes for the past two weeks before blowing up the well. They claimed that "terrorists" would target their houses and offered to transport them by large buses to the Beit Al-Faqih area. When they failed to convince them to leave, they blew up the well and assassinated the citizen Saleh Hassan Jahe, accusing him of inciting tribes not to leave(5).

- On November 23, 2020, the official Yemen channel broadcast a report about the Houthis blowing up drinking water tanks in several villages north of Hajjah province after their withdrawal, which exacerbated the suffering of the population in this area(6).

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(1) A video published on the “Media Center for the Fifth Military Region” channel on YouTube entitled: Watch militia members carry out a remote school bombing and stand behind the bombing of schools and water tanks, November 11, 2019.

(2) The Houthis blow up water tanks in the city of Hays in Hodeidah, Aden Al-Ghad, May 23, 2018 AD.

(3) The militia explodes a water tank in Al-Tuhayta, Nabd Al-Sharaa website, July 9, 2018.

(4) The Houthi militia blew up the Al-Durayhimi water tank, Youm 2 website, August 6, 2018.

(5) executed a citizen who protested the crime.. The Houthi militia blew up a water tank for 3 villages in Al-Durayhimi, New Yemen, January 20, 2019 AD.

(6) A news report on Yemen Channel entitled: Hajjah...a water crisis due to the Houthis bombing water projects and tanks, YouTube, November 23, 2020 AD.

Many voices have called for an end to this type of crime, as it is a weapon the Houthis use against the people. One of those voices is the human rights activist Hani Al-Aswadi, the head of the Right to Support Rights and Freedoms Center. He emphasized in a seminar held within the Human Rights Council in Geneva(1) that the Houthis' siege of cities is one of the main factors aggravating the water crisis in Yemen, especially in Taiz province. It has been used as a weapon in the war, forcing the population to transport water on the backs of animals. Additionally, the Houthis have bombed and blown-up artesian water tanks in several directorates of Hodeidah as a means of revenge against residents who did not support them against government forces(2).

The situation was not better than elsewhere in areas under Houthi control. The group has committed numerous abuses that have deprived the residents of those areas of drinking water.

According to a subsidiary report issued by the National Committee for Investigating Allegations of Human Rights Violations, the Houthi group prevented the Danish Red Cross organization from implementing a water project in Al-Mahweet city using solar energy technology.

Al-Mahweet city is located 111 km northwest of the capital Sana'a, and its residents have long suffered from water scarcity due to the unavailability of diesel fuel, which is used to operate the pumps in the Hajar region to deliver water to the city's inhabitants residing on the mountain peaks. The water pumping project using solar panel energy technology was a real opportunity to significantly alleviate the suffering of the city's residents for long periods. In March, the Houthis informed the Danish Red Cross of the complete suspension of the project, claiming the need to hand over the project funds to their Supreme Council for Humanitarian Affairs to complete the project. The Danish Red Cross rejected this, realizing that the fate of the funds would end up - like previous cases - in the pockets of Houthi leaders.

The Houthis have previously prevented several water-related projects that would have helped alleviate the suffering of Al-Mahweet residents, according to various media and human rights reports. What has happened in this governorate has also occurred in other governorates under the group's control.

(1) The symposium on the right to water in humanitarian emergencies, held by the Yemeni Coalition for Human Rights Monitoring in Geneva on the sidelines of the 39th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council.

(2) Al-Houthi uses bombing wells and water tanks as a weapon of war, Al-Watan News website, September 19, 2018.

The Theft of Relief Aid - Another Unseen War:

After six rounds of war between the Yemeni government and Houthi rebels in Sa'ada and some areas of Amran, which first erupted in 2004 and caused suffering to the residents of those areas, the Houthis announced in February 2010 their agreement to the six conditions set by the Yemeni government to stop the sixth war(1). Shortly thereafter, the United Nations launched the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Sana'a, stressing the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Yemen and its rapid escalation due to the war resulting from the Houthi rebellion in Sa'ada. The inability of humanitarian and relief organizations operating in Yemen to coordinate their activities, along with their need for advocacy activities to help mobilize sufficient funding, further exacerbated the situation.

In their customary disregard for treaties and agreements, the Houthis failed to uphold the six conditions they had previously agreed upon, persisting instead with their assaults on the Yemeni army, civilians, and both public and private infrastructure. This led them to gain control over the city of Sa'ada in March 2011, ushering in a new phase of humanitarian suffering resulting from the new wars they initiated in regions like Kitaf, Damaj in Sa'ada, and Kushar and Harad in Hajjah (northwest), along with parts of Al-Jawf (east), causing the displacement and migration of thousands of families.

The suffering of Yemenis worsened as clashes expanded into multiple areas due to the weakening of government institutions in city capitals. This was a natural outcome of the political disagreements that intensified in 2011 in the capital, Sana'a. Alongside this, there was an intense flow of Iranian weaponry into Yemen. In January 2013, the Yemeni government announced the interception of Iranian ships carrying weapons, explosives, and anti-aircraft missiles intended for the Houthis(2), indicating that the following years would be even more challenging for ordinary Yemeni citizens who were the most significant victims of the conflict's expansion.

While the Houthi group engaged in a fierce war against the Arhab tribes in an attempt to gain control over the northern entrance to the capital,

(1) The government set six conditions to stop the war, which are: commitment to a ceasefire, opening roads, removing mines, ending barricades in sites, roads and heights, withdrawing from government directorates and headquarters, not interfering in the affairs of the local authority, and returning looted civilian and military equipment.

(2) In 2009, the Yemeni government seized an Iranian ship loaded with weapons that was on its way to the Houthis. Source: The Free Encyclopedia (Wikipedia). In 2013, the Yemeni Coast Guard seized a shipment. Advanced weapons on board an Iranian ship called "Jehan 1." The ship's cargo was about 40 tons of various weapons. Then the smuggling operations of Iranian weapons and military technology continued and did not stop.

Sana'a, at the beginning of 2014, the United Nations, represented by the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Representative of the High Commissioner for Refugees in Yemen, Johannes van der Klaauw, announced that approximately 14.7 million Yemenis, or half the population, were in need of assistance. He emphasized that the crisis in Yemen was significant and required combined efforts to resolve(1). These warnings were repeated in May 2014 when he stated, " We count over twenty-five million Yemenis, with approximately fourteen million requiring some manner of humanitarian aid, constituting more than half of the population. Among them, there are approximately seven million people identified as the most urgently requiring help(2)."

These recurrent statements aimed to mobilize support for the humanitarian work carried out by UN and international organizations in Yemen. The United Nations succeeded in garnering increasing support, coinciding with the escalation and expansion of the conflict and the growing number of victims it produced.

Year	Amount in Billions
2012	0.4 Four Hundred Million US Dollars
2013	0.5 Five Hundred Million US Dollars
2014	0.4 Four Hundred Million US Dollars
2015	1.8 One Billion Eight Hundred Million US Dollars
2016	1.8 One Billion Eight Hundred Million US Dollars
2017	2.4 Two Billion Four Hundred Million US Dollars
2018	5.2 Five Billion Two Hundred Million US Dollars
2019	4.1 Four Billion One Hundred Million US Dollars
2020	2.2 Two Billion Two Hundred Million US Dollars
2021	Three Billion US Dollars

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

International agencies and organizations have consistently described the humanitarian situation in Yemen as "the worst in the world(3)." This has led to the highest level of support provided by donor countries to UN and international organizations for assistance to Yemenis in the history of

(1) From a speech delivered by the Humanitarian Coordinator and Representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Yemen, Johannes van der Klaauw, at the meeting to review the Humanitarian Response Plan for Yemen for the year 2014, Saada Press website, March 18, 2014.

(2) United Nations News website, May 15, 2014.

(3) United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) website.

humanitarian work. Since 2015, the Yemen office of the World Food Programme (WFP) has received the highest budget among all the organization's branches in countries affected by wars or natural disasters. The same applies to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), whose Yemen office has consistently received the highest budget among the organization's branches worldwide for years.

The Houthis and Humanitarian Aid:

International and UN organizations have contributed in various ways to alleviate the impact of the war on Yemenis by providing humanitarian assistance, despite limited effectiveness and many observations and irregularities associated with their operations. However, their lack of transparency in humanitarian work has made them susceptible to widespread criticism in both local and international media. But the worst part is the hindrance of aid delivery, theft, and exploitation for military and sectarian purposes, directly or indirectly contributing to prolonging the war and the suffering of the Yemeni people, which is the focus of this discussion.

While looting and hindering aid operations occurred in all Yemeni regions, including those under the control of the Yemeni government or the Southern Transitional Council, such cases are significantly fewer compared to the systematic policy of looting and exploitation of aid carried out by the Houthis. The United Nations' engagement with the Yemeni government ends with addressing the obstacles that humanitarian organizations face, as stated by the Executive Director of the World Food Programme, David Beasley, in his address to the UN Security Council in June 2019(1).

In April 2020, the United Nations issued its annual report on the humanitarian situation in Yemen during the year 2019. The report confirmed that humanitarian relief operations and projects conducted by UN agencies, international organizations, and local organizations in Yemen had been subjected to over 2,380 incidents of looting, obstruction, and assault by conflict parties in Yemen. Approximately 93% of these cases of looting and assault occurred in areas under Houthi control(2). Yemeni human rights activist Saif Al-Hadi commented on this information, stating, "These details make the citizen wonder how the Houthis lament the suffering of the Yemeni people while they loot the food and medical aid provided to them. The Houthis haven't settled for looting salaries, alms, and the public treasury, but they also do not refrain from looting international aid meant for

(1) United Nations World Food Program website, June 17, 2019.
(2) Humanitarian Access Snapshot, OCHA, 2019 Yearly Overview.

the hungry and needy[1]."

Yemenis, as well as international humanitarian workers, are aware that the Houthis have deliberately and systematically worsened the humanitarian situation to achieve various objectives. Moreover, they have not stopped at this, but they have exploited humanitarian aid, which has flowed due to the dire situation resulting from their expansionist wars, for political, military, and sectarian purposes, in addition to looting aid for the benefit of the group's leaders.

How is the aid looting process carried out?

The Houthi group intensified its looting of aid provided by international organizations after taking control of government institutions in Sa'ada city in 2011. Initially, the looting process was direct, with aid being monitored and taken by supervisors or Houthi points by force, using various justifications. Numerous cases of this type have been documented and reported by various media outlets.

This process was characterized by its randomness, with the top Houthi leadership's inability to exert comprehensive control over the volume of aid taken from organizations for the benefit of supervisors and sub-leaders distributed across areas under the group's control. Furthermore, the direct looting process exposed them to criticism and media scrutiny. This prompted the group to take different steps to legitimize and organize the looting process.

Closure of Civil Institutions and Establishment of Affiliated Ones:

A few months after the Houthi takeover of the capital, Sana'a, Human Rights Watch revealed in a report that the Houthis had stormed 33 organizations in Sana'a, closed them, and seized their assets and furniture. In the report, Joe Stork, Deputy Middle East Director at the organization, stated, "The closure of organizations by the Houthis is taking place amidst a campaign of arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances of activists, political opposition figures, and journalists. This is an additional repressive approach that the Houthis use to narrow the space for democracy in the areas they control[2]."

The group continued to close and take over numerous civil charitable

(1) 2,380 incidents of looting and attacks on humanitarian relief, 93% of which were committed by Al-Houthi, personal blog of human rights activist Saif Al-Haddi, May 19, 2020 AD.

(2) Report entitled: Yemen - The Houthis close organizations and detain activists, Human Rights Watch, December 13, 2015.

organizations and rights associations, with their number reaching 128, according to a report from the "Yemeni Scholars Engagement Program."

The report, issued in 2017, confirmed that the losses incurred by organizations and charitable associations targeted by the Houthi group exceeded $1.5 billion during the period from December 2014 to January 2015 alone. The report added that "Al-Yatim Charitable Foundation in Sana'a alone estimated its losses at $100 million, and the value of the damages incurred by civilians (beneficiaries of the foundation) cannot be estimated. The closure of charitable institutions by the Houthi coup militia caused the suffering of millions of Yemenis who depend on the aid provided by these organizations as their main source of sustenance and education(1)."

To illustrate the severity and impact of the closure of these associations, the closure and seizure of the Al-Yatim Charitable Foundation deprived nearly 35,000 orphans across Yemen of assistance, as well as tens of thousands of others who benefited from its educational programs(2).

During the period from 2018 to 2020, the group closed many community and charitable associations and seized their assets, including the Saleh Charitable Association, the Kanaan Association, the Sanhan Association, and other organizations representing various components and regions of Yemen.

On the other hand, the Houthi group has established a new generation of affiliated organizations and associations to act as intermediaries between them and international organizations and to provide cover for their looting operations. Many of these local associations and organizations exhibit sectarian and ethnic characteristics, which can be observed through their names, the individuals who run them, and, most importantly, through the direction of their humanitarian work.

Examples of such organizations include the Social March Charitable Association, the Zahraa Women's Association, the Lady of the Worlds Foundation, the Binyan Association, the Zainab Association, the Martyrs Foundation, the Ikram Development Charitable Foundation, the Martyred Minbar Foundation (Al-Murtadha Al-Mahdouri), the Takaful Social Development Charitable Foundation, the Care for Health Services Foundation, the Imam Hadi Foundation, the Mawaddah Development Charitable Foundation, the Noon Foundation, the Amanuna Foundation, the Development Without Borders Association, the Haidara Foundation for Peace and Human Development, the Bannan Development Charitable Foundation, the Yemen Thabat Development Foundation, and the Dunes

(1) Report: $1.5 billion in losses from charitable organizations "violated by the Houthis," Anadolu Agency, April 1, 2017.

(2) Ibid.

Social Development Organization, and more. These organizations, associations, and initiatives have been created under the Houthi umbrella to execute various activities, including looting, and directing aid[1].

The tasks of many of the organizations and associations recently established by the Houthis vary, ranging from those specializing in distributing aid provided by international organizations to Houthi leaders and fighters and their families, to other organizations that use this aid to influence Yemeni society, especially impoverished families living under their control, particularly in remote areas. Additionally, they are involved in their military and security activities and operate their cells, constantly monitoring and surveilling the community's movements[2].

The Houthi group, which controls the resources of the state, refuses to pay the salaries of government employees, closes off most sources of income, and raises the prices of goods and services. This has made the Yemeni people heavily reliant on the aid provided by international organizations through newly established local organizations and institutions created by the Houthis. Unfortunately, the fate of a significant portion of this aid does not reach the intended beneficiaries as determined by the Houthi-affiliated local organizations, who gather those in need and direct them to participate in Houthi political, sectarian, and military activities.

These Houthi organizations and institutions use humanitarian aid to disseminate their sectarian ideas among Yemenis and to mobilize fighters for the frontlines. They do this by pushing the beneficiaries to attend what they call "cultural sessions" or by sending their children to sectarian centers, which, in turn, prepare the children for recruitment and combat, despite their young age[3]. These organizations with sectarian labels often require citizens to attend lessons and lectures with sectarian inclinations in exchange for including their names on aid lists[4].

Many impoverished families, especially those living in rural and remote areas, are compelled to comply with the Houthis in order to receive the essential sustenance that is now under the group's control.

(1) In January 2019, the Al-Ain News website published an extensive report on the establishment of approximately 46 institutions and organizations working within the social circle of the Houthi system in civil society and using humanitarian and development work as an umbrella to steal relief aid.

(2) How do the Houthis control the work of international organizations? Al-Masdar Online, May 6, 2021.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid.

The Houthi Members in the Organizations' Offices:

The Houthi lineage present in a distinctive manner, organized into small and limited families scattered throughout villages and cities in Yemen. The network distribution of these families was one of the mechanisms and means of the Imamate rule and its influence, as they maintained control over Yemeni society before the September 26, 1962, revolution. This revolution brought the republican system that abolished the Imami theological-racial discrimination, equalizing the rights and duties of all components of the Yemeni people, as these Sali families had previously given themselves various privileges, which led to Yemen's economic and cultural backwardness and the deprivation of Yemenis of their various rights. Consequently, these families had a significant presence in all Yemeni government institutions, like other Yemenis, and they even enjoyed some exceptions due to previous political settlements after the post-revolution wars. This favored their prospects in specialized education and higher positions than others.

Several circumstances and factors contributed to the rise of the Houthi movement, including the fact that this movement possesses a civilian wing deeply entrenched in various state institutions, serving as an advanced coordinator for its military wing originating from Sa'ada. With the emergence of the Houthi insurgency in Sa'ada since 2004, many Hashemite families, whose members worked in various institutions, supported the Houthi movement and its founder, Hussein al-Houthi, and later Abdul-Malik, standing by him as their religious and political leader of this era. He came to restore their rule after more than 50 years since the revolution that overthrew their rule, represented by the Hamid al-Din family at that time. Once they pledged allegiance and secretly endorsed the group, members of these families worked from their civilian and military positions within the state to serve the armed Houthi group until they brought it to Sana'a.

This significant presence was one of the factors that aided the Houthis in militarily overthrowing the Yemeni state by a group that did not enjoy any popular support. The Houthi elements affiliated with the military, security, intelligence, political parties, and civil society organizations worked to hand over the capital Sana'a and other cities to their armed militias. This process was initiated with the emergence of the group in Sa'ada in 2004.

Houthi members can be found not only in government institutions but also in Yemen's civil society and humanitarian organizations, as well as in various international organizations, embassies, and international agencies.

While these Houthi members differ in their sub-affiliations, political affiliations, and regions of presence in Yemen, they ultimately belong to the same lineage as Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. They believe that

God chose them to rule over the Yemenis and that their fight for power and wealth is a religious duty, an integral part of their religious beliefs.

Initially, there were very few Houthi employees in the offices of international organizations in Sana'a. However, as the group gained control of power, they pressured these organizations to hire or promote Houthi employees, whether they were from the same lineage or close loyalists. This allowed them to reach top positions within these international organizations and influence their activities. These Houthi employees provide the organizations' leaders with misleading human or security information to impact their press releases and official reports, which can misinform the international community and present false information about the situation in Yemen.

International organizations that resist the dictates of the Houthi group often face complications in their humanitarian operations. This includes the detention or restriction of movement for their staff or the diversion of their aid away from areas in need, as confirmed by the international organizations themselves, as we will explain later.

Since day one, Houthi employees within these organizations maintain continuous coordination with the Houthi leadership. They pass on the information they receive about the organizations and their plans for assisting civilians in government-controlled areas. These elements also play a real role in terrorizing UN employees in many stages and persuading them not to enter areas under the control of the Yemeni government, such as the besieged province of Taiz and the city of Marib, which has been under constant missile attacks by the Houthi group since the beginning of the conflict. One of the most significant transgressions of these organizations is not holding those employees accountable who transfer the names and data of internally displaced and aid beneficiaries to the Houthi group, putting many of these individuals in danger.

The Houthi group has employed numerous methods to compel international organizations, both humanitarian and human rights-focused, to comply with its demands. One of its key demands is the appointment of Houthi elements within these organizations or the redirection of aid. These methods have included the kidnapping of Yemeni employees working for these organizations, summoning them, or preventing international employees from entering Sana'a or carrying out their work.

Blackmail and Exploitation of International Organizations:

Based on documents obtained from UN sources, the Houthis summoned several employees from both the World Health Organization and the World Food Programme on multiple occasions. The purpose of these practices was

to blackmail the organizations and coerce them into executing various requests.

Another document indicated that the Houthis, who were in control of the Ministry of Health, appointed an individual responsible for the department of incoming supplies in the warehouses of the World Health Organization. This appointment aimed to facilitate the looting of medicines and medical supplies belonging to the organization.

Taking the example of the Houthi extortion of the World Health Organization as a case in point, the Houthis' dominance over this critical organization intensified and became more catastrophic after the group appointed Taha Moutawakel as the Minister of Health and Population on May 12, 2018. Moutawakel is one of the religious figures closely tied to the Houthi group, serving as the preacher and imam of the Al-Hashoosh Mosque in the Al-Jarraf neighborhood north of the capital, Sana'a.

Following Moutawakel's appointment as Minister of Health in the Houthi government, Al Jazeera published an extensive report entitled "The Health Sector in Sana'a: A Hen Laying Gold for the Houthis." The report aimed to answer a crucial question that had been raised by Yemenis during that period: Why is this extremist religious figure, who is very close to the leadership of the Houthi group, appointed to this position when the ministry is non-revenue generating and not part of the sovereign institutions? The report cited various reasons, including the fact that the ministry, previously categorized as a consumption ministry, had transformed into a "hen laying gold" for the Houthis. This was because the ministry was now receiving substantial funds from international organizations as support for the healthcare sector(1), which had been severely affected by the war and Houthi policies.

Among the practices imposed by the Houthis on the office of the World Health Organization within the aforementioned ministry, the following can be noted:

- The imposition of Houthi employees within the office of the World Health Organization in Yemen in exchange for any facilitations for the organization. In case of refusal, the organization faces difficulties with permits and harassment of its affiliated employees.
- The promotion and advancement of employees supportive of the Houthis within the organization's office.
- Forcing the organization to dismiss employees working with them on the pretext that these employees are also working with the Ministry of Health(2).

(1) The health sector in Sana'a.. A hen lays golden eggs for the Houthis, Al Jazeera Net, May 25, 2018, AD.

(2) Because the Houthis did not pay salaries for years, many health workers, doctors, and employees

- The Houthis continuously submit requests to the organization, demanding the furnishing of offices for certain ministry leaders or departments.
- Determining the local organizations and institutions that the organization should deal with, whether providing health services, medical supplies, medications, or other needs.

Often, the organization cannot provide services to Yemeni citizens except through intermediaries – organizations, institutions, commercial companies, and others. Many of these intermediary institutions are aligned with the Houthi group, which is why the World Health Organization cannot ascertain the fate of this aid, whether it's funds, medicines, medical supplies, or petroleum products for operating hospitals and health centers. The World Health Organization doesn't know whether the ambulances it operates are used to transport patients and the wounded or to transport Houthi fighters and leaders.

In March 2021, Yemeni activists on social media raised numerous questions about the fate of the ambulances provided by the World Health Organization to the Ministry of Health under Houthi control, especially after armed Houthi elements appeared on board some of them(1). In response, the Qatari office of the World Health Organization stated that "the organization does not own any ambulances in Yemen; its role is limited to facilitating the supply of these ambulances to healthcare facilities as part of its continuous support for the health sector in Yemen," and that it is "not responsible for how these ambulances are used after being delivered to the relevant authorities(2)."

What the World Health Organization experienced has also been encountered by all international and relief organizations, primarily UNICEF and the World Food Programme (WFP). For years, these organizations have grappled with verifying the ultimate destination of millions of dollars' worth of aid annually.

A Body for Legitimizing the Theft and Exploitation of Aid:

As international institutions increasingly criticized the random looting of humanitarian aid from ports, checkpoints, and warehouses, the Houthis

were forced to work within the activities of the World Health Organization in Yemen, and as soon as Taha Al-Mutawakkil was appointed, he forced the organization to abandon them.

(1) In February 2020, the spokesman for the Ministry of Health, which is under the control of the Houthis, announced that the World Health Organization had provided approximately 100 ambulances to the Ministry, and that they would be distributed to hospitals in the governorates under the group's control, and months after the UN grant, Houthi militants appeared on board those ambulances. the cars.

(2) After the appearance of Houthis on board... World Health says it is not responsible for how the ambulances it provided are used, Al-Masdar Online, March 31, 2021 AD.

established entities to regulate the looting and exploitation of humanitarian aid and extort international organizations.

In November 2017, the Houthis established what was then called the "National Authority for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response," known by its acronym NAMCHA(1). Its mission was to communicate and coordinate with international organizations operating in humanitarian and development fields.

In November 2019, they disbanded NAMCHA and established the "Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation," known as SCAMCHA(2). A close Houthi leader, Ahmed Hamed, was appointed Chairman of the SCAMCHA Board, in addition to his other duties. Additionally, Houthi leader Abd al-Muhsin al-Taous became the Secretary-General of the Council.

The same decision led to the cancellation of the International Cooperation Sector within the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, which was responsible for liaising and coordinating with international organizations. The sector and its functions and responsibilities were transferred to the Supreme Council. But why was the International Cooperation Sector within the Ministry of Planning canceled? What need did the Houthis have to create a new and separate entity for these activities?

The answer is that the Houthis encountered difficulties in implementing their new policy with the existing staff. The vast majority of those working in this sector did not support the group, just like other government institutions under Houthi control. Therefore, they obstructed this vital sector and established an entity where all employees are loyal to the Houthi group. This allowed them to exploit aid easily and secretly. The council also appointed its members and representatives in all directorates and in several major villages in areas under their control. The council's functions and activities are summarized as follows:

- Determining the targeted regions, categories, and the names eligible for aid, with a focus on their followers, as well as creating fictitious names.
- Identifying local Houthi-affiliated organizations acting as intermediaries between international organizations and citizens. In this manner, they manage to direct aid as they desire and to whomever they wish.
- Issuing or renewing work permits for international and local organizations willing to collaborate with them.
- Defining projects and activities that organizations must execute.
- Issuing work permits for new foreign employees in these organizations.

(1) The website of the Yemeni News Agency (Saba), which is under the control of the Houthi group, November 25, 2017.

(2) Website of the Supreme Council for the Administration and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation, November 7, 2019.

- Issuing permits for movement within the country for organization employees, including locals.
- Identifying areas to be excluded from receiving aid.
- Appointing council-affiliated employees within organizations' offices or projects.
- Banning field surveys by all local and international organizations, restricting this task to the council. This allows them to rely on what the Houthis determine as needs and beneficiary lists.

In a typical situation, recognized governments carry out some of these procedures in partnership and coordination with organizations to arrange humanitarian and development work to ensure the interests of the targeted groups receiving this aid. However, the problem here is that the Houthis established this council with the goal of achieving political, military, racist, and sectarian objectives.

The council was connected by the Houthis to their special security and intelligence apparatus, which they established on the ruins of state security agencies before seizing control of institutions. This connection aided them in imposing council-affiliated employees within international and local organizations. They also harnessed security and military checkpoints on roads, in provinces, and villages to stay fully informed about the movement of aid and to prevent any humanitarian activity not under their control(1).

Lise Grande, who served for years as the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Yemen, testified to this fact before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, saying, "Ansar Allah [the Houthis] has effectively imposed hundreds of restrictions on humanitarian assistance, seeking to control the nature of all forms of humanitarian aid, its flow and targeting. Ansar Allah [the Houthis] continues to threaten and harass and intimidate humanitarians and detain them(2)(3)."

The council has control over every aspect related to international organizations, even to the level of transport companies that they mandated organizations to work with. The Houthis established transportation companies to deal with international and local organizations and government institutions receiving support from these organizations. The most important among these are "Golden Car," affiliated with Houthi leader

(1) Al-Masdar Online, previous source, May 6, 2021.

(2) The Crisis in Yemen, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, Lise Grande, United States Institute of Peace, 21 April 2021.

(3) This testimony is the result of long experience resulting from years of work in Sana'a and extensive experiences in dealing with the Houthis. After completing her term as Humanitarian Coordinator in Yemen, she served as President of the United States Institute of Peace, an institution established by the US Congress in 1984.

Abdullah Noor, a relative of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, and "Al-Rahla Al-Saeeda," linked to a close associate of Houthi leader Ahmed Hamed. These companies generate substantial revenue paid within the aid provided to Yemenis(1).

Employees of "Scamcha" receive very high wages and salaries compared to those offered by government and private institutions in Yemen. Moreover, individuals working for the Houthi council receive scholarships in languages and postgraduate studies both domestically and abroad. The furniture used in the council and its branches is from renowned international brands, according to various media reports(2). Naturally, these funds spent on council employees are deducted from the aid money intended for the hungry, the very people these aids are named for and meant to save.

There have been numerous local and international media reports shedding light on various aspects of Houthi corruption and mismanagement of international aid. One of the most prominent of these reports was prepared by the well-known Egyptian journalist "Magi Michael" and published by the "Associated Press," one of the world's leading news agencies.

The first investigative report by journalist "Magi Michael," titled "The Theft of Food Aid and the Suffering of Hunger in Yemen," highlighted cases in which aid was looted in the Taiz province due to the security breakdown following the liberation of the city from Houthi control. However, the report also emphasized that aid theft is more widespread and significant in areas under Houthi control and often carried out by the Houthis themselves. Given the importance of such investigations and international reports for their role in documenting a crucial and challenging period in Yemen's history, I will provide the key findings related to the Houthis' involvement in aid looting and hindering aid delivery in summarized form:

- Some observers attributed the near-famine conditions in most parts of the country to the coalition's blockade of ports supplying areas under Houthi control. However, the investigation conducted by the Associated Press found that large quantities of food enter the country, but upon arrival, the food often does not reach those who are in desperate need. This raises questions about the effectiveness of United Nations agencies and other major relief organizations in Yemen.
- For the first time, the United Nations World Food Programme accused the Houthi rebels of diverting aid. David Beasley, the Executive Director of the World Food Programme, sent a message to the Houthi leader,

(1) Al-Houthi and international organizations... blackmail “stifles” relief efforts, Al-Ain News website, November 16, 2020 AD.

(2) Al-Masdar Online, previous source, May 6, 2021.

warning that if the rebels did not put an end to the theft, the organization would suspend some aid, potentially affecting nearly 3 million people. He added that the Houthis were stealing food from the mouths of hungry Yemeni children.

- The World Food Programme confirmed that its own investigations found evidence of trucks illegally transporting food items from food distribution centers in areas under Houthi control and local aid distributors associated with the Houthis engaging in fraudulent activities.
- The World Food Programme was only able to monitor and confirm the delivery of aid to about 20% of the total delivery operations at 5,000 distribution sites serving 10,000 people monthly.
- Despite the increase in aid, hunger persisted in Yemen.
- In some parts of the country, fighting, roadblocks, and bureaucratic obstacles reduced the amount of aid reaching its intended recipients. In other areas, aid arrived but did not reach the hungriest families.
- In Sa'ada Governorate, a Houthi stronghold, international relief organizations estimate that 445,000 people need food assistance in some months. The United Nations sent enough food to feed double that number. However, the latest figures from the United Nations and other relief organizations indicate that 65% of the population faces severe food shortages, including at least 7,000 people suffering from definite famine.
- United Nations officials, in general, were cautious about making statements regarding Houthi violations due to fears that the Houthis might prevent them from accessing hungry people.
- David Beasley, the Executive Director of the United Nations World Food Programme, stated that certain elements of the Houthis were preventing the agency from accessing some parts of rebel-held territory, and they appeared to divert food aid. He described what was happening as a disgrace, a crime, and an error that must end because innocent people are suffering(1).
- The Houthis closed the main road to Taiz, complicating the tasks of relief organizations and hindering the delivery of food and other supplies to the city.
- Houthi rebels have aggressively moved to control the flow of food aid in these areas, pressuring international relief workers by threatening them with arrest or expulsion from Yemen. They established checkpoints

(1) In January 2018, Houthi gunmen stormed the headquarters of the orphanage in the Al-Tawila District of = To Al Mahweet Governorate, western Yemen, and they emptied the warehouses of aid for orphans provided by the World Food Program and expelled the orphans who were waiting for the aid to be distributed. Source: A video explaining the looting process broadcast by Balqis satellite channel on January 23, 2018.

demanding "customs taxes" on relief trucks attempting to aid and move through areas under Houthi control.

- Formerly, Yemen's Deputy Minister of Education, Abdullah Al-Hamadi, stated, "Since the Houthis came to power, the looting has been extensive." This is why the poor receive so little. He stressed that "every month in Sana'a, more than 15,000 food baskets intended to be provided by the Ministry of Education to starving families have been diverted to the black market or used to feed Houthi fighters on the frontlines." Additionally, about half of the food baskets provided by the World Food Programme for areas under Houthi control are stored and distributed by the ministry headed by the brother of the Houthi group's leader, Yahya Badr al-Din al-Houthi.
- Various accounts from humanitarian workers confirm their knowledge of the Houthis diverting aid but refrain from speaking out of fear that the Houthis would obstruct aid programs and refuse entry visas to areas controlled by the Houthis.
- Ma'in Al-Najri, a journalist at the Houthi-controlled newspaper Al-Thawra, informed the Associated Press that the newspaper knew that hundreds of its employees were on a list to receive food baskets for over a year, yet they had not received anything(1).
- A senior United Nations official stated that there were large quantities of aid sufficient to address the hunger crisis in Yemen, but much of it had been stolen, and "if there is no corruption, there is no famine."
- Citizens are registered to receive aid, but it is not being delivered to them.
- The Houthis maintain strict control over the amount of food going to any area and who receives it, manipulating official beneficiary lists by giving preferential treatment to Houthi supporters and their families, according to relief workers and officials.
- Five relief workers told the Associated Press that they believe the United Nations and other international organizations have been forced to compromise their independence to maintain access to various areas to provide assistance to as many people as possible.
- A senior relief official told the agency that the Houthis "threaten decision-makers and international staff through permits and visa renewals." "Those who do not comply will have their visas rejected," and

(1) Journalist Moin Al-Najri wrote a post on his Facebook account, in which he said that a number of journalists at the Revolution Foundation had received calls from the World Food Program in Sana'a, to ensure that they had received their baskets = Monthly food, and when they went to the World Food Program office, they were surprised to find that there were receipts for monthly rations from a year ago with their names, phone numbers, and personal cards, and in front of each name was a fingerprint confirming receipt. Al-Najri also confirmed that the employees of the Revolution Foundation are not the only victims, but there are others from different institutions.

he discovered that his employees were sharing his conversations and emails with the Houthis. When he complained about the spying, the rebels revoked his visa and forced him to leave the country[1][2].

After over a year, the same agency released an investigative report highlighting the most prominent practices of the Houthis that involve the looting and hindrance of aid delivery. The extensive investigation, titled "Houthis in Yemen Obstruct Flow of International Aid and Demand a Share of It," focused on the systematic nature of the Houthis' aid theft, relying on documents and testimonies from international officials. Here are the key points from this important investigation:

- According to documents obtained by the international agency, the Houthis obstruct aid delivery programs provided by the United Nations in Yemen to force international institutions to grant them greater authority over significant aid and withhold a larger portion of foreign aid funds.
- The Houthi group has imposed conditions, some of which grant them a larger share of aid in exchange for allowing access to areas where the population requires assistance.
- According to a senior United Nations official, the Houthis have obstructed numerous programs that feed the starving population and assist those displaced due to the civil war, affecting more than two million beneficiaries.
- Documents revealed that the Houthis refused to oversee around 370 million dollars annually given by organizations to government institutions under their control. This money was supposed to be used for salaries and other administrative expenses.
- The United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, Lise Grande, sent a letter to the Prime Minister appointed by the Houthis, listing a long set of demands placed on humanitarian organizations operating in Yemen, causing delays and interference with aid delivery and violating humanitarian principles.
- The Houthis demanded a 2% cut of the entire aid budget for themselves, a condition rejected by the United Nations and donors. A spokesperson for the United States Agency for International Development stated that the Houthi attempts to "impose a tax on humanitarian assistance are unacceptable and directly contrary to international humanitarian principles."
- A United Nations official stated that the Houthi practices would lead to a

(1) AP Investigation: Aid stolen as Yemen stars, The Associated Press, December 31, 2018.

(2) The well-known Yemeni journalist Fares Al-Humairi published a post on his Facebook page, quoting a field researcher working with the World Food Programme, that a Houthi supervisor representing the “Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs” affiliated with the Houthis, “interferes in everything, including its by searching our teammates’ phones under threat.” Published on: November 3, 2021 AD.

reduction in aid and added, "It's unfortunate that people will suffer from a reduction in aid, but the Houthis can't hold people hostage for long."

- The Director of the United States Agency for International Development, Mark Green, told the Associated Press, "We want to help the suffering people of Yemen, but the Houthis are putting restrictions that make it very difficult to do that."

- The demands of the Houthis have raised concerns among relief agencies about the diversion of funds and humanitarian supplies into their pockets, to their supporters, or toward their war-related activities.

- Aid workers in Yemen have stated that the concessions made by international organizations and agencies to the Houthis have encouraged them to press for more concessions.

- The Houthis have blocked visas and permits for the equipment and supplies of humanitarian organizations and have denied permits for United Nations missions to travel.

- Another United Nations official stated that almost 300,000 pregnant and breastfeeding mothers and children under the age of five in Yemen have not received nutritional supplements for over six months because the Houthis "held beneficiaries' hostage to impose a 2% quota."

- Qassem Hussein al-Houthi, the head of the international organizations department in the Houthi Political Council, justified their demands for a 2% tax on aid by saying, "These funds are necessary to cover the operating expenses of (Scomasha)."

- Relief workers in Yemen have confirmed that the harassment, intimidation, and embezzlement of funds by the Houthis have been ongoing for years, but they intensified after the Houthis established their own Aid Coordination Agency in early 2018 (referred to as NAMCHA and SCAAMCHA). Since then, Houthi-led security agencies arrested local employees, blocked relief missions, or suspended supplies, and "not even a simple project can be carried out in northern Yemen without the approval and oversight of this body."

- United Nations agencies place hundreds of millions of dollars into Houthi accounts for "capacity building," which has raised concerns among relief workers about the transfer of funds from UN-affiliated aid agencies into the coffers of Houthi leaders or their supporters.

- Data shows that some officials in the Supreme Council for Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation (Scomasha), led by the Houthis, received multiple salaries. Among them, three UN agencies paid salaries to the head of the agency, his deputy, and the general managers. The data revealed that each official received a total of $10,000 per month from UN agencies.

- The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees granted one

million dollars every three months to cover the rent and administrative costs of Scomasha, while the United Nations Migration Agency provided another $200,000 to the office for furniture and fiber optics.

- When UNICEF decided to reassess its partners, including local intermediary organizations mostly established after the Houthi takeover, reduced funding handed over to the Houthis, and decided to pay suppliers and contractors directly, the Houthis initiated a media campaign inciting against the international organization, accusing it of corruption and wasting funds.

- An official mentioned that the working environment for humanitarian organizations is indeed difficult due to the Houthis, saying, "It has become extremely stifling with threats and directives."

- The Houthi leadership of Scomasha imposed over 200 new directives on humanitarian agencies. Among these directives is the demand for international agencies to disclose the identities of aid recipients and involve the Houthis in assessing the needs, which would give them greater authority to direct aid to their supporters.

- Some of the Houthis' demands aim at surveillance and intimidation, such as issuing orders for local Yemeni employees to obtain permission from the Houthis to attend UN training courses abroad and then report on the content of these workshops(1).

- The Houthis demanded a new agreement that would give them a hand in assigning UN contracts to suppliers, choosing local partners to implement programs, and overseeing the budget of monitoring programs.

- The Houthis compel the United Nations to work with preferred non-governmental organizations, including an organization known as Bonyan, in which the brother of the Houthi leader, Ibrahim al-Houthi, was a member of its board. The Houthis also prevented UN agencies from delivering food to the targeted population in Hodeidah province and insisted on working with the Bonyan Foundation for the distribution of aid(2).

In October 2018, various international media outlets broadcasted scenes of Yemeni citizens in the Tihama areas of Hodeidah province in western Yemen, specifically in the Aslam district, eating tree leaves out of extreme hunger and poverty. The scenes were shocking to many inside and outside Yemen. After about a year, a report by the Associated Press Agency revealed the main reasons that led the residents of that district to reach that stage.

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(1) The Houthi group imposed on international and local organizations to notify them before any meeting held, whether a meeting in the presence of employees or via group video calls and specify the reasons for this meeting.

(2) Yemen’s Houthi rebels impeding UN aid flow, demands a cut, The Associated Press, February 19, 2020.

The agency confirmed in the report that the Houthis had refused - for months - to grant permission to international organizations to distribute 2,000 tons of food (enough to feed 160,000 people) in the Aslam district, whose residents were forced to eat boiled tree leaves due to hunger. The approval for the distribution of food came after the aid had spoiled(1).

CNN news network also published an investigation into the theft of food aid by the Houthis, highlighting the following points:

- The World Food Program stated that the distribution lists included fingerprints presumed to belong to people who received the aid, but around 60% of the beneficiaries, numbering in the thousands in seven areas of the capital, did not receive any assistance. This indicates embezzlement and fraud.

- In addition to falsified records, there are unauthorized individuals who received the food, and other supplies are sold in the city's markets.

- Amira Saleh, one of the witnesses, says that she found her name listed as a beneficiary of the aid, but she informed CNN that her family of 10 had received their last ration six months ago. She also found records indicating that she received 110,000 Yemeni rials (about $440 at that time) from another charitable institution, but she did not receive anything initially.

- According to documents seen by CNN related to aid in approximately 33 Yemeni areas, there is a wide gap between the officially delivered quantity of aid and its impact on the ground.

- The Houthis punished international and UN organizations simply because they demanded monitoring of the aid delivery process to ensure it reached those who deserved it. They imposed further restrictions, visa delays, or refused to issue them(2).

Another significant report highlighting the looting of aid by the Houthis, this time from Al Jazeera, pointed to the following:

- According to a high-ranking source in an international organization, the Houthis require humanitarian organizations to work in their controlled areas through local partner organizations, which are involved in looting all aid.

- The same source confirmed that the Houthis "restrict all their fighters and leaders as being displaced, including fighters who came from northern provinces to take control of Sana’a, and their fighters register as being war-affected."

- The source within the organization explained that most of the beneficiaries of humanitarian aid are Houthi supporters, but they sell the aid

(1) Due to poverty in some areas, several residents resorted to eating plants that were only eaten on days = Hunger and drought during the rule of the Imams before the September 26 Revolution, including a bitter plant known locally as “halas.”

(2) CNN exposes systematic abuse of aid in Yemen, By Sam Kiley, Sarah El Sirgany and Brice Lainé, CNN, May 20, 2019.

in the markets for profit. "Entire shipments are looted and sold to traders, which exacerbates the humanitarian crisis and widens the circle of hunger. However, we don't have the power to confront it, perhaps leading to depriving thousands of the real affected people."

- Because organizations rely on local officials loyal to the Houthis, these officials push for the inclusion of undeserving names claiming to be war-affected, in return for the aid being split in half between officials and beneficiaries.

- In Dhamar province, a local official registered all the residents of his village, including traders. After aid was distributed, half of it was stored in the courtyard of his house, loaded onto trucks on its way for sale(1).

Among the important testimonies presented in Al Jazeera Net's report, one woman corroborated what Yemenis often assert about the racial bias in Houthi practices, particularly in the distribution of aid, work, and money. The report states: "A widow and mother of six, Fatimah Musa, tried to inquire with the official who registers names in long records. He shouted at her sharply to obey the system. After hours, her name was registered, and she was told to wait for a call. The mother kept checking her phone repeatedly, but no one called. A few days later, she agreed with a woman who was a Houthi to go to one of the organizations. When they arrived there, they both introduced themselves as internally displaced, even though the latter lives in Sana'a and her husband is an Interior Ministry officer. As her last name ends with 'Al-Ahdl,' referring to the same tribal ethnicity as the Houthi, she was accepted immediately. It took less than a week for her to receive the first instalment of aid, which included comprehensive food and shelter materials. Fatimah Musa told Al Jazeera Net, 'Because her last name is Al-Ahdl, they gave her all the aid and financial amounts, while us, the displaced who suffered from the war, they didn't care about our situation and said our names had been removed from the lists because our data was incomplete. I thought this woman would give us aid because she didn't need it, but she sold it(2).'"

Humanitarian Aid for Combat:

The Houthis exploited humanitarian aid provided by donor countries and international organizations to increase recruitment to the battlefronts. Reports from local and international sources have repeatedly highlighted this crime, which has contributed in one way or another to prolonging the war and the suffering of Yemenis.

(1) In Sana'a.. food is stolen from the mouths of the hungry, Al Jazeera Net, January 2, 2019, AD.
(2) Ibid. Al Jazeera Net.

The most important and comprehensive investigative journalism on this type of violations was published by Al-Masdar Online in March 2021. We will mention some summarized points from it based on testimonials and interviews conducted by the website:

- The investigators conducted interviews with dozens of residents, all of whom confirmed that aid distribution is contingent on loyalty to the Houthis.
- The Shara'b District in northern Taiz is a clear example of how the Houthis use food aid to establish control and mobilize fighters from rural areas to the warfronts against government forces.
- The Houthis maintain control over the population in the Shara'b District by buying the loyalty of local community leaders with humanitarian aid.
- According to testimonies from residents in the Shara'b District, the Houthis govern these areas by granting local village elders the authority to control the distribution of aid.

- In the Bani Al-Awam District in the Hajjah Governorate, northwest Yemen, the Houthis lure young men to the battlefronts using a tactic known among locals as "food for fighters." According to local testimonies, the distribution or withholding of food aid is directed by Houthi authorities, based on certain conditions, such as providing fighters from families registered to receive aid.
- A private sector employee testified: "Poor residents in the governorate suffer in despair as they watch food aid go to those who do not need it. Many families in Hajjah face two choices: death from hunger or death on the battlefields."
- In the Bani Hassan camp for displaced persons in the Abs area of the Hajjah Governorate under Houthi control, displaced people say that local officials steal food aid and leave scraps for the camp residents. In the Bani Qais camp for displaced persons in the same governorate, one displaced person said, "We do not know the criteria used to distribute aid, which we see going to officials in the area, or being stolen by some of the camp supervisors."
- In September 2020, a group of displaced persons in the Mahra camp in the city of Abs, which is part of the Hajjah Governorate, filed a complaint calling for the arrest of those manipulating aid distribution lists. However, the complaint led to the complete exclusion of those who filed it from humanitarian assistance.
- Some of these organizations provide aid directly to Houthi fighters as beneficiaries, while the families of the deceased and wounded enjoy privileges. In other cases, a portion of the aid is sold on the black market for the benefit of the group and its leaders.

- A teacher in a government school in Sana’a confirmed that in 2018, he received a complete food basket and subsequently received three half-baskets in the following months before being informed that his name had been deleted from the registered beneficiaries' list. In November of the same year, the teacher received a phone call from an employee of the World Food Program who wanted to verify that he was receiving his food baskets, and it turned out that he was still listed by the United Nations agency as one of the targeted beneficiaries.

- An employee working in an organization run by Houthi supporters said that when he tried to register the name of a former teacher in the lists of beneficiaries, he was surprised to learn that the teacher's name was already listed on those lists, even though he had not received anything.

- Nearly a third of the monthly food baskets, totalling 16,000 baskets, allocated to the affected individuals in the Hiran al-Mahrak area in the Hajjah Governorate, goes to benefit Houthi fighters in Midi, Haradh, and Hiran.

- According to residents in the Mahabesha area of the Hajjah Governorate, many women in the "Hajjar" region, most of whom are from families allied with the Houthis, make bread that is sent to Houthi fighters. In return, the families of these women receive fixed supplies of wheat rations, in addition to household cooking gas, which is sold on the black market for about $12 per cylinder.

- Houthi supervisors exploit humanitarian aid to obtain money in exchange for promises to register individuals in the lists of aid recipients provided by United Nations organizations or to receive aid through other channels[(1)].

Aid and the Famine in Tihama:

Throughout my daily monitoring of the humanitarian situation in Yemen during the years of the war, working as a specialized correspondent for an international newspaper, it can be confirmed that the daily lives of people in the western coastal areas, including the Hajjah Governorate, were the worst and most wretched during the war compared to other areas. The residents there were the poorest in the country, and they lived in dire conditions for various reasons, including soaring temperatures, prolonged power outages, rising prices of food and healthcare services, and the scarcity of drinkable water. There were also limited job opportunities. Additionally, the Houthi rebels looted and obstructed aid deliveries.

(1) “Fighters in exchange for food”.. This is how the Houthis exploit humanitarian aid to strengthen their control, Al-Masdar Online, March 15, 2021.

In late 2016, images circulated on the internet of a group of residents in Hodeidah and Hajjah whose skin clung to their bones due to severe hunger. Many reports confirmed deaths among women and children due to the lack of food and the spread of diseases. This happened while many relief organizations, including Islamic Relief, Oxfam, UNICEF, FAO, WFP, French Action Against Hunger, the Technical Cooperation Agency, International Humanitarian Appeal, Médecins Sans Frontières, International Organization for Migration, the Norwegian Refugee Council, UNFPA, the World Health Organization, ADRA, the International Cooperation Association, and the International Red Cross, were present in these areas. What happened to the aid provided by these organizations to the needy population in these areas, and why did these major organizations fail to save the starving?

By monitoring Houthi activities in these areas, it was clear that systematic looting operations and Houthi domination have hindered the work of organizations that remained silent to maintain the support of donor countries, which might cease their support if these organizations were seen as incapable of distributing aid and reaching the poor. Examples of these incidents include Houthi leader "Abu Mashghal" and ten armed men closing the office of the Norwegian Refugee Council in Al-Khushm in the Hajjah Governorate at the end of 2016. One of the organization's employees confirmed to me that they took the staff's laptops and internet satellite equipment, leading to the closure of the organization's office there. Some employees fled after being accused of being "Daesh" (ISIS). The same organization suffered another attack in February 2017 at the hands of the Houthis, who detained three of the organization's employees and a contracted driver while they were distributing aid in the Hodeidah Governorate(1).

In the coastal areas of the Hajjah Governorate, Houthi leader Ali Sharaf al-Din prevented the distribution of aid to displaced persons until what is referred to as the "war effort" was fulfilled. He also kidnapped the Food Security Manager of Oxfam in the Shafar Office in the Hajjah Governorate.

These practices, among others, played a role in exacerbating the humanitarian situation, as indicated by a senior official at the United Nations to the Associated Press when he stated that there were large quantities of aid that could have been sufficient to address the famine crisis in Yemen, but much of it was stolen, and "if there is no corruption, there is no famine."

The absence of a wide and tangible positive impact on the ground has led Yemenis on several occasions to launch media campaigns demanding

(1) Swiss Info International website of the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation, February 20, 2017.

transparency in humanitarian work, the most prominent being the(#WhereIsTheMoney) campaign. Activists in this campaign called on international organizations to release detailed reports on the fate of the aid and grants received from donor countries to assist the Yemeni people. They accused these organizations of dissipating a significant portion of these grants in operational expenses for the staff of these organizations. However, little of this has occurred, and there are no clear reports on the fate of this aid.

Destruction of Aid:

While Yemenis were in dire need of assistance due to the war, the warehouses of organizations and the Houthis were filled with food aid that ended up being destroyed due to expiration or poor storage after organizations were unable to distribute them.

While millions of Yemenis were starving, the Houthis were broadcasting videos of the destruction and burning of this aid as a means of showing off. This resulted in a situation where accusations were exchanged between the Houthis and the World Food Program regarding the party responsible for not distributing and causing the destruction of this aid(1).

After each operation of aid destruction, the Houthis accuse the World Food Program of introducing expired aid, while the program states that the actions of the Houthis hinder its delivery and distribution to some areas, leading to its expiration.

In August 2019, the Customs Department and the National Authority for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response (NAMCHA) announced the destruction of over three thousand boxes of food intended for pregnant women and 1500 sacks of flour (each weighing 50 kilograms) provided by the World Food Programme. They claimed that this aid was spoiled and unfit for human consumption, a claim that the organization denied, affirming that the mentioned aid "arrived about a year ago in Yemen and was suitable for consumption before it went bad due to prolonged improper storage."

The organization stated that this aid was "intended for the most needy and impoverished families in Taiz Governorate and was supposed to be distributed to beneficiaries in November 2018. However, the authorities in Sana’a withheld it for several months, and then announced its destruction last month(2)."

In another incident, but this time in the Rima Governorate in the

(1) “Expired”... Wasting food aid in Houthi areas, Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, September 26, 2019.
(2) Ibid.

southwest, the director of the National Authority for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Rima Governorate, Kamal Al-Dibibi, stated that the food aid that was destroyed at the end of July was damaged and stored in warehouses of the World Food Programme in the Al-Jaafariyah Directorate.

And the Houthi official clarified that the main reason for the spoilage of 68 tons of food aid was due to improper storage, as well as "the former director of the National Authority for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Houthi) refusing to distribute the aid to the intended beneficiaries at that time for personal reasons[1]."

Why the Silence?

During the years 2015-2019, the Houthi group systematically and deliberately obstructed the delivery of aid to those in need in the areas under their control. This led to a worsening of the humanitarian situation. Workers of humanitarian organizations faced a series of violations, crimes, extortion, incitement, and harassment by the Houthis. Instead of issuing statements condemning these actions, the organizations remained silent, except for indirect statements from undisclosed UN and international sources, justifying this silence by the need to ensure the organizations' continued work and fear of the Houthis expelling them. They limited their comments to acknowledging the presence of obstacles, challenges, and risks without specifying the responsible parties or the nature of the risks.

This silence or the use of a timid and indirect critique policy continued until some organizations took a strong and public stance led by David Beasley, the Executive Director of the World Food Programme, in June 2019. His statement went beyond indirect media statements, as he delivered a speech before the UN Security Council regarding the situation in Yemen, in which he condemned the Houthis' looting of aid. He stated:

"Today, it saddens me to inform you that the World Food Programme is being prevented from providing food to the people most in need of it in Yemen. The food assistance provided by the United Nations is being diverted in areas controlled by the Houthi group 'Ansar Allah' at the expense of children, women, and men suffering from hunger. Let me pause here to clarify one of the main tasks of the program. Namely, the identification of the neediest categories for our assistance. It doesn't matter where we work, but we should be able to work independently to identify those who need assistance and verify their identities. We must also establish monitoring systems to ensure that food reaches those in need. This is another commitment of ours. These systems help us ensure that others cannot

(1) Yemenis denounce neglecting food aid and causing damage, Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, August 5, 2019.

deprive these people of the food they deserve to stay alive and that the food we provide does not serve political agendas."

These systems work to protect the individuals to whom we provide food. These systems ensure that the fundamental humanitarian principles are applied and that we are accountable to our donors and the world.

Over the past two years, we repeatedly told the "Ansar Allah" group that we are deeply concerned about their resistance to our work, which is characterized by neutrality and independence. It wasn't just about the registration of beneficiaries. We also faced issues regarding equipment import, approval of travel visas for our staff, and many other issues. We raised these issues repeatedly.

In December 2017, we initiated official negotiations with the authorities in Sana'a to allow us to identify the most food-insecure individuals and register them through a biometric registration system (fingerprint-based beneficiary registration). However, these negotiations, which lasted for many months, did not yield any results. During these discussions, we discovered in late 2018 serious evidence of some food aid being diverted to the wrong recipients.

As I informed the Security Council in November of last year, the situation in Yemen was and still is deteriorating to the point of catastrophe. Livelihoods have been destroyed, and the economy is in a state of utter chaos. We are currently providing food to more than ten million people every month. However, as the Executive Director of the World Food Programme, I cannot assure you that all the assistance reaches those who need it most.

Why? Because we are not allowed to work independently, and aid is being diverted for profit or other purposes. In summary, food is taken from the mouths of hungry children, from boys and girls who need it to stay alive. Let me provide just a few examples of the evidence we have gathered:

In the city of Sana'a, several beneficiaries told us that they hadn't received any food aid, even though their fingerprints were on the distribution list as if they had already received the aid. Who has taken their food? We conducted interviews with some beneficiaries in seven centers in Sana'a, and around 60% of them confirmed that they had not received any food aid. Where did their food go?

Despite initially witnessing improvement in early 2019 thanks to the dedicated work of individuals like Martin, Mark, and Lisa Gryniewicz, we received some concerning information as follows:

- 33% of respondents to our survey in the governorate of Sana'a did not receive food aid in April 2019.
- In the past 60 days alone, our hotline and monitoring system detected over 30 potential cases of food diversion in parts of Yemen under the control of the authorities in Sana'a.

Additionally:

- In the governorate of Sa'ada, 79% of third-party monitoring visits were blocked, and 66% of monitoring visits by World Food Programme staff were obstructed.

While food aid diversion primarily occurred in areas controlled by the Ansar Allah group, it is not limited to Houthi-controlled areas. When we faced challenges in areas under government control, we received continuous cooperation to address these issues.

Mr. President, our food aid is now being manipulated, and we are prevented from solving this problem. If we do not act on this issue...

Will we be complacent about this problem?

Will we be complicit in this problem?

Will we become non-neutral?

Humanity is foremost the reason for our presence in Yemen, and it's also the reason why the entire world, along with many nations represented in this chamber today, contributes more than $150 million to the World Food Programme every month to provide food to the hungry in Yemen.

When food aid goes to the wrong recipients and when it fails to reach the neediest, have we forsaken humanity?

We cannot let this continue(1)." After a few days of this statement, the World Food Programme announced the partial suspension of food aid operations in areas under Houthi control due to the organization's inability to deliver aid to Yemenis without the intervention of the Houthi authorities.

The spokesperson for the program in Geneva, Herve Verhoosel, stated that the top priority remains feeding the hungriest, including children, women, and men. However, as is the case in any conflict area, some individuals seek to profit by harming the vulnerable's food and diverting it away from where it is most needed(2).

In this manner, Houthi operations have led to a reduction in humanitarian aid, causing approximately 8.5 million Yemenis receiving monthly food assistance in Houthi-controlled areas to experience a significant drop, amounting to a 50% decrease in the volume of aid provided by the World Food Programme. The United Nations' Early Warning Famine Systems Network attributed this setback to the constrained operational environment for independent and neutral humanitarian work increasingly faced by the World Food Programme in these areas.

As of the writing of this text, it cannot be said that the situation has

(1) United Nations World Food Program website, June 17, 2019.

(2) The World Food Program partially suspends its food aid in some areas of Yemen, United Nations News website, June 21, 2019.

changed significantly. The relationship between the Houthis and international organizations continues to be based on the extortion of the first party and the fear of the second party being deprived of work in Yemen. It is uncertain whether aid piracy has come to an end, as the United Nations has not announced such. Therefore, Yemenis are calling for the application of transparency in relief work, as well as the necessity of reducing the volume of in-kind aid in exchange for intensifying support for the Yemeni community through cash-for-work programs, especially since international reports confirm that the living conditions of Yemenis are deteriorating despite the grants and funds received by organizations with the aim of assisting the Yemeni people.

Aids in the Reports of the UN Panel of Experts:

The Security Council sees a connection between the obstruction of humanitarian aid delivery and actions that threaten security, peace, and stability in the Republic of Yemen. This prompted the Yemen panel of experts affiliated with the Security Council to briefly highlight this issue in their reports.

The reports of the United Nations panel of experts have highlighted various practices by the Houthi rebels, among other armed groups and the Arab coalition, which have impeded the delivery of aid. I will focus on the Houthi practices in the reports, as they account for more than 90% of the total violations in this area (according to UN reports). The Houthis systematically engage in these crimes with the intent of causing hunger, in contrast to other parties that responded to reforms and rectified errors in this field, as previously noted by David Beasley, the Executive Director of the World Food Programme.

Report of the UN Panel of Experts Submitted to the Security Council in January 2016:

- The UN Humanitarian Country Panel coordinates relief operations in Yemen through a network of national and international actors. However, access to affected populations remains limited in territories controlled by Houthi forces and armed groups. Ongoing political violence, threats of abducting and assassinating aid workers, safety, and security management restrictions on movement due to safety concerns, and logistical communication complexities all impede large-scale relief operations in areas with active combat operations.

- Houthi forces systematically besieged Aden and Taiz, targeting humanitarian service providers and their facilities. This hindered the

distribution of aid and humanitarian assistance. These sieges were achieved by closing roads and access routes, resulting in food, water, and medical supplies shortages.

- In Taiz, the deliberate actions of Houthi forces to restrict the delivery of humanitarian aid and commercial goods caused harm to the directorates of Al-Muzaffar, Al-Qahira, and Salh in the city center. Approximately two-thirds of the population were displaced, while the remaining residents were in dire need of food and water.

- The blockade imposed on Taiz led to the deaths of some patients in hospitals, even though their conditions were treatable(1).

Report of the UN Panel of experts submitted to the Security Council in January 2018:

- In 2017, Houthi forces continued to obstruct the distribution of humanitarian aid and prevented the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The team examined these hindrances, which included the following:
  a) Diverting aid.
  b) Delaying or refusing aid, affecting timely distribution.
  c) Acts of arrest, detention, intimidation, and torture endured by humanitarian aid workers, including the seizure of their equipment.
  d) Interference in selecting beneficiaries, operation areas, and implementing partners.
  e) Declaring areas as military zones, making access difficult for humanitarian workers.
  f) Extortion and demands for payments under the threat of violence.
  g) Obstructing efforts to deliver cholera response materials.
  h) Customs clearance issues.
  i) Delays in the clearance of imported medicines from Sana'a International Airport. These obstacles were compounded by the non-payment of public sector employees' salaries and restrictions on the entry visas of humanitarian workers.
- The expert team investigated the impediments imposed by the Executive Unit in Taiz, Hajjah, and Hodeidah, under Houthi control, the Ministries of Education and Health in the Houthi government, and the Houthi-affiliated National Security Bureau based in Sana'a to humanitarian aid access. Some of these actors militarized the distribution of aid. The team believes that Mutaik Amar Al-Murani (also known as Abu Imad), Deputy Head of the National Security Bureau based in Sana'a, is also responsible

(1) Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen 2016, previous reference, paragraphs 174-176-177-178, pp. 66, 67.

for arbitrary detention of humanitarian workers and employees of other humanitarian relief authorities, as well as their detention and ill-treatment. He has used his authority and influence to interfere with the delivery of humanitarian aid as a means of personal gain(1).

Report of the UN Panel of Experts Submitted to the Security Council in January 2019:

- In 2018, the team investigated Houthi forces' obstruction of the distribution of humanitarian aid, including the following:

a) Arrest and intimidation of humanitarian workers.

b) Lack of respect for the independence of humanitarian organizations.

c) Refusal to issue, delays in, or cancellations of visas.

d) Interference in beneficiary selection and operation areas. The team received information indicating that some international organizations had to adapt to the pressures imposed by Houthi authorities to continue their work.

- In 2018, Mutlaq Amer Al-Marani (also known as Abu Imad), the Deputy Head of the National Security Bureau based in Sana'a, continued to hinder the delivery of humanitarian aid(2).

Report of the UN Panel of Experts Submitted to the Security Council in January 2020:

- The information received by the expert team indicated that threats and incidents against humanitarian workers are increasing in areas under Houthi control.
- The expert team received information about the following actions by the Houthis:

a) Arresting and intimidating humanitarian workers.

b) Illegally seizing the personal property of humanitarian workers and the property belonging to humanitarian organizations in Sana'a.

c) Disregarding the independence of humanitarian organizations.

d) Numerous administrative and bureaucratic obstacles, including delays of up to 11 months in approving sub-agreements, and lengthy meetings and negotiations with the National Authority for Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response. For example, one organization informed the team that these meetings consume up to 50% of the time of some of its staff.

(1) Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen 2018, previous reference, paragraphs 192-193, pp. 64, 65.

(2) Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen 2018, op. cit., paragraphs 168-169, p. 62.

- The manipulation of beneficiary lists and/or pressure to access these lists is a particular concern, and cases of violence and coercion at aid distribution points in 2019 have increased.
- Humanitarian actors reported that they were denied access to specific areas or refused permission to travel because of their refusal to provide access to beneficiary-related information or personal information about their national staff.
- The team investigated three acts of violence against humanitarian workers at distribution points, with the intent to influence or control the distribution process. In one of these incidents, humanitarian aid materials were looted, while in another, they were diverted. The team also investigated five cases of humanitarian workers being arrested and detained, including women.
- The Houthis established the Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation to replace the National Authority for Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management. A Houthi leader, Abdul Mohsen Abdullah Qasim Taous, was appointed as the President of the Council. This recent development led to the suspension of many humanitarian activities during the transitional period. Of particular concern is the content of Article 13 of the Higher Political Council Resolution No. 201 for the year 2019, which states that 2% of the budget of each approved humanitarian project will be used to finance the new entity(1).

Report of the UN Panel of Experts Submitted to the Security Council in January 2021:

- During the period between late 2019 and mid-2020, the expert team documented a deterioration in the relationship between the Houthis and certain UN-affiliated agencies and humanitarian actors. This included an increase in threats, intimidation, restrictions on movement, and acts of violence against humanitarian workers.
- The team investigated the cases of six individuals, two men and four women, who work for humanitarian organizations and were arrested by the Houthis and detained in Taiz, Al-Bayda, Sana'a, and Hajjah(2).

(1) Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen 2020, previous reference, paragraphs 123-124-125-126-127, pp. 51, 52.

(2) Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen 2021 AD, previous reference, paragraphs 156-157, p. 52.

Report of the UN Panel of Experts Submitted to the Security Council in January 2022:

- There continue to be numerous obstacles to effectively delivering humanitarian aid in areas controlled by the Houthis, including delays in approving sub-agreements, demands for detailed information on beneficiary lists, pressure to influence the selection of implementing partners or program design, restrictions on access and movement, including arbitrary restrictions on prohibited facilities, harassment of humanitarian workers, and frequent attempts by local authorities to impose their own conditions on halting trucks at checkpoints or threatening humanitarian actors. The team also documented cases in which families were threatened with removal from the beneficiary list if they refused to allow their children to join the Houthi forces.
- The team received evidence of the mistreatment of a specific humanitarian organization by the Houthis, as well as constant harassment and obstruction to force it to change its policy. Violations included physical violence, arbitrary detention, denial of visas or entry, expulsion of senior staff, restrictions on the movement of employees and supplies, and interference in activities and the selection of service providers.
- In addition to UN staff members arrested in November 2021, the team documented the arrest and detention of three other humanitarian workers by Houthi authorities.
- The media campaign against the United Nations continues. This not only affects humanitarian activities but also poses additional security risks(1).

The UN reports, which mostly highlighted the Houthis' hindrance of aid distribution, looting, and control, served as a basis for the issuance of Resolution 2624 by the Security Council. This resolution was adopted with the majority vote on February 28, 2022. In this resolution, the Houthis were described as a terrorist group, and they were added to the sanctions list for Yemen, under the arms embargo specified in Resolution 2216. This action was due to their involvement in activities that threaten peace, security, and stability in Yemen, with hindering and looting of humanitarian aid being among the key crimes(2). Two weeks after this resolution, the General

(1) Panel of Experts Report on Yemen 2022, previous reference, paragraphs 137-138-139-140, p. 53, 54.

(2) UN Security Council Resolution 2624, adopted by majority vote on February 28, 2022. The resolution noted that the Houthis have launched attacks targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure in Yemen, implemented a policy of sexually violent acts against politically active women and professionals and suppressed them, recruited, and used children, incited violence against groups based on religious and national affiliations, and randomly used landmines and improvised explosive devices on the Yemeni west coast. They also obstructed the delivery, access to, or distribution of humanitarian aid in Yemen. The Houthis conducted attacks on =

Secretariat of the Council of Arab Interior Ministers classified the Houthis as a terrorist group and added them to the list of terrorist entities on the Arab blacklist of those involved in and funding terrorist activities(1).

Banning the Donations of Charity and Merchants' Alms:

In addition to a series of measures that caused unemployment, price increases, corruption, and interference with and obstruction of aid distribution, resulting in Yemenis being deprived of salaries and essential services, the Houthis prevented traders, businessmen, and philanthropists from distributing seasonal alms to Yemen's poor, as is customary and in line with the teachings of the Islamic religion.

While any authority or ruling system in the world usually aims to support and encourage philanthropists to alleviate poverty and human suffering, the Houthi group carried out extensive campaigns to prevent the distribution of any alms that were not fully supervised by them. They intended to exploit these alms for political, sectarian, and military purposes, alongside looting them for the benefit of their leadership and the supervisors working with them.

In the month of Ramadan, in particular, each year, traders, expatriates, businessmen, and the affluent used to donate to the poor in various regions. Additionally, community initiatives increased to alleviate their suffering and provide as much food and festive clothing as possible for their children. This is why hundreds of thousands of Yemen's poor eagerly await the arrival of this month to receive assistance.

These aids are distributed through mosques, or through delegates representing traders and businessmen, or through community associations and initiatives in neighborhoods and villages. Since the Houthi takeover of the capital, Sana'a, the group has been confiscating donation boxes in mosques and public facilities, as well as those belonging to approved charitable associations and institutions, redirecting them for their own benefit. Since 2020, they have been conducting raids on the homes and businesses of businessmen and public figures who provide aid to citizens. In Ramadan 1441 Hijri (May 2020), Houthi elements stormed the headquarters of the Sondos Company in Sana'a, closed it, and detained several of its employees for distributing alms to the poor living in residential

= commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea using portable improvised explosive devices and maritime mines. They carried out repeated terrorist attacks across the borders targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure in the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and threatened to strike civilian sites.

(1) The General Secretariat of the Arab Interior Ministers Council has classified the Houthis as a terrorist group, Al Jazeera Net, March 12, 2022.

neighborhoods near their homes and the company's headquarters. They also raided the home of the company's owner to inform him to stop distributing alms or deliver these alms to Houthi supervisors in the area(1).

Hamid Hussein Al-Kubous, a wheat and sugar merchant, also faced harassment that weakened his charitable activities. According to residents of the Ghail Hamdan region he belongs to, Al-Kubous used to distribute annually during Ramadan, to approximately 1500 families living in the Ghail Hamdan and Beit Mous districts of Sana'a Governorate, a sack of wheat (fifty kilograms), a sack of sugar, rice, and oil. However, the Houthi representative in the region confronted him and forced him to distribute through the Houthis, with a significant portion of the alms being deducted for the benefit of the Houthis.

Every year, the Houthi restrictions on alms have been increasing and becoming more severe. In 2022, the renowned Yemeni poet Zain Al-Abidin Al-Dubaibi wrote about it, stating: "The well-known Yemeni merchant Haider Fahim used to distribute three thousand food baskets annually in Sana'a. Over the past years, he faced harassment and was forced to distribute according to the lists imposed by the Houthi group rather than those he was used to distributing to, in addition to an increase in taxes on his business because he distributed alms to the poor. This year, he is entirely banned from distribution except through their will and channels. Even the livelihood of the poor is not spared from them... these are not rulers, they are thieves(2)."

What happened to the Sondos Group and the merchant Al-Kubous has also occurred with many companies, businessmen, and affluent individuals in areas under Houthi control. The Houthi Ministry of Endowments issued a circular to mosques, prohibiting the disbursement of any aid, whether during Ramadan or in other months, without obtaining permission from the Ministry of Endowments. During Ramadan, Houthi elements are deployed on the streets and in neighborhoods where businessmen or affluent individuals are accustomed to distributing aid during the second half of the month. They disperse crowds of the poor who are waiting for aid or iftar meals(3). They also demand financial contributions from charitable associations in exchange for allowing them to assist the poor and needy, according to the Future Center for Yemeni Studies and Research(4).

(1) In Sana'a only... Charity is a crime punishable by imprisonment, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper, May 14, 2020, AD.

(2) A post by the poet Zain al-Abidin al-Dabibi on his Facebook page, April 12, 2022, AD, corresponding to Ramadan 11, 1443.

(3) The Houthis steal Ramadan alms from the mouths of the poor, Al-Sharaa newspaper, May 18, 2020, AD.

(4) "Zakat Authority" ... another Houthi tradition to plunder what remains in the pockets of =

In April 2022, coinciding with Ramadan, the Houthis in Hodeidah Governorate confiscated a large quantity of dates that a Yemeni expatriate had donated to teachers in the mountainous region of the governorate due to their difficult living conditions resulting from not receiving their salaries for years. They also prevented traders and expatriates from distributing their zakat (alms) to poor families and stipulated that it must be handed over to them for distribution. This forced many benefactors and affluent individuals to distribute their zakat and alms to poor families in secret.

These catastrophic practices have pushed the limits of the patience and silence of Houthi Revolutionary Committee member Mohammed Al-Muqalih, leading him to write condemning the infringement on individual freedom in alms distribution, stating: "They even want to control every charity given to those in need without it passing through them. They want to control every penny in society after completing their control over every penny in the state and beyond[1]."

Yemeni intellectuals and activists, including Abdulbari Taher, Ahmed Naji Al-Nabhani, Ali Abdullah Al-Sallal, Yahya Mansur Abu Asba', Abdulkarim Al-Razahi, Mohammed Sadiq Al-Adaini, Mohammed Ali Al-Louzi, and others, have issued a statement denouncing these practices, describing them as "barbaric behavior."

Statement of solidarity against restrictions on individual freedom in spending on the poor and needy:

The practices witnessed in Sana'a, which involve the arrest of any wealthy merchant who personally distributes alms and is not released until he signs a pledge that if he wishes to give charity, he must do so through the Houthi supervisors. This means that he hands over the alms to them, and they distribute it on his behalf. Here we wonder: Do the Houthis carry out directives from their leadership in this regard, or do they engage in this type of behavior on their own initiative? In any case, the Houthi leadership should clarify its position on this ugly behavior, which is based on the principle of restricting people's freedom in giving charity to the needy. Many merchants will stop giving alms and will suffice with paying Zakat alone. Such behavior will harm the poor and the needy, and no one else. This behavior breaks the secrecy of charity, which righteous Muslims have been accustomed to, spending secretly so that their left hand does not know what their right hand spent. It is the responsibility of the wise among the

= Yemenis, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper, May 31, 2019, AD.

(1) A post by Muhammad Al-Maqaleh on his page on the social networking site “Twitter”, October 27, 2021.

Houthis to free their group from this ugly and misguided behavior, and it is the responsibility of civil society organizations, human rights organizations, and civil activists to condemn such practices that restrict individual freedom in spending on the poor and needy. Let us all stand together against this savage behavior(1).

With the arrival of Eid al-Adha every year, the Houthi group seizes the opportunity and prepares itself to loot as much money and alms as possible at the expense of the poor and needy in Yemen. They begin by demanding that residents aid under the pretext of "supporting the Eid sacrifice caravan" or "cleanliness fees for Eid sacrifices(2)." They also confiscated citizens' sacrifices and kidnapped volunteers(3) distributing aid and sacrifices to the needy in the Muzbah neighborhood in the capital, Sana'a. They only released them after they pledged in writing not to distribute the aid(4).

In several Yemeni areas, the Houthis take citizens' Eid sacrifices after slaughtering them during the days of Tashreeq, claiming they will send them to fighters on the frontlines without the consent of the sacrifice owners. One example of the looting of Eid sacrifices is what the Sand Relief and Development Organization, led by Mohammad Hameed Al-Kubous, went through during Eid al-Adha in 2021. The Houthis looted approximately 250 sheep and 50 cows that were intended for distribution to around 600 families in the Television Street, Bab Al-Yemen, Nuqum, Al-Jiraf, and Al-Ziraa neighborhoods. This was done with the support of a donor organization in the Republic of Indonesia.

According to the testimony of one of the beneficiaries, after slaughtering around fifty sheep, the Houthis took them and distributed a small portion to some families on their lists. They seized the rest of the sacrifices after a dispute with some members of the organization, leaving the citizens ultimately yearning for their homes.

The Houthis' actions, including drying up the sources of almsgiving during Ramadan and other months, and besieging this form of social solidarity, in addition to the economic measures that have exacerbated suffering and worsened the humanitarian situation, serve as compelling evidence of a deliberate policy of widespread hunger. This policy aims to control both income sources and aid, ultimately allowing them to indoctrinate the society politically and employ it militarily.

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(1) The statement was published with the names of its signatories on the page of the Yemeni critic Ahmed Naji Al-Nabhani on the social networking site "Facebook", May 12, 2020.

(2) The Houthis impose a new collection campaign under the name "cleaning the Eid sacrifices," Al-Mashhad Al-Khaleeji, July 17, 2021, AD.

(3) The sacrifice is the lambs, sheep, cows, and camels that a Muslim slaughter during the days of Eid al-Adha, such that the sacrificer and his family members eat them and give part or all of them in charity. It is one of the rituals of Islam.

(4) The Houthi militia kidnaps dozens of volunteers in Sana'a and prevents the distribution of sacrifices and aid to the needy, Yemen Shabab Net website, July 22, 2021, AD.

Destructing the Healthcare Sector:

We have previously mentioned - in the previous sections - the practices that have deprived the poor in Yemen, in Houthi-controlled areas, of healthcare services. These practices include the Houthi's declaration of what was called "general mobilization," which involved diverting budgets and resources from ministries, including health and education, to support the Houthi wars in various parts of Yemen and enrich warlords within the group. Additionally, they raised the prices of healthcare services, withheld the salaries of doctors and healthcare workers, and looted aid provided by organizations concerned with the health situation, including the World Health Organization and UNICEF.

During the years of war, many healthcare institutions have been targeted and bombed, which has been highlighted by many international human rights and media organizations as a cause of the deterioration of the health situation. However, there has been a strange neglect of many dangerous practices that played a direct and central role in depriving Yemenis of healthcare services and the spread of epidemics and diseases that could have been eradicated long ago.

Cholera, measles, polio, leishmaniasis, diphtheria, dengue fever, chickenpox, and other diseases have spread in Yemen during the years of war, affecting hundreds of thousands of people and causing the deaths of many who could have been saved.

Why was cholera in Yemen described as the "worst in the world"?

Cholera spread across most of Yemen during the years of war, despite the massive amounts of money provided by donor countries to international organizations to contain it. Where did this money go, and why did tens of millions given to international organizations not curb this deadly disease over four cycles? Before answering these questions, let's remember the reasons for the return of this deadly disease after Yemen had declared itself free of it in 1977.

The Houthi announcement of "general mobilization" on March 21, 2015, was one of the factors contributing to the humanitarian catastrophe. The group mobilized all the state's resources and budgets of government institutions, including the Ministry of Public Health and Population, and many service institutions like the city sanitation funds and the Water and Sanitation Authority in the name of "war effort."

Based on the decision to escalate the war in 2015, the militia stole the salaries and dues of sanitation workers, seized transport vehicles, and waste disposal facilities containing disease-carrying insecticides for use in armed

confrontations. They halted the operation and maintenance of sewage networks. These vital institutions have come to rely on aid provided by international organizations and centers, but they fail to meet even the basic needs due to continuous looting by Houthi supervisors in every institution.

Waste piled up in the streets of Sana'a after sanitation workers went on strike multiple times due to unpaid wages. This led to the outbreak of cholera and other diseases(1). With the emergence of the disease in 2016, some doctors at the "Revolution General Hospital" in Sana'a (the largest government hospital in Yemen) pleaded with the Houthi-controlled Ministry of Health in Sana'a to provide solutions and medicines to combat the disease at its outset, but to no avail. The Houthis partially responded in May 2016 by designating only three hospitals in Sana'a to receive the infected, but they failed to contain it. They then decided to open health centers that were ill-equipped with medical staff and medications, according to the testimonies of doctors working in the hospital(2). The epidemic continued to spread until it became "the worst in history," according to descriptions by international organizations(3).

Returning to the above question: Why did organizations fail to contain cholera despite the generous support they received during that period? A study conducted by the "Johns Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health," affiliated with the American Johns Hopkins University, revealed the most important factors that led to the failure of humanitarian organizations in controlling the cholera epidemic.

The study found that organizations did not have a sufficient plan for preparedness and response to cholera before its outbreak, despite cholera's presence and endemic status in some regional countries, such as Iraq and Somalia. The survey resulting from the study revealed "initial gaps not filled by organizations, including epidemiological analysis for appropriate response, resorting to oral cholera vaccines, community behavioral monitoring, infection prevention and control." Furthermore, organizations did not make the disease treatment centers work in a decentralized manner but placed them "in or around health facilities, rather than in the outbreak and remote areas where residents lack the means to travel to health centers."

The study titled "Pandemic Preparedness and Response" mentioned that organizations were slow in providing technical support and paying attention to the most vulnerable groups at risk of cholera, such as pregnant women and severely malnourished children. As for the role of the Houthis in the continued spread of this disease, the study confirmed that "the health

(1) Why did cholera spread in Yemen? Al Jazeera Net, May 16, 2017 AD.
(2) Cholera medicine is not free, Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, July 11, 2017.
(3) Oxfam: The cholera epidemic in Yemen is the worst in history, Anadolu Agency, September 28, 2017.

authorities in Sana'a (controlled by the Houthis) refused to supply and use oral cholera vaccine (OCV), and organizations did not deal with them firmly" at that time[1].

The Houthi role during this period didn't stop at preventing the implementation of vaccination campaigns to save Yemenis from this disease. They continued to refuse the entry of oral cholera vaccine at the end of March 2019, and they stipulated that organizations should deliver personal hygiene materials (soap, detergents, male and female underwear, sanitary napkins for women, and for children, etc.) to organizations they had set up during the years of war to distribute to the affected, according to the testimonies of doctors at the Ministry of Health in Sana'a.

Previously, in July 2017, to be precise, the Houthis prevented the opening of the Emergency Operations Center (the International Regional Center) for cholera in Sana'a, after armed Houthi infiltrators stormed the operations room and prevented the work from commencing[2].

Among the reasons that contributed significantly to the spread of the disease was that most families could not afford the cost of cholera medicines due to the Houthis' failure to pay salaries, increasing poverty, unemployment, and the sale of cholera medicines to patients despite them being provided free of charge by organizations.

One doctor working at the "Revolution General Hospital" criticized what was reported in the media about providing aid and medicines to combat cholera while the patient cannot find most of the medicines and is forced to buy them from the market. According to his testimony presented through a media outlet at the time: "Imagine that a family came to the hospital with a cholera patient and could not afford the cost of a bottle of water. What about the cost of medicine? It is disgraceful that we see giant billboards filling the streets of Sana'a talking about free cholera medicine, but when the patient goes, they find that the supported medicines are very few, and the patient must buy the rest of the medicines... International organizations are selling illusions to Yemenis, and that is why most of the cholera victims in Yemen are a result of the unavailability of medicine, as Yemenis have been without salaries for 10 months[3].

Cholera medicines provided by organizations have been subject to theft

(1) CHOLERA IN YEMEN: A CASE STUDY OF EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, Author (s)
Spiegel, Paul; Ratnayake, Ruwan; Hellman, Nora; Latagne, Danielle; Ververs, Mija; Ngwa, Moise; Wise, Paul, Source: United States Agency for International Development Johns Hopkins University.

(2) A Houthi leader storms an emergency center in Sana'a and prevents its opening, Al-Mawqea Post, July 26, 2017.

(3) Cholera medicine is not free, previous source.

in several areas, often remote, leading to the deaths of many cholera patients.

At the end of November 2018, the Houthis looted cholera treatment medicines in the village of Al-Asabia in the Mawiyah Governorate. These medicines were provided by the Ministry of Health and Population in Aden, in coordination with the World Health Organization.

The group abducted activists Muhammad Hassan Naser and Sultan Al-Dusam, taking them to a prison in Al-Kadan Directorate. They also expelled many of the village's residents who had to leave due to accusations by the Houthi group of "communicating with the legitimate government to obtain these medicines to confront the cholera epidemic that spread among the village's residents."

According to testimonies from the villagers, "the Houthis looted all the cholera medicines available in the village's health unit, and they didn't stop there. They also took 200,000 Yemeni Rials from the residents in exchange for promises to return the medicines, but this didn't happen[1]."

Poliomyelitis:

On March 14, 2017, specifically, the newspaper "Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed" published a report titled "Fears of the Return of Polio to Yemen." The report revealed the appearance of a case of polio after the United Nations had confirmed Yemen's polio-free status in 2006.

The report pointed out several factors that contributed to the return of this disease to Yemen, including incitement against vaccination campaigns, considering them a conspiracy by health organizations. However, sources within the Ministry of Health, controlled by the Houthis, denied the appearance of the disease at that time[2].

The Houthi group denied the appearance of polio in Sa'ada, which naturally contributed to an increase in the number of cases and their spread to other areas. The Yemeni government officially announced the appearance of polio in areas under Houthi control in September 2020, at a time when this disease had almost completely disappeared from most countries around the world.

The Yemeni Ministry of Health then held the Houthi group responsible for the spread of the disease in the Sa'ada and Hajjah governorates, accusing them of preventing immunization teams from performing their duties in these governorates. This was likely to lead to its reappearance and its spread to other governorates. The ministry called on the United Nations and its

(1) Accusations against the Houthis of stealing cholera medicines in the Yemeni village of Al-Asabaa, Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, December 1, 2018, AD.

(2) Fear of the return of polio to Yemen, Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, March 14, 2017.

organizations to "press the Houthi militia to allow vaccination and immunization teams to carry out their tasks before the disease spreads to new governorates[1]."

Subsequently, the Assistant Undersecretary of the Yemeni Ministry of Health, Abdul Raqeeb Al-Haidari, made a statement in which he held the Houthi group responsible for the appearance of the disease in Sa'ada and Hajjah after they "repeatedly prevented the polio vaccine from reaching the two governorates[2]."

At the same time, UNICEF confirmed that cases of polio had appeared in the Sa'ada Governorate because the "Polio Eradication Program had not reached it for over two years[3]." In October of the same year, the government announced that it had identified approximately 16 cases of polio in the Sa'ada Governorate alone[4].

As for the main reasons behind the Houthis not allowing the population to be vaccinated against polio, the Minister of Health and Population at that time explained that the resurgence of the disease was "an inevitable result of irresponsible rumors against the polio vaccine and the Houthi coup militia's prevention of vaccination teams from reaching Sa'ada's directorates. This was based on extremist religious fatwas that fail to comprehend the catastrophic consequences of their statements[5]."

In addition to spreading rumors against vaccination campaigns and considering them an international conspiracy against Yemenis, the Houthis reject door-to-door vaccination campaigns and only make the vaccine available in health centers. Due to these rumors and the "conspiracy theory," along with the difficult living conditions resulting from the war, many Yemeni children are deprived of their right to receive vaccines that protect them from diseases, leading to the spread of the disease in various Yemeni governorates.

During the years of the war, the Yemeni government conducted comprehensive polio vaccination campaigns in 12 governorates within areas under its control. This was due to the Houthi's continuous refusal to implement campaigns in the areas they controlled. In February 2022, the Minister of Health and Population, Dr. Qasim Bahibh, stated on this matter: "We are launching a campaign against polio in areas under the legitimate

(1) Polio returns to Yemen 17 years after the country was declared free of it, Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, September 20, 2020 AD.
(2) A Yemeni official warns of a new danger threatening the country's children, RT Russia Today, September 18, 2020 AD.
(3) United Nations Children's Fund "UNICEF" website - Yemen, September 11, 2020, AD.
(4) Houthi negligence brings "polio" back to Yemen 14 years after its disappearance, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, October 5, 2020 AD.
(5) The government: Extremist religious fatwas caused the resurgence of "polio" in Saada Governorate, Yemen Shabab.net, November 3, 2020 AD.

government's control, covering nearly 2 million children. Unfortunately, Yemeni children in areas under the control of the Houthi militias are being deprived due to their continuous rejection of vaccination campaigns based on the scientific frameworks approved by all international organizations. This is what has caused the return of polio to Yemen and other epidemics(1)."

The Houthi rebels continued to reject comprehensive vaccination campaigns for children in their controlled areas, despite demands from organizations and the Ministry of Health in Aden. At the end of August 2022, the Ministry of Health and Population under Houthi control issued a report confirming that the total number of discovered acute flaccid paralysis cases until week 34 in 2022 reached 827 cases, with 52 percent in age groups under three years. Most of these cases were concentrated in Dhamar, Sa'ada, Hajjah, Hodeidah, Al-Bayda, Sana'a, Ibb, Amran, Al-Jawf, and the Capital Municipality, due to the Houthi's refusal to implement comprehensive vaccination campaigns from door to door.

Corona Virus - COVID-19:

While the world mobilized to combat the spread of the COVID-19 virus through monitoring, restrictions, and protective measures to safeguard people from this deadly disease, the Houthis treated this disease with negligence and deliberate disregard. They targeted anyone who warned of the dangers of the pandemic, which led to a significant spread of the virus and the deaths of hundreds of Yemenis, as confirmed by international and local organizations.

Initially, the Houthis denied the existence of the disease and considered discussions about it in global media to be a "major conspiracy" to frighten and intimidate countries and entities opposed to "America and Israel." This was the discourse of Houthi leaders in the media and among the Yemeni people, taking advantage of the prevailing ignorance and illiteracy, especially among impoverished segments of society.

As the days passed, the Houthis could no longer conceal the news of the disease's spread due to the increasing number of deaths. They considered this pandemic as a biological weapon used against certain populations. Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi confirmed this notion in one of his speeches, saying, "Some experts in biological warfare talk about the Americans working for years to exploit the coronavirus and spread it in certain societies(2)."

(1) A post by the Minister on his page, Dr. Qasem Buhaibeh, on the social networking site "Twitter", February 18, 2022 AD.

(2) Coverage of Abdul Malik al-Houthi's speech on the occasion of the anniversary of the killing =

The virus spread in areas under Houthi control amidst a high and systematic level of secrecy. Social media was filled with condolences, images, and videos that showed the increasing number of deaths, despite the Houthis hiding the truth about the virus's spread and denying its existence.

On December 15, 2020, BBC Arabic published an investigative report that shed light on Yemen's ordeal in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic and how the Houthis concealed the presence of the disease until a late stage, resulting in its increased spread and the deaths of many Yemenis.

The investigative report also highlighted the errors committed by the Yemeni Ministry of Health at the outset of the pandemic. This included the absence of the Minister of Health and his deputy during the outbreak of the virus in Aden, which led to a significant number of medical staff fleeing. Moreover, they failed to provide the necessary resources to combat the disease in its early stages. However, the most critical and dangerous factors were the deliberate practices of the Houthi rebels that contributed to the spread of the virus among the population. The following is a summary of these practices according to the investigation on BBC:

- While the Houthis initially confirmed the presence of only four cases infected with the coronavirus, doctors speaking to BBC revealed that the virus had spread significantly, and hospitals were full of patients and fatalities. The situation was described as "almost catastrophic," especially among healthcare workers and doctors.
- BBC's interviewer asked Houthi Health and Population Minister Taha al-Mutawakil about the number of COVID-19 cases they had, but Mutawakil evaded the question and refused to answer.
- A Houthi laboratory prevented anyone from filming anything related to the coronavirus in Bab Al-Salam popular market in Sana'a, where the first case in Sana'a was detected. The laboratory instructed store owners on what they should tell the BBC reporter.
- Epidemiology specialist and a supervisor of cases affected by the disease, Dr. Ihab Al-Saqaf, said that the first wave of the pandemic had passed but had been catastrophic. His team continuously reported the number of disease cases to the Houthi-controlled Ministry of Health, but the ministry continued to deny the virus's spread.
- The Houthis' official media outlets did not hold daily press conferences to report infection rates but instead aired promotional videos about the authorities' efforts to combat the virus.
- The Houthis did not acknowledge the first death from COVID-19 until May 5, 2020. Meanwhile, social media was filled with videos and

= of Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi on the website of the Yemeni News Agency (Saba), which is under the control of the Houthis, March 21, 2020 AD.

testimonials from residents confirming the existence of hundreds of cases at Kuwait Hospital in Sana'a. The Houthis spoke of only four cases.

- As soon as the pandemic reached Yemen, the Houthis prevented journalists from entering hospitals.
- Many patients arrived at the hospital at a late stage, making it difficult to save them.
- In most countries, younger individuals are less prone to infection, but in Yemen, many people in their twenties, thirties, and forties came to the hospital having trouble in breathing, and within a week or two, they died.
- The broadcaster asked: Why did patients arrive at the hospital at such a late stage, making it difficult to save them? She answered: The approach adopted by the Houthis may have led to counterproductive results. While the Houthi authorities continued to publicly deny the virus's spread, they would send teams to collect suspected cases.
- Dr. Ihab Al-Saqaf explained that they would send police or security teams with the nurses. People felt like they were being treated as criminals or accused of a crime or indecency if they were known to be infected with the disease. In some cases, there were even gunshots fired in some neighborhoods. This made people afraid to report their symptoms and prefer to treat their illness at home.
- Videos posted on Facebook showed armed men forcibly taking patients away, and many died in their homes.
- In a single week in June 2020, the investigators collected hundreds of condolence posts for deaths due to COVID-19 on Facebook.
- According to the Yemeni Doctors Association, 107 healthcare workers died due to the virus.
- The host asked Dr. Adel Al-Emad about the reasons for the Houthis' secrecy regarding COVID-19 case numbers. He emphasized that the Houthi's announcement of the disease's spread would force them to confront it. He added that the Houthi's denial of the virus's existence was an evasion of responsibility, which he considered incorrect.
- The healthcare system was severely affected after the Houthis imposed taxes on foreign aid[(1)].

The Houthi behavior in dealing with COVID-19 led the World Health Organization to suspend its activities in areas under their control to "pressure the Houthis to be more transparent regarding suspected COVID-19 cases[(2)]."

However, the Houthis remained obstinate and did not deal transparently

(1) An investigative report entitled Yemen: Corona on the battlefield, Nawal Al-Mahqafi, BBC Arabic Channel, December 15, 2020 AD.

(2) Why did the World Health Organization suspend its activities in the Houthi areas? Voice of Germany Radio or Deutsche Welle DW, May 10, 2020 AD.

with the disease. About a year after the World Health Organization's stance, the international organization Human Rights Watch released a report pointing to one of the main reasons the Houthis did not handle the COVID-19 pandemic appropriately. This was their concern for the taxes resulting from the continuation of economic activity. In addition to the Houthis not taking measures to protect people from the spread of the disease, they also prevented vaccines against the disease from entering their areas. The report highlighted many Houthi practices that contributed to the increasing death toll from the disease, including:

- The Houthis in Yemen were withholding information about the risks of the "coronavirus" and its impact, undermining international efforts to provide vaccines in the areas under their control. Since the start of the pandemic in Yemen in April 2020, Houthi officials sought to disseminate misleading information about the virus and vaccines.
- After the second wave of the coronavirus in Yemen began in March 2021, the number of confirmed cases multiplied, according to the statement by Mark Lowcock, the Deputy Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations, on April 15. However, the Houthi authorities in Sana'a adopted a policy of concealing data regarding cases spotted and deaths.
- Michael Page, Deputy Middle East Director at Human Rights Watch, said, "The deliberate decision by Houthi authorities to hide the true number of COVID-19 cases and oppose vaccines threatens the lives of Yemenis. Pretending that there is no coronavirus is not a strategy to reduce risks and will only lead to collective suffering."
- Between mid-April and early May, Human Rights Watch met with four Yemeni healthcare workers residing in Sana'a and three overseas with intimate knowledge of the COVID-19 crisis in Yemen, including Yemeni doctors living abroad and one international healthcare worker involved in COVID-19 response efforts. All requested anonymity for fear of reprisals. Human Rights Watch also reviewed video clips showing Houthi officials spreading misleading information about the virus and vaccines.
- Until early 2021, the Houthi-controlled Ministry of Health in the Yemeni capital, Sana'a, reported only one COVID-19 related death, four confirmed cases, and two recoveries since the start of the pandemic. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) stated that unofficial indicators pointed to increasing cases in the north. Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) reported in March a sharp increase in COVID-19 cases and severe conditions among its teams in Yemen.
- Yemen received 360,000 doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine on March 31

as a first batch, part of 1.9 million doses intended for Yemen in 2021. The plan specifies that the Houthi authorities will receive the vaccines for distribution in areas under their control. However, a medical source stated that the group's lack of cooperation with the World Health Organization and the Yemeni government prevented any vaccines from reaching the north. As a result, at the time of this report, vaccinations are ongoing only in the south.

- On April 23, Adham Rashad Abdelmoniem, a representative of the World Health Organization in Yemen, stated that the Houthi authorities initially agreed - under pressure - to accept 10,000 vaccine doses. Still, the vaccines have not been delivered after the Houthi authorities set a condition that the vaccines could only be distributed by them without oversight from the World Health Organization. The World Health Organization rejected this condition, as it needed to ensure that the vaccines were not diverted elsewhere.
- Later, the World Health Organization stated in a post on its Facebook page that the Houthis had accepted only a thousand doses instead of ten thousand, on the condition of increasing the dose allocation to the north in the next batch of vaccines. On May 8th, reports indicated that the internationally recognized Yemeni Ministry of Health in Aden had provided 10,000 doses to the World Health Organization for the vaccination of healthcare workers in areas controlled by the Houthis.
- Several Houthi officials have spread misleading information about COVID-19, claiming that the virus is a "conspiracy." Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, in a televised speech in March 2020 on the Houthi-affiliated Al-Masirah TV channel, said that the virus is an American conspiracy. He stated: "Some experts in biological warfare talk about the Americans working for years... to benefit from the coronavirus... and spread it in certain communities."
- Healthcare workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch believe that the Houthis refuse to acknowledge the pandemic to keep the economy fully operational and allow the political elite to exploit high fees imposed on companies. The Houthis have substantially increased their revenues in the past two years through involvement in corrupt practices and looting, according to the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies.
- In contrast to the Houthis, health authorities supported by the Yemeni government and operating in the south and east of the country regularly reported confirmed cases during 2020 and warned of a possible second wave. OCHA reported in April 2021 that the Yemeni government had reported 4,119 confirmed cases and 864 deaths, with over half of the total cases reported during the first quarter of 2021.
- Healthcare workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch stated that the

lack of transparency and misleading information from the Houthis has put the health of citizens at risk and hindered efforts to protect against the virus's spread. Two healthcare workers mentioned that after the first wave began in Sana'a in May 2020, the Houthis placed a special intelligence unit under the command of the group's "Political Security Apparatus" in medical centers, seemingly to intimidate and threaten healthcare employees and prevent them from providing information to the media or international organizations.

- In early 2021, according to a source with direct knowledge of the proceedings, the World Health Organization asked the Houthis to submit a request to the organization for vaccines, but the Houthis delayed and missed the designated deadline. The source added, "The Houthi authorities did not cooperate in a timely manner with the international community to secure the northern Yemen's share of the allocated vaccines."
- Seven healthcare employees stated that the lack of a plan or program to combat the coronavirus by Houthi authorities worsened the pandemic. They added that even before the pandemic, some prominent Houthis claimed that all vaccines were, in their opinion, a conspiracy. Local media reported in 2013 that Houthi forces prevented vaccination teams from carrying out immunization work against measles and polio in some remote areas of Sa'ada province, Yemen, under the pretext that the vaccines were "American."
- Three healthcare employees reported that the Houthis appointed individuals who were not qualified but belonged to Houthi-affiliated families of the "Sayyids" category directly descended from the lineage of the Prophet Muhammad (according to the employees) in high positions in medical facilities in Sana'a.
- During a press conference in Sana'a in May 2020, Taha al-Mutawakil, the Houthi Minister of Health, justified his group's policy of not providing information about the spread of the coronavirus in Yemen, saying that they treat patients based on their human right to healthcare rather than as numbers in stock markets discussed by media. In the same conference, he stated that Yemen would produce a drug to treat coronavirus infection. On May 1, 2020, al-Mutawakil claimed that Yemen was free of the coronavirus and that if any cases appeared, the United Arab Emirates would be responsible for its transmission to Yemen(1).
- After about a month, the same organization issued a brief report stating that healthcare workers in Houthi-controlled areas were struggling to

(1) A report entitled Yemen: The Houthis are risking the health of civilians in the face of "Corona", issued by "Human Rights Watch", June 1, 2021 AD.

obtain coronavirus vaccines that the Houthi group had committed to providing to the medical staff, and these vaccines might expire before use. The report mentioned that "Houthi authorities unnecessarily expose healthcare workers in the country to risks by failing to take available steps to confront the coronavirus pandemic, which could worsen the collapse of the healthcare system in the country[1]."

- In a short period, about 153 doctors and healthcare workers died in Yemen due to coronavirus, according to the Yemeni Doctors in Exile Association[2], with most of the deaths in Sana'a. The deaths of healthcare professionals had negative repercussions on the already fragile healthcare sector in Yemen, which was already suffering from a shortage of medical specialists[3].
- Regarding the Houthis' failure to work on mitigating the risks of the pandemic, the renowned Yemeni doctor and writer Marwan al-Ghafouri[4] published an article shedding light on the Houthi approach to the pandemic. He stated: "The authorities denied the existence of the pandemic and deceived the people. They knew the truth early on. People continued to go out, believing there was no virus on their way, and the pandemic spread, and they fell dead and infected. The Houthi authorities could have said: there is a pandemic, continue your lives while maintaining social distance, wear masks, stop prayers, weddings, popular markets, and schools, and continue your lives within these limits. This simple measure would have protected people, slowed the spread of the virus, and preserved lives. However, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi rejected such ideas and, once again, "let down his people[5]."
- Al-Ghafouri's article highlighted the Houthis' focus on the Hashemite group in Yemen rather than other Yemenis, echoing what Yemenis have been saying about Houthi discriminatory practices. He mentioned in the same article: "Let the Houthis treat the Yemeni people as they did with the Hashemites: they dedicated the Mövenpick hotel as a field hospital for them, transferred doctors, technology, laboratories, and delicious food facilities to it! The Houthis, who are the authority, benefited from their field experience in preserving the lives of the Hashemites, and they should do something similar for the people of that country[6]."

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(1) A report entitled: Health workers left to confront the Corona virus in Yemen, issued by Human Rights Watch, July 7, 2021.

(2) An urgent distress call from Yemeni doctors abroad, Association of Yemeni Doctors Abroad, April 25, 2021.

(3) Human Rights Watch, former source.

(4) Marwan Al-Ghafouri, a Yemeni writer and cardiologist residing in Germany, founded a medical application with a group of doctors to provide counseling services to patients whose tragedy has been compounded by the war.

(5) An article by Dr. Marwan Al-Ghafouri, published on his Facebook page, June 3, 2020 AD.

(6) Ibid.

Decline in Healthcare Services:

Without a doubt, the war affected the quality and costs of healthcare services provided to the general Yemeni population. Prices for medical services in Houthi-controlled areas skyrocketed to unrealistic levels, whether in government or private healthcare institutions. The deterioration in healthcare services and the increase in prices and costs would not have reached these record levels in Houthi-controlled areas if the de facto authorities in Sana'a had not committed a large number of violations and implemented many measures contributing in one way or another to creating this difficult situation.

The Houthis withheld the budget allocations of government hospitals and health centers, prompting healthcare workers to stage protests on multiple occasions. Furthermore, the Houthis raised fees for healthcare services in government hospitals and centers, which are often relied upon by the poorest of the poor in Yemen, to the level of costs for services provided in private hospitals(1). Alongside this, they failed to deliver salaries to healthcare professionals and doctors, leading many of them to leave their jobs in the government health sector and seek opportunities in the private sector or leave the country in search of work, as confirmed by Houthi leader Taha al-Moutawakel when he said that 95 percent of public hospitals do not have general practitioners, and the rest have no specialists(2).

Before the Houthi incursion into the capital, Sana'a, many healthcare services were provided by government hospitals and centers for free or at nominal fees, as per the Yemeni constitution, which ensured healthcare for all Yemenis(3). However, all of this changed during the Houthi era. Every healthcare service became costly and unaffordable for most Yemenis, especially with the Houthis refusing to pay salaries. The situation escalated to the point where they began charging fees for healthcare services funded by international organizations. For example, they started charging 1,000 Yemeni rials for each child seeking child vaccinations, which were originally provided as aid by international organizations and should have

(1) Sana'a residents complain about the migration of specialized medical staff. Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, January 17, 2020.

(2) Minister of Health: Most consultant doctors have left Yemen. Al-Majallah Al-Tibbiyah, July 15, 2019.

(3) Article 55 of the Yemeni Constitution states that healthcare is a right for all citizens, and the state guarantees this right by establishing various hospitals and healthcare institutions and expanding them. The law regulates the medical profession and the expansion of free healthcare services and the dissemination of health awareness among citizens. Article 56: The state guarantees the provision of social security for all citizens in cases of illness, disability, unemployment, old age, or loss of family. It particularly provides this for the families of martyrs according to the law.

been offered for free[1]. Furthermore, they engaged in selling healthcare aid[2].

In August 2022, Sheikh Fares al-Habari, who the Houthis appointed as the governor of Rima province, appeared in a video confirming that the Houthi Minister of Health, Taha al-Mutawakil, refused to establish a healthcare authority and hospital for the province's residents, despite the availability of ready buildings. He stated that healthcare activities in the province depended solely on what international organizations provided. He said, "The Minister of Health visited us three times; he promised things he never fulfilled. I send him a message from here with all due respect: we gave them buildings and told them to establish authorities, and we provided other buildings and told them to build hospitals, not just health centers. We only have what the international organizations give us. As for the official side, it is limited to the Minister of Health's visits to Rima Province. We receive him, record him, and thank him for his visit, and then he leaves."

Al-Habari also confirmed that Houthi leader al-Moutawakel handles appointments in the Ministry of Health based on sectarian considerations, leading to the collapse of the healthcare situation in the province. He mentioned a respected individual, Dr. Mohsen al-Azizi, who had significantly improved the general hospital in the province, performed advanced surgeries, and transformed the hospital. Despite these achievements, the Minister fired him from his position, with the reason given that he "folds his hands in prayer and doesn't pray properly." Al-Habari emphasized that he wanted anyone who could improve the hospital, even if they were wearing Jewish skullcaps, to serve the community.

I address the minister from this platform: Why did you remove Dr. Mohsen al-Azizi from his position after he improved the hospital?! Go now and see the deteriorating condition of the hospital after Dr. al-Azizi's dismissal. I hold the Minister of Health entirely responsible. Sure, you say this Dr. al-Azizi is an infidel and you removed him? Where is the alternative? Did you bring us an alternative, or did you come to waste the existing individual who was serving the community and bear the burden of these actions? Now, the health situation here is dire. This is in addition to other fields[3]."

Many impoverished Yemenis have died from treatable diseases, but the lack of medical staff, most of whom have left government hospitals or emigrated after being deprived of their salaries by the Houthis or subjected

(1) The healthcare sector in Houthi-controlled areas: Sectarianism, corruption, and nepotism. 2 December News Agency, August 24, 2021.

(2) The Houthi's monopolization of the healthcare sector. Al-Sahel Al-Gharbi, November 19, 2020.

(3) A speech by Fares Al-Habbari about Taha Al-Mutawakkil, Minister of Health, a statement by Fares Al-Habbari, YouTube, August 3, 2022.

to incitement, along with the inability of families to afford the cost of treatment, exacerbated by the substantial increase in healthcare costs in both public and private hospitals. Furthermore, the Houthis raised drug prices to record levels because of the taxes and additional fees imposed on healthcare institutions.

Just like other investment institutions, the Houthis increased levies and taxes imposed on private hospitals, healthcare centers, as well as drug merchants and manufacturers. The Ministry of Health and Population under Houthi control mandated significant fees for healthcare practitioners and pharmacists to obtain work permits, and those in these fields are required to pay fees for renewing their permits periodically(1).

In December 2019, the Houthis required several private hospitals to pay a 4% tax on every surgical procedure performed in the hospital. Naturally, this percentage was added to the treatment fees in the hospital, placing an additional burden on ordinary citizens(2).

According to testimonies from hospital owners and healthcare workers in Sana'a, the Houthi-controlled Health and Population Office in the capital systematically and extensively engaged in extortion of private hospitals and healthcare centers, forcing the owners of these establishments to face two options, either raising healthcare costs or closing down.

In mid-2021, the Yemeni Network for Rights and Freedoms issued a human rights report that documented 4,121 violations targeting healthcare facilities and healthcare workers from May 2017 to May 2021. These violations took place in several Yemeni provinces controlled or contested by the Houthi forces, including Sana'a, Ibb, Amran, Hajja, Marib, Al Mahweet, Al Jawf, Al Bayda, Dhamar, Rima, Taiz, Al Hodeida, and Lahj. The violations included direct killings of medical staff and paramedics, injuries, arrests, forced disappearances affecting doctors and nurses, field executions, physical assaults, the direct targeting of healthcare facilities with mortar shells and Howitzer cannons, rocket attacks, the blowing up and booby-trapping of healthcare facilities, and the seizure of medical aids, as well as looting and extortion of hospitals and healthcare centers, and the sale of medicines on the black market, depriving civilians of access to these medicines(3).

In October 2022, the Yemeni Organization for Combating Human Trafficking revealed a crime in which dozens of children suffering from cancer were killed after being injected with smuggled drugs that the Houthi

(1) From doctors to midwives... Houthi levies amounting to tens of billions, West Coast, November 14, 2020 AD.

(2) Houthi decision to impose taxes on surgical operations, Ababil Net website, December 16, 2019.

(3) A human rights report documenting 4,000 violations affecting the health sector, including 62 killings of doctors and nurses, Al-Masdar Online, July 24, 2021.

Ministry of Health and Population knew were expired at the end of September 2022.

The organization, led by Yemeni human rights activist Nabeel Fadel, stated in a press release that the Houthi Ministry of Health and Population "dispensed expired medicine after tampering with the expiration date and used it at the Kuwait Hospital for children with cancer." The organization pointed out that the World Health Organization and international organizations regularly provide free medication for intractable diseases such as cancer, diabetes, hypertension, dialysis, and others. However, a significant portion of these treatments ends up being sold on the black market(1).

About a month before this crime, the Houthi-affiliated "Al-Hawiya" channel aired a brief interview with Dr. Nidal Al-Azab, who complained that the Houthi-controlled Ministry of Health in Sana'a had shut down his well-known clinics called "Al-Thiqa" due to his filing a report with the Public Money Investigation Police, providing evidence and documents showing that the Houthi Ministry of Health in Sana'a was selling government medicines in the markets(2).

Following the revelation of details regarding the crime of killing children suffering from cancer with smuggled drugs, the former Houthi spokesperson Ali Al-Bukhaiti posted tweets on his Twitter account, exposing systematic Houthi practices that have led to the collapse of the healthcare situation in areas under their control. He said, "In Kuwait Hospital in Sana'a, 17 children with cancer died due to being injected with contraband drugs brought from outside the hospital. This incident raises many questions about the health situation in areas under Houthi control. After Houthi harassment and interference in the work of doctors, government hospitals are now run by medical students from various colleges who have not yet graduated, but they practice medicine in government hospitals under the pretext of practical training. This has led to many medical errors against patients, and what concerns the Houthis is to provide a free medical workforce."

Al-Bukhaiti added, "International organizations regularly supply government hospitals and medical centers with medicines, which then disappear and are diverted to Houthi-controlled front-line hospitals after being received by the ministry's agents. These medicines include vaccines, medical supplies, kidney dialysis medications, cardiac medications,

(1) Urgent notification about the death of dozens of children with cancer in Sana'a due to a spoiled dose, the official website of the Yemeni Organization for Combating Human Trafficking, October 5, 2022.

(2) An interview published on YouTube entitled: "Clarification from Dr. Nidal Al-Azab: Al-Thiqa clinics have been closed due to our cooperation in fighting government drug selling gangs," September 1, 2022.

intensive care medications, and more, with the surplus being sold in the market. For example, the 48 Military Hospital, previously run by the Republican Guard, was privatized by the Houthis and turned into a commercial civilian hospital. They contracted with senior consultants and surgeons to make it an important surgical center. The hospital is not free for citizens or the Republican Guard soldiers for whom it was originally built, but it is free for the Houthis and their relatives. In the kidney center at the Revolution Hospital in Sana'a, many kidney failure patients die due to neglect and delays in dialysis. Reports indicate that four patients died within two hours during dialysis due to the deterioration and lack of sterilization of the machines. Kidney failure patients also suffer from the cost of medicines, which they now have to buy after they were no longer distributed for free."

Al-Bukhaiti harks back to the period before the Houthi takeover of Sana'a and their seizure of power, stating, "The Ministry of Health, as a government entity, used to distribute medicines for diabetes, kidney failure, heart conditions, liver diseases, cancer, and others, which were provided to them for free by international organizations. However, in recent years, the Houthis stopped providing these medications for free to low-income and impoverished individuals, causing tens of thousands of preventable deaths. For example, at the [government] Kuwait Hospital in Sana'a, the cost of a heart catheterization is $2,000, and the cost of a regular childbirth at the Revolution Hospital is 300,000 Yemeni rials, while the cost of a single bed stay at the government Seventy Hospital is 10,000 Yemeni rials. This is how it is in all government facilities that used to be free. In recent years, the prices of medicines have skyrocketed, and low-quality Chinese and Indian medicines have appeared in the markets, which are contraband and imitation drugs, while the original medicines and Western companies have disappeared. Merchants who pay fees to the Houthis have been granted permits to import medicines within days without going through quality and safety procedures. This led to the emergence of new pro-Houthi traders who have taken over the market, and official agents with experience and expertise have declined, despite the official permission process for accepting any medicine in the market usually taking three to five years. They granted it within a few days as long as the merchant is one of them or a relative and pays the fee without hesitation."

Al-Bukhaiti continues his discourse with a comprehensive conclusion known to Yemenis and those working for international, regional, and local organizations in Yemen: "The healthcare situation in the areas controlled by the Abdul-Malik al-Houthi group is living in the worst imaginable conditions. If not for the support of some international organizations in providing vaccines, medicines, and operating many healthcare centers and institutions in Yemen, Yemenis would be dying in the streets and homes,

and epidemics that disappeared from the world decades ago would have spread[1]."

Healthcare During the Time of the Early Imamates:

The Houthis' approach to the people's healthcare situation is no different from the approach and methods of their forefathers from the House of Hamid al-Din, with the time difference and the development of the healthcare sector during the rule of the republican regime.

Some of this situation has been documented in the book "I Was a Doctor in Yemen" by the French doctor Claudia Vayon[2], who practiced medicine in some areas of Yemen and witnessed the neglect of the House of Hamid al-Din and their disregard for the lives of Yemenis during that period.

On her first visit to the hospital in Taiz, accompanied by Dr. Colonel Reboulié (whom she was supposed to work with before his death), her first shock was the hospital's lack of services, basic equipment, needs, and medicines due to the Imam's refusal to support the hospital. She says in her book: "The small hospital serving a large city like Taiz had no services, and there were no basic devices, equipment, or medicines due to the Imam's refusal to support the hospital. At the time, there were several buildings, each consisting of a single ground floor, surrounded by a courtyard. Dr. Reboulié cared for about thirty beds. When we arrived at the hospital, he took out a lunchbox with leftovers and warmed it for a young patient. He supervised everything personally, and most of the humble situations he was involved in here are not degrading when done for the sake of goodness and virtue. Dr. Reboulié provided necessary treatments for his patients himself, as there were only two pharmacists in the hospital who were supplied with medicines every fifteen days. The surgical room was empty of everything. When I wanted to see the treatment rooms, Dr. Reboulié refused to accompany me, so I passed through them alone, guided by one of the nurses, unwillingly. I passed through them one by one and found the same astonishing and alarming scene: a foul smell, beds consisting of poles stretched with ropes, without any bedspreads. Emaciated, almost naked bodies. When they felt my presence, they moved slightly, tried to stand up, extended their hands toward me, and their voices rose imploringly and painfully. I was something new to them; they saw a ray of hope before inevitable death claimed many of them while they supervised death. The

(1) Tweets posted by Ali Al-Bukhaiti on his Twitter page, commenting on the death of children due to smuggled medicine, October 12, 2022.

(2) Claudia Vayon (1912-2002), author of the book I Was a Doctor in Yemen, is a doctor and anthropologist. She came to Sana’a in 1951 based on an invitation she received from Ahmed Hamid al-Din, at the time, to practice medicine in Sana’a and its environs.

nurse looked at me and said, 'Typhoid.' But all these patients had no medicines. Ten rooms for men in this manner. I felt like I was in a nightmare. No one guided me to the women's section, but I found it. Small rooms without windows, literally dens, where women lay side by side on a dirty floor, and many of them had their children with them. People might think that they can imagine the horror and atrocity of such a thing, but I saw, with my own eyes, a dying woman lying on her feces, and I saw her rise, leaning on her elbow, and take her wet child while in her last breath, pleading and supplicating."

Dr. Reboulié turned to me and said, "Now you've seen everything. It's repugnant for a person to work in these conditions every day. But what can one do when there are no medicines, and the Imam doesn't provide a single rial to the hospital?[1]"

It may seem to the reader, as they read what the doctor described, as if she is describing the situation of Yemenis in Tihama during the Houthi control, but she is talking about the situation in the 1950s. She says, "External consultations were of little importance, as few people could afford to buy medicines, and daily life presented many troubles. However, when illness appeared, it was a catastrophe. People were poor and had no money to buy medicines, and the Soviet medical mission that used to distribute free treatments had left Yemen long ago. The government pharmacy had no medicines, and all patients could do was go from one Amir (local leader) to another to ask for charity to buy medicine[2]."

Regarding the preferential healthcare treatment given to the ruling family over other Yemenis, she says, "I remained deprived of work, and Amir al-Hasan was traveling, and no one could make any decisions in his absence. But some tests were urgent. Only a blood test could determine the cause of the constant fever in one of my patients, whose condition was worsening. In vain, I submitted several requests, and after about ten days, I realized I could no longer wait. An opportunity came when a young Amir had a minor complaint, and I refused to diagnose his pain until I examined his urine. Since the issue concerned an Amir, all difficulties miraculously disappeared, and I was informed that the laboratory would be at my disposal the next day. So, I went, full of hope and expectation, with a vial of my patient's blood in my bag, who was asleep in the hospital. But what a disappointment! Waiting for me at the laboratory entrance were the Minister of Public Health, the hospital director, their secretaries, hospital pharmacists, the central pharmacy pharmacist, and half a dozen soldiers, one of whom was carrying the expensive bottle. They asked me to perform the test (for the young Amir) immediately, right in front of all of them, and they told me that

(1) I Was a Doctor in Yemen, Claudia Vayon, translated by: Mohsen Ahmed Al-Aini, pp. 33-34.
(2) Ibid. p. 66-67.

the laboratory would be closed immediately[1]."

On another occasion, the doctor recounts her dispute with one of the Imami court princes for his attempt to control and harness her services for himself, disregarding the rest of the patients. She says, "Then, the family of one of the princes filed a complaint against me to the Imam because they asked me to wait for over an hour while they went to the pharmacy to fetch a non-urgent injection. I refused to wait because I had many tasks. The prince, annoyed, said, 'If the prince is ill, the whole city must wait.' I was amazed to find a prince, pretending to be religious, selfishly claiming the right to monopolize the only doctor in a large city[2]."

The doctor pointed out in several places the concern of the Hamid al-Din family for wealth and their neglect of the suffering of Yemenis due to the lack of medical services for the general population. She added, "And a similar story... A woman went into labor, and the birth canal was narrowing. The fetus died inside its mother. In Sana'a, there were no surgeons, and my colleague and I decided to intervene. On the way to the hospital, someone stopped me and said that Dr. Vinrouni had left Sana'a! The governor of Hajjah had summoned him, and the Imam ordered his deputy to transport the doctor to Hajjah. But al-Saif al-Hasan, who cared for nothing, valued his interests, and paid for the doctor's trip. They immediately found a car to bring Dr. Vinrouni back.

I felt dizzy when I heard this news. The hospital had three hundred beds, and I was the only doctor responsible for watching over them for many weeks. This was too much and unbearable[3]."

Landmines and Hidden Explosives: Sowing Hunger and Reaping Starvation

The Houthis claim to defend Yemen's sovereignty and the dignity of the Yemeni people, but they commit crimes against Yemenis that a group with a genuine sense of belonging to Yemen would not. The crimes of cultural and physical extermination they commit suggest that they treat Yemenis as enemies. They view the people who reject their racial based "Wilayah" (authority) myth, which grants their ethnic group economic, political, and religious privileges, as enemies deserving of punishment, or as their religious leader, Abdulah bin Hamza, described them, "A useless flock deserving of destruction."

(1) Ibid. p. 68.
(2) Ibid. p. 81.
(3) Ibid. p.90.

One of these heinous crimes that is destroying the present and future of Yemenis, indicating that the Houthis deal with a free Yemeni as an adversary and an enemy, is the process of planting landmines and deploying hidden explosives, which the Houthis have been planting in Yemen since 2004 and continue to do so as of the writing of this author.

The Houthis plant vast numbers of landmines in every Yemeni region they reach, fully aware that the Yemeni civilians are the ones most affected by these mines. Soldiers have the experience and capability to navigate these mines and protect themselves, which has been the case since the beginning of the war. Most landmine victims are civilians.

Since 2004, the Houthis claim to be fighting against America, Israel, Britain, and the Arab coalition countries, but they plant internationally prohibited hidden explosive devices and landmines everywhere, with full knowledge that they will only harm Yemenis.

In March 2018, the Conflict Armament Research (CAR) organization released an important report titled(1): "Wireless and Infrared Negative-Marking Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices: The Latest Iranian Technological Contributions to the Yemen War(2)." The qualitative report included findings comparing remotely controlled explosive devices camouflaged as natural rocks (EFPs) documented in Yemen with similar explosive devices documented in other regions in the Middle East, such as Bahrain, South Lebanon, and Iraq.

The armed Houthi forces control these explosive devices remotely and detonate them using infrared negative-marking triggers. According to the report, the components of these explosive devices used by the Houthis in Yemen match those of remotely controlled explosive devices seized by Bahraini security forces from elements supported by the Iranian regime in Bahrain. These components also match the explosives found on the "Jihan" ship arriving from Iran, which was intercepted by Yemeni security forces in 2013. These are the same explosive devices that Hezbollah used extensively in South Lebanon, and the U.S. military found the same explosive devices in arms depots belonging to the forces fighting on behalf of the Iranian regime in Iraq(3).

The danger of this type of explosives lies in their camouflage, as they are disguised as rocks, tree branches, plastic containers, and many everyday tools people use. The Houthis place them on roads, in farms, homes, and service institutions, making it difficult for soldiers to detect them. This

(1) A research center registered in Britain that was established in 2011 and includes experts from around the world.

(2) "Wirelessly controlled and negative infrared remotely detonated explosive devices... The latest Iranian technological contributions in the Yemeni war." Center for Arms Research (CAR), March 2018.

(3) Ibid.

poses a significant risk to civilians, who ultimately become the primary victims of these explosive devices.

Even though the Republic of Yemen signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines in 1998, and Yemeni law prohibits their production, use, transport, and sale(1), the Houthis consider these weapons one of their most important weapons, both in production and use. This is in parallel with their production and use of anti-vehicle mines that are randomly planted, posing a direct danger to civilians, contributing to displacement(2), and leading residents to leave their homes and areas, negatively impacting their living conditions.

There are no unified statistics that illustrate the extent of landmines planted by the Houthis during the years of the war and the civilian casualties caused by them. Reports and statistics related to landmines have varied. However, different estimates have confirmed that the Houthis planted more than one million landmines during the early years of the war alone(3), making Yemen the most heavily mined country since the end of World War II and the most affected in the Middle East and North Africa region by the catastrophe of landmine proliferation(4).

From July 2018 to March 2022, the specialized "Masam" project for landmine clearance in Yemen removed nearly 323,875 landmines, unexploded ordnance, and explosive devices. They cleared an area of 31,244,526 square meters(5). When considering the time frame and area, these numbers highlight the heinousness of the crime and the brutality of the party responsible for spreading death in this catastrophic manner.

Various media outlets, including social media, have continuously covered the news of landmine victims throughout the years of the war. Almost every week, social media platforms are filled with images and testimonies of civilian victims, especially women, children, and the elderly, about these painful incidents. According to the National Mine Action Program, the Houthi landmines have caused the deaths of approximately 8,000 civilians, including children, women, and the elderly(6). They have also led to a significant number of Yemenis suffering from various

(1) Law No. 25 of 2005 regarding the prohibition of the production, possession, use, transfer, and trade of anti-personnel mines.

(2) Report of the Yemen Panel of Experts, 2021, previous reference, summary, p. 3.

(3) "HOW HOUTHI-PLANTED MINES ARE KILLING CIVILIANS IN YEMEN," 2019 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).

(4) Statement by the Director of the National Mine Action Center, Brigadier General Amin Al-Aqeeli, Yemeni News Agency (Saba), April 23, 2018.

(5) The official account of Masam Project on Twitter.

(6) 8 thousand people are victims of mines in Yemen, Yemeni News Agency (Saba), April 7, 2021 AD.

disabilities, rendering them unable to regain their social and economic roles due to the lack of access to appropriate rehabilitation services(1).

In addition to the physical harm the thousands of civilians have suffered due to these landmines and explosive devices, there are severe economic damages inflicted on Yemenis. These economic damages will continue to affect them for decades until Yemen's lands are completely cleared of landmines, unlike the bombings whose effects fade relatively quickly.

Landmines have deprived thousands of farmers in various Yemeni regions, including the western coast, Taiz, Marib, Al-Jawf, Shabwa, Hajjah, and Al-Dhale, of their ability to engage in agricultural activities. They have also hindered movement between regions and prevented thousands of families from receiving aid provided by local and international organizations.

According to a report by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which specializes in collecting and analyzing data related to conflict zones worldwide, the extensive use of landmines and concealed explosive devices also undermines economic activities. The report, titled "How Do Houthi-Laid Landmines Kill Yemeni Civilians?" indicates that landmines have been widely planted in the lands of farmers and pastoral areas, which are the primary sources of livelihood for many rural families(2).

Human Rights Watch is one of the few international organizations that has addressed this crime and shed light on the economic dimension of planting landmines and concealed explosive devices, along with the resulting humanitarian catastrophe. For the historical documentation and importance of its report, which was issued in April 2019, I will provide a summary of the key points:

- The Houthis' extensive planting of landmines along the western coast of Yemen since mid-2017 has killed and wounded hundreds of civilians and prevented relief organizations from accessing vulnerable communities(3).
- Landmines planted in agricultural lands, villages, wells, and roads have killed at least 140 civilians, including 19 children, in the Hodeidah and Taiz governorates since 2018.
- Landmines and homemade explosive devices have prevented

(1) A study published by the Pomed Academic Research Foundation. Global health diplomacy: a solution to meet the needs of disabled people in Yemen, 24 September 2020.

(2) HOW HOUTHI-PLANTED MINES ARE KILLING CIVILIANS IN YEMEN, 2019 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED).

(3) According to testimonies from locals, the Houthis have planted mines in many areas belonging to the Al-Hodeidah Governorate, including large expanses owned by traders, businessmen, or even citizens. They then blackmail the owners, taking money in exchange for removing the mines from their lands, despite the fact that the United Nations provides grants and substantial funds for mine clearance. Therefore, mine clearance should be free of charge. However, the Houthis continue to plant mines and steal the allocated funds for their removal.

humanitarian organizations from reaching those in need and blocked access to farms and water wells. They have caused harm to civilians attempting to return to their homes.

- Priyanka Motaparthy, Acting Emergencies Director at Human Rights Watch, said, "Houthi-laid landmines haven't only killed and maimed numerous civilians but have deprived Yemen's most vulnerable of harvests and clean water they desperately need to survive, and have prevented relief organizations from bringing food and healthcare to increasingly hungry and ill Yemeni civilians."
- There is evidence that, in addition to planting anti-personnel landmines, Houthi forces have planted anti-vehicle landmines in civilian areas, modified anti-vehicle landmines to detonate from a person's weight, and concealed homemade explosive devices in the form of rocks or tree branches.
- The Houthis have used anti-personnel landmines in Haradh, near the Saudi border, and have confirmed the use of naval mines despite the risks posed to commercial fishing vessels and humanitarian aid ships.
- Areas where anti-personnel landmines have caused casualties were previously under Houthi control, and civilians had not been harmed until Houthi forces withdrew from these areas.
- Anti-personnel landmines in the western coastal region have made it impossible to access at least three water facilities. Additionally, these landmines have made it difficult for locals to feed themselves and maintain their livelihoods.
- Five people were injured, and their relatives were killed when anti-personnel landmines exploded in farmlands or grazing areas. Many displaced people reported that landmines prevented them from safely harvesting their crops, and their valuable livestock were killed.
- Humanitarian organizations have been prevented from reaching needy local communities along the western coast due to anti-personnel landmines. These communities include villages and towns in the districts of Al-Tuhayat and Mawza, as well as the major coastal city of Al-Hodeidah.
- Three relief organizations stated that they cannot access major locations or provide services to areas because of the presence of anti-personnel landmines either there or along the roads. Many of these communities can only be reached via dirt roads, which are riskier than paved roads.
- The Houthi use of anti-personnel landmines, which deprive people of water and food sources, contributes to the humanitarian crisis throughout the war-torn country.
- Human Rights Watch has called on Houthi authorities to immediately cease using these weapons and conduct a credible investigation, holding accountable the leaders responsible for their use. They have also called

on the UN Security Council to impose targeted sanctions on all individuals responsible for these violations.

- Houthi forces bear primary responsibility for civilian casualties and expected civilian damage resulting from anti-personnel landmines.
- Priyanka Motaparthy said, "Houthi leaders should immediately stop using anti-personnel landmines, which they may one day be held accountable for[1]."

As for Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), they issued a report titled "People Trapped by Landmines," in which the Head of the Mission in Yemen, Claire Ha-Duong, stated that Yemenis suffer doubly because "landmines not only harm their children but also deprive them of cultivating their fields. They have lost their source of income as well as the sustenance of their families[2]."

In addition to landmines, the Houthi group has also spread death in the sea. They have deployed a significant number of naval mines, some of which are of Iranian origin, while others are locally manufactured[3]. This has hampered the movement and activities of thousands of Yemeni fishermen and resulted in the deaths of some while they were practicing their profession.

The Houthis have planted landmines along the coasts, hindering the work of local fishermen. But they didn't stop there; they also laid naval mines. This has eliminated job opportunities and livelihoods for thousands of those engaged in fishing-related activities in areas under their control.

The prominent expert team on Yemen, affiliated with the Human Rights Council, pointed to the catastrophic consequences of landmine planting in coastal areas specifically, where poverty has been prevalent for a long time. In their report titled "Yemen: The Pandemic of Impunity in a Tortured Land," the team states that "the use of landmines has exacerbated the food security crisis," as they "prevented fishermen from accessing coastal areas for fishing, especially in Hodeidah, where fear looms due to the spread of mines along the coastal roads." The presence of landmines has also affected the availability and prices of fish in the market. Furthermore, the existence of landmines has deterred many farmers from cultivating their lands or grazing their livestock, leading to increased poverty in fishing and rural communities in Yemen. Regarding the damages caused by maritime mines, the UN team confirmed that they had killed numerous fishermen in 2018[4].

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(1) Report issued by Human Rights Watch titled: "Yemen... Houthi Landmines Kill Civilians and Block Aid," April 22, 2019.

(2) "People are trapped by landmines," Doctors Without Borders, January 10, 2019.

(3) Report of the Yemen Panel of Experts, 2018, previous reference, paragraphs 111, 113, p. 39-40.

(4) The human rights situation in Yemen, including violations and abuses committed since September 2014, report by the prominent international and regional panels of experts on Yemen in 2020, with a subheading: "Impact of Landmines on Food Access Routes," paragraph 52, page 11.

Chapter Four
Halting Development

The suspension of development activities in the country has constituted one of the most significant disasters resulting from the Houthi takeover of state institutions following their invasion of the capital, Sana'a. In addition to exploiting the available resources to sustain and expand the war into new areas, they have been keen on maintaining a state of weakness within society, ensuring that the population remains dependent, submissive, and reliant on the minimal offerings provided by the militias as acts of favor and benevolence, rather than obligations resulting from their revenue-generating activities.

According to a study conducted by the United Nations Development Programme on April 23, 2019, the continued engagement of the Houthi group in this war has resulted in a setback of 21 years in human development (meaning that it would take Yemenis 21 years to regain the same level of development that existed prior to the Houthi control over Sana'a in 2014). The study, titled "Assessing the Impact of the War on Development in Yemen," warned of the escalating effects of the war on human development, anticipating that if the war were to end in 2022, the development gains would have regressed by 26 years, equivalent to approximately a generation. If the war continues until 2030, this setback will increase to four decades in reverse(1).

Development, whether funded by the government or international donors, gradually stopped in the areas controlled by the Houthi group, beginning in the far north Maran region in 2004, and it extended to all parts of the country when they issued the decision for the financial and human general mobilization for war on March 21, 2015. This decision essentially harnessed all state finances and budgets for the war, effectively suspending all development efforts. A month before that, when the claws of the group began plundering the accounts of development projects and others in the central bank in Sana’a, the World Bank suspended the operations of 19 principal development projects, which constituted the entirety of what the World Bank was managing in Yemen. They announced this step on March 11(2), and with the group's announcement of the war mobilization decision, the World Bank issued its second statement, declaring the closure of its development project support office in Yemen while maintaining the suspension of all its projects.

(1) "Assessing the Impact of War on Development in Yemen," United Nations Development Programme website, April 10, 2020.

(2) "World Bank Suspends Operations in Yemen," World Bank official website, March 11, 2015.

The cessation of development, along with the halt of income for millions of Yemenis, is the primary guarantee for the continued subjugation, humiliation, social stagnation, and the perpetual dependence on humanitarian organizations. These organizations, despite their substantial funding, have only succeeded in keeping the Yemeni people alive during the period of their aid consumption. This, in turn, renews the threat to their existence and perpetuates their lack of any means to preserve their dignity in the face of the organizations' efforts to portray them as helpless and destitute, dependent on their assistance.

Relief efforts do not replace development, which helps individuals reach a point where they can build their own capacities, skills, knowledge, and enable them to optimally utilize their available resources without damaging them. This allows them to generate income and produce essential services to support themselves and those they care for(1).

The Houthi war on Yemen's state institutions resulted in the loss of substantial development achievements that the country had made over many difficult decades. These accomplishments required significant financial, human, and time resources. This happened while Yemen, before the war escalated, was at the bottom of global human development indicators, and it had departed from the path of achieving sustainable development goals supported by the United Nations.

As a result, Yemen shifted its focus from a myriad of detailed sectoral priorities in health, education, employment, small projects, vocational and technical training, industry, agriculture, justice, cultural heritage, and much more. Now, these sectors have become mere facades for Yemen's priorities still in search of funding. The quality of the services and their impact in achieving the desired outcomes has become unimportant. The Houthis pursued this strategy because it helped them subjugate society, inculcate their beliefs, and spread their influence.

For example, Yemen had made progress in reducing maternal mortality through strenuous developmental efforts and the support of various partners who provided emergency obstetric centers, equipped them, and trained personnel to work in them. Community midwives in thousands of villages were trained and equipped, and rural roads were improved to facilitate the access of pregnant women to health facilities(2). However, due to the Houthi group's involvement in the war, and their systematic impoverishment practices, they refused to provide services without levying taxes on the

(1) RIC GOODMAN, CHRISTINA FREY, RACHAEL STELLER, ZAKEE AHMED, ADNAN QATINAH, YEMEN – LINKING HUMANITARIAN CASH AND SOCIAL , PROTECTION, June 2019

(2) Twenty-five years ago, a promise made to advance women’s health and rights. Have we delivered ،؟UNFPA Yemen ،July 30 2019.

citizens. Consequently, merely having a functioning public hospital (not specializing in maternity care) has become a requirement for childbirth. The request for establishing and equipping emergency obstetric centers became a leisure activity and was rejected by most donors and organizations. Their rationale was the priority of having general healthcare facilities operating, while the lifesaving centers for mothers and newborns were treated as entertainment.

Considering that half of the healthcare facilities in Yemen (thousands of them) are out of service, the health sector's priority today is to maintain the presence of health and medical teams working in functional facilities, secure these facilities with essential materials and equipment to ensure their continued operation, serving the largest possible number of people affected by the war who cannot access private healthcare services(1).

Living Dependently on Relief instead of Development:

The war in Yemen has garnered both local and international consensus as a catastrophic humanitarian crisis, classified by the United Nations every year as one of the largest humanitarian crises globally. Recent data on the deteriorating food situation is particularly alarming. For the first time, early 2022 indicators confirm that nearly 160,000 people in Yemen are at risk of famine if urgent assistance is not provided(2). All indicators suggest that this accelerating negative downturn is a result of the ongoing practices of the Houthi group, which continue to destroy and impede development efforts. The ineffectiveness of relief alone has been unable to stop the continuous deterioration of humanitarian conditions.

This challenging humanitarian and living situation are a natural result of the halt in development. The Houthi group intentionally obstructs developmental activities and relies on the aid provided by foreign relief agencies while ensuring its non-sustainability. Yemen was already extremely impoverished and weak even before the war, which began by igniting this extensive conflict and seizing all public funds, controlling private funds. This played a significant role in halting sustainable development and exacerbated mental, physical, behavioral, and social fragility among the people(3). This, in turn, led to the spread of dangerous chronic diseases such as maternal and newborn mortality, malnutrition, cholera, diarrhea, kidney disease, liver disease, cancer, diabetes, and more.

(1) Health system in Yemen close to collapse. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 93 ,(10) 671 -670. World Health Organization2015 ،.

(2) "Yemen: A Glimpse of Food Security and Nutrition," United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), March 2022.

(3) "Assessing the Impact of War on Development in Yemen," previous reference.

Depriving people of their basic rights to secure essential sustainable development services such as sufficient food, clean drinking water, sanitation, fuel, cooking gas, community security, and others has forced people to adapt negatively to this deprivation. They resort to harmful practices, sometimes using toxic plants, seeking help from witch doctors, cooking tree leaves such as the "Halas" and some toxic plants(1), or purchasing expired, cheap food products. They drink impure well and spring water, causing deforestation and the construction of facilities on waterways. All of these negative and involuntary behaviors have led to the aforementioned diseases. Some families, in order to secure the necessary funds for buying food or obtaining water, have resorted to marrying off their young daughters or dropping their children out of school, putting their future in grave danger(2).

Ultimately, the war has left a severely damaged society, impoverished in terms of knowledge and skills, entirely dependent on external aid that primarily focuses on other countries. It has created a wide generational gap where many individuals don't even know how to read single words. This has resulted in a depleted and exhausted environment, with arid or hardened lands drained of water and organic diversity, rendering them virtually useless after years of migration and misuse.

The policies of prevention, siege, deprivation, and even continuous arrests carried out by the Houthi group have consistently obstructed the resumption of development activities, particularly through skilled government agencies with long experience in development work. Donors became discouraged due to the inefficiency of their ongoing support in improving the living conditions of the population. The group systematically prevents the mere delivery of in-kind or cash assistance to those in need with the intention of plundering it(3). Given this situation, how can organizations sustain their development projects in the community for extended periods?

Humanitarian funding for Yemen had consistently increased until it reached its peak in 2018, setting a record for any conflict-ridden country worldwide at approximately 8 billion dollars. However, due to the group's obstinance against facilitating humanitarian work and changing the nature of aid from goods that the group could easily exploit and loot(4), the funding

(1) "Famine-Like Conditions in Yemen Force Families to Eat Tree Leaves," World Food Programme, September 16, 2021.

(2) "Two Million Children Out of School and Another 3.7 million at Risk of Dropping Out," UNICEF website, September 25, 2019.

(3) "Deadly Consequences. Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19," Human Rights Watch, September 14, 2020.

(4) "World Food Programme Calls for Necessary Actions after Revealing the Misuse of Food Aid for the Needy in Yemen," World Food Programme, December 2018.

began to decrease each year. In 2022, it amounted to only 1.3 billion dollars, with most of it concentrated in liberated areas (with the International Organization for Migration and CARE International being examples). Many international reports have condemned, as we mentioned earlier, the practices of the Houthi authorities aimed at managing and coordinating aid, obstructing the movement of workers and statisticians, and hindering the establishment of a reliable information database based on registering the eligible poor recipients. This, in turn, reflects the difficulty of humanitarian and development work on the ground, which has led to serious negative decisions from donors, contributing to the continued deterioration of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen(1). Major donors, such as the governments of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom, were forced to reduce humanitarian support and focus more on development or shift their support to other countries(2).

Deterioration of Human Capital as a Result of Starvation Policy:

The World Bank defines human capital as "the knowledge, skills, and health capacities that accumulate in individuals over their lifetimes, enabling them to make the most of their potential as productive members of society(3)."

The current policy of starvation threatens to collapse the already low components of human capital in Yemen, as evident from the indicators of health, education, and employment rapidly deteriorating. These indicators place these components within what the United Nations has described as the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Development experts attribute the decline in the accumulation of human capital in Yemen to a significant extent to the Houthi group's hindrance of resources supporting this vital sector and the complete transformation of the local context into a war environment, prompting donors to shift their support agendas away from development and human capital towards unrelated humanitarian support(4).

The impact on the education, health, and employment sectors is considered the main driver of the collapse of human capital, which Yemenis had relied on to achieve the highest possible rates of economic and social productivity, building strong development outcomes at the individual, family, community, and national levels(5). This was following the example

(1) "Yemen. Events of 2021," Report by Human Rights Watch, September 17, 2021.
(2) RIC GOODMAN, CHRISTINA FREY, RACHAEL STELLER, ZAKEE AHMED, ADNAN QATINAH, "Yemen – Linking Humanitarian Cash and Social Protection," June 2019.
(3) "Human Capital Project: Frequently Asked Questions," World Bank website.
(4) "Assessing the Impact of the War on Development in Yemen," previous reference.
(5) "Economic and Social Updates Bulletin," Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Issue 30, December 2017.

of third-world countries that achieved significant economic growth by intensively promoting their education, health, and labor sectors.

The conditions of health, education, and employment reflect a bleak image of the Yemeni situation. Experts believe it has pushed back the reality of human capital for many years, if not decades. The group's neglect of providing water services, sanitation, garbage collection, and waste management has led to the resurgence of certain life-threatening diseases and epidemics such as cholera, scabies, and dengue fever. The Houthi group has contributed to targeting the healthcare system with numerous actions that hindered its growth at a time when people were in dire need of even the most basic services, as mentioned in previous sections.

International and Local Testimonies about Theft and Starvation Crimes:

Lise Grande, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, succeeded Jamie McGoldrick in March 2018. After the end of her tenure, she presented a testimony to the Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the situation in Yemen. This testimony is a summary of her experience over the years.

In her new role as the President of the United States Institute of Peace, Lise Grande highlighted a range of reasons that have exacerbated the humanitarian situation in Yemen. Among these, some were related to the Yemeni government, while others were connected to the Arab coalition supporting the government. However, she dedicated most of her speech to the practices of the Houthi group, which contributed to the worsening of the humanitarian situation and the suffering of the Yemeni people. This testimony focuses on the deliberate acts of starvation carried out by the Houthis to achieve sectarian goals. Moreover, this testimony reaffirms what has been outlined in this book. Grande stated the following:

"In northern Yemen, Ansar Allah systematically took power and made changes in governance in the areas they control. They now completely control state institutions. Parallel institutions were established in which the Houthis work exclusively to carry out essential functions, including policing and internal security.

Almost all public revenues are now directly transferred to institutions under the control of the movement, including the branch of the central bank in Sana’a. The movement also introduced mechanisms for preparing and implementing the budgets of directorates and governorates. Ansar Allah forcibly seized the Zakat, a pillar of social protection, and imposed it as a

mandatory tax. The movement also imposed strict customs duties on agriculture and trade.

The new structures and mechanisms established by Ansar Allah are not an improvement on the old system; they are harmful and operate without public accountability, forming a separate power structure with extensive authorities.

The Houthis utilize these mechanisms to divert revenues from goods and public services to their fighters, undermine private sector companies that do not cooperate with them, and manipulate currency and liquidity for their own interests, rather than for the public's benefit.

At the same time, Ansar Allah effectively imposed hundreds of restrictions on humanitarian aid, seeking to control the quality of all forms of humanitarian assistance and its flow and even targeting it. Moreover, Ansar Allah continues to threaten humanitarian workers, harass them, and detain them(1)."

The significance of this testimony lies in the fact that it comes from a highly respected international figure with extensive experience gained through her work in many conflict-affected countries and transitions. She has also served within United Nations peacekeeping missions and in the fields of recovery, reconstruction, and development(2).

As I was researching Lise Grande's career, I couldn't find any armed groups that have implemented such "harmful" actions in any of the countries where she has worked, which have experienced wars and humanitarian crises. Certainly, no other group that claims to represent a people has implemented starvation policies as the Houthis have against the Yemeni people, who have been treated as hostages according to the United Nations' description. Instead, the mechanisms of starvation are used "to divert revenues from goods and public services to their fighters" rather than paying salaries and providing services. Furthermore, the movement "sabotages private sector companies that do not cooperate with them and manipulates currency and liquidity for their interests, not for the public's benefit."

Non-Yemenis tend to perceive the crimes of the Houthis, as described by

(1) "The Crisis in Yemen," Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, Lise Grande, President United States Institute of Peace, April 21, 2021.

(2) Grande has served as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Resident Coordinator and Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in South Sudan (2011-2012), Deputy Resident Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in South Sudan (2008-2011), Head of the Integrated United Nations Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2005-2008), UNDP Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative in Armenia (2003-2005), UN Resident Coordinator and Resident Representative for UNDP in India, and before her work in Yemen, she was the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq.

the UN official, as mere excesses or practices stemming from ignorance, failure, or greed for wealth or supporting fighters. This superficial understanding is natural for those who are not well-versed in the ideological roots of the Houthi group, which deals with society as if it were a hostile entity for not accepting the rule of the "sacred lineage" as they consider themselves. From this perspective, they continue their wars, capitalize on the people's suffering and blood without any regard or value for lives and blood. This is why the Houthis create the dire humanitarian situation for the Yemeni people, using it as a bargaining chip and a tool in the discourse of war, nothing more. Only the Yemenis themselves truly grasp the real dimensions of such practices, which not even the most dangerous and ruthless criminal organizations in the world engage in.

The daily practices of the Houthis undeniably confirm that they are nothing more than a gang that feels no attachment to Yemen and, as a result, does not care about the well-being of the Yemeni people. While governing regimes may engage in corruption, especially in the absence of an anti-corruption system in the country due to the ongoing war, and governmental authorities may fail to fulfil their duties for various reasons, they will at least try to provide the bare minimum of services and necessities to citizens. This is not what the Houthi leadership did when they took control of half of Yemen's governorates; quite the opposite happened.

In an article published by the well-known Yemeni leftist writer Bushra Al-Maqtri[1], she made a clear distinction between the acknowledged failures of the Yemeni government in fulfilling some of its commitments to the people, largely due to political divisions that have contributed to the spread of corruption and the lack of institutional activation, among other reasons, and the practices of the Houthis that can only be described as those of a gang. In her article, Al-Maqtri pointed out the government's failures in various economic aspects. When she discussed the role of the Houthis in creating the humanitarian catastrophe, she referred to them as a gang and presented many practices that demonstrate their intention to impoverish and exploit the Yemeni people in the areas under their control. She said: Bandits, even when they become ruling authorities, cannot hide their predatory behavior, turning citizens into perpetual victims. In this context, the Houthi authorities delve into inventing new mechanisms of looting, managing the lives of citizens through resource absorption, surpassing the state's resources for the war effort, imposing daily levies, and soliciting donations to support the fronts. As a result, more than a million Yemeni employees have been deprived of their salaries for five years, which has

(1) Bushra Fadl Abdullah Al-Maqtri is a Yemeni journalist and political activist, who has received numerous local and international awards, including the Francoise Giroud Award for defending rights and freedoms from Paris.

pushed the middle class of employees and academics to the brink of poverty. The Houthi authorities created fraudulent methods for looting citizens' funds, transforming the religious obligation of Zakat, taken from wealth according to specific percentages within Islamic guidelines, into a hefty tax extracted from private sector institutions and subject to the General Zakat Authority, in a blatant violation of Yemeni laws and the constitution. Just days ago, the Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Sana'a was forced to accept the General Zakat Authority's conditions, imposing a Zakat tax of over 25% on private sector institutions, following raids on most shops and factories. This could lead to the displacement of what remains of national capital in the areas controlled by the Houthi group, a result of the group's policy of looting private sector institutions, which is not limited to Zakat but extends to raising fees for duties and other taxes, as well as daily levies. Additionally, the Houthi group imposed new taxes on commodity exports entering their controlled areas, which reached 50%, even though these goods had already undergone customs clearance in Aden. This significantly raised food prices. The group also compelled homeowners in the areas under their control to renew property documents, regardless of their age, in exchange for paying substantial sums to the legitimate authorities affiliated with the group. All of this, along with the mismanagement of societal crises, exacerbated the humanitarian crisis and pushed citizens to the brink of poverty.

One of the most criminal methods used to plunder citizens and exacerbate their suffering is the management of the oil derivatives and household gas file by the Houthi group. Throughout the years of the war, the group has relied on a policy of shutting down oil derivatives stations in the areas under their control to promote the black market they manage. They consistently shift the blame to the Arab coalition authority, alleging that they prevent oil derivative vessels from entering the port of Hodeidah. In exchange, the Houthi group continues to supply oil derivatives to the black market, whether from state-owned or commercial stations or obtained from loyal traders who monopolize the supply of oil derivatives to the black market. They manipulate the prices of oil derivatives and household gas, forcing citizens to buy from the black market as their only option, and charging them exorbitant prices. Over the years of the war, the Houthi authorities have accumulated substantial wealth by managing oil derivatives and household gas, because of the price difference between the official and black-market prices. However, the criminal gang's mindset, trained in plundering and siphoning citizens' money, recently increased the price of petrol at the stations to 11,000 Yemeni rials, which is close to its price in the black market. They also raised the price of household gas to 7,000 Yemeni rials without issuing any official decision. While the Houthi group claims

that the goal of raising oil derivative prices is to eliminate the black-market phenomenon, the truth that the residents in their controlled areas understand is that the purpose of this step, which had been prepared for more than a year, is to continue plundering citizens through unlawful and unethical means[1].

Arab Study Confirms the Historical Crime:

"From Citizens' Pockets to the Frontlines of War and Support for the Racial Project"

In September 2021, an important study titled "Armed Militias' Economies in the Arab Region: The Houthi Ansarullah Group as a Model" was published by the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. This study, authored by researcher Ahmed Alieba[2], is the first of its kind to shed light on the economy of the Houthi militia compared to other militias in the Arab region.

Due to the importance of the study and its issuance from one of the most prominent research and media institutions in the Arab world, it was necessary to highlight its content, as it confirms many of the points discussed in this book.

The study clarified the methods used by the Houthi group to control the economy of government and private institutions, diverting them to serve their war efforts and enriching their elements. The study also suggested that the Houthi economic elite may become the wealthiest in Yemen, or even wealthier than any future Yemeni government if the situation remains the same or if there is an agreement between the parties.

Despite the substantial support received by the Houthi group from the Iranian system in the region, it has invested in this devastating war and implemented harsh financial and economic measures that caused suffering for Yemenis by failing to provide for their needs. In the event of a settlement between the Yemeni government and the Houthi group, the latter will work to maintain these economic channels in the future and may not bear the costs of post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation, potentially benefiting from the reconstruction process in the following years. The study affirmed that the Houthis receive economic support from Iran, among other forms of support, through a network of Iranian agents in the region as part

(1) "Gallows of Poverty in Yemen" by Bushra Al-Maqtri, published in Al-Araby Al-Jadeed newspaper on April 28, 2021.

(2) A researcher at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, and a master's degree researcher in Political Science at the Faculty of Graduate African Studies. He holds postgraduate studies in international negotiations from the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University.

of the solidarity system of agents within the pro-Tehran Shiite cartel. This is in addition to the economic links between the Houthi economy and Iran through complex financial networks managed by Houthi warlords through unofficial channels to avoid sanctions.

After the Houthi group took control of Sana'a and seized state institutions in September 2014, it established entities based on the Iranian model. The Supreme Political Council, which sets major policies as the highest authority and whose leader is considered the head of state according to the political structure of Houthi authority, coexists with the Houthi group's government. The government is tasked with implementing policies and decisions of the Houthi militia leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi.

The study reveals that the Houthi militias' economy is considered dual or, as it is known, a composite economy. They control a sector of the official state economy in addition to the private economy of the militia, which ultimately enriches the group claiming affiliation to the Prophet.

The composite or dual economy becomes evident through the model of the "militia state," which dominates the remnants of the official economy. The militia conducts its financial activities in the name of the state, receiving its own revenues. For instance, the study points out that the militia receives approximately 3 million dollars annually from overflight revenues through its economic structure. Despite the central bank being moved to Aden, the funds flowing through the economic structure are transferred to a bank in Sana'a, effectively establishing an alternative economy that operates under the parallel Houthi government that manages affairs in Sana'a.

The researcher suggests that the Houthi militias have their own distinct economy, known as the "warlords' economy," which has emerged alongside the rise of the Houthi economic elite. There are distinctions between the general Houthi militia economy and the economy of the "Hashemite lineage," which we have extensively detailed in the pages of this book.

The study confirms the existence of economic aspects like those of the official economy, through unacknowledged economic entities, in the presence of a central bank under Houthi control and economic bodies responsible for taxation and customs, among others, under the unrecognized Houthi government. This implies that there are financial flows directed to the central bank in Sana'a through these channels. However, it remains unclear how these revenues are spent, as the Houthi authorities do not issue any economic reports regarding financial conditions. Moreover, they lack transparency in terms of typical expenditures, such as employee salaries, which were previously disbursed by the legitimate government until the Houthi decision to ban the new edition of the national currency after transferring the central bank to Aden. Additionally, there is no evidence of

public spending directed toward improving infrastructure like road paving, enhancing electrical grids, sewage systems, or drinking water, relying on the budget. This is something we have elaborated on extensively in previous sections.

In contrast to the failure to pay employee salaries and the deprivation of Yemenis from services, the study indicates that "the bureaucratic apparatus under the control of the militia receives semi-regular salaries. These salaries are known to different categories working in the security and quasi-military apparatuses of the militia, whether they were present before the Houthi coup against legitimacy, or the employees affiliated with the group who were appointed after the coup. However, estimating these categories is challenging, and, as a result, most of them are involved in financing the war managed by the militia."

The study highlights that the exports of various assets, money, and private properties constitute one of the economic sources for the Houthi militias. This mechanism is believed to have provided financial support to the Houthis from an early stage, particularly during the numerous battles before taking control of the capital, Sana'a. This is closely tied to the culture of "war spoils." Yemenis frequently assert that the Houthis employ the looting of private property to secure support and enrich Houthi leadership, using legal cover such as the "judicial guardian" to legitimize the process of looting private assets. The Houthis have also used "special committees" as another unlawful means with political implications. These committees aim to tarnish the reputation of those who oppose the Houthis, especially individuals associated with the legitimate government or those cooperating with it. The most prominent of these committees is the "Seizure and Handover Committee for Traitors," headed by Abdulkhakim Al-Khiwani. They prepared a list of 1,223 people, which was circulated to all official and private banks, instructing them to freeze all bank accounts. These measures led to the destruction of the banking sector, the rise of alternative economic elites, and the sabotage of Yemen's national economy.

The researcher considers the Houthis' confiscation of traditional economic elite assets as a move to liquidate various economic centers and replace the Houthi economic elite with them. This newly established elite has come to dominate the real estate market and the trade of strategic commodities in the black market, such as oil and its derivatives, as well as essential food items. This underscores the character of the "warlords' elite," a plutocracy that has become wealthier than the "militia state" it represents. This elite does not make any meaningful contribution to a society suffering from one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, and it operates outside of any legal framework.

The Houthis did not stop at the decisions and laws that legalized

confiscation and extortion. They also sought to destroy the entities of the national economy that had special initiatives in civil society during the extended period of conflict, such as the "Hael Saeed Anam" commercial groups, "City Max," and "Thabet Brothers" industries. These entities had their assets targeted in Houthi-controlled areas, resulting in armed intimidation by Houthi elements. All these actions underscore the absence of a national economic base, and the result of these actions is the destruction of the national economy.

Regarding the banking sector, the study explains that this crucial sector under the leadership of the Houthi militia does not represent a genuine banking sector. Instead, it is merely a façade for a Houthi treasury through which export revenues flow, or citizen's funds are exploited. The destruction of the banking sector is not limited to the government system but also extends to the private sector. To the extent that it became extremely limited, owned by the Houthis, and easily controlled outside the legal framework. This enables them to move funds through these institutions to the spending destination desired by the militia, particularly military spending.

The study reveals that the core of the parallel Houthi economy relies on taxes. Various forms of taxes are imposed, including taxes on merchants and service sectors like telecommunications, health, and private educational institutions. In addition to this, there are specific taxes on revenues, such as the annual Zakat (almsgiving) and Khums (one-fifth) that fall under the category of compulsory taxes. The Health Ministry under Houthi control forces doctors to work in government hospitals and imposes fines of up to 500,000 Yemeni rials if a doctor's work in the private sector disrupts the government's working hours, as a mandatory policy. The aim is to treat wounded military personnel on different fronts and, in return, impose taxes on their government salary, according to the study. Naturally, all of this has a negative impact on citizens as it drives up the costs of medical services.

The Houthis have separated their private economy, which includes domination over the black market, real estate market, and many private sector companies, from the parallel economy managed through the central bank they control. One of the goals, according to the study, for keeping the central bank is to create the image that there is a body managing the state's revenues, regardless of the nature of this administration and its outputs. In addition, in any political settlement deal, such tools can be used to distinguish between their private economy and the state institutions they dominate.

Houthi economic activities mainly focus on the petroleum derivatives, trade, imports, industrial investments, shipping agencies, and real estate investments, as well as other companies that deal with humanitarian and food aid. These investments represent the backbone of any national economy.

The Houthis dominate the real estate market, indirectly controlling it through the restructuring of the property documentation process. This restructuring has aided them in housing Houthi leaders and elites in Sana'a, which is part of a broader process aimed at demographic change in favor of the Houthi militia in the capital, Sana'a, after they shifted there from their stronghold in Sa'ada.

Through their control of the real estate market, the Houthis engage in money laundering by converting various funding sources and illicit trade operations into assets. They do this by purchasing properties and land. In recent years, there has been unprecedented competition among Houthi leaders and their businessmen in the real estate market, resulting in a significant increase in prices, especially in Sana'a. Their control of this market has also facilitated the establishment of logistical centers for military operations and militia activities. They convert properties, land, and farms into centers for religious and cultural militia activities, weapons storage, training sites, sectarian and military mobilization centers, and sites for sustaining their members.

The Houthis have established what is known in Yemen as the "Tribal Economy," referring to the economy of the Hashemite families who exclusively receive 20%, or what is known as the "Khums" tax. This tax is collected from all economic revenues and returns from natural resources, such as oil, gas, and all extraction revenues from land, sea, air, and underground, as well as from all minerals. This means that these families are the wealthiest class in the country.

The Khums tax not only enshrines a culture of racism that makes the Hashemites the ruling elite in the country but also further reinforces this racism by giving the name "Descendants of Bilal" to those who are marginalized or have dark African origins. In addition to the economic significance of this project, it symbolizes the idea of divine authority that the Hashemites prepare, seeing themselves as the rightful holders of power and governance from a religious perspective, as an extension of the "Ahl al-Bayt" Imams, as mentioned in the study.

The study concludes that all profits earned by the militias are a deduction from the Yemeni state's economy. While it's difficult to officially quantify these losses, available estimates suggest that it constitutes a massive drain on the country's official economy.

Despite various indicators pointing to the weak development dynamics in Yemen before the war and its collapse afterward, the key difference is that the state, which existed, had obligations towards its citizens. In contrast, in recent years, the Houthi economy has been moving in one direction, from the pockets of citizens to the warfronts, supporting the tribal project and enriching warlords. To the extent that the economic resources of the Houthi

economy have become substantial enough to form a partial budget for the country, despite controlling less than half of the country's territory, their economic budget is twice the size of the previous regime's economic budget.

Here are the numbers mentioned in the study:

- The official economic losses due to the Houthi coup between 2015 and 2018 amounted to approximately $54.7 billion.
- Due to the war, the average per capita income from the GDP at current prices decreased from about $1,287 in 2014 to $385 in 2018, with a cumulative change rate of 70%. This contraction means that more citizens have fallen below the national poverty line, estimated at $600 per person in the year.
- Poverty rates in Yemen rose to over 90% by the end of 2018, compared to 49% in 2014.
- The salaries paid by the Central Bank in Sana’a to officials and pro-Houthi fighters reduced Yemen's foreign exchange reserves from $5.2 billion in September 2014 to less than $700 million by the end of August 2016. This means that approximately $4.5 billion was spent in almost two consecutive years, at a rate of about $2.25 billion per year.
- Economic reports estimate the annual customs revenue transferred to the Houthi treasury at around YR 100 billion, approximately $72 million annually. This amount may have doubled after the militia increased customs tariffs by 100% in 2021 on most goods.
- More than 50% of economic institutions were forced to either close or leave Houthi-controlled areas for the south.
- The Houthi militias took control of 37 private companies belonging to figures opposed to them residing abroad and gained about 50% of the revenues of the six largest hospitals in Sana’a. They also took control of Yemen Gulf Bank, Gulf Bank, Saba Islamic Bank, and Yemen International Bank.
- The tax pattern imposed by the Houthis, with its multiple clauses, has burdened citizens and business owners and led to the closure of 41% of various sectors. 26% of them closed permanently, and the rest were forced to close their branches in Houthi-controlled areas. A 35% tax is imposed on both the commercial and industrial sectors, along with a 20% Khums tax, as well as a 2.5% traditional Zakat tax, and a 7.5% double customs fee on goods like tobacco, rice, flour, and other food items.
- Tax revenues from the telecommunications sector range from YR 80-120 billion annually. Between 2015 and 2020, the total collection from three companies, namely Yemen Mobile, SabaFon, and MTN, amounted to YR 305 billion and 316 million Yemeni rials.
- Topping the list of taxes on goods are those taxes levied on local and imported cigarettes and tobacco that exceed 100 billion Yemeni Rials

according to 2019 estimates, with an expected increase in 2020. Following these are taxes on fuel, which have reached 90 billion Rials. The total revenue from taxes on goods and services has exceeded 400 billion Rials, meaning that fuels and cigarettes account for nearly half of the revenue from taxes on goods and services.

- Approximately 14,000 local civic organizations were forced to suspend their operations due to taxes, with most of them. Meanwhile, regional, and international organizations are required to pay taxes for fear of hindering their work in Yemen, estimated at about 74 organizations, in addition to income taxes on their employees, which reach 20% of their income.
- The Houthi militia raised the tax rate more than once, the latest in 2020 when it was raised by about 100%. When traders refuse to comply with the tax or cannot pay it, the shipment is confiscated as a war effort, and the annual tax revenue is estimated at about 2 billion Yemeni Rials, equivalent to approximately 8 million dollars[(1)].

Starvation in the Eye of International Law:

There is no doubt that the Houthis have practiced a deliberate starvation policy to achieve several goals as we mentioned earlier. Here it can be confirmed that international human rights law and international humanitarian law apply to many of the facts and practices documented in this book, and this does not mean the absence of other forms of violations and methods that expose those affected to starvation or plunder that were not included in the book.

The principle of protecting civilians and not harming or targeting them in wars is one of the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law. This includes preventing the starvation of civilians and using it as a weapon to subdue them by depriving them of the essential materials they need to survive, including deliberately obstructing the access of relief supplies.

The principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are considered ethical rules that states must adhere to. Yemen has also ratified the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions on non-international armed conflicts. In addition, states are required to comply with customary rules of humanitarian law, and it is prohibited to violate them.

Article (1/2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights for the year 1966 emphasizes that "in no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence[(2)]." According to Article (11/1)

(1) "Economies of Armed Militias in the Arab Region: The Houthi Ansar Allah Group as a Model" by Ahmed Al-Layba, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Issue 325.

(2) International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.

of the Covenant, the contracting states recognize "the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing, and housing, and the continuous improvement of his living conditions." The same Article (11/2) also stresses the provision of necessary measures to secure the "fundamental right to be free from hunger."

Article (54/1) of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 prohibits the use of starvation as a method of warfare[1][2]. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court for the year 1998 classifies causing severe suffering or serious harm to the body or health of civilians as a grave violation. Article (8/b/25) specifies that "intentionally starving civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of essential items for their survival, including intentionally impeding relief supplies as specified in the Geneva Conventions," is considered a war crime[3].

In general, cities are usually besieged from the outside to starve and subdue the residents. However, in the Yemeni situation, those who claim to represent the Yemeni people and defend them systematically work to starve them for exploitation and as a punishment for the community that refuses to accept Abdul-Malik al-Houthi as a ruler in the name of God and religion.

International humanitarian law obligates the occupying force of any other people to use all available means to ensure the needs of the population under occupation. According to Article (55) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, "the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores, and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate[4]." This responsibility on the occupying force, as an actual authority, has been expanded to include other essential resources for livelihood as stipulated in Article (69) of the First Additional Protocol[5]. Furthermore, Article (59) requires the occupying force to ensure the essential needs of the population in the occupied area.

If the occupation is required to provide the population under its control with food and medical supplies, and it must import necessary food and medical equipment if the resources of the occupied land are insufficient, then how should a group that has seized power and claims to represent Yemen and Yemenis act? Instead of providing the basic needs of civilians,

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(1) First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts.

(2) Even though the war in Yemen is internal, governed by the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions and Common Article 3, it is a fact that the provisions of international humanitarian law criminalize this act.

(3) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted in Rome on 17 July 1998.

(4) Fourth Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War dated 12 August 1949.

(5) First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, 1977.

such as food, medicine, and health, as an actual authority responsible for allocating resources, it has worked to starve them to subdue and exploit them for political, military, and sectarian goals. In other words, it is a group that loots but does not provide, robs Yemenis, and gives them nothing.

In the year 1919, a report from the Committee on Responsibilities established in the aftermath of World War I affirmed that "intentionally starving civilians" constitutes a violation of the laws and customs of war, and those who engage in such acts are subject to prosecution. According to the basic framework of the International Criminal Court, "intentionally starving civilians as a method of warfare" constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts.

There are international examples that emphasize that internal conflicts have become a core concern of international law, which does not require the perpetrator and the victim to belong to different states; they can be from the same state(1). For instance, the crimes committed against the Tutsi tribe by the Hutu tribe in the Republic of Rwanda, which led to the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda by the United Nations Security Council(2). The conflict was between two local tribes but acquired an international dimension due to the nature of the rights violated. Therefore, the crime of starving in the war suffered by Yemenis at the hands of the Houthi group, supported by Iran, is considered a war crime, and those responsible for it can be held accountable before international justice.

As demonstrated in the preceding sections, it has been established that the Houthis carried out deliberate attacks and destroyed critical assets and materials that the population cannot do without, and these were not mere mistakes. Examples include sabotaging and burning water wells and tanks, destroying, and burning farmlands, booby-trapping and bombing schools, water pipelines, and bridges, shelling health centers and hospitals, disabling and relocating power generators and waste collection vehicles from rural areas to areas where Houthi leadership is present or for trade purposes. These are practices prohibited by Article (14) in the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, which explicitly prohibits "attacking, destroying, removing, or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas producing foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations, and

(1) The International Legal System for the Crime of Cultural Genocide, Atiya Ahmed Atiya Al-Sweih, a previous reference. Cited from Ali Abdul Qader Al-Qahouji, International Criminal Law, 124.

(2) The International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in Rwanda or by Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994.

supplies and irrigation works[1]."

The Houthi group has doubled customs duties, taxes, zakat (charitable donations), and other levies. They have also created new forms of taxation. However, they refuse to provide the most necessities for citizens or even pay salaries to government employees, despite being in a position of authority. This is even though they have access to funds that could cover the salaries of all civil and military employees in the entire Republic of Yemen, not just the areas under their control. Moreover, they refuse to provide healthcare and education services to citizens[2]. This refusal is considered a form of starvation to achieve political, military, and sectarian goals and to concentrate funds within the leadership of the group, led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. Through these actions, they seize the right of the Yemeni people to live[3], their right to work, and their right to receive "just and favorable remuneration ensuring for themselves and their families an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection" according to Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[4].

As for the theft, exploitation, or hindrance of humanitarian aid access, the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions emphasizes the right to access humanitarian assistance. It obligates parties to conflicts to accept the necessary humanitarian aid to sustain the population's survival. The looting of humanitarian aid (relief supplies) or hindrance of its access is considered a war crime according to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, as outlined in Article 8(b)(25), as previously mentioned.

Racial Segregation:

The international community's approach to the situation in Yemen often lacks depth due to a lack of complete understanding of the roots that have caused this war. As a result, their repeated efforts to stop it and achieve a comprehensive and sustainable peace have failed. International envoys, organizations, and ambassadors of influential countries involved in Yemeni affairs focus on the political dimension of this war, ignoring the fact that

(1) The Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts.

(2) A Multi-Faceted Economy... A Special Investigation by "Al-Musader Online" Reveals the Enormous Revenues Looted by the Houthi Militia from Yemenis, Al-Musader Online, March 9, 2022.

(3) Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a United Nations-affiliated website.

(4) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a significant historical document in the history of human rights. It was drafted by representatives from various legal and cultural backgrounds from around the world and was adopted by the General Assembly in Paris on December 10, 1948, under Resolution 217 as the common standard to be aimed at by all peoples and nations.

Yemenis engage in this battle against the Houthis because they reject the racial discrimination disguised as sectarianism and religion. Therefore, the social, human rights, and humanitarian dimensions are fundamentally present in this war, just as they have been the cause of ancient wars.

The religious and political theory of the Houthis is based on the centrality, purity, and distinction of the lineage they belong to. Hence, it necessitates political entitlements (granting them governance), economic entitlements (giving them the fifth share), and control over the funds, businesses, and institutions of Yemenis. They also demand religious entitlements, where Yemenis are required to pledge loyalty and obedience to them, or else they are considered infidels deserving of death. Furthermore, there are social entitlements, where Yemenis are expected to kiss their feet and hands and place them at the top of their councils. This racism is only present within this group, and therefore, all the crimes and violations committed by the Houthis in Yemen are motivated by racial and ethnic discrimination.

This racism is not openly discussed by the Houthis except within narrow boundaries. However, it is present in their books, writings, legislation, channels, and daily practices, whether official or societal. Their followers often reveal it in councils and social gatherings.

Houthi leaders appear to talk about coexistence and unity, but these speeches and statements primarily aim to deceive Yemenis. They clash with their religious theory of "Wilaya" (governance), which restricts power, national wealth, prestige, and knowledge to a specific lineage, excluding the rest of Yemenis. Then come the practices based on racial discrimination, as well as the racist laws and legislation, such as the law legitimizing the fifth share for the "Bani Hashim" mentioned in the previous chapters.

Studying the Houthi group’s racist ideology and practices, allows us to understand their motives in starving and tormenting Yemenis. They rely on fabricated religious texts that claim their superiority over other humans, asserting that they are entitled to governance, control over finances, delivering Islam to others, and interpreting the Quran. They believe that striving for these rights through force and violence is a form of jihad, worship, and seeking closeness to Allah.

Based on this supremacist ideology, the Houthi group engages in massive violations against Yemenis, based on preferential discriminatory criteria of race and sect. These practices are considered war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The Houthi group deals with Yemenis based on this supremacist ideology, using religion and certain political slogans related to fighting America, Israel, liberating Jerusalem, sovereignty, and combating ISIS,

Takfiris, and terrorists as a cover for imposing their dominance, even if it requires committing mass killings, displacing populations, destroying homes, and starving people.

Referring to Article 2 of the "International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination" as racial segregation practices, any objective review and thorough examination confirm that the systematic and ongoing crimes committed by the Houthi group indicate that this group is racist in its thinking, ideology, and practice.

Furthermore, referring to the "International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid," it emphasizes that war crimes and crimes against humanity do not have a statute of limitations as they violate the principles of international law, particularly the principles of the United Nations Charter, and pose a serious threat to international peace and security.

Article 2 of the convention states that the term "racial segregation," which includes policies and practices of racial isolation and discrimination similar to those practiced in South Africa, applies to the following inhumane acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the dominance of one racial group over any other racial group and systematically oppressing it.

1) Depriving a member or members of a racial group of the right to life and personal liberty:
   a) By killing members of a racial group.
   b) By inflicting serious bodily or mental harm on members of a racial group, or by subjecting them to torture, or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
   c) By arbitrarily arresting and imprisoning members of a racial group unlawfully.
2) Subjecting a racial group or groups to conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction, in whole or in part, intentionally.
3) Imposing measures, both legislative and non-legislative, intended to prevent a racial group or groups from participating in the political, social, economic, and cultural life of the country, and creating conditions preventing the full development of this group or these groups, particularly by depriving them of their human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to work, the right to form recognized trade unions, the right to education, the right to leave any country, including one's own, and to return to one's country, the right to nationality, the right to freedom of movement and residence, the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
4) Taking measures, including legislative measures, designed to divide the

population along racial lines by creating separate reserves and ghettos for members of a racial group, prohibiting mixed marriages between persons of different racial groups, expropriating property belonging to a racial group or groups or to members thereof.

5) Exploiting the labor of members of a racial group, particularly by subjecting them to forced labor.
6) Persecuting organizations and persons by depriving them of fundamental rights and freedoms because they oppose apartheid[1].

The Convention has defined several actions committed "for the purpose of establishing and maintaining the domination of one racial group of humans over any other racial group and systematically oppressing them." These are the same objectives that the Houthi group seeks to achieve by depriving Yemenis of their right to life and personal liberty because they belong to a racial group, they consider distinct and pure, aiming to maintain their dominance over the rest of Yemenis. They do this through actions such as killing, arbitrary arrests, forced disappearances, torture, inflicting serious physical and mental harm, and violating their freedom and dignity, as well as imposing harsh or inhuman sanctions and depriving them of their freedom of expression.

The Houthi group commits most of the crimes outlined in the Convention against Yemenis for sectarian and ethnic motives. They use strategies like increasing tariffs, fees, taxes, customs, and zakat; controlling and supporting the black market for oil derivatives and electricity; withholding donations; stealing aid; not paying salaries for years; and denying Yemenis access to healthcare and education, even though they have the economic capacity to provide these services, as reported in various economic studies.

Furthermore, the Convention in Article 3(j) mentioned taking measures, whether legislative or non-legislative, intended to prevent a racial group or groups from participating "in the political, social, economic, and cultural life of the country, and creating conditions preventing the full development of this group or these groups, particularly by depriving them of their human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to work, the right to form recognized trade unions, the right to education, the right to leave any country, including one's own, and to return to one's country, the right to nationality, the right to freedom of movement and residence, the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association." Most of these actions are practiced by the Houthi group with ethnic and sectarian motives, particularly against individuals, groups, parties, and residents who reject their ideology, which they seek to

(1) The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid was adopted, opened for signature, ratification, and accession under United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3068 (XXVIII) on November 30, 1973. It entered into force on July 18, 1976.

impose forcibly through schools, mosques, official media, government institutions, and erasing Yemeni cultural traits.

As for those who try to coexist within their coercive authority and reside within their control silently, deprived of the right to express themselves and voice their opinions, they are forced to send their children to school to learn a belief that their parents do not share. This amounts to depriving them of the right to education, as indicated in the previous article. Moreover, it constitutes a violation of the Yemenis' right to religious beliefs recognized by the United Nations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948[1]. These actions also infringe upon the parents' right to choose and determine what their children learn in schools, as per one of the provisions in Article 18(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which emphasizes that state parties undertake to "respect the liberty of parents, legal guardians, or other persons to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions[2]."

Without a doubt, the Houthi group has created and systematically reinforced "conditions preventing the full development" of other Yemeni groups that do not align with them ethnically, religiously, and politically. They have done this through a series of direct and indirect measures that culminate in depriving dissenters of their basic human rights and freedoms, including the right to work, receive salaries, financial rights, healthcare, and other basic needs.

The Houthi group prohibits the formation of any associations, organizations, or unions that are not under their complete control by dominating those affiliated with their ethnicity within these entities. This makes these unions purely symbolic, and they cannot operate independently, which undermines the interests of groups that do not belong to the Houthis.

As for the Houthis' crime of preventing Yemenis from their right to freedom of movement, they have obstructed anyone who stood against their violations from leaving their areas, or they extorted them at checkpoints. An extensive report by the Sam Organization for Rights and Freedoms outlines this type of crime titled "Barriers of Fear and Deception." The report highlighted that the Houthis established 38 security checkpoints in seven governorates to commit violations of the right to freedom of movement, detain citizens in their own prisons, accompanied by media deception, fabricated accusations, and other violations like enforced disappearance and

(1) Ibid.

(2) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted, opened for signature, ratification, and accession under United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) on December 16, 1966. It entered into force on March 23, 1976.

torture[1]. All of this is motivated by sectarianism and is often disguised under a political veneer, like their other violations.

Among the actions considered a form of racial discrimination, as stated in Article 3(d), is taking any measures, including legislative ones, aimed at dividing the population based on racial criteria. This is exactly what the Houthi group has done. For instance, they concentrated financial resources within their own ethnic group, laid off a vast number of employees after displacing most of them, issued appointments for thousands of Houthis in key positions within institutions to control society. Additionally, they have destroyed and targeted the private sector by besieging, pursuing, and impoverishing businesspeople, creating a new exclusive market controlled by the Houthis, and enacting the racist tithe law, as we discussed in previous sections.

The article refers to the practice of banning marriage between individuals belonging to different racial categories, which is what the Houthi group does. In addition, they engage in confiscating properties owned by individuals or groups that do not belong to their lineage after inciting media campaigns against them, accusing them of being traitors, collaborators, affiliated with ISIS and Al-Qaeda, using these accusations as justification for seizing properties through what is known as the "judicial guardian."

In Article 3 of the convention, it mentions the crime of exploiting members of specific racial groups, particularly through subjecting them to forced labor, which is exactly what the Houthi group does. They force employees in institutions under their control to work without receiving wages (known as "sakhrah") since 2016 and until the time of writing this book in 2022. In contrast, they allocate substantial funds to their supporters, especially those who belong to the racial ideology of the Houthi group.

As for the last act mentioned in Article 3 (f), the Houthis persecute all organizations, parties, and individuals who reject racist practices. It can be said that they have carried out a political extermination of major parties in their areas, most notably the General People's Congress Party, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, the Yemeni Socialist Party, and the Nasserist Party, among others. Thousands of leaders and members of these parties have been killed, displaced, or imprisoned, and those who submit to house arrest or are forced to coexist under Houthi dominance await release. Additionally, they have terminated the operations and activities of dozens of civil society organizations and established a new generation of organizations led by individuals belonging to their own racial group or a few outsiders who work with them, spreading their ideology based on racial

(1) A human rights report documents violations of the right to freedom of movement and travel at security checkpoints by the Ansar Allah group for the period from January 2015 to December 2021.

discrimination, as mentioned in previous sections.

Article 3 establishes criminal responsibility, regardless of motive, for individuals, members of organizations, institutions, and state representatives:

a) If they commit the acts specified in Article 2 of the convention, participate in them, directly incite them, or collude with them.
b) If they directly incite or encourage the commission of the crime of racial discrimination or directly engage in its commission(1).

International Law and the Looting of Funds and Property:

In addition to the fact that the looting of properties and assets for ethnic reasons falls within the forms of racial discrimination under Article 3/d of the aforementioned convention, international human rights law prohibits arbitrary confiscation, looting, and seizure of private property under Article 17/1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms that "everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others," and that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property" (Article 17/2)(2).

International humanitarian law criminalizes the seizure of funds and considers it a violation of the right to property. Article 4/2/c of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts states that acts of pillage and looting against individuals are always prohibited and, in all places,(3). Furthermore, the Statute of the International Criminal Court considers "the pillaging of any town or place, even when taken by assault" as a war crime in non-international armed conflicts, according to Article 8/2/a/16(4).

As for the Arab Charter on Human Rights of 2004, Article 31 emphasizes the right to private property as a guaranteed right for every individual, and it prohibits the arbitrary or unlawful seizure of all or part of their funds(5).

Based on the above, it can be stated that the actions of the Houthi group involving the seizure and looting of the properties of Yemeni dissenters who oppose their racial discrimination-based ideology, whether carried out by the so-called "judicial guardian" or in a random manner, constitute war crimes and forms of racial discrimination under the rules of international humanitarian law. Yemeni legislation, on the other hand, considers these

(1) Previous source.
(2) Previous source.
(3) Previous source.
(4) Previous source.
(5) The Arab Charter on Human Rights (latest version) was adopted during the sixteenth Arab Summit hosted by Tunisia on May 23, 2004.

acts as forms of theft, even though the Houthis may attempt to provide a semblance of legitimacy to these crimes using certain courts under their control.

International Law and Landmines

It can be said that the planting of landmines and booby traps by the Houthis is one of the most prominent factors contributing to the spread of poverty and unemployment, and the exacerbation of the humanitarian situation in Yemen, in addition to the physical damage and permanent disabilities they cause to the victims, the majority of whom are civilians.

The landmines that only the Houthis plant in Yemen, limit the ability of the people to farm, travel, and go to work, prevent them from fishing in the sea, and contribute directly and indirectly to the displacement and displacement of the population. The planting of landmines and explosives in schools, health centers, government institutions, as well as the bombing of water tanks is considered one of the reasons for the exacerbation of the humanitarian situation in Yemen.

The outgoing United Nations expert team on Yemen in 2021 explained that the Houthis carried out "random attacks using indirect shelling weapons, and used anti-personnel landmines, which are acts that could amount to war crimes(1)."

In the Protocol on the Prohibition or Restriction of the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps, and Other Devices, Article 3/3 affirms the prohibition of "the use of any mine, booby-trap, or other device designed to cause unnecessary injury or unnecessary suffering or which, by its nature, causes such harm" in all circumstances(2). Additionally, Article 4 of the Protocol prohibits the use of "anti-personnel mines that are not detectable(3)." It is known that Yemen signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction in 1997(4).

(1) The report of the prominent international and regional panels of experts on Yemen in 2021, paragraph 87/d.
(2) Traditional Weapons – Protocol (Second, amended on May 3, 1996) relating to the prohibition or restriction of the use of mines, booby-traps, and other devices.
(3) Ibid.
(4) The National Information Center.

Conclusion

Yemenis have a conviction, based on accumulated experience, that the Houthis derive their strength from three main factors: ignorance, poverty, and divisions. This group works to manufacture these factors by fueling conflicts among Yemeni tribes, parties, and regions. They systematically destroy education to spread their racist myths. Additionally, they intentionally impoverish Yemenis, as evidenced by documented facts, testimonies, and practices presented in this book, confirming that the Houthis were behind one of the largest humanitarian crises of our time, as described by the United Nations.

What is mentioned in the depths of this book is just a glimpse of the crimes and looting operations carried out by the Houthi group based on sectarian motives. It was difficult to monitor and track all the theft practices executed by the Houthis as a group or by their elements as individuals with the aim of enrichment and concentrating wealth within their faction. When we say the concentration of funds within an ethnicity or sect, it means monopolizing land, food, health, education, trade, media, art, and controlling everything through looted funds.

It is sufficient for the reader to be aware of the fatwa we have provided in this book by Abdullah bin Hamza, who issued a ruling allowing the destruction of the people if they reject their rule (meaning rejecting their dynasty) by killing them, throwing them away, and sending hunting dogs to eliminate them. Naturally, such fatwas, specific to them, explain their sadism and motives for committing all these atrocities. Never has a group ignited a devastating war with the goal of seizing power based on racial and racist beliefs and caused the suffering of the people they claim to represent. They then implemented deliberate policies of starvation to achieve their objectives. The crimes did not stop there. When the world intervened to provide food assistance to the starving people, they stole it from the mouths of hungry children, according to the United Nations and the Houthis' own admission.

The issue is not limited to collecting money, looting property, and stealing aid from citizens. It is also about targeting Yemen as a people, identity, and history, and working to politically, culturally, socially, and economically subjugate it to the project of the Imamate dynasty allied with the Khomeini regime in Iran, through various means, with starvation being at the forefront.

If a fair researcher were to examine the religious books of the Houthis' ancestors and their imams, they would find that many of their fatwas and speeches focus on three fundamental points: propagating the myth of racial guardianship and the rule of the "Batnain" dynasty by the sword, asserting

their right to collect money and loot the property of supporters and opponents by all means, and legitimizing the persecution of dissenters and rejecters of the myth of guardianship. Therefore, Yemenis and others interested in Yemeni affairs should understand that looting, theft, corruption, racism, and persecution will continue because these practices are inherent to the Imamate and its genetic makeup historically and presently. They have been the cause of most wars and conflicts in Yemen over the past centuries. This painful reality will not end, and the Yemeni tragedy will not stop unless a unified state is established based on equal citizenship, respect for beliefs, and the fight against racial discrimination, rather than empowering a racial dynasty to oppress Yemenis.

Based on the above, efforts must be intensified to track and trace stolen funds and assets to reclaim them concurrently with the restoration of state institutions. What has been stolen from Yemenis during the war should not be lost, and it cannot be subject to expiration. It should be noted that the recovery of stolen funds is a fundamental principle in the United Nations Convention against Corruption, which Yemen ratified on December 18, 2003, and these are the funds of Yemenis that have been proven to be looted in recent years.

Moreover, Yemenis - especially those living outside the Houthi-controlled areas - are continuously called upon to expose these crimes by disseminating them through media outlets and regional and international forums, with the aim of raising awareness about them, firstly, and alleviating the suffering of Yemenis (the hostages) who are subjected to daily injustice, secondly. Like any other thieves, the Houthis fear any enlightening role and the documentation of their crimes.

It is also important for Yemenis to exert their utmost efforts to defend their existence and counter the direction of the Houthis and the Khomeini alliance in the region, which aims to eradicate the identity of Yemenis and commit the crime of "cultural genocide."

Finally, Yemenis are in dire need of promoting the values of coexistence, but this can only be achieved through the enactment of strict laws to confront racism in all its forms, especially the racial discrimination imposed on Yemenis as a celestial religion. This should ensure the realization of equality in rights and responsibilities among all Yemeni components without exception, whether they are indigenous residents or those who have migrated to Yemen during different periods. Any political and economic solutions that do not guarantee justice and equality (equal citizenship and social justice) among Yemenis mean that the suffering of this oppressed people will continue.

Annex 1
Photos and Documents:
Chapter One

1 - Their own handwritten Testimonies:



٤٩٨ كتاب الزهد والآداب وغيره من محاسن الأخلاق

باب القول في فضل من يوالي آل محمد ﷺ

قال يحيى بن الحسين صلوات الله عليه: قال رسول الله ﷺ: ((يا علي، من أحب ولدك فقد أحبك، ومن أحبك فقد أحبني، ومن أحبني فقد أحب الله، ومن أحب الله أدخله الجنة، ومن أبغضهم فقد أبغضك، ومن أبغضك فقد أبغضني، ومن أبغضني فقد أبغض الله، ومن أبغض الله كان حقيقا على الله أن يدخله النار)).

قال: وقال رسول الله ﷺ: ((ما أحبنا أهل البيت أحدٌ قزلت به قدم إلا ثبتته قدم حتى ينجيه الله يوم القيامة)).

وقال ﷺ: ((مثل أهل بيتي فيكم كمثل سفينة نوح: من ركبها نجا، ومن تخلف عنها غرق وهوى)).

وقال ﷺ: ((أهل بيتي أمان لأهل الأرض، والنجوم أمان لأهل السماء، فإذا ذهب أهل بيتي من الأرض أتى أهل الأرض ما يوعدون، وإذا ذهبت النجوم من السماء أتى أهل السماء ما يوعدون)).

قال يحيى بن الحسين رضي الله عنه: خيار هذه الأمة من تولى الله ورسوله وأهل بيته: أمير المؤمنين عليه السلام، وذريته؛ لأن الله قد أمر بتولِّيهم. وأشرُّ هذه الأمة وأظلمُها من أبغض الله ورسوله وأهل بيته: أمير المؤمنين وذريته؛ لأن الله قد حرم ذلك عليه في كتابه وعلى لسان نبيه محمد ﷺ، وجعلهم خلفاء أرضه، وأئمة خلقه، ورحاة بريته، وخزنة وحيه، وحفظة كتابه، استأمنهم عليه، وجعلهم الهداة إليه، وأمر بسؤاليهم، والالتجاء في كل علم فرائضه إليهم، وجعل عندهم علم الكتاب وفصل الخطاب، وقيمَ ما التبس من الأسباب، يهدون إلى الرحمن، ويدعون إلى البر والإحسان ﴿نَارٌ نُّورُ عَلَىٰ نُورٍ يَهْدِي اللَّهُ لِنُورِهِ مَن يَشَاءُ﴾ [النور:٣٥]، ويؤتي التقوى من عباده من اعتدى، والحمد لله العلي الأعلى، والصلاة على محمد المصطفى وآله[1] بيته الأخيار النجباء، وأتباعهم الأولياء.

(١)- «وعلى آله». نخ.

١٤٣/٤ ١٤٣/١

الأحكام في الحلال والحرام

تأليف

الإمام الهادي الراسخ المبين

يحيى بن الحسين بن القاسم بن إبراهيم

عليهم السلام

الجزء الثاني

منشورات أهل البيت

"Fabricated narratives used by the Hashemite families in Yemen to legitimize their racism against Yemenis, plunder their wealth, seize power by force, and target anyone who opposes that."



الشافي / ج ٤ ٤٧٧

فهذا قول علي عليه السلام في أمر الصلاة وفي مدتها وفي ولاية أبي بكر وعمر وصحتها، وفي ثنائه عليهما بما هما له أهل، وفي لعنه من أضمر فيهما إلا الحسن الجميل، فقد لعن هذا القدري وفرقته الذين يدعون إمامته وموالاته وهم في ذلك كاذبون.

ولكن إنما يعرف الفضل لأهل الفضل ذوو الفضل كما قال النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم. ولو أردنا أن نذكر ما روي عن علي عليه السلام وعن أهل البيت في فضل أبي بكر وعمر والثناء عليهما لخرج ذلك عن الحصر، إلا أنا قد ذكرنا ما تحتمله هذه الرسالة، ولا بد من ذكر طرف من هذا في آخر الرسالة إن شاء الله

وقد قال علي: (إنا صنائع ربنا، والناس بَعْدُ صنائع لنا).

قال ابن أبي الحديد: معناه نحن عبيد الله والناس عبيد لنا [أو] معنى هذا، فكيف يفضل العبد على سيده، هذا هالك للمعقول.

وأما الأخبار المصرحة بكون علي أفضل أمة محمد صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم فكثيرة، وقد مضى ما به يُزرى المتحرفون [أي الأصل المتحرفين]، ونقر به أعين المؤمنين لله والحمد لله رب العالمين.

وقد قال علي لعثمان لما قال له: (والله ما أنت عندي بأفضل منه يعني مروان فغضب علي، وقال: تعادل بي مروان أنا أفضل منك. [إلخ] رواه المسعودي في مروج الذهب.

وقد تقدم الحديث عن ابن عمر عنه صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم، وقوله في علي: ((من أغضبه فقد أغضبني)) الذي أخرجه أحمد في المناقب، وأبو سعيد عبد الملك الواعظ ذكره في السنى المطالب برهان الدين فراجعه في حاشية الجزء الثاني.

فإذا عثمان قد أغضبه وإذا أغضبه فقد آذاه، ومن آذاه فقد آذى محمداً صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم، ومن آذى محمداً صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم فقد آذى الله بالنصوص المتقدم ذكرها بتبيح ما لا يخفى!!! لمن كانها.

وقد روى أبو بكر الجوهري نحو حديث المسعودي بسنده إلى ابن عباس بلفظ: (لم لا يشتمك كالمك غير منه أبي مروان، فقال علي: إني والله ومنك).

الشافي في تخريج أحاديث الكشاف

تأليف

عبد الله بن حمزة بن سليمان

تحقيق

هادي حسن هادي الحمزي

الجزء الرابع

منشورات مكتبة أهل البيت

One of the false narratives that the Houthis rely on to glorify their lineage, by claiming that Allah has created them as His successors on earth and created people as their slaves.

الوثيقة الفكرية والثقافية

الحمد لله رب العالمين القائل: ﴿وَاعْتَصِمُوا بِحَبْلِ اللَّهِ جَمِيعًا وَلَا تَفَرَّقُوا﴾ وصلى الله وسلم على سيدنا محمد وآله وبعد

إنه في يوم الجمعة الموافق ١٧/ ٣/ ١٤٣٣هـ اجتمعت اللجنة المكلفة لصياغة الاتفاق بين أبناء الزيدية عموما ومن جملتهم المجاهدون وفي مقدمتهم السيد/ عبد الملك بدر الدين الحوثي وبعض علماء الزيدية وأتباعهم وفي مقدمتهم السيد العلامة/ عبد الرحمن حسين شايم والسيد العلامة حسين بن يحيى الحوثي؛ وقد توصلت اللجنة إلى الآتي:

أولا: في مسائل أصول الدين فالذي نعتقده وندين به الإيمان بأن الله واحد أحد فرد صمد لم يلد ولم يولد ليس له شبيه ولا ند ولا مثيل عالم بكل شيء قادر على كل شيء الأول والآخر والظاهر والباطن لا تدركه الأبصار ـ لا في الدنيا ولا في الآخرة ـ وهو يدرك الأبصار وهو اللطيف الخبير، الغني عما سواه لا تجوز عليه الأعضاء والأبعاض والأيدي والأرجل ونحوها من الأدوات ولا تجوز عليه الحركة والسكون والزوال والانتقال ولا يحويه زمان ولا مكان.

والإيمان بأنه تعالى عدل حكيم لا يظلم العباد ولا يرضى بالفساد ولا يكلف ما لا يطاق ولا يجبر على الأفعال بل جعل المكلفين مخيرين ﴿فَمَنْ شَاءَ فَلْيُؤْمِنْ وَمَنْ شَاءَ فَلْيَكْفُرْ﴾ الكهف الآية ٢٩ لا يعذب أحدا إلا بذنبه ﴿وَلَا تَزِرُ وَازِرَةٌ وِزْرَ أُخْرَى﴾ الأنعام الآية ١٦٤ ﴿وَأَنْ لَيْسَ لِلْإِنْسَانِ إِلَّا مَا سَعَى﴾ النجم الآية ٣٩.

والإيمان بأن الله صادق فيما وعد به المؤمنين وفي وعيده للعاصين لا يخلف وعده ولا وعيده كما قال عز من قائل ﴿مَا يُبَدَّلُ الْقَوْلُ لَدَيَّ وَمَا أَنَا بِظَلَّامٍ لِلْعَبِيدِ﴾ ق الآية ٢٩ وأن الجنة مأوى لمن أطاعه

علم الكلام

أما ما يقال من النقد على علم الكلام فليس المراد به علم أصول الدين ولا العقائد التي مشى عليها أئمة الآل الطاهرين وإنما المراد التعمق والأسلوب الذي انتهجه الفلاسفة والمعتزلة وغيرهم وفق منهجيتهم وطريقتهم التي هي مغايرة لطريقة ومنهج أهل البيت عليهم السلام.

فهذه عقيدتنا ورؤيتنا الموحدة في هذه المسائل يرد إليها ما سواها من الرؤى والمسائل التي قد تشكل من هذا الطرف أو ذاك

وفق الله الجميع لما يحبه ويرضاه وجمع شمل الأمة ووحد كلمتها بحق محمد وآله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم والله ولي الهداية والتوفيق.

والحمد لله رب العالمين

حرر بتاريخ ٢١/ ٣/ ١٤٣٣هـ
الموافق ١٣ فبراير ٢٠١٢م

الاصطفاء

أما مسألة الاصطفاء فالذي نعتقده أن لله سبحانه وتعالى يصطفي من يشاء من عباده جماعات وأفرادا كما قال تعالى: ﴿إِنَّ اللَّهَ اصْطَفَى آدَمَ وَنُوحًا وَآلَ إِبْرَاهِيمَ وَآلَ عِمْرَانَ عَلَى الْعَالَمِينَ﴾ آل عمران الآية ٣٣ وكما قال صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم إن الله اصطفى من ولد إبراهيم إسماعيل واصطفى من ولد اسماعيل بني كنانة واصطفى من بني كنانة قريشا واصطفى من قريش بني هاشم واصطفاني من بني هاشم) ونعتقد أن الله سبحانه اصطفى أهل بيت رسوله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم فجعلهم هداة ئلامة وورثة للكتاب من بعد رسول الله إلى أن تقوم الساعة وأنه يقيض في كل عصر من يكون سارا لمعالمه وقادرا على القيام بأمر الأمة والنهوض بها في كل مجالاتها إن عند كل بدعة تكون من بعدي يكاد بها الإسلام وليا من أهل بيتي موكلا بعض الحق وبنوزه ويرد كيد الكائدين فاعتبروا يا أولي الأبصار وتوكلوا على الله) ونهجنا في إتباعه وتعيينه هي منهجية أهل البيت عليهم السلام

أصول الفقه

أما أصول الفقه فما كان منه مخالفا للقرآن الكريم أو بدلا عن آل محمد فهو مرفوض ومنتقد من الجميع وما كان منه موافقا للقرآن ويستعان به على فهم النصوص الشرعية في إطار آل محمد مع ملاحظة الدور الكبير للإخلاص لله سبحانه وتعالى والعمل بأسباب الهداية الإلهية ﴿وَالَّذِينَ اهْتَدَوْا زَادَهُمْ هُدًى وَآتَاهُمْ تَقْوَاهُمْ﴾ محمد الآية ١٧ فهو قبول معتمد لا اعتراض عليه ولا إشكال

الاجتهاد

أما بالنسبة للاجتهاد فما كان منه يؤدي إلى التفرق في الدين والاختلاف في معرفة الله وغيره من أصول الشريعة أو إلى مخالفة نهج الآل الأكرمين أو إلى الإضرار بوحدة المسلمين وتكوين الأمة التي أمر بها رب العالمين: ﴿وَلْتَكُنْ مِنْكُمْ أُمَّةٌ يَدْعُونَ إِلَى الْخَيْرِ وَيَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَيَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ وَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْمُفْلِحُونَ﴾ آل عمران الآية ١٠٤ أو مخالفة من أمر الله بطاعتهم وجعلهم ولاة للأمة ـ فهو اجتهاد مرفوض لا نقره ولا نرضاه بل هو مفسدة في الدين.

وأما ما كان منه استفراغا للوسع والطاقة في البحث عن أحكام الدين وشريعة رب العالمين ملتزماً منهجية القرآن الكريم وعلى طريق ونهج أهل البيت الأكرمين لا يؤدي إلى تنازع في هذه الأمة ولا مخالفة لمن أمر الله بطاعتهم وجعلهم ولاة للأمة محكوماً بالضوابط التي وضعها ومشى عليها ئمة الآل عليهم السلام فهو مقبول ومطلوب ومحتاج إليه في معرفة الدين خصوصاً فيما يستجد من المسائل.

"The Houthi intellectual and cultural document in which they claim that Allah has chosen their lineage and distinguished it among people. Based on this document, they practice racism against Yemenis and ignite wars for power and wealth."



قصد السبيل
إلى
معرفة الجليل

تأليف
السيد العلامة
محمد عبد الله عوض
حفظه الله وأبقاه

مكتبة أهل البيت (ع)

٢٣٠ — مكتاب الإمامة

• الاعتراف والتصديق بأنهم أهل الحق، وقرناء القرآن، والمبينون للناس ما اختلفوا فيه.
• موالاة أوليائهم ومعاداة أعدائهم.
• إظهار محبتهم ومودتهم بالقول والفعل، وإظهار التوجع مما نزل بهم.
• الاهتداء بهديهم، والاقتداء بأعلامهم، والانتماء إليهم.
• الإحسان إلى محسنهم، والعفو عن مسيئهم.
• الإيمان والتصديق بأنهم أولى الناس بمقام رسول الله ﷺ بلا فصل.
• أنهم لا يفارقون الحق، ولا يفارقهم إلى انقطاع التكليف.
• أنهم حجج الله على خلقه بعد النبي ﷺ إلى انقطاع التكليف.

الحسبة والمحتسب

الحسبة هي: الانتصاب في مقام الإمام عند عدم الإمام للقيام بأعماله من الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر وإصلاح البلاد والعباد و.... إلخ، ويكون له ما للإمام وعليه ما عليه إلا ما استثني.

ويشترط في المحتسب العقل الوافر، والورع الكامل، وحسن الرأي، وحسن التدبير، والعلم، سواء كان بالاجتهاد أم بالتقليد.

ولا يشترط أن يكون المحتسب من آل النبي ﷺ، ولا من قريش، ولا من العرب، بل يشترط: الذكورة، والحرية، والعدالة المحققة، وعدم من يصلح للإمامة بلا مانع.

وليس له أخذ الحقوق المالية كرهاً، ولا إقامة الحدود.

ويجوز له الإكراه على المعاونة على دفع المنكر، وأخذ المال لدفع الكفار والبغاة، وله الإكراه بغير قتال على فعل الواجبات كإقامة الصلاة وأداء الزكاة و.. إلخ، والله أعلم.



المجموع المنصوري ٣

المهذب
في فتاوى
الإمام المنصور بالله عبد الله بن حمزة

جمع وترتيب
الفقيه العلامة
محمد بن أحمد المرادي
(ت ١٠٤٩هـ)
رحمه الله عليه ورضوانه

تحقيق وتعليق
عبد الكريم بن عبد الله الخيواني

مؤسسة الإمام زيد بن علي الثقافية

كتاب قسم

فإن قيل: وأين منزلة أولئك ومنزلة رسول الله -صلى الله عليه وآله- وغير أبنائه ما قدمنا ما أخر ولا أخرنا ما قدم.

وأما الضرائب وقبالات الأسواق والخلاب وإكراه أهل الرساتيم على أخذ أكثر من الزكاة فيجوز للإمام من ذلك ما يسد به الثغور ويصلح به الجمهور، وقد كتب رسول الله -صلى الله عليه وآله- يوم الخندق لعيينة بن حصن ومن تابعه من غطفان بثلث ثمار المدينة من غير مشورة أهلها، فلما عرفوه حاله[1] وقوتهم أعطاهم الكتاب فمزقوه على أن تولي اليتيم أن يدفع قسطاً من ماله للنفاع عن سائره، فهي أمر الدين أولى، لأن المال بذلك يقدس، والدين لا يترك للمال ولا يترك ذلك من سيو آبائنا -عليهم السلام- إلا جاهل، فإن الهادي -عليه السلام- أخذ المعونة من أهل صنعاء.

وقال السيد المؤيد بالله قدس الله روحه: من له فضل مال وجب عليه إنجاده في سبيل الله وبأنهم إن لم يفعل، والقاسم -عليه السلام- أخذ المعونة من بلاده السبق استقرت عليها ولايته غير مرة.

والسلطان القائم إذا تاب وقد أخذ من الرعية أموالاً لا يجوز له أخذها ورجع إلى طاعة الإمام جاز للإمام إقراره على ما في يده؛ لأن له أن يأخذه بحيث المال إذا رأى ذلك صلاحاً.

وللإمام أن يقتل من يظهر الفساد، وكذلك من يرهب، قال الله تعالى: ﴿لَئِن لَّمْ يَنتَهِ الْمُنَافِقُونَ وَالَّذِينَ فِي قُلُوبِهِم مَّرَضٌ وَالْمُرْجِفُونَ فِي الْمَدِينَةِ لَنُغْرِيَنَّكَ بِهِمْ ثُمَّ لَا

(١) في (ب): حاتم.

-٤٥٥-

كتاب قسم

ويجوز للإمام وغيره ليس الرفيع مع الثياب، وقد كان رسول الله -صلى الله عليه وآله- يلبس الخز وإن قام الصوف مقامه.

ويجوز للإمام أن يولي من يغلب في ظنه كفايته فيما ولاه فيه وإن كان فاسقاً، وقد ولى رسول الله -صلى الله عليه وآله- القساف، كالوليد بن عقبة، وأبي سفيان، وعمرو بن العاص.

ويجوز للإمام أن يكل السائل إلى غيره من العلماء ممن يقوم مقامه لا سيما إذا كثرت الأشغال، فإن لم يقم بها غيره تعين عليه، وله أن يمسك عن الجواب إن كان له فيه نظر.

ويجوز للإمام أن يعطي الغير[2] من الزكاة والكفارة وغيرهما من الحقوق مطلقاً كان أو فاسقاً؛ لأن رسول الله -صلى الله عليه وآله- أعطى عيينة الأوتان وهم يأكلون على كفرهم وحربه، وأعطى يهودياً من صدقة بني زريق.

ويجوز للإمام أن يعطي الفاسق ما يقتضي به دينه أو ينتفع به ولا يجوز لغيره.

ويجوز تعذيب المقرفة والمشبهة والفساق لأحد الثلاثة منهم[3]، وقد فعل ذلك رسول الله -صلى الله عليه وآله- حين دفع ابن أبي الحقيق إلى الزبير فربط في صدره حتى حرج على فؤاده.

باب الولاة ومن تجوز توليته ومن لا تجوز وما لهم فعله وما ليس لهم فعله

يجب الاجتهاد في تولية من يصلح به أمر الإسلام، فإن خالف ما أمر به زالت

(١) في (ب): التعين.
(٢) زيادة في (ب).

-٤٥٧-

"An Imami (Shi'a) fatwa that permits taking Yemeni people's money by force under the pretext of causing harm to the infidels, according to their mufti, Mohammed Abdullah Awad. This is what they are practicing today.".

"A fatwa by Abdullah bin Hamza allowing the confiscation of Yemenis' money by force, exceeding what is due for Zakat, and the killing of the Murji'ah Zaidi group and looting their wealth."



"A fatwa by Abdullah bin Hamza authorizing his lineage to kill Yemenis who oppose their beliefs, capture their women, and loot their wealth. To this day, the Houthis refuse to disavow or deny this fatwa and consider Abdullah bin Hamza as their second reference after Yahya Al-Rassi."



"Another fatwa by Abdullah bin Hamza in which he permits the killing and annihilation of the people or the general population who reject the rule of their lineage."



"The Imams themselves wrote and documented a part of the heinous crimes they committed against the Yemeni tribes that rejected their racial discrimination."



"Proponents of the theory of racial Imamate do not recognize any ruler who does not belong to what they describe as the 'Ahl al-Bayt.' Therefore, they believe that zakat should be given to the Imam and not to the state, even if he is not in a governing position. This was the case in Sa'ada before the Houthi group took control of the capital."



Yahya Al-Rassi describes the inhabitants of Sana'a who rejected the theory of racial rule as dogs.



الشافي/ج٣ ٧٢

بدع، ولأن الهمية عندنا لا تصح إلا بالاتباع، ومتى لم يقع اتباع لم تخلص[1] عبية، ومثبهم[2] فلا بد أن يتمسك بشرائع الإيمان، وأن من ادعى محبتهم من مرتكبي الكبائر، فهو كاذب في دعواه.

تَعْصِيْ الإلهَ وَأَنْتَ تَـأْمُلُ حُبَّـهُ هَـذَا مُحَـالٌ فِي المَقَـالِ بَدِيْـعُ
هَيْهَـاتَ لَـوْ أَحْبَبْتَـهُ لأَطَعْتَـهُ إِنَّ المُحِـبَّ لِمَـنْ يُحِـبُّ مُطِيْـعُ

وإنما ساء في محبة آل محمد -صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وآله وَسَلَّم- اعتقاده فيهم، وهم أعلى من ذلك، روينا عن النبي -صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وآله وَسَلَّم- ما رواه عن ربه: ((خلقتكم من طينة عليين، وخلقت شيعتكم منكم)) و((شيعتنا رعاة الشمس والقمر)) وروياه[3] مرفوعاً، فتأمل معاني الحديث والإلزام، وما أحالك كذلك، ولكنه يذم أهل البيت -عَلَيْهِم السَّلام- وما ذمه لمن مدحه الله، شعراً:

قَـدْ قِيْـلَ إِنَّ الإِلَـهَ ذُو وَلَـدٍ وَقِيْـلَ إِنَّ النَّبِـيَّ قَـدْ كَهَنَـا
لَـمْ يَسْـلَمِ اللهُ مِـنْ بَرِيَّتِـهِ وَلا نَبِـيُّ الهُـدَى فَكَيْـفَ أَنَـا

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[1] تحصل (نخ).

[2] متبهم: مبتدأ، وقوله: (فلا بد..إلخ) الخبر، ودخول الفاء على الخبر على مذهب الأخفش وهو ظاهر. قلت سمعاً من شيخنا الإمام الحجة/ عبدالدين بن محمد بن منصور المؤيدي -أيده الله تعالى-.

[3] قوله: روياه مرفوعاً، أراد الإمام بقوله: روياه مرفوعاً الخبر القدسي وهو إلى قوله: ((وخلقت شيعتكم منكم)) رواه الإمام الأعظم زيد بن علي في (ظ) المجموع.

وأما قوله: ((وشيعتنا رعاة الشمس والقمر)) فهو أثر عن الإمام زيد بن علي فسره الإمام الناصر الأطروش بأنهم أهل المراقبة للصلوات في الأوقات أو كما قال. انتهى إملاء مولانا الإمام الحجة/ عبدالدين بن محمد المؤيدي حفظه الله آمين ونفع بعلومه.

الشافي

تأليف/ الإمام المجتهد المطلق، المحدث، الحافظ، رباني العلماء، وقدوة المجتهدين، أبي محمد

عبدالله بن حمزة بن سليمان[1]

ت ٦١٤هـ

حققه، وعلق عليه، وخرج أحاديثه، وآثاره، وقدم له

مجدالدين بن محمد بن منصور المؤيدي[2]

(١٣٣٢هـ - ١٤٢٨هـ)

مقابلة وتصحيح/

هادي حسن هادي الحمزي

الجزء الثالث

مذيلاً بكتاب التعليق الوافي في تخريج أحاديث الشافي

تأليف/ السيد العلامة نجم الأمة الظاهرة

الحسين بن القاسم بن محمد

(ت ١٣٨٨هـ)

حقق كتاب التعليق الوافي في تخريج أحاديث الشافي/

عبدالحميد عبدالرحمن حسن الحوثي

هادي حسن هادي الحمزي

منشورات

مكتبة أهل البيت[3]

The Houthi leadership, represented by Abdullah bin Hamza, states that it is not enough to love their lineage but requires absolute obedience to them. They have also claimed that Allah, the Almighty, said that He created the family of the Prophet from the purest lineage and created those who love them from that lineage. This is one of the lies aimed at subjugating Muslims.

رابعاً: ما حكم من أنكر فضل أهل البيت عليهم السلام؟

وأما من أنكر فضيلتهم، وجحد ما اختصهم به من الإجتباء، وأهل الإصطفاء، وفرضهم على سواه، فقد رد ما صرائح القرآن، وخالف الأحاديث المتواترة عن سيد ولد عدنان، وحاله في هذا معلوم، وأمره عسير غير يسير، وحكم من رد آية من القرآن الكريم معلوم عند جميع المسلمين فكيف من رد آيات وآيات، وأحاديث وأخبار.

وليتذكر أفضل أهل البيت عليهم السلام لا يضر إلا نفسه، لأنه بمعانده عليهم، وإنكاره لما أوجب لهم من الفضل والتفضيل عطائهم، لا يستطيع أن يُنزل من مقدارهم، أو يرد شيئاً من الآثار الواردة فيهم، أو يحوها ويمحوها إلى سواهم.

وأيضاً فإن البغض لأهل البيت صفة قبيحة، وخلاصة ذميمة، لا تكون إلا لمن سلبه

الفضائل المنطبقة ١٧ على الأنوار المؤتلقة

الله من ألطافه، يقبح قوله وفعله، ولا يتحلى بها إلا من هو يستحق الإهانة واللذم.

كيف لا وقد ورد ذمه على لسان النبي المكرم صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم، وأخبر بصفة مخصوصة في أخبار كثيرة، وتذكر بعض الصفات التي يتحلى بها من يبغض أهل البيت على لسان النبي صلوات الله وسلامه عليه وعلى آله.

أولاً: ابن الزنا، الذي ولد لغير رشدة، وأتت به أمه من غير أبيه أو غير فراشه.

ثانياً: الذي حملت به أمه في حيضة، يعني جامعها زوجها وهي حائض وحملت.

ثالثاً: الذي لا خير فيه من الرجال، وهو الذي يؤتى من دبره كما تؤتى النساء في أزواجهن.

وعلى هذا الصفات القبيحة يدل قول النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم ((لا يبغضنا أهل البيت إلا أحد ثلاثة: رجل حملت به أمه في غير حيضتها، ورجل لغير رشدة، ورجل يؤتى من دبره)) فما الفائدة أو معناه.

رابعاً: المنافق. وخامساً: المرائي.

والمنافق والمرائي من الصفات الذميمة، التي يرد اللوم لمن تحلى بها في القرآن الكريم وعلى لسان النبي الأمين صلى الله عليه وآله، وأعد الله تعالى لمن تحلى بها عذاباً أليماً.

ثالثاً: هل ذلك التفضيل ابتداء أم بسبب الأعمال؟

إذا ثبت أن الله تعالى قد فضل أهل البيت عليهم السلام، فإن ذلك التفضيل إبتداء من الله تعالى، واختيار واصطفاء، وليس جزاء على عمل قدموه، أو فعل صالح عملوه، ولكن هو تفضيل تفضل من الله تعالى عليهم.

وإنما قلنا بأنه تفضيل ابتداء: لأن الله تفضلهم قبل أن يوجدوا، وحكم بتفضيلهم بدون أن يعلق ذلك بسبب أنهم فعلوا أو تركوا أو قدموا.

وأيضاً: فإن التفضيل سنة الله الجارية بين خلوقاته، فقد فاضل حتى بين المخلوقات، وبين غير العقلاءات، وبالطوم أنها لا تفعل شيئاً ولا تقدر عليه.

وإنما قلنا بأنه ليس جزاء على الأعمال: لأن التفضيل بسبب العمل أمر آخر غير التفضيل المبتدأ، فإذا اجتمع للرجل من أهل البيت عليهم السلام فضيلة العمل كان له بذلك فضلين، وتزدوج له ثواب الأمرين.

ونعني بقولنا إن الفضل ليس جزاء على الأعمال: هو أن من كان منهم فاسقاً أو ظالماً لنفسه أنه لا يحرمه عن كونه مفضلاً، بل تفضيله باق بسبب انتسابه إلى البضعة

الفضائل المنطبقة ١٦ على الأنوار المؤتلقة

النبوة، والسلالة المصطفوية، وإن كان بعض عمله، وإبداع الاقتداء به.

ويكون حكمه حكم الأية المنسوخة، يجب احترامها، ولا يعمل بما، ولا يقاس عليها، ولا تؤثر في غيرها.

والذي يدل على أن الفضل ليس جزاء على العمل: أنه لو كان جزاء على الأعمال لم يستحقه العامل إلا بعد إتمام العمل، لأن العامل لا يستحق الجزاء إلا بعد الإكمال والإتمام للعمل، ولا يكون ذلك إلا يوم القيامة، فعلى هذا يلزم إبطال التفضيل بكافة أشكاله، التفضيل المبتدأ على زعم القائل، والتفضيل الذي هو جزاء على الأعمال، ويلزم من ذلك رد القرآن الكريم والسنة النبوية الشريفة.

لأن أدلة التفضيل من الكتاب والسنة لم تذكر أن التفضيل جزاء على الأعمال.

الفضائل المنطبقة على الأنوار المؤتلقة

(بحث في أفضلية المؤمن من أهل البيت على العالم من غير أهل البيت)

تأليف

السيد الإمام المجتهد المطلق علي بن يحيى بن أحمد المحبري المؤيدي رحمه الله

ولد (١٢٨٨)هـ، وتوفي (١٣١٩)هـ، وعمره (٣١)عاماً

تحقيق

إبراهيم يحيى الدرسي الحمزي

منشورات مركز الإمام المنصور بالله للدراسات الإسلامية

The lineage claims that the Prophet, peace be upon him, said that whoever hates "Ahl al-Bayt" is considered an illegitimate child or a child of a woman who conceived during menstruation or a man in whom there is no good, and he will be born from his back, just as women give birth, and he is a hypocrite and an evildoer. This is a blatant slander against the Messenger of Allah, and they have deceived the Yemenis with this false claim for long periods, aiming to empower themselves with the authority and wealth of the Yemenis.

An old photo taken in 1955 in Al-Sakhna, which is now part of Al Hodeidah Governorate. The photo illustrates the class disparities created by the racial imamate in Yemeni society. Those with clean clothes and individuals who appear affluent belong to the Hashemite families that govern the country according to the racial and sectarian theory. The barefoot individuals, bearing the marks of poverty and destitution, do not belong to this ethnicity. This photo was taken by the Swedish pilot Ingvar Svensson and was published by his wife, Gunilla Christina Svensson, in 2022.



This letter sent by one of the Imams to some Yemeni elders, referring to them as "servants," is one of the many correspondences in which the Imams used such terminology to assert the subjugation of Yemeni tribes to this lineage.

2- Cultural Genocide and Houthisation of Society:



وزارة التربية والتعليم
قطاع التدريب والتأهيل
المعهد العالي للتدريب والتأهيل
أثناء الخدمة (التوقاني)

القسم: القرآن الكريم
العام الدراسي: ٢٠١٨ - ٢٠١٩م
الفصل الدراسي: الأول
الدفعة: (٢٣)

الامتحان النهائي لمادة : تفسير (١)

الاسم:

السؤال	الأول	الثاني	الثالث	الرابع	المجموع	المجموع بالكلمات	توقيع مدرس المادة
الدرجة							

أجب عن جميع الأسئلة التالية — الدرجة

السؤال الأول : ضع علامة صح أو خطأ داخل القوس أمام كل جملة

١. ( ) سورة الصف سورة مباركة تطبع أسر النجاة واضحة لبناء الصف الإيماني
٢. ( ) المؤمنون من نجار انصار الله هم اساس الصف الإيماني الذي يحبه الله تعالى
٣. ( ) الجيش واللجان الشعبية تدخل في الصف الإيماني الذي أمر به الله تعالى
٤. ( ) مخالفة القيادة المختارة من الله هو عمل يشابه عمل بني إسرائيل
٥. ( ) القيادة المختارة من الله هي الرسول صلوات الله عليه وآله وأعلام الهدى من عترته
٦. ( ) من لا يكون من انصار الله فاسق عاص لأمر الله
٧. ( ) الله تعالى دلنا على تجارة مهلكة للأنفس والأموال
٨. ( ) من أظلم الناس المجاهدون في سبيل الله تعالى
٩. ( ) أهم وسائل الميدانين لدين الله الحروب الكلامية وهي حرب تضليل وافتراء
١٠. ( ) سبيل الله تعني قومية أو وطنية أو إقليمية

٢٠

وتضحي بالشرح المفصل قوله تعالى : ((الإجابة خلف الورقة))

٤٠ (يا أيها الذين آمنوا هل أدلكم على تجارة تنجيكم من عذاب أليم (١٠) تؤمنون بالله ورسوله وتجاهدون في سبيل الله بأموالكم وأنفسكم ذلكم خير لكم إن كنتم تعلمون).

٢٠ من علامات الإيمان برسول الله توقيره وتعزيره صلوات الله عليه وآله ما الشيء الذي قطعته في المولد النبوي وما دلالة الاحتفال بالمولد النبوي في واقع الأمة خاصة في هذا الزمان ؟

Examination questions for students in a technical institute that include references to criminalizing those who do not acknowledge the leadership chosen by God, with a specific reference to the leadership of the lineage under the leadership of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. Additionally, the questions emphasize the necessity of following "Ansar Allah" (the Houthis) and their affiliated committees, considering it a part of Islamic faith.

مصر تتهم إخوان اليمن بتدريب وتهريب مقاتلين جهاديين إلى سيناء ورفح

خلافات غير معلنة بين هادي وقيادات دينية تشترط الحوار مع «القاعدة» وحرب «الروافض»

مصدر عسكري: تغييرات عسكرية مرتقبة ستشمل قائدي الاحتياط والمنطقة السابعة

ستطال التغييرات قائد اللواء 27 ميكا المتمركز في المكلا وعددا من مدراء دوائر وهيئات وزارة الدفاع

هناك احتجاجات متزايدة في قوات الاحتياط بسبب الفساد والإنتقاص عن 21 ضابطا من مقربيه وأقرانه

مسلحون مجهولون يقتحمون قسم شرطة بالحديدة ويطلقون الرصاص على الجنود ويلوذون بالفرار

الشارع

مقتل شخص بسبب عراك بين فتيان وسجين ينتحر خنقا في قسم شرطة بعدن

مقتل 7 أشخاص بينهم مهرب في جلسة متفجرات وأب يقتل ابنته حرقا بتعز

الحوثي: أنا أحق بالحكم

ألقى أمس كلمة مسجلة بمناسبة يوم الغدير، قال فيها إن «ولاية المسلمين أحقية مطلقة» لنسل الإمام علي

من لديهم موقف سلبي من الولاية هم سبب التبلد السياسي للأمة وتقبلها للحكام الظالمين

موقع قيادة الأمة هو الإمام، هناك مؤهلات خاصة يتوفر على القيادات والحكام العالمين

الموت لأمريكا

اللعنة على اليهود

The first page of the Independent Street newspaper, which covered a speech by the Houthi leader in which he explicitly stated that the rule belongs to his lineage because God has distinguished them from other people.

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة التعليم الفني والتدريب المهني
المعهد التقني بعمران
صنعاء

اختبار مادة التربية الإسلامية
للعام الدراسي ٢٠١٨/٢٠١٩م
الفصل الدراسي الثاني
الدفعة السابعة والثلاثون
مدة الاختبار ثلاث ساعات

الله أكبر
الموت لأمريكا
الموت لإسرائيل
اللعنة على اليهود
النصر للإسلام
يد تحمي ويد تبني
كونوا أنصار الله

أجب عن جميع الأسئلة التالية في دفتر الإجابات المخصص لذلك:

السؤال رقم (١)	عدد فيما لا يقل عن عشرون سطر أهم منجزات المسيرة القرآنية منذ أن ولدت بقيادة السيد القائد الشهيد/ حسين بدر الدين الحوثي قدس الله سره؟	٢٠ درجات
السؤال رقم (٢)	ما هو المقصود بالمنافقين في سورة الكهف؟ وهل فضل الله أنصار الله عن بقية المؤمنين؟ ولماذا؟	٥ درجات
السؤال رقم (٣)	من هم آل بيت النبي؟ ولماذا يصلي عليهم المسلمين في كل صلاة؟	٥ درجات
السؤال رقم (٤)	عدد فضائل آل البيت على اليمنيين؟ وكيف ساهموا في نشر الإسلام في اليمن؟	٥ درجات
السؤال رقم (٥)	من علامات الإيمان برسول الله هو انتصار أبنائه وأبناء بلاته إلى أن وصل النصر هو إلى مقدمه السيد عبد الملك بدر الدين الحوثي فأي نصر الأمة الإسلامية وأهم مواصفة المنافقين والمرتزقة علل سبب هذا الانتصار ومن هم المنافقين والمرتزقة الذي يحاربون آل بيت رسول الله؟	١٠ درجة
السؤال رقم (٦)	لقد ضحى السيد حسين بدر الدين الحوثي قدس الله سره بحياته لكي تحيا الأمة الإسلامية وتصحوا من سباتها التي ظلت غارقة في وحل الظلم والارتزاق تحت رحمة الأمريكيين والإسرائيليين والسعوديين الوهابيين. اذكر أسباب ادخال المذاهب الوهابي على المجتمع اليمني الذي استورده المنافقين من امريكا في فترة الثمانينات؟ وكيف تمكن أنصار الله بمشتصاله من جذورة؟	١٥ درجات
السؤال رقم (٧)	ما هي أفضل الوسائل الفاعلة لمواجهة أمريكا واسرائيل ومرتزقتهم ال سعود؟ اذكر ذلك فيما لا يقل عن ١٠ أسطر	١٠ درجات
السؤال رقم (٨)	ارسم شجرة نسب السيد عبد الملك بدر الدين الحوثي في صفحة مستقلة	٣٠ درجة
السؤال رقم (٩)	علل لما يلي: لا يكتمل ايمان المرء الا بطاعة من تولاه الله؟	١٠ درجات
السؤال رقم (١٠)	ما هو المقصود بأن أنصار الله وال البيت هم الفرقة الناجية؟	٦٠ درجات

انتهت الأسئلة

مع تمنياتي بالتوفيق والنجاح

مدرس المادة/ حمود بن حمود الشرفي

An exam for students at the technical institute, with most of the questions aimed at promoting the ideology of the Houthi group among the students. This is the method that has been used in the other educational institutions under Houthi control to achieve cultural genocide.

A picture of Hussein al-Houthi and his father, Badr al-Din, at the entrance of a government university in the Al-Jawf Governorate. This is how all state institutions have been turned into venues for the images of the tribal leadership.

رئاسة مجلس الوزراء
أمانة العاصمة صنعاء
الإدارة العامة للعمليات

رقم المرفقة - /
التاريخ - 4/ 1 /2020م

تعميم

من:
الادارة العامة للعمليات

الأخوة: مدراء عموم المديريات
مكرر: أمناء عموم المديريات

الموضوع / تشكيل لجان تأصيل الهوية الإيمانية اليمنية

بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه ... وبموجب توجيهات الاخ/ عبدالوهاب شرف الدين وكيل الأمانة – رئيس حملة تأصيل الهوية الايمانية اليمنية بتشكيل لجان تأصيل الهوية الإيمانية اليمنية على مستوى المكاتب التنفيذية بالمديرية والاحياء والحارات على أن يكون قوام اللجان على النحو التالي:-

الجهة	العدد المرشح	ملاحظات
فروع المكاتب التنفيذية	ثلاثة أشخاص	
الاحياء	سبعة اشخاص	على أن يكون جلهم المعلم الفني رئيسا للجنه وبراعي التخصصات المتعلقة ان امكن
الحارات	خمسة اشخاص	

وترفع البيانات الى العمليات خلال ثلاثة أيام..//

...مرسل للتنفيذ...

درجة الاهمية (هام)

مدير عام العمليات

Forming committees to forcibly spread the beliefs of the Houthi (racial and sectarian) group in neighborhoods under the cover of what they call the "faith identity".

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة التربية والتعليم
مكتب التربية والتعليم م/ المحويت
إدارة تعليم الفتاة

الرقم: ( ) التاريخ: / / 2021 م

الإخوة / مدراء إدارات التربية والتعليم / جميع المديريات
الإخوة / رؤساء أقسام تعليم الفتاة والمشاركة المجتمعية بالمديريات

المحترمون
المحترمون

تحية طيبة وبعد:

الموضوع / تحديد يوم ثقافي كل أسبوع للمعلمات وحصص ثقافية ثابتة خلال المرحلة القادمة

تهديكم إدارة تعليم الفتاة بمكتب التربية والتعليم بالمحافظة أطيب التحايا والتبريكات

بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه ..... من أحد المبادئ المهمة والأسس والركائز المتينة في إطار ترسيخ الهوية الإيمانية والانتماء الإيماني هو / الوعي والبصيرة وأن يكون الأنسان مستنيرا بنور الله ، إنسانا ذكيا واعيا ، أنسانا لا يعيش حالة من الذاجن في حياته فيخدع بكل بساطة من قوى الطاغوت التي تعتمد على الخداع والتضليل كأسلوب رئيسي في السيطرة على أفكار الناس ومشاعرهم .

وعليه ... ونحت شعار : (الإيمان يمان والحكمة يمانية)

يتم تحديد يوم ثقافي كل أسبوع للمعلمات وحصص ثقافية ثابتة خلال المرحلة القادمة للطالبات لتعزيز ثقافتهن الدينية والقرآنية ويتم التوجيه إليكم بالمكلفات ذلك.

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتنا

مدير إدارة تعليم الفتاة
درهمان محمد الحيكن

مدير مكتب التربية والتعليم
إبراهيم خالد محمد الزيد

A circular from the Education and Learning Office under Houthi control, mandating female teachers in Al Mahweet Governorate to attend Houthi courses aimed at forcibly spreading the group's racial beliefs under the banner of the "faith identity." This is what has happened in other areas under their control.

Changing the name of the Nashwan Al-Humairi School - a highly symbolic and important Yemeni figure - to Hani Tawmour. Hani was a child recruited by the Houthis and was killed on one of the battlefronts.

قرار رئيس الجامعة رقم( ) لسنة ٢٠٢١م
بشأن تسمية الكليات والمراكز والأقسام والقاعات والمدرجات بأسماء الشهداء

رئيس الجامعة :-

- على القرار الجمهوري بالقانون رقم(١٧) لسنة ١٩٩٥م بشأن الجامعات اليمنية وتعديلاته ولائحته التنفيذية.
- وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (١٩٩) لسنة ٢٠٠٥م بشأن انشاء جامعة عمران.
- وعلى مذكرة وزارة التعليم العالي والبحث العلمي رقم (١١٧٩) وتاريخ ٢٠٢٠/١١/٢٠م بشأن تسمية الكليات والمراكز والأقسام والقاعات والمدرجات بأسماء شهداء تخليد لذكراهم.
- ولما تقتضيه المصلحة العامة.

// قـــــــــرر //

مـــادة(١): يتم اعتماد اسماء القاعات الدراسية بأسماء الشهداء العظماء وبحسب قرين اسم كلاً منهم تخليداً لذكراهم وفي كالتالي:

م	التسمية قبل	التسمية بعد	الكلية
١	القاعة الكبرى	قاعة الشهيد الرئيس صالح الصماط	كلية التجارة والاقتصاد
٢	قاعة ١٧	قاعة الشهيد مجد الزعرور	كلية التربية والعلوم التطبيقة
٣	قاعة ٧	قاعة الشهيد عبدالمجيد غولة	كلية الطب والعلوم الصحية
٤	قاعة ٦	قاعة الشهيد مجد الدين القطاع	كلية الطب والعلوم الصحية

مادة(٢): يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وعلى الجهات المعنية تنفيذه كلاً فيما يخصه.

والله الموفق،،،

صدر بجامعة عمران الموافق ٢١/ ٥ /١٤٤٢هـ

تاريخ ٥ / ١ /٢٠٢١م

أ.د/ خالد حسين الصوالي

رئيس الجامعة

Changing the names of the halls at the University of Sana'a to bear the names of their leaders.

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة التعليم الفني والتدريب المهني
مكتب الوزير

Republic of Yemen
Ministry of Technical Education & Vocational Training
Minister's Office

الرقم: ... التاريخ: ... Date: ... Attachment: ... المرفقات: ...

تعميم هام

الإخوة/ مدراء عموم مكاتب الوزارة بالأمانة والمحافظات المحترمون
الإخوة/ عمداء المعاهد التقنية والمهنية الحكومية والخاصة والأهلية المحترمون

تحية طيبة وبعد.....

الموضوع / تأصيل الهوية الإيمانية واحياء شهر رجب 1441هـ

بالإشارة الى الموضوع أعلاه.. وبناء على توجيهات دولة رئيس الوزراء بخصوص تأصيل الهوية الإيمانية واحياء لشهر رجب 1441هـ في وجدان الشعب اليمني بطريقة متميزة تحقق ترسيخ مبادئ الهوية الإيمانية بمختلف مكوناته وتحصين المجتمع من أشكال استهداف هويتهم وتعريفهم بسبل وطرق المواجهة ... مما يتوجب تنفيذ الآتي:

1. عقد اجتماع تنسيقي لشهر رجب وحث الجميع على الاهتمام بشهر رجب وإحيائه بما يعزز الهوية الإيمانية.
2. تخصيص محاضرة أسبوعية على صعيد كل الكليات والمعاهد للتوعية بمبادئ الهوية الإيمانية (الإيمان يمان والحكمة يمانية)
3. تنفيذ ندوة توعية على الهوية الإيمانية على مستوى كل كلية ومعهد.
4. تفعيل الأنشطة الطلابية (رسم – انشاد – دوريات رياضية – مشاريع تخرج ....الخ) ضمن عناوين الهوية الإيمانية.
5. تفعيل غرفة عمليات في مكاتب الأمانة والمحافظات والجهاز التنفيذي لكليات المجتمع للمتابعة المستمرة للحث على التفاعل مع إحياء الذكرى في جميع الكليات والمعاهد.
6. مواقاة الوزارة بتقرير يومي مالم تتيقاه مع التوثيق بالصور عبر غرفة العمليات بالوزارة على الرقم (771401530).

وعليه ...
يتم العمل بما ذكر اعلاه، وموافاتنا بما تم.
وتقبلوا خالص التحية والتقدير ...

وزير التعليم الفني والتدريب المهني

تلفاكس: ٢٨٦٧٧٩ - ٢٨٦٠٦٦ - ميلتكس: ٢٠٢٣٦٧ - ٢٨٦٣٧٨ - تحويلات: ٢٠٢٤١٤ - ص.ب: ٢٥٢٣٥ - شارع بغداد - صنعاء
Fax: +967-1-212016/469279 - Direct: 202362/469278 - Ext.: 202414 - P.O.Box: 25235 - Baghdad St. - Sana'a

Houthi directives impose their political, religious, and sectarian beliefs and target the identity and beliefs of Yemenis under the banner of religious identity through educational institutions.

مبعوث خاص من الملك عبد الله وصل بها إلى صنعاء وتحفظ الرياض على الرئيس هادي للموافقة على الجلوس مع الرئيس السابق برعاية شخصية من الملك

مبادرة سعودية للمصالحة بين «هادي» و«صالح»

مصدر سياسي رفيع:
المبعوث سمع من الجانبين عن قضايا الخلاف بينهما والمملكة ترى أنه لا بد أن يتصالح الرئيس أجلت وصول ساعات تخطيط تجاوز قيمتها 1 خيارات دولار حتى تعرف موقف هادي من مبادرة تلك

صحيفة تابعة لـ: صالح ..
السعودية ستقوم بدور هام لإنجاز مبادرة المصالحة وستشيد أواخر شهر رمضان تطورا مهما في هذا الصدد

مسلحون من «القاعدة» يقتحمون بريد حورة بحضرموت ويقتلون حارسه وينهبون مبالغ مالية مه

مدير عام بريد حضرموت الوادي والصحراء يروي تفاصيل الهجوم الذي نفذه 15 مسلحين ملثمين:

قتلوا الحارس بـ 3 رصاص في الرأس ثم أطلقوا الرصاص على جثته بعد أن عرفوا أنه جندي

صوبوا أسلحتهم نحو الموظفين ونهبوا مليونا و600 ألف ريال وهم يكبرون باسم الله

الشارع
يومية - مستقلة

منع صلاة التراويح في عمران

جولش يفتشون مساجد خارج مدينة عمران ويكتبون تعهدات على أئمة المساجد لإقامة الصلاة بجماعة أن المساجد لإقامة الصلوات فقط

تجبر عشرات الجنود وهدوا
إقامة صلاة التراويح في مسجد
السلام وتعتقد بعد أن أخذوا بالقوة
مفاتيحه من قيادي الصلاحي

لإخلاء المنطقة عن طريق بعض أعضاء المحافظة
تأخير الإفطار لمدة أربع ساعات بعد أن تم
ما ذكره في التوثيق الرسمي للمحافظة صلاة

An independent newspaper publishes on its front-page news about the Houthi's prohibition of Taraweeh prayers in the Imran governorate before they took control of Sana'a. This is part of the Houthi's cultural genocide activities aimed at depriving Yemenis of their right to belief because they consider Taraweeh prayer as an innovation.

{قـــــــرر}

مادة (أولى)

يقر ا.ه. مدرسة علي عبد المغني الى الاصعر مدرسة الإمام الحسن بن علي بمكتب التربية والتعليم مديرية بلاد الروس .

مادة (ثانية)

يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وعلى الجهات المختصة تنفيذه كلٌ فيما يخصه صدر بمكتب التربية والتعليم بمحافظة سنحان .

As part of the practices of cultural genocide, school and institution names bearing Yemeni national symbols are being changed and replaced with names of Islamic figures used by the Houthi group for ethnic and sectarian purposes, aiming to obliterate the unified national memory.

All the Houthi's racial crimes and practices are dealt with as divine instructions. This portrays the process of killing, displacement, and looting of Yemenis as a mission assigned to them by God, Almighty.

A Houthi magazine for children called "Jihad," with the aim of changing the beliefs of children, recruiting them, and pushing them to the frontlines of the conflict.

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة التربية والتعليم
المعهد الوطني للعلوم الإدارية
صنعاء- شارع الصدق

قسم القرآن الكريم
العام الدراسي 2018-2019
الفصل الدراسي الأول
الدفعة (34)
مدة الاختبار (02) ساعتين

الله أكبر
الحمد لله
الحمد لله
الحمد لله
النصر للإسلام

فخامة/ البشمخ الأمريكية
من كان مولاه علي مولاه
كولن أصار الله

الاختبار النهائي لمادة: التربية الدينية

أجب عن جميع الأسئلة التالية:

		الدرجة
السؤال الأول:	ضع علامة صح على إحدى الإجابات التالية:	10
	1) السيد عبد الملك بدر الدين الحوثي هو: □ ابن رسول الله □ ولي الله □ مجدد الإسلام □ كل ما سبق ذكره	
	2) السيد حسين بدر الدين الحوثي هو: □ مبعوث الله □ الصادق الأمين □ روح الحسين □ كل ما سبق ذكره	
	3) ثورة الحسين عليه السلام هي ثورة من أجل: □ هزيمة أمريكا واسرائيل □ نصرة الإسلام والمسلمين □ إعادة حكم آل البيت	
السؤال الثاني:	اكتب لمحة مختصرة عن سيرة السيد حسين بن بدر الدين الحوثي سلام الله عليه وكيف بدأ حياته المتواضعة في مواجهة أعداء الله والمنافقين واتباع يزيد بن معاوية.	الدرجة
		20

Examples of exam questions that clearly reflect the sectarian and racial dimension, as well as the absolute loyalty to the lineage in the name of religion.



السؤال الخامس:	علل لما يأتي:	الدرجة
	1) انصار الله رجال الرجال 2) يزيد بن معاوية منافق 3) يعطى الخمس لأولياء الله؟ 4) لا يكره علياً إلا بغيض ومنافق؟ 5) السيد عبد الملك بدر الدين الحوثي قائد مخلك ومنهم في صفه؟	20

انتهت الأسئلة
مع تمنياتنا لكم بالتوفيق والنجاح
أ/ عبد الكريم الشامي

Continuing with the examples of sectarian and racial questions.



علل لما يأتي:
١. الله امرنا ان نكون(انصار الله)
٢. انصار الله لهم قيادة ربانية
٣. الله يحب من يقاتلون في سبيله كانهم بنيان مرصوص.
٤. الحواريون هم خلص المؤمنين
٥. هذا الزمان زمن ظهور الاسلام الحق
٦. التسبيح قاعدة ايمانية مهمة
٧. لن تتحرر القدس الا على ايد انصار الله من اهل اليمن ومن سيكونون في صفهم
٨. الله يمقت من يدعي الايمان من دون جهاد في سبيل الله
٩. السيد القائد عبد الملك عليه السلام من تتحقق فيه قيادة الأمة الحقة وفق كتاب الله وهدي رسول الله صلوات الله عليه وآله
١٠. الاختلاف في التشريع والمذاهب ليس من تسبيح الله

انتهت الاسئلة
يأيها الذين آمنوا كونوا أنصار الله
أ/ايمان الشعاري

Examples of exam questions that illustrate the sectarian and racial aspects, emphasizing allegiance to the lineage in the name of religion, and encouraging children to carry weapons and participate in combat.

قرار مدير مكتب التربية والتعليم رقم (٥٧) لسنة ٢٠٢١م
بشأن تغيير أسماء عدد من المدارس بإدارة التربية والتعليم بمديرية الشاهل

مدير مكتب التربية والتعليم :

- بعد الاطلاع على قانون الخدمة المدنية رقم (١٩) لسنة ١٩٩١ م بشأن الخدمة المدنية.
- وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (٢٨) لسنة ١٩٩٢م بشأن اللائحة التنظيمية لوزارة التربية والتعليم.
- وعلى قانون رقم (٣٧) لسنة ١٩٩٨م بشأن قانون المعلم والمهن التعليمية.
- وعلى قرار وزير التربية والتعليم رقم (٥٤) لسنة ١٩٩٨ م الخاص بالتفويضات.
- وبموجب قانون السلطة المحلية رقم (٤) لسنة ٢٠٠٠م.
- وبناءً على عرض مدير إدارة التربية والتعليم ومدير عام المديرية رئيس المجلس المحلي بالشاهل
- ولما تقتضيه المصلحة العامة.

(قـــــــرر)

- **مادة أولى** : تغير أسماء المدارس التالية إلى الأسماء الجديدة المبينة قرين كل اسم بإدارة التربية والتعليم بمديرية الشاهل وفقاً للآتي :

م	اسم المدرسة السابق	اسم المدرسة الجديد
١	مدرسة / النصر الأساسية بني بدر	مدرسة الشهيد / أبو تراب العابد بني بدر
٢	مدرسة / الفتح الأساسية بجبل حرام	مدرسة / الأمام زيد بن علي الأساسية بجبل حرام
٣	مدرسة / الخير بالمداهيس	مدرسة / ٢١ سبتمبر بالمداهيس
٤	مدرسة / الثانوية الأساسية الثانوية بالمروعة	مدرسة / الشهيد القائد الأساسية الثانوية بالمروعة
٥	مدرسة / الزهري الأساسية بالجرين	مدرسة / الأمام الهادي الأساسية بالجرين
٦	مدرسة / الفاروق بصابة قشلان	مدرسة / ملك الأشتر بصابة قشلان
٧	مدرسة / عمر المختار الأساسي بيت الجمل	مدرسة / الشهيد القاضي أحمد الحرب الأساسي بيت الجمل
٨	مدرسة / التشغل الثانوية	مدرسة / الشهيد الرئيس الصماد
٩	مدرسة / أم حكيم الأساسية الثانوية للبنات	مدرسة / أسماء بنت وهب الأساسية الثانوية للبنات
١٠	مدرسة / جبل الشيخ	مدرسة / بلال بن رباح بجبل الشيخ
١١	مدرسة / ١٧ يوليو الأساسية للبنات بني بدر	مدرسة / السيدة زينب بنت علي الأساسية بني بدر
١٢	مدرسة / المرتاق بالقارح	مدرسة / الأمام الحسن بن علي بالقارح

- **مادة ثانية** : يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وعلى الجهات المختصة تنفيذه كلٌ فيما يخصه.

صدر بمكتب التربية والتعليم محافظة حجه.
بتاريخ / / ١٤٤٢ هـ
الموافق ٢٥/ ٥ / ٢٠٢١ م

مدير مكتب التربية والتعليم
علي عبد الله الحاضري

صورة مع التحية :
- شعبة المشاريع والتجهيزات
- شعبة التعليم
- إدارة الموارد البشرية
- إدارة الأمانات

A document that illustrates the change of names of 12 schools as part of a wide and systematic policy to change the names of schools, streets, and government facilities to achieve the goal of cultural genocide and the Houthi influence on society.

قرار تغيير مسمى مدرسة للعام الدراسي 2021/2020م

مدير مكتب التربية والتعليم

- بناء على قانون التعليم رقم (45) لسنه 1992م .
- وعلى قانون المعلم والمهن التعليمية رقم (38) لسنه 1998م واللائحه التنفيذيه لها
- وعلى قرار وزير التربيه والتعليم رقم (510) لسنه 2002م بشأن اعادة تنظيم الدارس والعمليه التعليميه

قـــــــرر

مادة أولى : يغير مسمى مدرسة عمرو بن العاص ببيت داغش قيدان ملحان الى الاسم الجديد مدرسة الشهيد / ابو همام بيت داغش وادي حمى ابتداء من العام الدراسي 2020/2021م

مادة ثانية : يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وعلى من يلزم تنفيذه كلا فيما يخصه

والله الموفق .....

التوزيع والاحالة :
على علي الحاضري
مدير التعليم العام
محمد عبدالله البخاري
مدير مكتب التربية والتعليم
ابو اسامة احمد محمد الزين

صورة مع التحية :
- شعبة المشاريع والإدارة
- شعبة التعليم
- شعبة التربية والتوجيه
- شعبة الشؤون والتنمية

A document that shows the change of the name of the school "Amr ibn al-As School" for sectarian reasons because the Houthis have animosity towards many of the companions, including Amr ibn al-As, may God be pleased with him.

وزارة التربية والتعليم
مكتب التربية والتعليم بالأمانة
شعبة التعليم، إدارة الأنشطة المدرسية

تحميم رقم ( ) لسنة 1443هـ 002687

الأخوة/ مدراء المناطق التعليمية
الأخوة/ رؤساء أقسام الأنشطة المدرسية بالمناطق
المحترمون
المحترمون

تحية طيبة وبعد...

الموضوع/ احياء فعاليات(الهجرة النبوية) محرم 1443هـ استشهاد الإمام الحسين(عليه السلام) 10محرم 1443هـ استشهاد الامام زيد (عليه السلام) 25 محرم 1443هـ.

عطفا على مذكرة الوزارة وتوجيهات الأخ/ وكيل قطاع التعليم برقم (351) وتاريخ 2021/08/10م وإشارة إلى الموضوع اعلاه ولأهمية تفعيل الأنشطة التربوية والثقافية والتوعوية التي لها دور كبير في تحصين أبناءنا الطلاب والوسط التربوي، وكما تعلمون فنحن مقبلون على مناسبات دينية وثورية عظيمة(الهجرة النبوية- استشهاد الإمام الحسين- استشهاد الإمام زيد).

نأمل من الجميع إحياء هذه المناسبات بمختلف الأنشطة:

- ندوات تربوية وثقافية.
- إقامة الفعاليات الثقافية والإذاعات المدرسية.
- المسابقات الثقافية.
- لوحات حائطية وبروشورات.
- المسرح المدرسي.
- الرفع بجداول الإذاعات المدرسية بهذه المناسبات.
- الاهتمام بالمواهب في كل المجالات والرفع بأسمائهم.
- تجهيز الفرق الكشفية المدرسية وموافاتنا ببيانات وأسماء الفرق الكشفية.
- تشكيل فرق الانشاد والمسرح والفرق الرياضية والابتكارات العلمية.
- وتفعيل سجلات الانشطة المدرسية.

وعليه:-
يتم الالتزام والتقيد بما ورد اعلاه وتوثيق وتغطية ذلك إعلاميا والرفع لنا بتقارير الانجاز.

وتقبلوا فائق تحياتنا...

وكيل قطاع العاصمة
مدير مكتب التربية والتعليم

مكتب التربية والتعليم - ميدان ... شارع الستين هاتف 8/ 622867 00967 1
بريد الكتروني :- AMANA_EDU@YEMEN.NET.YE

The Houthis require educational district directors and heads of school activities departments to continuously organize sectarian events as part of a set of activities aimed at enforcing their beliefs through official educational institutions.

At the end of December 2020, the Houthis burned the library of the Al-Sunnah Mosque in the Hajjah governorate, which was one of the most famous religious libraries in the country. They also burned and destroyed other Sunni offices in Sana'a and other provinces under their control, driven by sectarian motives and as part of their policy of cultural genocide.

Annex 2
Photos and Documents:
Chapter Two

1-Collecting revenues and dues but do not paying salaries.

الموضوع / ايرادات ومصروفات الدولة خلال شهر اكتوبر وللفترة يناير – اكتوبر 2020م

يالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه ، نتشرف بأن نرفق لكم مع هذا عدد(32) كشفاً تمثل إيرادات ومصروفات الدولة خلال شهر اكتوبر 2020م شاملاً لجميع محافظات الجمهورية ما عدا محافظات (عدن- حضرموت- لحج- شبوة- المهرة- مأرب- الجوف- سقطرى- الضالع).

حيث بلغت الإيرادات لشهر اكتوبر 2020م مبلغ (56.119.047.913/65) فقط ستة وخمسون مليار وماية وتسعة عشر مليون وسبعة وأربعون الف وتسعمائة وثلاثة عشر ريال وخمسة وستون فلساً لا غير.

فيما بلغت المصروفات مبلغ (66.478.344.160/52) فقط ستة وثمانون مليار وأربعمائة وثمانية وسبعون مليون وثلاثمائة وأربعة وأربعون الف ومائة وستون ريال واثنان وخمسون فلساً لا غير.

وبخصمة النفقات العامة للمكاتب التنفيذية لسلطة المحلية ومبلغ (335.195.671/35) فقط ثلاثمائة وخمسة وثلاثون مليون ومائة وخمسة وتسعون الف وستمائة واربعة وثلاثون ريال وخمسة وثلاثون فلساً لا غير.

وبلغ العجز لشهر اكتوبر 2020م مبلغ (30.359.296.246/87) فقط ثلاثون مليار وثلاثمائة وتسعة وخمسون مليون ومائتان وتسعة وثلاثون الف ومائتان وستة وأربعون ريال وخمسة وثلاثون فلساً لا غير.

فيما بلغ إجمالي الإيرادات للفترة يناير – اكتوبر 2020م مبلغ (529.998.136.523/88) فقط خمسمائة وتسعة وعشرون مليار وتسعمائة وثمانية وتسعون مليون ومائة وستة وثلاثون الف وخمسمائة وثلاثة وعشرون ريال وثمانية وثمانون فلساً لا غير.

وبلغ إجمالي المصروفات لنفس الفترة مبلغ (1.182.488.312.172/30) فقط واحد تريليون ومائة واثنان وثمانون مليار وأربعمائة وثمانون مليون وثلاثمائة واثنا عشر الف ومائة واثنان وسبعون ريال وثلاثون فلساً لا غير.

وبلغ إجمالي العجز للفترة يناير – اكتوبر 2020م مبلغ (652.492.175.648/32) فقط ستمائة واثنان وخمسون مليار وأربعمائة واثنان وثمانون مليون ومائة وخمسة وتسعون الف وستمائة وثمانية وأربعون ريال واثنان وثلاثون فلساً لا غير.

وقد تم تمويل العجز من (دون الخزانة والسندات الحكومية بمبلغ 161 مليار ريال، والباقي من حساب الحكومة العام وربطاً بلغ رصيد حساب الحكومة العام المكشوف حوالي مبلغ (3.249) فقط ثلاثة تريليون ومئتان وتسعة وأربعون مليار ريال في نهاية شهر اكتوبر 2020م.

فيما بلغت إيرادات السلطة المحلية لشهر اكتوبر 2020م مبلغ (5.275.764.348/06) فقط خمسة مليار ومئتان وخمسة وتسعون مليون وتسعمائة و أربعة وستون الف وثلاثمائة وثمانية وأربعون ريال وستة فلساً لا غير.

وبلغت النفقات الاستثمارية للسلطة المحلية لشهر اكتوبر 2020م مبلغ (2.462.327.192/03) فقط اثنان مليار وأربعمائة واثنان وستون مليون وثلاثمائة وسبعة وعشرون الف ومائة واثنان وستون ريال وثلاثة فلساً لا غير.

وبلغ إجمالي إيرادات المكاتب التنفيذية للسلطة المحلية للفترة يناير – اكتوبر 2020م مبلغ (23.148.051.364/91) فقط ثلاثة وعشرون مليار ومائة وثمانية وأربعون مليون واحد وخمسون الف وثلاثمائة وأربعة وتسعون ريال وثلاثة وتسعون فلساً لا غير.

وبلغ إجمالي النفقات الاستثمارية للسلطة المحلية لنفس الفترة مبلغ (25.489.113.398/81) فقط ثلاثة وعشرون مليار وأربعمائة وتسعة وثمانون مليون ومائة وثلاثة عشر الف وثلاثمائة وثمانية وتسعون ريال واحد وثمانون فلساً لا غير.

المحافظ

وكيل أول محافظ البنك المركزي اليمني

More than 56 billion Yemeni rials in revenue declared by the Houthis in just one month (October) in 2020.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
YEMEN CUSTOMS
Port of Hodeidah Customs

الإخوة / موظفي جمرك ميناء الحديدة المحترمين

الموضوع: رسالة شكر وتقدير

نود الاحاطة بأننا تلقينا مذكرة مصلحة الجمارك رقم (2/4978) بتاريخ 2017/8/5م حاملة على مذكرة معالي الاخ وزير المالية رقم (10/580م و) بتاريخ 2017/8/1م المتضمنة الشكر والتقدير للجهود المتميزة التي بذلتم من قبلكم والتي أدرت عن تحقيق نمو في الإيرادات التي حققها الجمرك والمصلحة خلال شهر يوليو 2017م والتي بلغت (9.300.913.965) ريال منها (8.600.000.000) ريال نقداً مستحقين بذلك الفضل نتيجة عن الشهر السابق من السنة المالية والتي تعد الفضل نتيجة عن اي شهر سابق من السنة الجمارك والدخل نتيجة عن بقية مكاتب المصلحة .

ويجدرنا تتقدم لكم بجزيل الشكر والتقدير للجهود المتميزة التي بذلتموها في سبيل تحقيق هذا الانجاز والذي ما كان ليتحقق لولا جهودكم المخلصة متمنيا لكم دوام التوفيق والنجاح والاستمرار في ذات الوتيرة من الأداء لتحقيق المزيد من النتائج الايجابية .

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتي ...

مدير عام جمارك ميناء الحديدة

A document reveals that the Houthis obtained 9 billion Yemeni rials from the customs of the port of Hodeidah in just one month.



معلومة بحصيلة ضريبة مبيعات القات للفترة من ٢٠٢٠/٨/١م الى ٢٠٢٠/٨/٣١م

اسم المركز	حصيلة	دخل	نقش	الاجمالي	صندوق سرطان	الاجمالي	الفترة	حصيلة	دخل	نقش	سند وق سرطان	الاجمالي	الزيادة	النسبة
نقطة الشام	١٤٤,٢٩٠,٠٠٠	٢١٧٩٣٥٠٠	٣١٣٢٢٥٠٠	٣٣٦٤٥٠٠	٢١٠٧٠٥٠٠	٢٩/٠٨/٢٠٢٠	٨٩,٢٥٠,٠٠٠	١٣٢٨٧٥٠٠	١٣٢٨٧٥٠٠	٢٢٢١٢٥٠٠	٤٤٦٢٥٠٠	١٣٩,٤١٢,٥٠٠	٨١,٢٥٨,٠٠٠	-٣٩٪
باب الناقة	١٨٨,٨٥٠,٠٠٠	٢٨٢٣٧٥٠٠	٥٧٢١٢٥٠٠	٩٤٤٢٥٠٠	٢٧٣٨٢٢٥٠٠	٢٩/٠٨/٢٠٢٠	٢٩٦,٢٠٠,٠٠٠	٨٠٣٢٥٠٠٠	٨٤١٩٥٠٠٠	٢٣٩٤٢٥٠٠	١٦٠٦٥٠٠٠	٤٦٥,٨٨٥,٠٠٠	٢٧٦,٠٥٢,٥٠٠	٢٠٥
جبل راس	٩٦,٤٢٥,٠٠٠	١٣٧١٣٥٠٠	٢٦٨٥٦٠٠٠	٤٥٢١٢٥٠	١٢٢٥٦٤٨٠٠	٢٩/٠٨/٢٠٢٠	١٠٧,٧٧٠,٠٠٠	١٦١٦٥٤٥٠٠	١٦١٦٥٤٥٠٠	٢٦٩٤٢٥٠٠	٥٣٨٨٥٠٠	١٥٦,٢٢٦,٥٠٠	٤٩,٧٠١,٧٠٠	١٨٢٪
الخميس	٥٥,٤٢٢,٩٠٠	٨٢١٩٥٤٠	١٢٨٦٥٩٠٠	٢٧٢٣١٨٠	٨٠٤٢٢٢٠	٢٩/٠٨/٢٠٢٠	٢٩,٨٠٠,٠٠٠	١٠٩٢٠٠٠٠	١٠٩٢٠٠٠٠	١٨٢٠٠٠٠	٣٦٤٠٠٠٠	١٠٥,٥٢١,٠٠٠	٤٥,١٢٧,٧٨٠	٢١٥٪
دير عبدربه	١٢,٩٥٨,٠٠٠	٢٠٨٣٧٠٠	٢٤٨٩٥٠٠	٦٩٧٩٠٠	٢٠٢٣٩١٠٠	٢٩/٠٨/٢٠٢٠	١٨,٨٤٠,٠٠٠	٢٨٣٦٠٠٠	٢٨٣٦٠٠٠	٤٧١٠٠٠٠	٩٤٢٠٠٠٠	٣٣,٢٦٨,٠٠٠	٢٠,٣١٨,٩٠٠	٢٥١٪
السوق القديم	٢٢,٠٨٥,٠٠٠	٤٠٦٢٧٥٠	٦٧٧١٢٥٠	١٢٥٤٢٥٠	٣٩٢٢٢٢٥٠	٢٩/٠٨/٢٠٢٠	٣٩,٥٢٥,٠٠٠	٥٩٢٨١٢٥٠	٥٩٢٨١٢٥٠	٩٨٨١٢٥٠	١٩٧٦٢٥٠٠	٥٧٠,٢١١,٢٥٠	١٨٠,٠٢٨,٠٠٠	٤١٥٪
القطن	٨,٠٥٠,٠٠٠	١٣٠٧٢٥٠٠	٢٠١٢٥٠٠٠	٤٠٢٥٠٠	١٦٦٢٢٥٠٠	٢٩/٠٨/٢٠٢٠	١٤,٣٩٩,٠٠٠	٢١٥٨٨٠٠٠	٢١٥٨٨٠٠٠	٣٥٩٨٠٠٠	٧١٩٦٠٠٠	٢٠٨,٦٨٦,٤٠٠	٩,١٨٥,٩٠٠	٣٩٪
بويحس	٩,٨٠١,٠٠٠	١٤٧٠٠٠٠	٢٤٥٠٠٠٠	٥٩٠٠٠٠	١٤٢٦٠٠٠٠	٢٩/٠٨/٢٠٢٠	١٢,٤٩٠,٠٠٠	١٨٣٢٥٠٠	١٨٣٢٥٠٠	٢١٢٢٥٠٠	٦٢٤٥٠٠	١٨,٦١٠,٥٠٠	٢,٩٠٩,٥٠٠	٢٧٪
الحجيلة	١,٥٢٦,٠٠٠	٢٢٨٠٠٠٠	٢٨٠٠٠٠٠	٣٦٠٠٠٠	٢٢٠٤٠٠٠	٢٩/٠٨/٢٠٢٠	١,٧٢٠,٠٠٠	٢٥٨٠٠٠٠	٢٥٨٠٠٠٠	٤٣٠٠٠٠	٨٦٠٠٠	٢,٤٩٤,٠٠٠	٣٩٦,٠٠٠	١٣٪
المعرفية	٥,٢٤٦,٠٠٠	٧٨٦٩٠٠	١٣١١٥٠٠	٢٦٢٣٠٠	٣١٠٦٢٠٠	٢٩/٠٨/٢٠٢٠	٥,٩٣٠,٠٠٠	٨٨٩٥٠٠٠	٨٨٩٥٠٠٠	١٤٨٢٥٠٠٠	٢٩٦٥٠٠٠	٨,٥٩٨,٥٠٠	٩٩١,٨٠٠	١٢٪
العقاري	٥,٢٣٣,٥٠٠	٧٩٩٨٧٥	١٣٣٢١٢٥	٢٦٦٢٤٥	٧٧٢٢١٢٥	٢٩/٠٨/٢٠٢٠	٥,٩٠٤,٠٠٠	٨٨٥٦٠٠	٨٨٥٦٠٠	١٤٢٦٠٠٠	٢٩٥٢٠٠	٨,٥٥٦,٠٨٠	٨٢٨,١٧٥	١١٦٪
السّحّار	٠	٠	٠	٠	٠	٢٩/٠٨/٢٠٢٠	٥٩,٠٠٠	٨٥٥٠	٨٥٥٠	١٤٢٥٠	٩٨٥٠	٨٢,٦٥٠	٨٢,٦٥١	٠٪
حريس	٠	٠	٠	٠	٠	٠	٠	٠	٠	٠	٠	٠	٠	٠٪
الاجمالي	٥٥٦,٠١٩,٠٠٠	٨٩,٨٠١,٥٦٥	١٢٨,٠٠٤,٧٧٥	٣٢,٦٠٠,٩٥٥	٣٩٨,٨٩٨,٠٠٠		٨٠٠,٤٢٢,٩٤٥	١٠٣,٢٩٦,٧٠٠	١٠٣,٢٩٦,٧٠٠	٢٧٢,٤٨٨,٩٠٠	٧٠,٠٤٢,٤٠٥	٧٠٠,٠٤٨,٦٠٠	٢٠٠,٤٠٨,٦٠٠	٢٥٦٪

يمن ميديا

Taxes on qat in one province for just one month. The Houthis receive significant amounts while refusing to pay salaries.

An invoice confirming that the Houthi group imposes fines on business owners who announce price reductions for goods to citizens without prior permission from them.

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة الصناعة والتجارة
مكتب الصناعة والتجارة

التاريخ: ٢٠٢٢/٦/١٩
المرفقات:

الاخوة / مدراء فروع المكتب بالمديريات المحترمون

تحية طيبة وبعد ...

الموضوع / حصر مخازن الوكلاء ومحلات الجملة للمواد الغذائية

بالاشارة الى الموضوع أعلاه ..وبناء على البرقية العاجلة الواردة من مدير عام عمليات الوزارة رقم (149) وتاريخ 2022/6/7م والمتضمنة حصر مخازن الوكلاء ومحلات الجملة للمواد الغذائية وكذا تحيدة استمارة احتياج المطاعم والثلاجات ومرفق لكم طي هذا :

- نموذج حصر مخازن وكلاء الشركات المستوردة والمنتجة المحلية للسلع الغذائية الأساسية والاستهلاكية (قمح-دقيق سكر – ارز-زيوت-سمون -بقوليات) .
- نموذج حصر احتياجات واستهلاك المطاعم والثلاجات من الدجاج والدقيق والارز.

وعليه: يتم التعميم بالملاحق على المنشات المستهدفة لتعبئة البيانات والرفع بها خلال مدة لا تتجاوز أربعة أيام من تاريخه ...

ولكم منا فائق التحية ...

مسؤولية التنفيذ... مرسل للتنفيذ...

مدير عام مكتب الصناعة والتجارة

صورة مع التحية :
- معالي وزير الصناعة والتجارة
- سعادة المحافظ
- نائب وزير الصناعة والتجارة
- وكيل قطاع التجارة الداخلية
- وكيل الوزارة لشئون المكاتب
- مدير عام المحافظات
- مدير استقرار الاسواق
- جهاز الامن والمخابرات
- مدراء المديريات

العنوان: 245603 – 245607 – 245608- فاكس: (232469) ص.ب (3451)
Tel:245603 -245603 -245607 - 245608- Fax :(232469) gmail:absenah20@gmail.com p .o. Box:(3451)

Scanned by CamScanner

A document confirming the requirement for wholesale merchants and agents of imported and locally produced food products to disclose their inventory of food products, as well as to inventory the needs and consumption of restaurants. This is an unprecedented step in Yemen's history, aiming to increase taxes and compete with merchants who do not belong to the Houthi group.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

Republic of Yemen
Main Center

الجمهورية اليمنية
اللجنة الثورية العليا

الاخ / وزير المالية المحترم
الاخ / محافظ البنك المركزي المحترم

تحية طيبة وبعد ..

بناءاً على قرارات اللجنة الثورية العليا في اجتماعها المنعقد بتاريخ ٢٤ / ٦ / ٢٠١٥ م بحضور الاخوة المحافظين يتم صرف مرتب شهر كامل أكرامية رمضان للمجاهدين في ميادين الشرف والبطولة (اللجان الشعبية) لعدد ٣٧٠٠٠ الف وفقاً للكشوفات المرفقة والمعتمدة من قبلنا ويمنع صرف أي مبلغ لأي جهة أخرى مدنية أو عسكرية نظراً للضائقة المالية التي تمر بها البلاد . مرسل للتنفيذ .

وشكراً

رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا
محمد علي الحوثي

خاص صفحة #ويكيليكس_ذمار

They provide incentives to their fighters in 2015 while depriving civilian employees, and the goal behind starving civilian employees is to push them to the frontlines of the fighting.

2- Looting the reserves and the depreciation of the national currency.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
Head Office –Sana'a

الجمهورية اليمنية
البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء

استمارة طلب تعويض عن العملة غير القانونية

- بيانات المواطن:
- استلمت مبلغ من العملة غير القانونية بيانه كالتالي:

الفئة / العيان	1,000	500	200	100
رقمياً:				
كتابياً:				

- والتي حصلت عليها من العملاء التالية:-

حوالة ☐ تاجر ☐ مستحقات رواتب ☐ عمليات تجارية ☐ أخرى ☐

الإقـــرار

- أقر وأعترف أن البيانات أعلاه صحيحة، وأنا ليست ولست أن هذه المبالغ ليست ملكي وأنها لطرف آخر فإني أتحمل المسؤولية القانونية وما يتعلق بها من عقوبات أو غرامات بالإضافة إلى القانون بإعادة المبلغ
- أتعهد بعدم التعامل مع تلك العملة غير القانونية لما لها من أثار كارثية على الاقتصاد الوطني وسعر الصرف وأسعار السلع
- أبدي استعدادي إلى حيازة العملة الجديدة من أماكن التسويق المعروفة لتسليم مبلغ آخر مطابقاً، وأنا تم ذلك من قبلي فإنك لا تحمل المؤسسة المالية أي مسؤولية عن ذلك.

الاســـم:
التوقيـــع:
البصمـــة:

بيانات الاستلام أو الحيازة للشخص الاعتباري

استلمت مبلغ:	(رقماً):	(كتابةً):
نقداً في حساب:		
وذلك:	بدلاً عن المبلغ الذي سلمته من العملة غير القانونية	

الاســـم:
التوقيـــع:
البصمـــة:

الإجراءات المتخذة من قبل محققك ( )

- تم مطابقة البيان والرقم الوطني للمواطن.
- تم التأكد من عدم تكرار العملة لدى وكيل آخر في المحفظة.
- كانت العملة برقم( ) في الساعة( ) وتاريخ / / 20م

الاســـم:
التوقيـــع:

Forms distributed by the Houthis with the aim of using them to seize paper currency and replace it with electronic currency, but this process did not gain any societal acceptance.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
Head Office-Sana'a
No.

الجمهورية اليمنية
البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي- صنعاء
الرقم :

بيـــــان هـــام

إنطلاقاً من المسئولية القانونية والدستورية التي أنيطت بالبنك المركزي اليمني في إدارة السياسة النقدية. وبإعتباره صاحب الحق الدستوري في إصدار العملة الوطنية والمحافظة عليها. والمتماشياً مع أصالة إدارة سعر الصرف وإنتهاج السياسات التي براها مناسبة في سبيل الحفاظ على قيمة العملة الوطنية والإسهام في إستقرار الأسعار.

وإزاء ما يقوم به فرع البنك بعدن من سياسات تدميرية ممنهجة ضد العملة الوطنية والمتمثل من كل التعهدات المتراكمة منذ يناير 2017م بعدم الطباعة مجدداً وإصداره المبالغ (900) مليار الذي سبق التعهد بالاحتفاظ بها كإحتياطي. وإستخدامها لتمحاربة والفساد وتمويل الحرب على أبناء الشعب .رغم كل التحذيرات من الخبراء والمؤسسات المالية الدولية. وبعد أن أستنفذت كل الوسائل لثنيهم عن هذا النهج الكارثي . بات حتماً حماية أبناء الشعب والاقتصاد من الكوارث إستمرار الطباعة . كإجراء فرضته المصلحة العامة لكبح التضخم الجامح الذي سيسحب الاقتصاد الوطني وسيودي الى إتساع رقعة المجاعة والمعاناة مع نزول كل دفعة من هذة العملة للتداول في السوق.

ولما كانت حكومة الإنقاذ قد أصدرت قرارها رقم (57) لسنة 2018م الذي يمنع التداول بالعملة غير القانونية وتجريم كل من يتعامل بها وما أعقب ذلك من جهود للجهات القضائية والأمنية والاقتصادية في الحد من الآثار التضخمية للعملة يمنع تداولها طيلة الأيام الماضية.

ولما لمقتضيه المصلحة العامة في الحفاظ على مدخرات المواطنين ورأس المال الوطني من التآكل ولإستقرار سعر الصرف والحفاظ على بقاء القوة الشرائية للعملة الوطنية وتجنب مزيداً من زيادة الأسعار لتستقر. فإن البنك المركزي اليمني. المركز الرئيسي- صنعاء- ويعد أن فقد الأمل في أي إجراء دولي أو إقليمي يحد من سياسات فرع بنك عدن التدميرية والمعاناة العدوان في إستخدام الطباعة كسلاح لضرب العملة وإستهداف حياة المواطنين.

قـــرر الآتي:-

1- إعتبار التداول أو الحيازة للعملة غير القانونية إخلالاً جسيماً بالاقتصاد الوطني والعملة الوطنية القانونية وكذلك المنظومة الوطنية الخاصة وغير مصرح بها من البنك المركزي اليمني -المركز الرئيسي-صنعاء.

2- تعويض المواطنين(الأفراد) الغير بريء من غير (التجار والبنوك والصرافين) بنقد إلكتروني أو بالعملة الوطنية القانونية عما يحوزهم من العملة غير القانونية (حسب الصنف المعدد) من خلال مخيم فرعية تسليمية خلال ثلاثين يوماً إبتداءً من تاريخ 2019/12/19م إلى أقرب مركز/وكلاء المحافظ النقدية الإلكترونية وهي:-

- موبايل موني
- كوالي كوكتك
- إم فلوس

وأن يتطرق أي طلب بعد هذه المهلة المحددة.

3- يدعو البنك المركزي كافة مكونات المجتمع إلى الإسهام الإيجابي في حماية الاقتصاد وقيمة العملة الوطنية من الإنهيار والحفاظ على سعر الصرف وبما يسهم في إستقرار أسعار السلع

4- يؤمن البنك بأن حماية الاقتصاد والعملة الوطنية مسؤولية وطنية ستتعرض به وتتفاعل معه السلطة التنفيذية والقضائية والتشريعية والأحزاب في عموم الجارحة اليمنية.

محاطة معلقنا من الاعتبار

صادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء

EMAIL:ba.depart@centralbank.gov.ye Fax :287814 Tel Operator : 274054 P.O.Box 59 Sana'a Y.R

Statement from the Central Bank under Houthi control regarding the prohibition of trading in the paper currency printed by the government and used for the salaries of some sectors in areas under the group's control.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
Head Office Sana'a

البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء

تعميم صادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني – المركز الرئيسي صنعاء

إلحاقاً بالبيان الصادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني –المركز الرئيسي صنعاء– بتاريخ 2021/6/22م بشأن منع المتعامل أو حيازة أو نقل العملة المزيفة فئة (1000) ريال التي يبدأ رقمها التسلسلي بحرف (أ) والمدون عليها عام 1438هـ – 2017م، واستنادا إلى أحكام القوانين النافذة، ولما تقتضيه المصلحة الوطنية من منع تسرب العملة المزيفة،

فإن البنك المركزي يهيب بجميع المقيمين من المناطق المحتلة إلى مناطق حكومة الإنقاذ الوطني الالتزام بما يلي:

1. عدم نقل العملة المزيفة المشار إليها أعلاه.
2. أن الحد الأعلى المسموح بنقله من العملة اليمنية (القانونية) هو مبلغ (100,000) مائة ألف ريال فقط لكل شخص، ويسمح بنقل أي مبلغ من العملات الأجنبية.

وفي حالة المخالفة ستقوم الجهات المختصة بضبط المخالفين واتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية بشأنهم وفق الحد الأقصى للعقوبات المقررة في قانون مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب والقوانين الأخرى النافذة.

كما يهيب البنك بجميع المواطنين الاتصال على الرقم المجاني (8006800) أو رقم (01274327)، للإبلاغ عن أية مخالفة مما سبق.

علما أن البنك سيقوم بصرف مكافأة بما يعادل نسبة (5%) من المبلغ المضبوط لمن قام بالإبلاغ عن المخالفة.

نأمل من الجميع الالتزام تحقيقاً للمصلحة العامة.

والله الموفق،،

صادر عن البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي – صنعاء
2021/6/27م

صورة لكل من:
- رئيس مجلس الوزراء
- رئيس مجلس القضاء الأعلى
- وزير الداخلية
- رئيس جهاز الأمن والمخابرات
- وزير الصناعة والتجارة
- وزير الإدارة المحلية
- النائب العام
- الغرفة التجارية والصناعية
- جمعية البنوك اليمنية
- جمعية الصرافين اليمنيين

هاتف : 274769 تلكس التحويلة: 274310/18 ص.ب 59 صنعاء – الجمهورية اليمنية
Email :governor@centralbank.gov.ye Fax :274760 Tel Operator : 274310 P.O.Box 59 Sana'a Y.R

A circular from the bank under Houthi control prohibiting the possession or use of 1000 rial banknotes, which has led to economic fragmentation in the country and deprived a significant number of employees in their controlled areas of their salaries.

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
HEAD OFFICE
Sana'a

البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي
صنعاء

Date:
NO : ٤٢٦١

قطاع الرقابة على البنوك
الإدارة العامة للنقد الأجنبة وعلميات المراقبة

التاريخ:
الرقم:

الأخوة/ شركات ومنشآت الصرافة المحترمون

بعد التحية ،،

الموضوع/ العملة المزيفة من فئة ألف ريال (1,000) ريال

بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه، ونرفق لعدكم رقم 4094 بتاريخ 2021/8/17م المتضمنة الإشارة إلى البيان الصادر عن البنك المركزي بتاريخ 2021/6/22م، بشأن منع المتعامل أو حيازة أو نقل العملة المزيفة من فئة (1,000) ريال التي يبدأ رقمها التسلسلي بحرف (أ) والمدون عليها عام (1438هـ - 2017).

وعليه ، نؤكد على ماورد بضرورة إلتزام شركات ومنشآت الصرافة بالتحري عند فحص أوراق العملة فئة ألف ريال فور إستلامها من قبل المتعاملين معها، وتحرير العملات المزيفة، وإبلاغ غرفة العمليات فور تلقيها وذلك على الأرقام التي سبق إعلامكم بها كالتالي:(779240028 – 779240027)

كما نؤكد على ضرورة تحريم العملات المزيفة التي يتم ضبطها دون المساس بالحرف والرقم التسلسلي، وتسليم تلك العملات للمصرح بهم بمحاضر الضبط إلى قطاع العمليات الخارجية في المركز الرئيسي بالبنك المركزي، أو فروع البنك المركزي في المحافظات.

وتقبلوا تحياتنا ،،،

سامي علي الصياغي
وكيل القطاع الرقابة على البنوك

الجمهورية اليمنية- صنعاء تلفون المركزية: 274054 تلكس 297814 ص.ب 59
Republic of Yemen- Sana'a Tel operator:274054 Fax:297814 P.O.Box 59
E-mail:ba.dept@centralbank.gov.ye

The Houthis renew their warning to exchange companies to investigate the currency notes of 1000 rials printed by the government and used for the salaries of employees in liberated areas and some sectors in the areas they control.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
HEAD OFFICE - Sana'a

الجمهورية اليمنية
البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء

وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية
Financial Information Unit

التاريخ: 2021/06/28
الرقم:

عاجل

(تعميم الى جميع منشاءات وشركات الصرافة العاملة في الجمهورية)

الأخ/ المدير العام **المحترم**

تحية طيبة وبعد،

الموضوع/ الحجز على جميع اموال وارصدة بنك التضامن الاسلامي

بالإشارة الى الموضوع أعلاه، والى مذكرة الاخ/ رئيس النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة بالأمانة القاضي/ عبدالله محمد زهرة رقم (3830) بتاريخ 2021/6/27م والمسلمة الينا بتاريخ 2021/6/28م بخصوص الحجز على جميع اموال بنك التضامن الاسلامي المودعة في جميع القطاعات المصرفية.

يتم حجز جميع اموال وارصدة بنك التضامن الاسلامي المودعة لديكم في أي صورة كانت فوراً وموافاتنا بجميع الاموال والارصدة المحجوزة يومنا هذا.

وتقبلوا خالص التحية والتقدير،،

رئيس وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية
وديع محمد السادة

Fax 274113 Tel : 274093 P.O.Box:39[illegible]Sana'a Y.R الجمهورية اليمنية - صنعاء ص . ب 39 فاكس : 274113 تلفون : 274093

Freezing the balances and accounts of the Solidarity Bank as part of targeting private banks and subjecting them to the financial policies of the Houthis.

3 - Retirees' pensions:



The former President Abd-Rabbu Mansur Hadi's directive to disburse retirees' pensions in all governorates, including those under Houthi control.

Republic Of Yemen
The General Authority for Social Security & Pensions
Head office

الجمهورية اليمنية
الهيئة العامة للتأمينات والمعاشات
المركز الرئيسي

No: Date: الرقم: التاريخ:

الأخ/ محافظ البنك المركزي اليمني

المحترم

بعد التحية والتقدير ...

الموضوع/ معاشات المتقاعدين في المحافظات الغير محررة لشهر فبراير 2020م

المحافظات	الثلاثة	الإجمالي	الصيرفة	الإجمالي
	283,640,275	2,061,561,517	20,515,615	2,072,077,132

(2,072,077,132) اثنين مليار واثنين وسبعون مليون وسبعة وسبعون ألف ومئة واثنين وثلاثون ريال يمني ، إلى حساب الهيئة بالبنك المركزي رقم(1001/15150) ، من رصيد الهيئة المعتمد لأعلاه بحسب الكشفة أعلاه ، والذي سيتم الصرف عبر مصرف التضامن بحسب الاتفاقية المبرمة معه.

تحياتي وتقديري لتعاونكم لما فيه الصالح العام

أحمد صالح مقبس
مدير عام الشؤون المالية

طاهر ناصر القدار
رئيس الهيئة

Request to increase the pensions of retirees for the month of February 2020 in all regions of Yemen, including areas under Houthi control, to be paid to the retirees.

Republic Of Yemen
The General Authority for Social Security & Pensions
Head Office

الجمهورية اليمنية
الهيئة العامة للتأمينات والمعاشات
المركز الرئيسي

No: Date :

للمحترم
دولة الأخ الدكتور/ أحمد عبيد بن دغر
رئيس مجلس الوزراء

الموضوع/ معاشات المتقاعدين في المحافظات الغير محررة

تحية طيبة وبعد،

نهديكم تحياتنا بمناسبة أعياد الثورة اليمنية المباركة سبتمبر وأكتوبر المجيدتين ونتمنى لكم التوفيق والنجاح في مهامكم الوطنية الجليلة. ونشير إلى أن معاشات المتقاعدين في المحافظات الغير محررة والذي لم يتم صرف معاشاتهم حتى تاريخه وعددهم (37,955) متقاعد بتكلفة شهرية مبلغ وقدرة (1,636,270,839) واحد مليار وستمائة وستة وثلاثون مليون ومائتين وسبعون ألف وثمانمائة وتسعة وثلاثون ريال يمني. بالإضافة إلى العمولة 1% مبلغ وقدره(16,362,708) ستة عشر وثلاثمائة واثنين وسبعون ألف وسبعمائة وثمانية ريال بإجمالي مبلغ شهري وقدره(1,652,633,547) واحد مليار وستمائة واثنين وخمسون مليون وستمائة وثلاثة وثلاثون ألف وخمسمائة وسبعة وأربعون ريال يمني (مرفق كشف تفصيلي للمحافظة والعدد و التكلفة)

وعليه:

نرجو تكرمكم بالإطلاع والموافقة والتوجيه بصرف معاشات المتقاعدين المتبقين في المحافظات الغير محررة على أن يتم صرفها من أرصدة الهيئة لدى البنك المركزي اليمني والبالغة(772,500,000,000) سبعمائة واثنين وسبعون مليار وخمسمائة مليون ريال يمني وتورد إلى حساب الهيئة العامة للتأمينات والمعاشات بالبنك المركزي (1001/15550) ، مراعاة لظروفهم المعيشية ووضعهم الإنساني.

ولكم خالص تقديرنا ...

نبيل حسن الفقيه
وزير الخدمة المدنية والتأمينات
رئيس مجلس الإدارة

نسخه مع التحية ،
- للاخ رئيس الهيئة
- الملف

A memorandum from the Minister of Civil Service and Insurances, Nabil Al-Faqih, addressed to the Prime Minister, Dr. Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr, regarding the pensions of retirees in areas under Houthi control and the necessity of disbursing them, with instructions to Prime Minister Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr to disburse them.

هيئة تنسيق التحالف المدني
للسلم والمصالحة الوطنية

الرقم: ١٩٩
التاريخ: ٢٠١٨/١١/٢٨م
المرفقات:

بيان هام

تحيتنا في التحالف المدني للسلم والمصالحة الوطنية ونقابة المتقاعدين بمعادة بالغة البيان الصحفي الصادر عن وزارة الخدمة المدنية والهيئة العامة للتأمينات والمعاشات والمتضمن تنفيذ توجيهات رئيس الجمهورية للحكومة بصرف معاشات المتقاعدين ..

وإذ إذ نعبر عن بالغ شكرنا وعميق تقديرنا لهذه الخطوة الكريمة والتصرف المسئول من الحكومة عامة ووزارة الخدمة المدنية والتأمينات بشكل خاص وكذلك الهيئة العامة للتأمينات والمعاشات ، لتؤكد أننا بمعزل عن هذا الوهدف عن المزايدين والوقوفالين من مواقف غير مسؤولة وأغراض ما صدر عن (أحمد محمد العماري ، رئيس ما يعرف بجمعية المتقاعدين . تؤكد أنه لا يمثل النقابة ولا التحالف المدني ولا يمثل المتقاعدين بشكل عام؛ بل يمثل شخص فاعله فقط ..

وإنها لا تهدف إلا لعرقلة جهود وزارة الخدمة المدنية والجهود التنفيذية للهيئة العامة للتأمينات والمعاشات بالمناسبة المؤقتة عدن و العاصمة لصرف معاشات المتقاعدين إبتداءً من يوم غدا الخميس مهيبين بالجميع أن يسموا الأمور بمسمياتها ويوكلون الفضل لأهله موجهين خالص الشكر والتقدير باسم هيئة تنسيق التحالف المدني ونقابة المتقاعدين للأخ رئيس الحكومة د. معين عبد الملك سعيد والأخ وزير الخدمة المدنية الأستاذ نبيل الفقيه ، كما هو الشكر موصول لكل من تعاون وأنجز هذا العمل الكبير //

والله من وراء القصد

صادر عن هيئة تنسيق التحالف المدني
للسلم والمصالحة الوطنية ونقابة المتقاعدين
صنعاء ٢٨ نوفمبر ٢٠١٨م

رئيس نقابة المتقاعدين
يحيى أحمد الشامي

الأمين العام
م. عبدالرحمن الحلقي

رئيس هيئة التنسيق
أ.د. حمود الهوري

A statement issued by the Civil Peace and National Reconciliation Coordination Alliance and the Retirees' Union commends the announcement by the Yemeni government in Aden to disburse pensions to retirees in areas under Houthi control and emphasizes that there are parties in Sana'a who seek to obstruct the disbursement process.



٣٤٤
٢٠١٦/٩/٣ بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

مكتب رئاسة الجمهورية

للعرض على الأخ /رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى **المحترم**

الموضوع طلب الاتحادات و النقابات الممثلة للعمال وأرباب العمل بإيقاف العمل بقانون التأمينات الاجتماعية الصادر من اللجنة الثورية العليا

احيل إلى المكتب الموضوع أعلاه للاطلاع والعرض بالرأي ،وهو ماوجزه بالآتي:

الملخص:

يتمثل الموضوع في الرسالة المقدمة إلى مجلس النواب من الاتحادات والنقابات لممثلي العمال وأرباب العمل والمتضمنة الإشارة إلى وجود العديد من الاعتراضات على مسودة قانون التأمينات الاجتماعية ،والذي على أثره يطالب إصدار توجيهات إلى وزارة الشؤون القانونية بإلغاء أي تدابير وإجراءات لإنفاذ هذا القانون والتوجيه إلى لجنة القوى العاملة بالمجلس بالاجتماع مع القيادات النقابية وممثلي أرباب العمل لسماع ملاحظاتهم على مسودة القانون واستيعاب تلك الملاحظات تمهيداً لعرض المسودة بعد التعديل على المجلس لإصدار ه مرة أخرى.

الملاحظات والرأي:

بداية فإنه على اثر ما سبق وبعد الرجوع إلى الأوليات السابقة الخاصة مع ما تم إيصاله مؤخراً من الاتحادات والنقابات لممثلي العمال وأرباب العمل ، ومن خلال كل ما سبق

Major labor unions in Sana'a refuse to allow the Houthi movement to pass the social insurance project, as per the document issued by the presidency office under Houthi control.

4- Military Effort:



الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة الإدارة المحلية
محافظة صنعاء
مكتب المحافظ

الرقم:
التاريخ:
المرفقات:

الاخ/ مدير عام مكتب المالية م/صنعـــــاء المحترم
الاخ/ مدير عام مكتب الخدمة المدنية م/صنعاء المحترم

بناءً على قرار الإجتماع الإستثنائي للمكتب التنفيذي بالمحافظة المنعقد بتاريخ ١٦/٨/٢٠١٥م القاضي/بخصم قسط على كافة موظفي الأجهزة التنفيذية بالمحافظة لصالح المجهود الحربي.
وعليه :- يتم العمل بموجبه وإستكمال إجراءات الخصم من مرتبات شهر نوفمبر/٢٠١٥م والمؤجل من شهر أغسطس/٢٠١٥م بالتنسيق مع اللجنة المالية وقطع شيك بالمبلغ المخصوم عبر أمين صندوق الجهة التابعة لكم لأستلام المبلغ من البنك وتسليمها الى اللجنة التالية بالمحافظة وسيتم اخلاء عهدته بموجب سند رسمي من اللجنة المالية بالمحافظة.

وتقبلوا تحياتي

العميد/ حسين محمد كعيش
محافظ محافظة صنعاء
رئيس المجلس المحلي

The Houthis deducted a portion of government employees' salaries for the so-called war effort in 2015 before later suspending it completely.

محمد المقالح -الحكيم
@Malmakaleh1

مليارات المليارات اخذها الولي باسم المجهود الحربي ولم يصل للمجهود الحربي سوى 20% بل اقل

Translate from Arabic
12/29/17, 4:47 AM

Testimony of Houthi leader Mohammed Al-Maqalih (a member of the Houthi Supreme Revolutionary Committee) regarding the looting of his group's war effort funds.

Most of the funds from what is known as the war effort go towards enriching Houthi leaders, according to the testimony of Houthi leader Mohammed Al-Maqalih.

مخرجات الاجتماع الموسع

بناء على مخرجات الاجتماع الموسع للاخوة مشايخ وأمناء وعقال واعضاء المجلس المحلي وشخصيات اجتما

٢٠١٦/٨/٢٩م بخصوص ما يلي :-

١- توعية المواطنين لعدم الانخراط في صفوف العدوان الغاشم وإبلاغهم بانه من انخراط في صفوف العدوا
منه براء وأهله وماله .

٢- منع المواطنين من اطلاق الاعيرة النارية في الاعراس منعا باتا ومن خالف يتحمل المخالف غرامة خمسو
حبس لمدة شهر و منع مكبرات الصوت في حفلات ومخيمات النساء .

٣- توعية والزام المواطنين بضرورة المشاركة في الدعم المجهود الحربي بالمال والرجال .

٤- من اراد من المنخرطين في صفوف الاعداء العودة الى اهله وبلده تعلى المذكورين ان يعود مواطنين صالحين د

٥- الالتزام بتوعية المجتمع بخطورة المرحلة والدعاء على العدوان ومن ناصرة في الخطب والمحاضرات .

وعليه :

يتم التنفيذ بما ورد في الاجتماع الموسع .

تم ابلاغكم بذلك وعليكم التنفيذ دون تقصير ولا عذر لمن تجاهل التعميم لما فيه الصالح العام .

والله يرعاكم ....

مدير فرع الاوقاف

الاستاذ/ أحمد سعد

مدير عام المديرية

The Houthis imposed on the dignitaries and leaders of the Al-Khabt district in Al-Mahweet governorate to compel citizens to donate to the war effort, as per the third point in the document, and this is what they have done in other areas under their control.

5 - Raising Tax and Zakat Fees and Establishing New Customs Centers.



فخامة المشير / مهدي محمد الشاط
رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى

تحية طيبة وبعد:

الموضوع : التعميم على جميع وحدات الخدمة العامة والقطاعين العام والمختلط باعتماد البطاقة الزكوية كشرط أساسي لتسجيل أو منح أي تراخيص

إشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه .... نود الإحاطة بأننا قمنا بمخاطبة جميع الوزارات والهيئات والمصالح الحكومية ووحدات القطاع العام والمختلط بشأن إعتماد البطاقة الزكوية كشرط أساسي لتسجيل أو منح أي تراخيص لو تجديدها أو إبرام عقود مقاولة ونحوها تنفيذاً لنص المادة (٤٦ مكرر) الفقرة (أ) من قانون الزكاة رقم (٢) لسنة ١٩٩٩م وتعديله، ولم نلحظ أ تجاوب ملموس منهم

وعليه:

يرجى الاطلاع والتوجيه بمخاطبة تلك الجهات والزامها بتنفيذ أحكام القانون .

شاكرين تعاونكم خدمة لأركان الثالث من أركان الإسلام،،،

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتنا..

شمسان محسن أبو نشطان
رئيس المجلس الأعلى للزكاة

Houthi measures in all government institutions to collect as much money as possible under the banner of zakat.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
Ministry of Public Health & Population
Minister

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة الصحة العامة والسكان
الوزير

Date :
Ref :

المحترمين
الاخوة / رؤساء هيئات المستشفيات العامة
الاخوة / مدراء عموم مكاتب الصحة العامة والسكان في المحافظات
الاخوة / مدراء عموم الإدارات بالوزارة
الاخوة / مدراء المراكز التخصصية التابعة للوزارة
الاخوة / مدراء عموم ومدراء المستشفيات

تحية طيبة وبعد،،،

الموضوع : اعتماد البطاقة الزكوية الالكترونية كبند أساسي في انجاز كل الاجراءات ذات الصلة به يكم .

بالإشارة للموضوع أعلاه، وبناءً على قانون الزكاة رقم (٢) لسنة ١٩٩٩ م وتعديله، وتوجيهات فخامة رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى ودولة رئيس مجلس بتم الالتزام بالتالي:

- اعتماد البطاقة الزكوية الالكترونية مجدداً بتاريخ كبند أساسي في إجراءات سير المعاملات ذات الصلة لديكم مثلما تم تسجيل أو منح أي تراخيص أو تجديدها أو إبرام عقود مقاولات أو نحوه.
- عدم اعتماد أي معاملات استلام / مستخلصات مجاملة / مذكرات / بطاقة زكوية مكتوبة .. الخ مستقبلاً من البطاقات الزكوية الإلكترونية.
- إبراز البطاقة الزكوية الأصل من قبل مقدم المعاملة لديكم من أجل مطابقتها والتأكد من تاريخ البطاقة قبل البدء في العمل وكذلك التأكد من الاسم التجاري بأنه نفس الاسم التجاري للمعاملات المقدمة.

ونحملكم المسئولية في حال التقصير أو عدم الالتزام بتنفيذ ما تحقق عمله.

وتقبلوا وافر التقدير والإحترام،،،

أ.د. عبد الله أحمد المتوكل
وزير الصحة العامة والسكان

2 8 MAY 221

www.moh.gov.ye- ٢٥٢٢٤٧-٢٥١٦١٠ ص.ب ٢٩٩ صنعاء- ٢٥٢٢٤٧-٢٥١٦١٠ تلفون
Tel: 252215-252193 Fax: 251610-252247 P.O.Box: 299 Sana'a - www.moh.gov.ye

Houthi measures in all government institutions to collect as much money as possible under the banner of zakat.

الموضوع / البطاقة الزكوية الالكترونية

A memorandum issued by the Houthi Zakat Authority to the Ministry of Health, instructing the linkage of transactions for healthcare institutions with zakat cards to collect the maximum amount of money, contributing to the increase in healthcare service prices provided to citizens.

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة الإدارة المحلية
محافظة المحويت
مكتب المحافظة

الموضوع / تقرير وتحصيل زكاة الحبوب الصيفي موسم ٢٠١٩م

Sending representatives to collect grain zakat in Al-Mahweet Governorate.

الغرفة التجارية الصناعية
Chamber of Commerce and industry

الأخوة/ رجال المال والأعمال المحترمين

الموضوع: دعوة عامة لمؤتمر صحفي لعرض تداعيات الإجراءات التعسفية الأخيرة لهيئة العامة للزكاة

تهديكم الغرفة التجارية الصناعية بأمانة العاصمة صنعاء أطيب تحياتها وخير مبارك وكل عام وانتم بخير...

بالإشارة الى الموضوع أعلاه، ونظراً لما يتعرض له القطاع الخاص من إجراءات تعسفية من الجهة العامة للزكاة والمتمثلة في النزول الميداني بالأطقم المسلحة والأمن والمخابرات لمطالبة القطاع الخاص بتسليم قاعدة البيانات أو إغلاق محلاتهم مع العلم بأن الأغلب مستدين ما عليهم من زكاة وملتزمون بالنظام والقانون مما سبب عليهم ضرراً كبيراً بسبب إغلاق لمحلاتهم.

وبناءً على ما سبق فإن الغرفة التجارية الصناعية بأمانة العاصمة صنعاء واتحادها العام يستنكران تلك الإجراءات التعسفية المخالفة لأحكام الشريعة الإسلامية الغراء والمخالفة للقوانين، وتدعو كافة شرائح القطاع الخاص لحضور المؤتمر الصحفي الطارئ الذي تقيمه الغرفة بحضور وسائل الإعلام المختلفة والذي سيعقد بمقر الغرفة الكائن بحي عصر جوار المؤسسة اليمنية لمكافحة السرطان

يوم عدد الأثنين الموافق 2021/4/19م الساعة الواحدة ظهراً.

لذا وللأهمية البالغة فإننا ندعوكم للحضور والمشاركة في المؤتمر بحسب الموعد المحدد أعلاه.

وتقبلوا وافر التقدير...

الغرفة التجارية الصناعية بأمانة العاصمة - صنعاء

The Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Sana'a issued a press statement condemning what it described as arbitrary measures against the private sector by the Houthi General Authority for Zakat.

بيان هام بشأن الإجراءات التعسفية لمصلحة الجمارك

وقد الاجتماع الموسع لتجار أمانة العاصمة صنعاء الذي انعقد يومنا هذا الخميس الموافق ٢٠١٧/٢/٢٣م في مقر الغرفة التجارية الصناعية بأمانة العاصمة أمام الإجراءات غير الدستورية التي تعرضها مصلحة الجمارك على تجار أمانة العاصمة في مداخل مدينة صنعاء.

وناقش المجتمعون ما تكوم به المصلحة من إلغاء وتخطيب لجميع الإجراءات والتعاملات الجمركية التي يتم استيفاؤها في المنافذ البحرية والبرية للجمهورية واستبدالها بإجراءات جديدة في مداخل أمانة العاصمة، بحيث لايتم احتساب أي إجراءات أو معاملات جمركية تتم بها موظفو الجمارك في الدوائر الجمركية للموانئ البحرية والمنافذ البرية للجمهورية.

إن المجتمعين يرون ويستنكرون هذه الإجراءات الجنونية ويرفضونها جملة وتفصيلا، ويبوأهمونها بالطرق القانونية والدستورية إذ أن الموانئ البحرية والبرية ومايترتبها الجمركية هي العمل والمكان الوحيد قانونا لتنفيذ جميع الإجراءات الجمركية، بما فيها المعاينة واستيفاء الرسوم القانونية المفروضة على السلع التجارية ، وتضيع إعادة أي إجراء أو معاملة جمركية أو استيفاء رسوم جمركية أخرى خارج حرم الدوائر الجمركية في الموانئ البحرية والمنافذ البرية.

إن ما تقوم به مصلحة الجمارك ما هو إلا ابتزاز وجبايه مرفوضة شرعا وقانونا، خاصة في ظل هذه الظروف التي تمر بها بلادنا، وما يتكبده التجار من مشاق ومخاطر لتوفير السلع الضرورية واحتياجات المواطنين ، وفي ظل انعدام شبه كامل لمتطلبات الأمن والسلامة في أغلب المناطق الحيوية بالجمهورية، بسبب الحرب والعدوان واستهداف المنشآت.

فبدلا من أن تكوم الدولة بمواساة أبناء القطاع التجاري والصناعي وتشجيعهم على الاستمرار في مواجهة العدوان والحصار، إذا بمصلحة الجمارك تجازي صمود التجار ومبرهم بإجراءات جنونية وجبايات كبيرة وغير شرعية في كل مدينة وكل نقطة، وإلتزامي في إجراءاتها الهمستورية أبسط المتطلبات الدستورية والقانونية، بحجة رفد خزينة الدولة بالأموال ولو كان ذلك بوسيلة غير مشروعة.

إن القطاع الخاص هو الحلقة الأخيرة في صمود هذا الشعب المغلوب على أمره، بعد تشمل القطاع العام للدولة عن الإيفاء بأبسط المتطلبات كالمرتبات وإعاشات المتقاعدين، في ظل تكالب الأشقاء والأصدقاء، على بلادنا، ووجود انقسام اجتماعي حاد لم تشهد له اليمن مثيلا.

إننا ننتقد رئيس وأعضاء المجلس السياسي الأعلى ورئيس مجلس الوزراء ونحمل عليهم إيقاف جنون وعبث مصلحة الجمارك، لأن أعمالهم ستكون وخيمة على المجتمع بأكمله في حال توقف القطاع الخاص عن العمل، أو تم استحداثه إلى مناطق أخرى تتواطئ فيها بعض مكومات الهيئة الاستثمارية العامة.

كما ننتقد رئيس وأعضاء مجلس النواب ورئيس وأعضاء هيئة مكافحة الفساد والجهاز المركزي للرقابة والمحاسبة وجميع الأجهزة الرقابية والقضائية للقيام بواجبهم الدستوري والقانوني من أجل إيقاف الإجراءات الخاطئة لمصلحة الجمارك ، وإلزامها بالتقيد بنصوص قانون الجمارك النافذ وعدم استحداث أية إجراءات غير مستوفاة يمكن أن تكرس (الإفشال) واقعا معاشا على الأرض .

إن المجتمعين يأملون في إيقاف عبث المصلحة خلال الأيام القليلة القادمة ، وسيكونون في حالة اجتماع دائم حتى إنهاء الموضوع كما سيتخذ المجتمعون خلال الأسبوع القادم الخيارات المطروحة أمامهم في حال تكرر حل هذه الإشكالية .

ويحمل المجتمعون مصلحة الجمارك كامل المسئولية القانونية عن الأضرار والخسائر التي يتعرض لها القطاع الخاص بسبب الإجراءات المخالفة للدستور والقوانين النافذة، كما يحملونها مسئولية التداعيات والنتائج الكارثية الناتجة عن ذلك.

والله غالب على أمره ،،،

صادر عن الغرفة التجارية الصناعية بأمانة العاصمة
(الاجتماع الموسع لتجار أمانة العاصمة صنعاء)
الخميس الموافق ٢٠١٧/٢/٢٣

Statement from the Federation of Yemen Chambers of Commerce and Industry regarding the extortion of customs in areas under Houthi control and the imposition of unjust taxes everywhere and at checkpoints, with negative repercussions on society.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
MINISTRY OF FINANCE
YEMEN CUSTOMS

مركز جبل راس الجمركي

اعلان هام

الاخوة / مكاتب التخليص الجمركي المحترمون
الاخوة / الممثلين ومفوضي التجار والمستوردين المحترمون
بعد التحية :

الموضوع - رفع نسبة الاستيفاء من 30٪الى 50٪

بالإشارة الى الموضوع اعلاه واعتباراً من يوم غد الأثنين الموافق ٢٠٢١/٣/١٥م سيتم رفع نسبة الاستيفاء على السلع الواصلة عبر ميناء عدن من ٣٠٪ الى ٥٠٪ على جميع السلع المشورة عبر ميناء عدن بأستثناء السلع التالية فقط :-

(١- الدقيق ٢- الذرة ٣- السكر ٤- الحليب ٥- الادوية ٦- زيت الطبخ ٧ - الاجبان ٨- التونة ٩- الفاصوليا ١٠- البازليا ١١- العدل ١٢ الذنور ١٣- الحمول ١٤- المواد النانم).

ويقية السلع سيتم الاستيفاء بنسبة 50٪

هذا للعلم والاحاطة

والله الموفق...

إدارة مركز جبل راس الجمركي

The Ras Al-Jamri Customs Center, under Houthi control, raised customs fees on essential foodstuffs and medicines coming through the port of Aden, contributing to price increases for these goods and worsening the suffering of Yemenis.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
Civil Aviation & Meteorology Authority
SANA'A

الجمهورية اليمنية
الهيئة العامة للطيران المدني والأرصاد
صنعاء

Date :
Ref :
File :

التاريخ : 7/6/2022
المرافق : لا يوجد
المرجع : ا ب ي / الأمر السامية

أمر حكومي رقم (2) لعام 2022 م
بشأن رسوم خدمة السفر

- استنادا إلى احكام قانون الطيران المدني رقم 13 لسنة 1993م وتعديلاته.
- وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم 444 لسنة 2000م بشأن إنشاء الهيئة العامة للطيران المدني والأرصاد.
- وبناء على التقرير المقدم من الادارة العامة للنقل الجوي لحماية مستهلكي خدمات النقل الجوي.
- و ذا للتقتضيه مصلحة العمل و خرصا من الهيئة على ضبط و مراقبة سوق النقل الجوي في بلادنا.

قـــــرر

مادة (١):
- يتم احتساد و رسوم خدمة سفر لوكالات السفريات بما لا يزيد عن 5 ٪ من القيمة الاجمالية لأي سيحات تذاكر لرحلي خدمات يقوم بها الوكلاء لصهور المسافرين

مادة (٢):
- فيما يخص الخدمات التي لا تتجاوز مائتين دولار يتم احتساد رسوم خدمة لا تتجاوز مبلغ عشرة دولار فقط عن كل خدمة.

مادة (٣):
- على كافة الوكلاء الالتزام بالتسعير اعلاه وعدم مخالفة المسافرين بأي مبالغ اضافية التلف هذا الأمر المكوس و سيتم اتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية اللازمة حيال المخالفين.

مادة (٤):
- يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وعلى كافة الجهات المعنية الالتزام به.

والله الموفـــــق...

د. مازن أحمد غانم
مدير عام النقل الجوي

م. محمد عبدالرحمن عبدالقادر
رئيس مجلس الإدارة

صدر برئاسة الهيئة بتاريخ 7/6/2022م

برقيا : سيفيليه – تلفون : ٢٧٤١١٨ / ٢٧٤١١٩ – تلكس : ٢٧٤١٩ – فاكس ٢٧٤١٢١
P.O.Box : 1042 - Telex 2324 - Tel : 272618 / 272619 - Cable (CIVILAIR) - Fax 274120

The decision to impose additional fees on travel agencies in Houthi-controlled areas has led to increased travel costs for passengers.

الجمهورية اليمنية
رئاسة الجمهورية
الهيئة العامة للزكاة

الرقم: ٤٣٩
التاريخ: ٢٠١٩/٩/٦
المواقف:
المرفقات:

كتاب دوري رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٩م
بشأن سعر زكاة الفطرة للعام ١٤٤٠هـ

الاخوة/ مدراء عموم مكاتب الهيئة العامة للزكاة بالأمانة والمحافظات المحترمون

بعد التحية:-

استناداً إلى أحكام الشريعة الإسلامية الغراء، وتنفيذاً لنص المادة (٢١) من دستور الجمهورية اليمنية، وتنفيذاً لأحكام القانون رقم (٢) لسنة ١٩٩٩ بشأن الزكاة ونظراً لدخول شهر رمضان المبارك وما يحتاج من تقرير وتحصيل زكاة الفطرة من جميع سكان الجمهورية اليمنية، الواجب عليهم أداء هذه الزكاة وفقاً لأحكام الشريعة الإسلامية فإن الهيئة العامة للزكاة تحدد سعر زكاة الفطرة لهذا العام ١٤٤٠هـ للشخص بمبلغ (٥٠٠) ريال بناءً على أسعار الحبوب و استناداً إلى فتوى مفتي الديار اليمنية المرفق لكم صورة منها.

وعلى أن يتم اتفاق الآتي:

- الهيئة مراقبة تطبيق زيادة في مقدار أصول وإيرادات وعاء زكاة الفطرة من خلال إلزام كافة المكاتب التنفيذية وشركات القطاع العام والمختلط في الأمانة والمحافظات بخصم زكاة الفطرة على الموظفين ومن يعولون، وذلك من الراتب للشهر الذي يتم صرفه خلال أو نهاية شهر رمضان الكريم كون ما يتم خصمة من بعض الجهات في الأعوام السابقة على الموظف فقط وترك من يعول.
- إلزام المخصصين في مكاتب الهيئة العامة للزكاة بسرعة تحديد أحياء المكلفين لزكاة الفطرة لجميع الموظفين في جميع المكاتب التنفيذية والقطاع العام وواقع كشوفات الراتب وتحديد العدد للمكلف ومن يعولة فيرين كل اسم بالتعاون مع المختصين في الموارد البشرية لكل جهة على حدة، وتكون هذه الكشوفات بمثابة قاعدة بيانات عن الموظفين المكلفين بدفع زكاة الفطرة للاحتفاظ بها ومراجعتها سنوياً مع التحديث لها من عام لآخر. وبتم خصم الزكاة المستحقة وفقاً لنسعر المحدد.
- على جميع مكاتب الهيئة العامة للزكاة وفروعها في المحافظات والمديريات الاهتمام الجاد بمتابعة تحصيل زكاة الفطرة من جميع المكلفين وإلزام الأسماء والأحياء بتسديد إقرارات زكاة الفطرة وتحصيل زكاة الفطرة من جميع المكلفين خلال الشهر الكريم، وتسليمها دون تأخير وفق السعر المحدد.

وتقبلوا خالص التحية...

❖ مرفق لكم صورة من الفتوى الشرعية.

رئيس الهيئة العامة للزكاة
شمسان محسن أبو نشطان

صورة مع التحية لـ:
- رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى.
- مكتب رئاسة الجمهورية.
- رئيس مجلس الوزراء.
- رئيس الجهاز المركزي للرقابة والمحاسبة.
- ديوان المحاسبة.

A memorandum from the Houthi Zakat Authority addressed to its representatives in the governorates, instructing them to deduct zakat from the salaries of government employees who have received only half their salaries every six months for years.

الجمهورية اليمنية
رئاسة الجمهورية
الهيئة العامة للزكاة
مكتب الهيئة العامة للزكاة وتعمد
فرع مديرية مدينة ذمار

الصحة العامة للزكاة
صادر برقم (٥٩٦)
بتاريخ ٨٣ /٨/ 1443هـ
الموافق ٢٠٢٢/٨/٨م
المرفقات:

الأخوة/ مدارس [redacted] المحترمون

تحية طيبة وبعد

نأمل حضوركم الى مكتب الهيئة العامة للزكاة بمديرية مدينة ذمار وذلك لتسديد الزكاة المستحقة عليكم شرعاً وبواقع الف ريال على كل طالب، بسبب الكشوفات المسلمه لنا من مكتب التربية والتعليم.

آملين سرعة تجاوبكم لأداء فريضة الزكاة.

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتنا،،،

مدير فرع مديرية مدينة ذمار

مجاهد علي حسن السماوي

مكتب الهيئة العامة للزكاة فرع مديرية مدينة ذمار - هاتف 06509187

Most countries rely on taxing private institutions to provide services to citizens. However, the Houthi group imposes taxes and various other forms of administrative and religious levies, including zakat, without providing any services in return. This directive requires private schools to pay a zakat of one thousand rials for each student.

6- Manufactured Fuel Crises and the Black Market:



The various returns and percentages that the Houthis gain from the fuel trade compared to the purchase price paid by citizens - Source: The Economic Committee.



The document attached to the article by the journalist Mohammed Al-Absi confirms that the Houthis impose a siege on the Yemenis, depriving them of fuel, and after the publication of this document, the journalist was assassinated with poison.

Some of the Houthi companies carry out smuggling operations of weapons and other prohibited items, as reported by the Recovery Initiative.

A document confirming that fuel ships remain submerged in the ports of Hodeidah and Al-Salif for months without the Houthi-controlled oil company unloading them into the company's tanks, despite the suffering of the citizens due to the lack of fuel. The goal is to exacerbate the humanitarian situation, aiding them in achieving political and military objectives.



The network of Houthi traders who bring fuel through the port of Hodeidah, as per the report by the Security Council's experts in 2019.

7 – Gas: A black market and political and military exploitation:

In 2017, Ahmed Ali Mohsen Al-Ahwal, the governor of Al-Mahweet province under Houthi control, condemned the disappearance of the province's share of gas, despite it being sent from Marib and reaching Houthi-controlled areas.

The official pricing of a gas cylinder in Yemen's government-controlled areas in 2021 is sent to Houthi-controlled areas at the same price. However, they sell it to citizens at the black-market price.

بسيم جناني
٦ يوليو ٢٠١٩ ·

#الجناني

في اليمين صورة صباح اليوم لمئات المركبات أمام إحدى محطات الغاز في شارع الستين بالحديدة تنتظر منذ أسبوعين الحصول على غاز . وفي الصورة الأخرى كشف بحركة ميناء الحديدة ويظهر وصول ناقلة غاز يوم الأسبوع الماضي وقامت بتفريغ مايقارب 5 الف طن . تبخرت الناقلة واليوم من أراد الحصول على غاز يحصل عليه في السوق السوداء بثمانية الف ريال للدبة.

#عيال_السوق_السوداء
#الصوص_المسيرة

According to the disclosure of ship movements in the Hodeidah port under Houthi control, gas arrives in the city but is not distributed to the residents, despite their severe suffering due to its unavailability.

الجمهورية اليمنية
مؤسسة موانئ البحر الأحمر اليمنية
المركز الرئيسي – ميناء الحديدة
العمليات البحرية /إدارة الحركة الملاحية

صفحة : ١

نظام المؤسسة الآلي

كشف حركة السفن ليوم:- الجمعة الموافق ٢٠٢٢/٠٣/١١ م

السفن الراسية على الأرصفة

رقم الرحلة	اسم السفينة	الطول	الغاطس	وقت وتاريخ الوصول	وقت وتاريخ الرسو	رقم الرصيف	نوع البضاعة	كمية البضاعة	الوكيل الملاحي	التشات المساعدة	المرشد
٢٢٠٠٢٨	MASSA G	١٧٠	٧,٥ ٥,٨٢	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٥ ١٠٢٠	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٩ ١٠٢٠	٢	دقيق	١٤٠٠٠	الشركه العالميه للملاحه	٢٢ مايو الطير	.حسن هاشم
٢٢٠٠٢٤	INCE MARMARA	٢٠٠	٨,٥٥ ٨,٤٥	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٣ ٠٣٢٠	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٥ ١٢٥٠	٤	قمح	٣٠٠٠٠	شركة الشرق الاوسط للملاحه	٢٢ مايو الطير	.عبدالله شاوه
٢٢٠٠٣٠	AYAT	١٦٩	٩,٧ ٩,٢٥	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٣ ٠٦٥٥	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٣ ١٤٢٠	٥	رز	٢٥٢٤٥	شركة الشرق الاوسط للملاحه	٢٢ مايو الطير	حسن هاشم
٢٢٠٠٣٥	CAPTAIN ADAM-1	١٠٣	٧,٦٥ ٧,٢٥	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٥ ٠٠١٥	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٨ ١٣٠٠	٧	دقيق+شحن نخالة	٧٠٠٠	عالم البحار للخدمات الاوبستية و	٢٢ مايو الطير	.عبدالله شاوه
٢٢٠٠٢٩	RINA	١٠٦	٦,٧ ٥,٦	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٣ ٢٢٠٠	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٨ ١٢٠٥	٨	دقيق + شحن نخالة	٥١٠٦	شركة سباء العالميه	٢٢ مايو الطير	احمد عايض
٢٢٠٠٠١	GAS ENERGY	١٥٥	٨,٥ ٨,٣	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٢ ٠٠١٨	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٢ ١٥١٠	محروقات-٢	غاز	٩٤٨٨	شركة المتنبأ للملاحة	٢٢ مايو الطير فيبر	.عبدالله شاوه

السفن المنتظرة في الغاطس للرسو

رقم الرحلة	اسم السفينة	الطول	الغاطس	وقت وتاريخ الوصول	نوع البضاعة	كمية البضاعة	الوكيل الملاحي	ملاحظات

السفن المتوقع وصولها

رقم الرحلة	اسم السفينة	الطول	تاريخ توقع الوصول	نوع البضاعة	كمية البضاعة	الوكيل الملاحي
٢١٠٠٠٥	PRINCESS KHADIJA	١٨٣	٢٠٢١/١٢/١٥	ديزل + مازوت	١٣٩٧٠٤١٥٩٥٣	شركة سباء العالميه
٢٢٠٠٠٢	IPLENDOUR SAPPHIR	١٨٣	٢٠٢٢/٠١/١٠	مازوت	٢٤١٩٠	شركة سباء العالميه
٢٢٠٠١٨	UHUD	١٨٠	٢٠٢٢/٠١/٣٠	ديزل	٢٩٩١٥	ويل بالس للخدمات الملاح
٢٢٠٠٢٢	TEAM TOMBI	١٧٨	٢٠٢٢/٠٢/١٣	قمح	٢٩٩٦٠	الشركه العالميه للملاحه
٢٢٠٠٢٣	BOLD EXPLORER	٦٩	٢٠٢٢/٠٢/٢٣	تقوع مرتفعين	مسح بحري	شركة وكلاء الخليج للملاحة
٢٢٠٠٣١	AMIRA SOPHIE	١٧٠	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٧	ذره+صويا	٢٥١٥٠	شركة القاسم للملاحه
٢٢٠٠٣٢	INCE PACIFIC	١٨٦	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٩	قمح	٣١٠٠٠	شركة القاسم للملاحه
٢٢٠٠٣٣	BEEK -6	١١٠	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٣	رز	٥٧٥٨	أبركة الشرق الاوسط للملاح
٢٢٠٠٣٤	CAESAR	١٧٦	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٣	بقول	٣٤٣٠٠	ويل بالس للخدمات الملاح
٢٢٠٠٣٧	DENIZ-M	١٨٠	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/١٤	ذرة+صويا	٢٨٦٦٤	الرواد للملاحة المحدودة

السفن المنتظرة بالغاطس بعد التفريغ على الأرصفة

رقم الرحلة	اسم السفينة	الوكيل الملاحي	وقت وتاريخ الخروج	سبب الانتظار بالغاطس بعد التفريغ
١٥٠٠٦٨	STAR LET	بركة عبر البحار للملاحه	٢٠١٥/٠٢/١٢ ٠١٣٠	محجوزة من قبل المحكمة التجارية
٢٢٠٠٢٦	EF ELENA	الشركه العالميه للملاحه	٢٠٢٢/٠٣/٠٢ ١٠٠٠	منتظرة التعليمات

TIMES & HEIGH OF HIGH & LOW WATER

DATE	١١/٠٣/٢٠٢٢		DATE	١٢/٠٣/٢٠٢٢	
Heig	Time	Tide	Heig	Time	Tide
L.W	٠١٣٦	٠,٤	L.W	٠١٣٦	٠,٤
H.W	٠٨٣٣	٠,٧	H.W	٠٨٣٣	٠,٧
L.W	١٤٢٠	٠,٥	L.W	١٤٢٠	٠,٥
H.W	٢٠٥٣	٠,٨	H.W	٢٠٥٣	٠,٨

A document published by the journalist Basim Jnani confirms the arrival of a gas carrier belonging to the Houthi leader Abdullah Al-Wazeer. However, it was not distributed despite the shortage of gas, and instead, it was sold at high prices near the month of Ramadan.



Linking the sale of essential gas commodities to citizens with the payment of Zakat to the Houthis.

8- Electricity Black Market:



الجمهورية اليمنية
مؤسسة موانئ البحر الأحمر اليمنية
المركز الرئيسي – ميناء الحديدة
الخدمات البحرية / الحركة الملاحية

صفحة : ١

نظام المؤسسة الآلـــي

كشف حركة السفن ليوم:- السبت الموافق ٢٠١٨/٠٢/٠٣ م

السفن الراسية على الأرصفة

رقم الرحلة	اسم السفينة	الطـــول	الغاطس	وقت وتاريخ الوصول	وقت وتاريخ الرسو	رقم الرصيف	نوع البضاعة	كمية البضاعة	الوكيل الملاحي	المناشف المساعدة	المرشـــــد
١٨٠٠٠٠٢٢	LANARK	١٥٢	٨,٩ ٨,٩	٢٠١٨/٠١/٢٣ ٠٣٠٠	٢٠١٨/٠١/٢٩ ١٨٢٥	٢-١	دبزل	١٤٣١٢	شركة شرق الاوسط للملاحه	٢٢ مايو حجة	عبدالجبارشايف
١٨٠٠٠٠٢٨	CASPER	١٠٦	٧,٤٥ ٧,٤٥	٢٠١٨/٠١/٣٠ ٠٤٤٥	٢٠١٨/٠٢/٠٢ ١٤٥٠	٣-٢	مازوت	٧٩٩٠	شركة المستنبد للملاحة	ابوطي الطير	خالد عبدالمغني
١٧٠٠٠٣١٨	SEA MERAY	١٨٠	٨ ٥,٣	٢٠١٨/٠١/٢٩ ١٩٤٢	٢٠١٨/٠١/٣٠ ٠٩٥٥	٥-٤	ذره+صويا	١٩٥٠٣	شركة القاسم للملاحه	٢٢ مايو حجة	منير الجنداري
١٨٠٠٠٠١٩	ALKAMAL2	٣٦	٢ ١,٥	٢٠١٨/٠١/٢١ ٢٢٠٠	٢٠١٨/٠١/٢١ ٢٠٣٥	٧	علاجات	٢٢٠	وكالة الأفوين		
١٨٠٠٠٠١٤	OMNIYAH	٩٤	٦ ٦,٠٧	٢٠١٨/٠١/٢٥ ١٨٠٠	٢٠١٨/٠١/٢٥ ١٨٣٥	٨	دقيق	٤٣٠٠	شركة سبأ للملاحه	ابوطي الطير	منير الجنداري
١٨٠٠٠٠١٦	TOTEEL	١٠٦	٥,٨ ٦,٨	٢٠١٨/٠١/٢٦ ٠٨٠٥	٢٠١٨/٠٢/٠٢ ١٠٣٠	محروقات-١	دبزل	٤٣٤٥	شركة الشرق الاوسط للملاحه	ابوطي حجة قبير	عبد الله شاوة
١٨٠٠٠٠١٨	NUSHI NALINI	١٤٥	٨,٨ ٨,٨	٢٠١٨/٠١/٢٢ ٢١٢٤	٢٠١٨/٠١/٢٨ ١٨٠٠	محروقات-٢	دبزل	١٤٥١٢	شركة المستنبد للملاحة	٢٢ مايو الطير قبير	منير الجنداري

السفن المنتظرة في الغاطس للرســـــو

رقم الرحلة	اسم السفينة	الطول	الغاطس	وقت وتاريخ الوصول	نوع البضاعة	كمية البضاعة	الوكيل الملاحي	مـــــلاحظـــــات
١٨٠٠٠٠١٧	SEA POWER	١٢٩	٨ ٨	٢٠١٨/٠١/٢٢ ٠٦٤٢	بترول	٩٩٤٨	شركة البكاري للملاحه	
١٨٠٠٠٠٢٣	VOLANTE	١٥٠	٨,٣٥ ٨,٣٥	٢٠١٨/٠١/٢٦ ٠٢٥٤	بترول	١٤٨٠٦	شركة إنجاز للملاحة والشحن والتفـ	
١٨٠٠٠٠٢١	VALE	١٥٠	٨,٤٥ ٨,٤٥	٢٠١٨/٠١/٢٧ ٠٦٣٦	بترول	١٤٩٩٣	شركة البكاري للملاحه	
١٨٠٠٠٠٢٤	LADY SARA	١٢٢	٥,٨ ٦,٩	٢٠١٨/٠١/٢٨ ١١٣٦	بترول	٤٧٦٥	شركة إنجاز للملاحة والشحن والتفـ	
١٨٠٠٠٠١٧	LIANA	١٢٣	٧,٣ ٧,٣	٢٠١٨/٠١/٢٩ ١٠٣٠	بترول	٧٨٩٤	الشركه العالميه للملاحه	
١٨٠٠٠٠٢٩	BAHIA DAMAS	١٧٥	٩,٤ ٩,٤	٢٠١٨/٠٢/٠١ ١١٠٠	دبزل/بترول	١٢٩٩٥/١٢٩٢١	شركة البكاري للملاحه	

السفن المتوقـــــع وصولها

رقم الرحلة	اسم السفينة	الطول	تاريخ توقع الوصول	نوع البضاعة	كمية البضاعة	الوكيل الملاحي
١٨٠٠٠٠٢٥	EKRAM	١٠٦	٢٠١٨/٠١/٢٧	دقيق+شحن نخالة	٣٥٠٠/٤٥٠٠٠	شركة سبأ للملاحه
١٨٠٠٠٠٣٠	NAVIGATOR-M	١٠٠	٢٠١٨/٠٢/٠٤	سكر	٥٨١٦	شركة سباء العالميه

السفن المنتظـــــرة بالغاطس بعد التفريغ على الأرصفـــــة

رقم الرحلة	اسم السفينة	الوكيل الملاحي	وقت وتأريخ الخروج	سبب الانتظار بالغاطس بعد التفريغ
١١٠٤٥٢	KATINA	شركة سباء العالميه	٢٠١١/١٠/٢٨ ٢٣٠٠	محجوزة من قبل المحكمة التجارية
١٥٠٠٦٨	STAR LET	شركة عبر البحار للملاح	٢٠١٥/٠٢/١٢ ٠١٣٠	محجوزة من قبل المحكمة التجارية
١٥٠٤١٧	FORCE-ONE	شركة القاسم للملاحه	٢٠١٥/١٢/٢٢ ١٥٠٠	محجوزة من قبل المحكمة التجارية

TIMES & HEIGHTS OF HIGH & LOW WATER

DATE	٠٣/٠٢/٢٠١٨			DATE	٠٤/٠٢/٢٠١٨	
Heigts	Time	Tide		Heigts	Time	Tide
H.W	٠٣٢٩	١,٣		H.W	٠٤٢٢	١,٣
L.W	٠٩٣٦	٠,٢		L.W	١٠٢٧	٠,٣

A document published by the journalist Basim Al-Janabi confirms the entry of diesel fuel at a time when the Houthis were depriving people of electricity, claiming a lack of fuel - February 2018.

نظام المؤسسة الآلـي

كشف حركة السفن ليوم:- الثلاثاء الموافق ٢٠٢١/٠٨/١٠ م

السفن الراسية على الأرصفة

رقم الرحلة	اسم السفينة	الطول	الغاطس	وقت وتاريخ الوصول	وقت وتاريخ الرسو	رقم الرصيف	نوع البضاعة	كمية البضاعة	الوكيل الملاحي	المناشف المساعدة	المرشد
٢١٠٠٢٤	HAFID	١٨٣	٩,٥ ٩,٥	٢٠٢١/٠٧/٢٠ ٠٦١٨	٢٠٢١/٠٨/٠٩ ١٠٠٠	٢	مازوت +بنزل	٦٠٠٠/١٥٢٣٠٦٦	شركة سباء العالميه	الطير حجة شبوه	عبدالله شاوه
٢١٠٠٢٣	LAVENDER	١٨٩	٩,١ ٩,٥٥	٢٠٢١/٠٨/٠١ ١٣٣٠	٢٠٢١/٠٨/٠٢ ١٩٠٠	٤	دقيق+شحن نخالة	١٣٥٠٠	عالم البحار السبعة للملاحة وشل	حجة شبوه	منير الجنداري
٢١٠٠٢٨	ABILITY	١٤٢	٧ ٨,٥	٢٠٢١/٠٧/٢٢ ٠٧٣٠	٢٠٢١/٠٨/٠٢ ١٥٢٥	٥	دقيق	١١٠٠٠	الشركه العالميه للملاحه	حجة شبوه	حسن هاشم
٢١٠٠٢٧	EF ELENA	١٦٢	٩,٠٤ ٩,٤٥	٢٠٢١/٠٨/٠٨ ٠٨١٢	٢٠٢١/٠٨/٠٨ ١٤٢٥	٦	حاويات	٥٦٢	الشركه العالميه للملاحه	الطير شبوه	عمر حسن حجر
٢١٠٠٣١	CAPTAIN ADAM-I	١٠٣	٧,٣ ٧,٧	٢٠٢١/٠٧/٣١ ٠٣٥٠	٢٠٢١/٠٨/٠١ ١٠٥٥	٧	دقيق+شحن نخالة	٧٠٠٠	شركة الشرق الاوسط للملاحه	حجة شبوه	علي محب النبي
٢١٠٠٣٣	SHANGHAI-M	١٢٥	٨,٦ ٨,٨	٢٠٢١/٠٧/٣٠ ١٤٠٠	٢٠٢١/٠٧/٣١ ٠٩٥٥	٧	دقيق +شحن نخالة	١١٦٠٠	عالم البحار السبعة للملاحة وشل	حجة شبوه	عصام القشيبي

السفن المنتظرة في الغاطس للرسو

رقم الرحلة	اسم السفينة	الطول	الغاطس	وقت وتاريخ الوصول	نوع البضاعة	كمية البضاعة	الوكيل الملاحي	مـــلاحظـــات
٢١٠٠٣٥	DALIAN STAR D	١٩٠	٩,٤ ٩,٤	٢٠٢١/٠٨/٠٥ ٠٧٢٥	قمح	٣٠٢٥٠	شركة الشرق الاوسط للملاحه	

السفن المتوقع وصولها

رقم الرحلة	اسم السفينة	الطول	تاريخ توقع الوصول	نوع البضاعة	كمية البضاعة	الوكيل الملاحي
٢٠٠٠٨٧	BIENDONG VICTORY	١٨٣	٢٠٢٠/٠٤/١٧	بترول	٣٠٢٧١	شركة البنادي للملاحه
٢٠٠٠٢٧	FOS SPIRIT	١٨٢	٢٠٢٠/١٢/٠٨	بنزل	٢٩٩٨٨	وكالة المعابر للملاحة
٢٠٠٠٢٤	G T FREEDOM	١٨٠	٢٠٢٠/١٢/٣٠	بترول	٢٩٩٧٤	شركة انجاز للملاحة
٢١٠٠٢٣	RAGGIANA	١٦٠	٢٠٢١/٠٦/٣٠	غاز	٨٨٦٨	شركة المستنبد للملاحة
٢١٠٠٢٦	CLAUDIA GAS	١٥٨	٢٠٢١/٠٧/١٤	غاز	٨٤٣٧	الشركه العالميه للملاحه
٢١٠٠٢٩	SERENITY-C	١٧٨	٢٠٢١/٠٨/٢٠	ذرة+صويا	٢٥٠١٧	شركة القاسم للملاحه
٢١٠٠٣٨	RAEDA	١٥٥	٢٠٢١/٠٨/١٢	ذرة	٢٠٨٠٥	الرواد للملاحة المحدودة

السفن المنتظرة بالغاطس بعد التفريغ على الأرصفة

رقم الرحلة	اسم السفينة	الوكيل الملاحي	وقت وتاريخ الخروج	سبب الانتظار بالغاطس بعد التفريغ
١٥٠٠٦٨	STAR LET	شركة عبر البحار للملاحة	٢٠١٥/٠٢/١٢ ٠١٣٠	محجوزة من قبل المحكمة التجارية
٢١٠١٣٠	BOSS 7	شركة سباء العالميه	٢٠٢١/٠٨/٠٩ ١٠٢٥	لم تكمل التفريغ

السفن المنتظرة في الغاطس

اسم السفينة	مـــلاحظـــة
FORCE ONE	السفينة تابعة لمؤسسة موانئ البحر الاحمر اليمنية

TIMES & HEIGH OF HIGH & LOW WATER

DATE	١٠/٠٨/٢٠٢١			DATE	١١/٠٨/٢٠٢١	
Heig	Time	Tide		Heig	Time	Tide
H.W	٠١٥٩	٠,٧		H.W	٠٢٣٥	٠,٧
L.W	٠٨٢٨	٠,٠		L.W	٠٨٥٧	٠,١
H.W	١٤٢٥	٠,٧		H.W	١٥٠٣	٠,٧
L.W	٢٠٣٨	٠,١		L.W	٢١٢٠	٠,١

Another document confirms the entry of fuel into Hodeidah at a time when Houthi elements were refusing to provide electricity, claiming a lack of fuel and a blockade - August 2018.



While children in Hodeidah Governorate were dying from the intense heat and the lack of electricity, the Houthis were selling the diesel fuel allocated for Hodeidah's electricity, according to this document published by journalist Basseem Al-Janani on June 19, 2016.

Due to the high temperature in Hodeidah and the lack of electricity, children are studying in schools without clothing.

Covering children's bodies with henna paste as a remedy to treat heat-induced skin rashes in Hodeidah due to the high temperature and power outages.

9- The Judicial Guard: A Houthi Tool for Legitimizing Theft:

وزارة العدل
المحكمة الجزائية الابتدائية المتخصصة بالأمانة

الاخوة/ شركة يمن ارمرد

تحية طيبة وبعد...

استناداً إلى القرارات القضائية الصادرة عن المحكمة في جلستها المنعقدة بتاريخ الموافق ٢٠١٨/٨/١م وتاريخ ٢٠١٨/٣/١٨م وتاريخ ٢٠١٨/٧/٢٤م التي قضت بإيقاع الحجز التحفظي على الأموال العقارية والمنقولة المملوكة للخونة المتهمين باقتراف جرائم ماسة بأمن الدولة وأعانة للعدو والتخابر مع دولة اجنبية وتعيين القوات/ صايغ مسفر الشاعر حارساً قضائياً على هذه الأموال وادارتها إدارة حسنة. وإلى مذكرة الحارس القضائي رقم (٨٦٨) بتاريخ ٢٠١٩/٧/٩م المتعلقة بمصاريف إيجار السيارات المدرجة لعام ٢٠١٨م وكذلك الأرباح المدورة للأعوام ٢٠١٧م و٢٠١٨م وحتى يونيو ٢٠١٩م.

وعليه:

يتم قطع وصرف الشيكات بمبلغ (٨٩٣٢.٠٠٠) تسعمائة وثمان وثلاثون الف دولار ومبلغ (٢.٠٠٠.٠٠٠) الثان مليون ومائة الف دولار باسم الأخ/ رائد حسن مسفر الشاعر لإيداع المبلغ خزينة المحكمة ولا يتم الصرف الا بأمر من المحكمة ومواقاة المحكمة بما تم بشأن ذلك.

وتقبلوا خالص التحية والتقدير ...

رئيس المحكمة الجزائية الابتدائية المتخصصة بالأمانة
القاضي/ عبدالله اسماعيل حسن راجح

مرفق 3

Seizing Yemenis' assets and properties through unjust legal cover.

الجمهورية اليمنية
المحكمة الجزائية الابتدائية المتخصصة بالأمانة
الحارس القضائي

الرقم:
التاريخ:
المرفقات:

اشعار بالحجز القضائي

انه في تمام الساعة..الثالثة عصراً.. من يومنا هذا ..الاربعاء..والموافق ١٨/ ٤ /٢٠٢١م

تم الحجز على هذا المـ(منزل – فله – ارض – شركة – هنجر – محل - عمارة .....) الكائنه في محافظة الحديدة مديرية الحوك حي الخاصرة كونه مملوك للمتهم الفار من وجه العدالة/ ...جميل المحروك..... المنسوب له تهمة اقتراف جرائم ماسه بأمن الدولة واعانه العدوان والتخابر مع دولة اجنبية، تنفيذا لقرار المحكمة الجزائية الابتدائية المتخصصة، واي شخص متضرر من إجراءات الحجز عليه بتقديم تظلمه امام المحكمة الجزائية الابتدائية المتخصصة بالأمانة.

رئيس لجنة الحجز

Notice of confiscating and seizing the properties of those opposing the Houthis under the jurisdiction of their controlled judiciary.

الجمهورية اليمنية
المجلس السياسي الأعلى
لجنة حصر واستلام ممتلكات الخونة

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الأخ / محافظ البنك المركزي المحترم

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته - وبعد

بناء على أمر النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة الصادر برقم (٤٣٧٦) وتاريخ ٢٠١٧/١١/١٧م بتكليفنا بإجراء الحجز التحفظي على ممتلكات الخونة المبينة أسمائهم بالكشف المرفق وعددهم (١٢٢٣) أولهم ابتهاج عبدالله الكمال واخرهم يوسف حسين مهدي المرفق لكم صورة منه.

وعليه وتنفيذا لامر النيابة الجزائية فإننا نامل منكم التعميم على كافة البنوك الرسمية والاهلية بإجراء الحجز التحفظي على جميع الحسابات البنكية بأسماء الخونة المحجوز على ممتلكاتهم والمبينة أسمائهم بالكشف المرفق .

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتنا والتقدير ...

اللـــواء / عبدالحكيم هاشم العجـــوائي
نائـــب ورئيس [illegible] الداخليـــة
رئيس لجنة حصر واستلام ممتلكات الخونة

صورة مع التحية للاخ
- رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى
- معالي النائب العام
- رئيس النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة

The Houthi Political Council issues directives to confiscate the properties of Yemenis who oppose the rule of the sectarian dynasty.

الجمهورية اليمنية
المجلس السياسي الأعلى
لجنة حصر واستلام
ممتلكات الخونة
الحارس القضائي

الرقم: [illegible]
التاريخ: ٢٠١٢/٢١/[illegible]م
المرفقات: [illegible]

الأخ / مظهر الكبسي المحترم

تحية طيبة وبعد...

الموضـــوع /تسليم المفاتيح والوثائق

عليكم تسليم المفاتيح والوثائق الخاصة بشركة ارمود كاملة للاخ/ نايف ناشر الهرين مدير المكتب، وتحملكم مسؤولية مخالفة ذلك.

وتقبلوا خالص التحية والتقدير ...

اللواء
[illegible]
رئيس لجنة حصر واستلام ممتلكات الخونة
الحارس القضائي لممتلكات الخونة

An order from the Houthi leader Saleh Al-Sha'ar to hand over the keys and documents of the company Aramood, which is one of the companies that have been seized.

الجمهورية اليمنية
مجلس القضاء الأعلى
المحكمة الجزائية الابتدائية المتخصصة - أمانة العاصمة
مكتب رئيس المحكمة

المحكمة الجزائية المتخصصة
الرقم: ١٧٦
التاريخ: ٢٠٢١/٦/٧

المحترم

الأخ/رئيس وحدة جمع المعلومات للبنك المركزي

تحية طيبة وبعد....

تنفيذاً للحكم الصادر بتاريخ الإثنين ١٩شوال ١٤٤٢هـ الموافق ٢٠٢١/٥/٣١م والذي قضى منطوقه بما هو آت:

أولاً: إلغاء قرار المحكمة الصادر في القضية رقم (٤٧١) لسنة ١٤٤١هـ بتاريخ ٢٠٢٠/٣/٢١م والذي قضى بإيقاع الحجز التحفظي على جميع أموال المحجوز عليه أبو بكر عبدالله القربي واعتباره كأن لم يكن.

ثانياً: التقرير برفع الحجز التحفظي على جميع أموال أبو بكر عبدالله القربي العقارية والمنقولة وشطب اسمه من كشوفات المحجوز عليهم.

وعليه:

يكون منكم تنفيذ الحكم بإلغاء الحجز التحفظي على جميع أموال المذكور وشطب اسمه من كشوفات المحجوز عليهم.

وتفضلوا بقبول الشكر،،،

القاضي/ مجاهد أحمد بن أحمد العمدي
رئيس المحكمة الجزائية الابتدائية المتخصصة بالأمانة

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
HEAD OFFICE - Sana'a

الجمهورية اليمنية
البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي - صنعاء
التاريخ: 2021/06/07م
الرقم:

وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية
Financial Information Unit

تعميم الى جميع شركات ومنشآت الصرافة العاملة في الجمهورية

الأخ / المدير العام
شركة/ منشأة:

المحترم

تحية طيبة وبعد ،،،

الموضوع: رفع الحجز والتجميد

بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه، وبناء على مذكرة القاضي مجاهد احمد بن احمد العمدي رئيس المحكمة الجزائية الابتدائية المتخصصة بالامانة، رقم (680/ب/176) بتاريخ 2021/07/07م والمسلمة الينا بتاريخ 2021/06/07م بخصوص الغاء الحجز التحفظي على جميع الاموال العقارية والمنقولة :

ابو بكر عبدالله القربي.

وشطب اسمه من كشوفات المحجوز عليهم (مرفق صورتها).

يتم العمل بما جاء في مذكرة النيابة مالم يكن هناك حجز على اموال المذكورة من محكمة او نيابة او جهة مختصة اخرى.

وتقبلوا تحياتنا،،،

رئيس وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية
وديع محمد السادة

Fax 274113 Tel : 274093 P.O.Box:393 Sana'a Y.R

فاكس : 274113 تلفون 274093 ص . ب 393 صنعاء – الجمهورية اليمنية

Directives from the Houthi courts and the Central Bank to financial institutions to revoke the decision to freeze the assets of the former Foreign Minister Abu Bakr Al-Qirbi and drop the charges of espionage and working for foreign entities against him, after he became one of those defending the Houthis in front of Western and Arab institutions.

الجمهورية اليمنية
النيابة العامة
النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
العدل أساس الحكم

الرقم: ٢٠٢١/٨٠٠
التاريخ: ٢٠٢١/٦/٢٠
المرفقات:

المحترم
الأخ / رئيس وحدة جمع المعلومات بالبنك المركزي
تحية طيبة وبعد:

بالإشارة الى قرار المحكمة الجزائية الابتدائية المتخصصة بالأمانة في تأريخ 19 / 6 / 2021م الذي قضى بالحجز التحفظي على أموال وممتلكات المتهم الفار من وجه العدالة محمد يحيى الحيفي المنسوب له تهمة المساس باستقلال الجمهورية اليمنية واعانة العدو والتخابر مع الموساد الصهيوني والاستخبارات الامريكية وتكليف الأخ صالح محمد دبيش حارساً قضائياً على تلك الأموال وله ادارتها ادارة حسنة وله الاستعانة بمن يراه من ذوي الخبرة والكفاءة والنزاهة.

ولـــــذلك

يتم ايقاع الحجز التحفظي على جميع أموال المتهم سالف الذكر لديكم والتعميم بذلك على جميع البنوك والمصارف.

وتـقـبـلـوا خالص تـحـيـاتـي،،،

خالد عمر سعيد
عضو النيابة

أحمـد محمـد القيـز
وكيل النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة

نجيب

A Houthi decision to seize the home and assets of the businessman Mohammed Al-Hafi after he was accused of espionage in favor of the Israeli Mossad and American intelligence.

10 - Theft and exploitation of endowment funds and properties.

مجلس الـــوزراء
الامانة العامة

قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم (60) لعام 2017م
بشـــأن
صرف أراضي لأعضاء حكومة الإنقاذ الوطني

استمع مجلس الوزراء إلى مقترح وزير التربية والتعليم حول صرف أراضي لأعضاء حكومة الإنقاذ الوطني من أراضي وعقارات الدولة ، وأقر الآتي :-

1 — الموافقة على صرف (30) لبنة لكل وزير في حكومة الإنقاذ الوطني من أراضي وعقارات الدولة ، على أن يصرف نصفها لبنك التسليف للإسكان مقابل بناء مساكن للوزراء في النصف الآخر ، وذلك في إطار دعم البنك لإعادة ممارسة نشاطه.

2- على رئيس الهيئة العامة للأراضي والمساحة والتخطيط العمراني اتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة لتحديد الموقع وعمل المخططات اللازمة وتوزيع القطع وتسليم عقود التمليك للوزراء بحسب ماورد في البند (1) أعلاه.

3- على رئيس مجلس إدارة بنك التسليف للإسكان اتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية اللازمة لتنفيذ الوحدات السكنية بموجب ما هو محدد في البندين (1و 2) أعلاه.

4- يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ 2017/7/16م، وينتهي بتنفيذ أحكامه .

5- ينفذ القرار بالوسائل الادارية المناسبة.

المتحفظون	المتضمون	المنفـــذون	
		رئيسي	مشـــارك
لايوجـد	لايوجد	رئيس الوزراء نواب رئيس الوزراء جميع الوزراء رئيس الهيئة العامة للأراضي والمساحة والتخطيط العمراني. رئيس مجلس إدارة بنك التسليف للإسكان	-

مدة القـــرار : مؤقت
مضمون القرار : خدمي/ رئاسة الوزراء — صرف أراضي لأعضاء حكومة الإنقاذ الوطني
شكل القـــرار : حكم عام
جهة التنفيذ : عام

A Houthi decision to distribute lands belonging to endowments among Houthi leaders.

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة الأوقاف والإرشاد
نائب الوزير

الأخ الأستاذ/ مهدي المشاط
رئيس الجمهورية رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى
المحترم

تحية طيبة .. وبعد

الموضوع: استقالة من العمل في وزارة الأوقاف والإرشاد

بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه، أتقدم إليكم بهذا الطلب مستأذناً من عملي نائباً لوزير الأوقاف والإرشاد ممثلاً بقرار من اللجنة الثورية العليا رقم (٨٩) الصادر بتاريخ ٢٣ فبراير / ٢٠١٦م، بالآتي:-

حجم الفساد المالي والاختلالات الإدارية والمالية في الوزارة من أجل تقديم فيها إلى السفلة - إلا من رحم الله - وقد رفعنا إليكم مراراً بقضايا فساد كبيرة في أموال الأوقاف وأراضيه بالوثائق والمستندات ولم نجد لقاضياً حدياً أمام هذه القضايا.

أيضاً دور الوزارة في مواجهة العدوان ضعيفاً نظراً لسلبية الوزير وأعضاء الحاكم إلى منزله وممارسة العمل من داخله في غالبة غالوية عبر إيفاد، وقد قدمنا كثيراً من الاقتراحات والخطط لتنهض بعمل الوزارة بشكل عام وفتاح التوجيه والإرشاد بشكل خاص ولكن لم نلمس تجاوباً، وكما قال الإمام علي عليه السلام: (لا رأي لمن لا يطاع).

لقد أثبت إلى الوزارة بناء على تكليف في ظروف صعبة للغاية وقدمنا هذا التكليف بدافع المسئولية وحاولنا خلال الفترة الماضية إصلاح ما نستطيع إصلاحه وإيقاف ما استطعنا إيقافه من الفساد، ولكن السيل الحرق على الزاحف، وأتمنى أن أفعل أمام الله ووزر ما يحدث، ورحم الله من يحتاج أو أراح فاستراح.

ولذا سبق أرجو قبول استقالتي هذه لأعود إلى الميدان الجهادي الذي جئت منه وليتحمل مسئولية الفساد والاختلالات في الوزارة من يستطيع السكوت على الباطل والقبول به.

هذا والله الموفق والهادي إلى سبل الرشاد

A resignation document from the Deputy Minister of Endowments in the Houthi government due to the corruption and systematic looting of endowments by the Houthi group's leadership, which he was unable to stop.

A picture of the commercial project called Maria Mall, which was built by a Houthi leader on land designated for the Al-Firdaus Mosque in the Sa'wan area of Sana’a.

11- Plundering state lands and citizens' properties:

الجمهورية اليمنية
النيابة العامة
نيابة الاموال العامة م/ الحديدة
نيابة الاموال الابتدائية

المحترم
الاخ / مدير عام شرطة محافظة الحديدة
تحية طيبة وبعد: -

تعقيباً على مذكرتنا السابقة برقم ٧٨٥ وتاريخ ٢٠١٩/٤/٩م بناً على الشكوى المقدمة امام النيابة من قيام / علي عبدالقادر المنصور بمحاولة الاعتداء على وحدتي جوار A٦١٢ و٦١٥ بلك ٣ قطعة رقم ٢ وبلك ٤ قطعة رقم ١ و ٢ وحيث ان القضية منظورة لدى محكمة الأموال العامة ومن ضمن قراراتها الصادرة في جلسات المحكمة منع الاستحداثات وازالة ما تم استحداثة في الأرض المتنازع عليها ولو باستعمال القوة

وعليـــــه:

نأمل وقف أي استحداث في قطع الاراض المذكورة أعلاه وإزالة أي استحداث جديد وايصال المتعدين الى النيابة لعرضهم على المحكمة كون القضية منظورة لديها ...

وتقبلوا اطيب التحية،،،

عضو النيابة
ياسر احمد الاغبري

وكيل نيابة الأموال العامة
ق/ خالد يحيى الشهاري

الممسوحة ضوئيا بـ CamScanner

The Houthi leader Abdulqader Al-Mansur's encroachment on lands in Hodeidah.



الموضوع / الشكوى المقدمة من جميع مشايخ وعقال الحرة همدان

بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه.. وبناً على الشكوى المقدمة من قبل جميع مشايخ وعقال الحرة همدان والتي أفادونا بأن هناك اعتداء على أملاكهم الخاص والتي تم طرحها من أمجادهم وإباءهم لمصلحة المحل والمسمى المخلابه وذلك الاعتداء حسب إفادتهم من قبل مؤسسة الشهداء والتي تقوم بالتسوير مع مجموعة من الأحقاد المسلحة بشكل مستفز وبدون أي تنسيق مع المشايخ والعقال مما دفعهم إلى تقديم هذه الشكوى من اجل توقيف الاستحداث والجلوس معكم محل الإشكال .

وعلية:

نكون مواشكورين بالاطلاع والتوجيه بما يلزم وذلك لما فيه امن واستقرار المنطقة .

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتنا ،،،

عقيد/
مير هاشم الكبسي
مدير عام المديرية
رئيس المجلس المحلي

Complaint from the Sheikhs of the Al-Urah Hamdan region due to the Houthi plundering of their lands.



رئيس محكمة الاستئناف بالمحافظة الفاضل

تحية طيبه وبعد

مرفق لعدالتكم صورة المذكرة الموجهة الينا من الاخ/ رئيس اللجنة الوزارية لمتابعة ارضية المؤسسة العامة للغزل والنسيج وحيث تبين بأن محكمة باجل تقوم بتنفيذ أحكام صادرة من اشخاص اخرين من ارضية المؤسسة الواقعة على الخط الرئيسي ولم تكن المؤسسة طرف في الخصومة والشجار ولما كان سير اجراءات التنفيذ من شأنه الحاق الضرر بحق المؤسسة لا يمكن تداركه في حال المضي في التنفيذ فإن المحافظة تأمل تدخلكم بالتوجيه لمحكمة باجل بإيقاف التنفيذ كون المؤسسة ليست طرفاً كما اسلفنا والمحكمة مرجع من له دعوى على المؤسسة في النزاع محل الاشكال .

شاكرين حسن تعاونكم .

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتنا ،،،

اللواء/ حسن أحمد الهيج
محافظ المحافظة
رئيس المجلس المحلي

عبد الرحمن الشيباني
مدير عام مكتب الشئون القانونية

وارد

Looting state lands in Hodeidah for the benefit of Houthi leaders with the assistance of Houthi members in the Bajil court.

م	الموقع والعقار	المحافظة	المساحة/بالمتر عشاري	ملاحظات
1	موقع منطقة المحجر شمال غرب استراحة وادي ظهر وجنوب الأزرقين	أمانة العاصمة	15,200	
2	موقع جنوب شرق فندق موفمبرك	أمانة العاصمة	1,400	
3	موقع شرق شارع الأربعين (سعوان)	أمانة العاصمة	1,566	
4	موقع غرب معسكر الحفاء أمام مبنى الجوازات (شارع خولان)	أمانة العاصمة	15,606	
5	موقع ما بين مذبح وشمالان، جوار جمعية الشرطة العسكرية	أمانة العاصمة	550,300	
6	موقع ظهر حمير، خلف حاجز السفارات	أمانة العاصمة	6,978	
7	موقع بظهر حمير، غرب دائرة الاشغال العسكرية (سعوان)	أمانة العاصمة	1,693	
8	موقع بمنطقه صرف، جبل الطويل (الحنارش)، شرق شارع المائة – شرق موقع الكسارات	أمانة العاصمة	14,400	
9	الموقع الكائن في منطقة بيت الجاكي – بمديرية سنحان – شرق قرية بيت الجاكي – شرق شارع المائة	محافظة صنعاء	10,000	
10	الموقع الكائن غرب منطقة أرتل، شرق شارع المائة، المرتبط بطريق صنعاء-الحديدة	محافظة صنعاء	15,000	يضم المناطق المجاورة له
11	الموقع ما بين جمعيتي الرئاسة وغمدان (نقم)	أمانة العاصمة	30,000	
12	موقع موقف مؤتمر الحوار الوطني الشامل- مديرية آزال	أمانة العاصمة		يتم معالجة إشكالية الموقع من قبل القائم بأعمال وزير الدفاع والقائم بأعمال رئيس الهيئة العامة للأراضي والمساحة والتخطيط العمراني
13	موقع بيت المنتصر (بعد الأزرقين) بين بيت ذيفان وعيال سريح	محافظة عمران	15,148	
14	موقع بربوع بني خولي، على الطريق الرئيسي	محافظة ريمة	17,600	

Land grabbing in Sana'a, according to leaked documents from the cabinet of the Houthi-controlled government, which were published in 2016.



Republic of Yemen
Ministry of Public Works and Highways
Minister

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة الأشغال العامة والطرق
الوزير

التاريخ: ٢٠٠٧/٤/١٤
الرقم: ١٠٧
Date:
No.:

الاخ / رئيس مجلس الوزراء
د . عبدالعزيز صالح بن حبتور
المحترم

بعد التحية ،،،

نظرا لجهود الاخوة المذكورين ادناه يرجى توجيهكم الى رئيس الهيئة العامة للأراضي والمساحة والتخطيط العمراني بمخاطبة فرع الهيئة فرع م/ إب بمنحهم والتمليك قطعة ارض مناصفة فيما بينهم في موضع وجبل مريش شارع الثلاثين للأخوة اسماءهم التالية : -

1) حسين عبدالله مثلي الذهبي
2) عبدالسلام احمد علي محسن
3) علي محمد صالح مقبل التركيني
4) حسن صالح علي المصيحي
5) محمد محمد عبدالله الرفاعي
6) عبدالخالق عبدالله زيد المتوكل

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتنا ،،،

وزير الاشغال العامة والطرق
غالب عبدالله محمد

The Houthis distribute state lands and endowments to buy loyalties and rewards for their supporters.

On September 12, 2020, residents of the Presidency neighborhood held a protest against the aggressions of the Houthi Land Committee.

Houthi leaders seized the lands, green areas, and parking spaces belonging to the residential city of Al-Hamdi in the Sa'wan neighborhood, north of Sana'a.

12- Deprivation of citizens from services:

مدرسة خولة بنت الأزور
مجلس الآباء

الأخ/ ولي أمر الطالب/ .....المحترم

كل عام وأنتم بخير. وحرصاً منا على استمرار العملية التعليمية لفلذات اكبادنا وعدم توقفها للفصل الدراسي الثاني 2017.2018م.
نرجو منكم التعاون في سرعة تسديد المساهمة المجتمعية بداية كل شهر بدء من شهر فبراير/2018م وحتى انتهاء الفصل الدراسي الثاني والمحددة كما يلي:

الابتدائية	الاعدادية	الثانوية
500 ريال	1000 ريال	1500 ريال

شاكرين تعاونكم لما فيه مصلحة طالباتنا. مع العلم بأنه سيتم مواقاتكم بسند قبض بالمبلغ...

مجلس الآباء

Notification of the fees required from parents for education in government schools under Houthi control, after it used to be free.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
Minister's Office
NO: ... الرقم: ... DATE: ... التاريخ:

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة التربية والتعليم
مكتب الوزير

المحترمون
المحترمون

الأخوة/ امين العاصمة ومحافظو المحافظات
الأخوة/ مدراء عموم مكاتب التربية في أمانة العاصمة والمحافظات
تحية طيبة وبعد ،،

الموضوع : اسهام القطاع التربوي في الحملة الوطنية لدعم البنك المركزي

بالاشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه ، واستشعاراً للمسؤولية الوطنية والتاريخية للقطاع التربوي في مواجهة العدوان ودعم البنك المركزي كرافد خزينة الدولة من خلال اسهام القطاع التربوي في تنظيم الحملات الوطنية للتربويين عبر مكاتب التربية والتعليم بالمحافظات والمديريات والمدارس بالتوجيه الى مكاتب البريد والبنوك لدعم من خلال التبرع او الايداع من قبل القيادات التربوية والمعلمين وتحفيز الطلاب على فتح حسابات التوفير البريدي أو البنكي ولدعم اسهاماً في دعم الحملة الوطنية لدعم البنك المركزي اليمني وتنظيم حملات تبرع ملوعين داخل المدارس.

وعليه،
للاطلاع والتوجيه بالتفاعل الايجابي مع الحملة نظراً لما تقتضيه مصلحة الوطن لمواجهة العدوان .

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتنا ...

د. عبدالله العامري
نائب وزير التربية والتعليم
القائم بالأعمال

The Houthis force students in schools to support the central bank.



The staff working in the General Emergency Department of the government-run Al-Thawra Hospital refused to raise the prices of medical services on citizens.

13- Education allocations:

السيرة الذاتية

البيانات الشخصية:

الاسم: يحي بدرالدين أمير الدين الحوثي

تاريخ ومحل الميلاد: 1380هـ - صعده – ساقين – بني بحر – الرويس

الحالة الاجتماعية: متزوج وأب لأربعة أولاد وخمس بنات

المؤهلات العلمية:

- درس على يد والده السيد العلامة بدرالدين الحوثي.
- درس العلوم الشرعية وله مؤلف تحت الطباعة بعنوان (الانسان في معارج التكريم)
- حاصل على العديد من الإجازات العلمية على يد العديد من العلماء.
- له العديد من المحاضرات في المحافل الدولية العلمية.

الخبرات والمهارات:

1988 عضو مجلس الشورى.

1990 من مؤسسي حزب الحق.

2003 - عضو مجلس النواب.

حالياً وزير التربية والتعليم في حكومة الإنقاذ الوطني.

أهم المشاركات:

- شارك في إعداد دستور الوحدة.
- في صيف 1994م دعى لمؤتمر في صعده لوقف الحرب.
- شارك في قانون توحيد التعليم.
- تمثيل اليمن في بعض المؤتمرات في الخارج.

The biography of Yahya Al-Houthi reveals that he does not possess any educational qualifications.

Complaints from teachers in Houthi-controlled areas due to the deduction of a portion of the financial incentives provided by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through UNICEF.

The Houthis claim that the so-called "community contribution fees" are voluntary and not mandatory. However, the "Sadaq" platform, specialized in tracking lies and rumors, has confirmed that these fees are mandatory for parents. They have published documents that confirm the collection of money from parents to varying degrees from one school to another.

A picture from a summer camp conducted by the Houthis in the Al-Tawilah district of Al Mahweet province, where children are being trained in disassembling and using the Kalashnikov rifle as part of a widespread policy aimed at recruiting children and involving them in the fighting fronts.

14- Community Initiatives to Salvage What's Possible:

Good-doers from the residents of the Baadan Al-Shu'ar area are taking charge of paving an 8-kilometer road to Beit Al-Sayyadi Al-Radai at a cost of 1.6 million dollars.

A community initiative to pave the roads after the Houthi authorities refused to do so in exchange for the taxes they impose, considering themselves an established authority.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الأخ مدير مكتب التربية والتعليم بالمحافظة المحترم

بعد التحيه

نحيطكم علماً بأننا قمنا خلال العام الماضي بأنشاء اربعة فصول دراسيه نظراً للازدحام الشديد الذي تعانيه المدرسه بين الصبايح ومساهمة جمعية ذائبة على حساب الأهالي وصلنا بالعمل الى مرحلة السقف ولم نستطيع إكمالها لعدم وجود الإمكانيات المادية وخلال هذا العام قمنا بالتنسيق مع جمعية الهلال الأحمر اليمني بالحوبة لمساعدتنا وقد وفر الاسمنت والحديد وبقية النواقص على الاهالي وقد قام الاهالي بجمع التبرعات والهبات لإكمال العمل كما بادره جمعية هلوليه وتم ذالك والآن نحن بصدد تنفيذ عملية صبة السقف فقط.

وعليه نلتمس منكم الموافقه والسماح لنا بذالك لكي نتمكن المدرسه من إستخدام الفصول للعام الدراسي القادم ٢٠٢٠-٢٠٢١م والله الموفق،،

شاكرين ومقدرين تعاونكم

وتقبلوا تحياتنا إخوانكم

رئيس مجلس الأباء بالمدرسه

عضو المجلس المحلي بالمنطقه

A document signed by a member of the local council, addressed to the Education Office in Al-Mahweet, requesting permission to establish classrooms in the school that the locals have built at their own expense after the Houthi authorities prohibited support from organizations that had decided to complete the construction.



بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الأخ اللواء فيصل أحمد قايد حيدر محافظ محافظة المحويت المحترم

تحية طيبة وبعد

نتقدم اليكم نحن أهالي حارات بني الصليحي وبيت الكردي والسفاينه بجزيل الشكر والتقدير وتود الأحاطه بأننا قمنا خلال العام الماضي بأنشاء اربعه فصول دراسية داخل ساحة مدرستنا مدرسة بني الصليحي الأساسية الثانوية نظراً لإزدحام الذي تعاني المدرسة بها هيه مجتمعيه طوعيه على حساب الأهالي ووصل العمل الى مرحلة السقف ولم نستطع اكمال العمل لعدم وجود الأمكانات المادية وقمنا بالتنسيق مع جمعية الوئام الأهلي الخيري في المحويت لمساعدتنا في صبة السقف واستعدوا بدعمنا ومساعدتنا بتكاليف الصبه وتمت الأجراءات واستلم المقاول العمل بحضور رسمي وبحضور مدير ادارة التربية بالمدينه وعندما بدأ المقاول بتنفيذ العمل تفاجأنا بتوقيفه من قبل مكتب التربيه والتعليم بالمحافظة لأسباب لا نعلمها مع العلم أن الاخوه في مكتب التربيه بالمحافظة والمدينه على علم واطلاع بهذه المبادرة المجتمعية الخيّره من بداية المرحله وميارسين ذالك ولله الحمد.

نكرر ومستمرين بتوجيهاتكم الكريمه لمكتب التربيه بالمحافظه بالسماح للمقاول بمواصلة العمل حتى لا يضيع المشروع الذي نحن بأمس الحاجه اليه لأنقاذ ابنائنا الطلاب والطالبات من حرارة الشمس وصقيع البرد حيث وان بعض الفصول تدرس تحت الطرابيل لمترب لكم والمشروع متواضع ومصلحته العامه كبيره وأنتم أحرص الناس حفاظاً على المصلحه العامه وخدمة المجتمع وتقبلوا تحياتنا

اخوانكم أهالي بني الصليحي وبيت الكردي والسفاينه

عنهم

الشيخ حسين صالح حبيش / الشيخ عبدالكريم محمد الكردي / الشيخ علي احمد السفياني / الشيخ فيصل صالح حبيش

A memorandum from the residents of the areas of Beit Al-Suleihi, Al-Kurdi, and Al-Safaina addressed to the Houthi governor of Al-Mahweet, in which they complain about the prevention of completing the construction of classrooms that they had initiated for the students of the region at the expense of the local community.

15- Corruption:



To send them to the frontlines, the Houthis released prisoners who had been incarcerated for crimes and criminal cases.

Prosecutor's deputy in Al-Makhadir district, Fuad Al-Humairi, confirms that armed individuals affiliated with the Houthis released forcibly accused individuals of theft, after the prosecution refused to release them.

Data of vehicles and equipment looted by the Houthis from the Ministry of Agriculture and its affiliated entities.

مشروع الحفاظ على المياه الجوفية والتربة – السيارات التي تم سحبها من قبل اللجان الأمنية

م	نوع السيارة	اللون	الموديل	رقم الشاصة	رقم الكينة	رقم اللوحة	النوع
.1	تويوتا حبه وربع	ذهبي		JTEFU71J6B4007010		91442	
.2	تويوتا حبه وربع	ذهبي		JTEFU71J1B4007013		91443	
.3	تويوتا حبه وربع	ذهبي		JTEFU71J6B4007056		91444	
.4	تويوتا حبه وربع	العنبي		JTEFU71JXB4006393		91445	
.5	تويوتا حبه وربع	ذهبي		JTEFU71J8B4007106		91446	
.6	تويوتا حبه وربع	ذهبي		JTEFU71J9B4006854		91447	
.7	تويوتا حبه وربع	ذهبي		JTEFU71J7B4006979		91448	
.8	تويوتا حبه وربع	ذهبي		JTEFU71J2B4006985		91449	
.9	تويوتا حبه وربع	فضي		JTEFU71J1A4005664		91450	

السيارات التي تم أخذها من قطاع الري

م	نوع السيارة	اللون	الموديل	رقم الشاصة	رقم الكينة	رقم اللوحة	النوع
1	تويوتا غمارتين		2006	201000024	60777498	6094	إدخال جمركي

تم أخذها من قبل الأخ/ احمد شرف المظهر ضمن اللجنة الثورية

سيارات مكافحة الآفات الثمانية والآفات المهاجرة التي تم سحبها من قبل وزارة الدفاع

م	المحافظة	الإدارة	نوع السيارة	اللون	الية المكافحة	الموديل	رقم الشاصة	رقم الكينة	رقم اللوحة	النوع	الجهة حاليا
48											
49											
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Data of vehicles and equipment looted by the Houthis from the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation.

اللجنة التحضيرية لفعاليات
ذكرى المولد النبوي الشريف

معالي وزير الاتصالات وتقنية المعلومات م/ مسفر النمير
رئيس اللجنة الاشرافية على فعاليات المولد النبوي الشريف

المحترم

1443 هـ - 2021 م

تحية طيبة وبعد،،

الموضوع / اعتماد مبلغ اضافي كأجور لحملات النظافة البعدية

بداية نهنئكم على النجاح الكبير الذي حققته فعاليات واحتفالات ذكرى المولد النبوي في مثل المحافظات، وهذا ان دل على شي فانما يدل على حنكتكم القيادية وعقلانيتكم الادارية في ادارة وتولي المهام الصعبة.

وبالاشارة الى الموضوع اعلاه .. نحررموا مشكورين باعتماد مبلغ 291,984,000 (مائتان وواحد وتسعون مليون وتسعمائة واربعة وثمانون الف ريال) مقابل اضافية لتنفيذ حملات نظافة بعدية في العاصمة صنعاء والمحافظات لتنظيف مخلفات الساحات العامة والشوارع التي طبعت فيها فعاليات واحتفالات الذكرى السنوية للمولد النبوي الشريف لهذا العام وازالة اللافتات والملصقات

شاكرين ومقدرين جهودكم وتعاونكم.

أخوكم/ خالد الماداني
رئيس اللجنة التحضيرية لفعاليات المولد النبوي الشريف

An additional amount of approximately 300 million rials for post-event cleaning campaigns of the areas where Houthi events were held, while Yemenis are suffering from one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, according to international organizations, and the Houthis refuse to pay salaries.

شركة صافر لعمليات الاستكشاف والإنتاج
Safer E&P Operations Company (SEPOC)

صافر SAFER

محضر إبلاغ بالمخالفات المرتكبة والأصول المنهوبة
من قبل فيصل اخرى حق شركة صافر

بالاشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه وإلى تزايد وتكرار المخالفات المرتكبة من قبل فيصل الجبري بحق شركة صافر وموظفيها والتي وصل الحد إلى الاعتداء الجسدي والتهديد وتهب أموال الشركة والتي سبق الإبلاغ عنها إلى الجهات العليا، ونظراً لما تمليه واجبات حفظ المال العام وتحقيق المصالح العام وإيفاء المسؤولية فقد اجتمعت الإدارات المعنية والنقابة للوقوف على المخالفات والاعتداءات المرتكبة من قبل المدعو فيصل الجبري المكنى "أبو ذياب" وتبين من خلال المعلومات البيانات لدى الإدارات المعنية أنه خلال الفترة من سبتمبر 2014 حتى تاريخ هذا احداد محضرنا هذا ، وقد ارتكب المذكور المخالفات والاعتداءات الآتية:

(1) استولى على أموال مملوكة للشركة حسب التفصيل التالي:
أ- السيارات(وفقاً للكشف المرفق).
ب- كميات كبيرة من المشتقات النفطية. (وفقاً للكشف المرفق)
ج- منقولات وفقاً للكشف المرفق.

(2) اعتدى على اكثر من موظف بالشركة في اكثر من واقعة بالتهديد والضرب كما قام بالتهديد بإغلاق الشركة ومنع الموظفين من الخروج اكثر من مرة بغرض الابتزاز.

- ادارة امن الشركة
- الشئون الادارية
- ادارة العلاقات العامة
- ادارة الشئون القانونية
- نقابة موظفي الشركة

A report from the Safir Oil Company about Houthi elements looting its properties and attacking its employees.

شركة صافر لعمليات الاستكشاف والإنتاج
Safer E&P Operations Company (SEPOC)

صافر SAFER

التاريخ 2017/7/24م

كشف بالسيارات التابعة للادارة العامة لشركة صافر بصنعاء والتي استولى عليها مشرف اللجان الشعبية بالشركة فيصل الجبري (ابونايف)

ت	السيارة	نوع السيارة	رقم اللوحة	رقم الشركة	تاريخ الأخذ	ملاحظات
1	شاص	تويوتا	7166	107	2016	اعادها واخذها بتاريخ 2017/6/11
2	باترن	تويوتا	7287	115	2016	اعادها واخذها بتاريخ 2017/6/13
3	صالون	تويوتا	436	140	2017/1/28	اعادها واخذها بتاريخ 2017/6/10
4	صالون	تويوتا	3464	550	2017/2/19	
5	سزوكي	سزوكي	1-988422	144	2017/7/1	
6	جانسي	هونداي	11486	168	2017/4/26	
7	بيكب كومبكر	تويوتا	438	453	2017/1/15	
8	باترن	تويوتا	7176	93	2017/7/11	
9	صالون (مدرعة)	تويوتا	6-29867	168	2017/7/19	بناء على مذكرة محمود الجايفي
10	سزوكي	سزوكي	2-35832	خاص	2017/7/20	تابعة للمهندس/ ناجي الشريف

شركة صـــافر

الجمهورية اليمنية
مكتب رئاسة الجمهورية
دائرة مكتب المدير

الرقم: ٣/١٤٩٤
التاريخ: ٢٠١٧/٥/٢٤
المرفقات:

الأخ/ المدير العام التنفيذي لشركة صافر المحترم

بعد التحية

نأمل التكرم بالتوجيه الى من يلزم بتسليم السيارة المدرع نوع (لاندكروزر) التي لدى الشركة الى مندوب الرئاسة السيد/ محمد المهدي قائد حراسة مكتب رئاسة الجمهورية.

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتي وتقديري،،

عبدالقادر الجنيد
مدير مكتب رئاسة الجمهورية

Documents confirming the Houthis' theft of vehicles belonging to the Safir Oil Company.

المكتب الإعلامي - سلطان السامعي
@Al_samie_60

#الفريق_السامعي: لص من اللصوص الجدد يشتري فلتين #بستة_مليون_ومئتين_الف
"دولار "وعامل نفسه ضدالفساد من فين لأبوه هذاالمبلغ الخيالي بعد ان كان حافي القدمين..

٩:٣٧ م · ٣١ يوليو ٢٠٢١ · Twitter for Android

٢٠ إعادة تغريد ١٧ تغريدة اقتباس ١٤٢ إعجابًا

Houthi leader and member of the Houthi Political Council, Sultan Al-Samai, twited about the corruption within his group's leadership.

16- Nepotistic (Lineage) Appointments:

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الجهات الحكومية والمؤسسات التابعة لها

استناداً إلى اتفاق السلم والشراكة ووفقاً لمخرجات الحوار الوطني ووثيقة الضمانات التي أكدت على إجراء التغيير في جميع الأجهزة التنفيذية لتحقيق الشراكة الوطنية.

م	اسم الوزارة	اسم الجهة / الوظيفة	اسم المرشح	المؤهلات	ملاحظات
١	رئاسة الجمهورية	نائب رئيس الجمهورية			
		رئيس الجهاز المركزي للرقابة والمحاسبة			
		نائب مدير مكتب رئاسة الجمهورية			
		رئيس أو نائب رئيس جهاز الأمن السياسي			
		وكيل أو نائب وكيل جهاز الأمن القومي			
		رئيس أو نائب رئيس مجلس الشورى			
		رئيس لجنة الحدود			
		اللجان الرقابية			
		جميع إدارات الرقابة والتفتيش في جميع الوزارات والهيئات والمؤسسات			
٢	مكتب رئاسة الوزراء	نائب رئيس الوزراء			
		الأمين العام لمجلس الوزراء			
		نائب محافظ البنك المركزي			
		نواب في بقية البنوك الحكومية أو التي تشارك فيها الحكومة			
		نواب في الشركات والمؤسسات، مثل: شركة			

Photos of the lists presented by the Houthis to the former president, Abd-Rabbu Mansur Hadi, in 2014. These lists included government positions within state institutions that they wanted to control through the issuance of urgent presidential decrees. This prompted the president to resign to his advisors at the time.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الجهات الحكومية والمؤسسات التابعة لها

م	اسم الوزارة	اسم الجهة / الوظيفة	اسم المرشح	المؤهلات	ملاحظات
١٧	وزارة الادارة المحلية	نائب وزير الادارة المحلية			
		وكيل الادارة المحلية			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
١٨	وزارة النقل	نائب وزير النقل			
		وكيل وزير النقل			
		المؤسسة العامة لموانئ البحر الأحمر			
		الهيئة العامة لتطوير الموانئ والإرصاد			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
١٩	وزارة الكهرباء	نائب وزير الكهرباء			
		رئيس الهيئة العامة لكهرباء الريف			
		رئيس المؤسسة العامة للكهرباء			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
٢٠	وزارة الاتصال الحامة والطرق	نائب وزير الاتصال العامة			
		وكيل قطاع الطرق			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
٢١	وزارة الصناعة والتجارة	نائب وزير الصناعة والتجارة			
		وكيل الوزارة لقطاع			
		رئيس مؤسسة الإسمنت ومؤسسة الفيز			

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الجهات الحكومية والمؤسسات التابعة لها

م	اسم الوزارة	اسم الجهة / الوظيفة	اسم المرشح	المؤهلات	ملاحظات
		والتنسيق			
		المكاتيس والمواصفات			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
٢٣	وزارة الصحة والسكان	نائب وزير الصحة والسكان			
		وكيل الوزارة لقطاع			
		إدارة المستشفيات			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
٢٤	وزارة الزراعة والري	نائب وزير الزراعة والري			
		وكيل الوزارة لقطاع شئون المائية			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
٢٥	وزارة المياه والبيئة	نائب وزير المياه والبيئة			
		وكيل الوزارة لقطاع			
		رئيس الهيئة العامة لحماية البيئة			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
٢٦	وزارة الشباب والرياضة	نائب وزير الشباب والرياضة			
		رئيس صندوق التشرد والشباب			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
٢٧	وزارة الشؤون القانونية	نائب وزير الشؤون القانونية			

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الجهات الحكومية والمؤسسات التابعة لها

م	اسم الوزارة	اسم الجهة / الوظيفة	اسم المرشح	المؤهلات	ملاحظات
	التأديبية	وكيل الوزارة			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
٢٢	وزارة الثقافة	نائب وزير الثقافة			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
٢٨	وزارة حقوق الإنسان	نائب وزير حقوق الإنسان			
		وكيل الوزارة			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
٢٩	وزارة تمثيل القانون	نائب وزير شئون القانون			
		وكيل الوزارة			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
٣٠	الهيئة العامة للمناسبات والاحتفالات	رئيس الهيئة			
٣١	الهيئة العامة للإعلام والتخطيط العمراني	رئيس الهيئة			
		وكيل الهيئة			

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الجهات الحكومية والمؤسسات التابعة لها

م	اسم الوزارة	اسم الجهة / الوظيفة	اسم المرشح	المؤهلات	ملاحظات
		المشيخ والمؤسسة الاقتصادية			
		نواب الأعضاء في المجلس التشريعي للمشروع المجلس لمجلدات التشريعي، بالإضافة إلى رئيسة المصارين			
٢	المحطة التشريعية	الأمين العام لمجلس النواب			
		دائرة الشؤون الفنية والإدارية			
		ويمكن أن يحتفظ البيه مجلس الشورى			
٣	المحطة الضمانية	النائب العام			
		نيابة الأموال العامة			
		نيابة المحافظة			
		نيابة البحث والأمن			
		المفتش العام			
		المكاتيس والمواصفات			
		رئيس المكتب الفني			
٤	وزارة التربية والتعليم	نائب وزير التربية والتعليم			
		وكيل قطاع الشؤون الفنية			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
٦	وزارة التعليم	نائب وزير التعليم العالي			

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الجهات الحكومية والمؤسسات التابعة لها

م	اسم الوزارة	اسم الجهة / الوظيفة	اسم المرشح	المؤهلات	ملاحظات
		سفير اليمن في سوريا			
		سفير اليمن في عمان			
		سفير اليمن في إيران			
		سفير اليمن في مصر			
		سفير اليمن في بروكسل			
		مندوب اليمن في الجامعة العربية			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
١٠	وزارة المالية	نائب وزير المالية			
		وكيل قطاع الاستثمار وصناديق الحكومة			
		وكيل قطاع الموازنة			
		رئيس مصلحة الجمارك			
		الإدارة الضريبية			
		إدارة الخزينة			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
١١	وزارة التخطيط	نائب وزير التخطيط			
		رئيس الجهاز المركزي للإحصاء			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
١٢	وزارة	نائب وزير الاتصالات			

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الجهات الحكومية والمؤسسات التابعة لها

م	اسم الوزارة	اسم الجهة / الوظيفة	اسم المرشح	المؤهلات	ملاحظات
	الاتصالات	وكيل الوزارة			
		شركة تيليمن			
		شركة يمن موبايل			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
١٣	وزارة الاعلام	نائب وزير الاعلام			
		المؤسسة العامة للإذاعة والتلفزيون			
		مؤسسة الصحافة			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
١٤	وزارة الأوقاف والإرشاد	نائب وزير الأوقاف والإرشاد			
		وكيل قطاع الإرشاد			
		وكيل قطاع الحج			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
١٥	وزارة الشؤون الاجتماعية والعمل	نائب وزير الشؤون الاجتماعية والعمل			
		وكيل وزير الشؤون الاجتماعية والعمل			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
١٦	وزارة الثروة السمكية	نائب وزير الثروة السمكية			
		وكيل وزير الثروة السمكية			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الجهات الحكومية والمؤسسات التابعة لها

م	اسم الوزارة	اسم الجهة / الوظيفة	اسم المرشح	المؤهلات	ملاحظات
	العالي	وكيل ادارة التعليم العالي			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
٧	وزارة العدل	نائب وزير العدل			
		وكيل قطاع شؤون			
		وكيل قطاع الشؤون الفنية			
		المكتب الفني			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
٨	وزارة النفط والمعادن	نائب وزير النفط والمعادن			
		شركة توزيع المنتجات النفطية			
		الشركة اليمنية للغاز			
		الهيئة العامة للاستكشافات النفطية			
		رئيس الهيئة			
		شركة صافر عدن			
		مدير الرقابة والتأديب			
٩	وزارة الخارجية	نائب وزير الخارجية			
		وكيل قطاع الشئون الفنية والإدارية			
		سفير اليمن في اليمن			
		سفير اليمن في روسيا			

الاسم	محل وتاريخ الميلاد	رقم البطاقة	تاريخها
هاشم احمد احمد علي الحيثي	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

الأخ/ وزيـــر الماليـــة — المحترم

بعد التحية ..

بالإشارة الى مذكرة مكتب رئاسة الجمهورية رقم (٨١٤/ص/١٧) وتاريخ ٢١/٣/٢٠١٧م المتضمنة استكمال إجراءات تعيين الأخ/هاشم احمد احمد الحيثي، مستشاراً بمكتب رئاسة الجمهورية بدرجة مدير عام . تنفيذاً لقرار مدير مكتب رئاسة الجمهورية رقم (٢٦) لسنة ٢٠١٧م القاضي بتعيين الأخ/هاشم احمد احمد الحيثي ، مستشاراً بمكتب رئاسة الجمهورية بدرجة مدير عام..

وعليه؛

فإن وزارة الخدمة المدنية والتأمينات تحدد استحقاق الأخ/ المذكور ، وفقاً للقرار المشار إليه اعلاه وعلى النحو التالي:

المستوى	الدرجة	المرتب
الأول	٣	٧٧٥٨٥

يرجى إكمال المعاملة وفقاً لما هو محدد اعلاه ضماً على موازنة مكتب رئاسة الجمهورية للعام المالي ٢٠١٧م...

وتفضلوا بقبول ...

Appointments of a racial nature, including the appointment of a young person, not older than 19, as an advisor in the presidential office due to his tribal affiliation.



الجريدة الرسمية العدد السابع الصادر بتاريخ ٨/ رجب/١٤٣٧هـ الموافق ١٥/ ابريل/٢٠١٦م

قرار رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا رقم (٩٩) لسنة ٢٠١٦م
بالتعيين بدرجة وزير والإحالة إلى التقاعد

رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا .

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الإعلان الدستوري الصادر بتاريخ ٦/٢/٢٠١٥م عن اللجنة الثورية العليا.

وعلى القانون رقم (٤١) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الأوسمة.

قـــــرر

(١) تعيين الشهيد/ عبدالكريم محمد الخيواني بدرجة وزير ويحال إلى التقاعد

(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية .

صدر بمقر اللجنة الثورية العليا بالقصر الجمهوري - بالعاصمة صنعاء
بتاريخ ٢٧ / جماد الثاني /١٤٣٧هـ
الموافق ٦ / إبـريل /٢٠١٦م

محمـد علـــي الحـــوثي
رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا

(٢) يحدد خاص بجهاز الأمن والمخابرات.

- ٢ -

The appointment of Abdul Karim Al-Khaywani to the rank of minister, even though he is deceased, due to his tribal affiliation.



قرار رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا رقم (٦٤) لسنة ٢٠١٦م
بالتعيين والترقية في وزارة الداخلية

رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا :

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.
وعلى الإعلان الدستوري الصادر عن اللجنة الثورية العليا.
وعلى القانون رقم(١٥) لسنة ٢٠٠٠م بشأن هيئة الشرطة.
وعلى القرار الجمهوري بالقانون رقم(٣٢) لسنة ١٩٩٢م بشأن المعاشات والمكافآت لقوات المسلحة والأمن وتعديلاته.
وبناءً على اقتراح وزير الداخلية.

// قـــــــرر //

مادة(١) يُعين ويرقى الآخوين التالية أسمائهما إلى رتبة اللواء في وزارة الداخلية:

١. طه حسن إسماعيل العدائي ٢. عبد الحكيم هاشم علي الخيواني

مادة(٢) يُعين ويرقى الأخ/ ابراهيم عبدالله أحمد قاسم العوية إلى رتبة العميد في وزارة الداخلية.

مادة(٣) يُعين ويرقى الإخوة التالية أسماؤهم إلى رتبة العقيد في وزارة الداخلية وعددهم (٢٨):

١. عبدالله محمد أحمد الهادي	٢. محمد عباس عزالدين يحيى الوجيه
٣. علي محمد علي اليساني	٤. حسن أحمد محمد صالح قياس
٥. علي سالم صالح جابر الصيفي	٦. عبد المنعم هاشم علي صالح الخيواني
٧. هايس صالح صالح شحوس الجماعي	٨. علي حسن دبيش هادي
٩. عبدالباري عبدالله أحسن قاسم الطالبي	١٠. فضل أحمد محمد سنين
١١. أحمد علي ضيف الله جطر	١٢. زكريا حسن محمد حسن الشرفي
١٣. إيهاب عبدالكريم عبد المغني الكحلاني	١٤. عبد الغني صغير علي أحمد الديمي
١٥. وليد ناجي محمد عبدالله أبو راس	١٦. محمد محمد حسين القران
١٧. خالد حسن محمد الشمام	١٨. محمد عباس عبدالله عامر
١٩. عبدالله عيضة مفرح العياني	٢٠. زيد علي مظهر الحوثي
٢١. خالد محمد محمد حسين العدائي	٢٢. محمد عبد الإله عبدالله أحمد جوده
٢٣. إسماعيل محمد اسماعيل المخلافي	٢٤. عارف يحيى مهدي دابل

Appointments, most of which are for individuals belonging to the same tribal lineage and are ideologically aligned with it.

Photos of folders containing a massive number of Houthi tribal appointments, primarily with ethnic and lineage-based characteristics, mostly within the years 2016 and 2017.



الجريدة الرسمية العدد التاسع الصادر بتاريخ ٨/ شعبان/١٤٣٧هـ الموافق ١٥/ مايو/٢٠١٦م

قرار رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا رقم (١٢٣) لسنة ٢٠١٦م

بتعيين نائب عام

رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا :

بعد الإطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الإعلان الدستوري الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٥/٢/٦م عن اللجنة الثورية العليا.

وعلى القانون رقم (١) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن السلطة القضائية وتعديلاته.

قـــــــرر

المادة (١) يعين الأخ / عبدالعزيز ضياء الدين محمد البغدادي نائبا عاما.

المادة (٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية .

صدر بمقر اللجنة الثورية العليا بالقصر الجمهوري - بالعاصمة صنعاء

بتاريخ ٧ / شعبان /١٤٣٧هـ

الموافق ١٤ / مايو /٢٠١٦م

محمد علي الحوثي

رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا



الجريدة الرسمية العدد السابع الصادر بتاريخ ١٨/رجب /١٤٣٨هـ الموافق ١٥/ ابريل/٢٠١٧م

قرار رئيس مجلس الوزراء رقم (٨٤) لسنة ٢٠١٧م

بتعيين مدير عام للإدارة العامة للتعليم الإلكتروني بقطاع المناهج والتوجيه بوزارة التربية والتعليم

رئيس مجلس الوزراء:

بعد الإطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م بين أنصارالله وحلفائهم وعلى المؤتمر الشعبي العام و حلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٥٦) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تشكيل حكومة إنقاذ وطني وتسمية أعضائها.

وعلى القانون رقم (١٩) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة المدنية ولائحته التنفيذية.

وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (٢٨) لسنة ١٩٩٣م بشأن اللائحة التنظيمية لوزارة التربية والتعليم.

وبناءً على عرض وزير التربية والتعليم.

قـــــــرر

المادة(١) يعين الأخ / محمد أحمد محمد شرف الدين مديراً عاماً للإدارة العامة للتعليم الإلكتروني بقطاع المناهج والتوجيه بوزارة التربية والتعليم.

المادة(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية .

صدر برئاسة مجلس الوزراء

بتاريخ ٥ / رجب /١٤٣٨هـ

الموافق ٢ / إبريل/٢٠١٧م

أ.د. عبدالعزيز صالح بن حبتور

رئيس مجلس الوزراء

يحيى بدر الدين الحوثي

وزير التربية والتعليم



الجريدة الرسمية العدد العاشر الصادر بتاريخ ٢٤/ شعبان/١٤٣٧هـ الموافق ٣٠/ مايو/٢٠١٦م

قرار رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا رقم (١٤٢) لسنة ٢٠١٦

بتعيين وكيل لمحافظة صعدة

رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا :

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الإعلان الدستوري الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٥/٢/٦م عن اللجنة الثورية ال

وعلى القانون رقم (١٩) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة المدنية ولائحته التنفيذ

وعلى القانون رقم (٤) لسنة ٢٠٠٠م بشأن السلطة المحلية وتعديلاته.

وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (٢٦٥) لسنة ٢٠٠١م بشأن اللائحة التنظيم لدواوين المحافظات والمديريات.

قـــــرر

مادة(١) يعين الأخ / محمد حسين مجد الدين المؤيدي وكيلا لمحافظة صعدة.

مادة(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية .

صدر بمقر اللجنة الثورية العليا بالقصر الجمهوري - بالعاصمة صنعاء

بتاريخ ١٨ / شعبان /١٤٣٧هـ

الموافق ٢٥ / مـــايـــو /٢٠١٦م

محمـــد عـلـــي الحـــوثي

رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا



رئيس مجلس الوزراء:

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م بين انصارالله

والمؤتمر الشعبي العام و حلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأ

مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

وعلى القانون رقم (١٩) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة المدنية ولائحته التنف

وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (٩٥) لسنة ١٩٩٦م بشأن اللائحة التنظيمية

الشباب والرياضة.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٥٦) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تش

حكومة انقاذ وطني وتسمية أعضائها.

وبناء على عرض وزيـــر الشباب والرياضة.

قـــــرر

مادة(١) يعين الأخ/ عـدنان محمـد قاسم المتوكـل مـديراً عامـاً للإدارة العا

للعلاقات العامة بديوان عام وزارة الشباب والرياضة.

مادة(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة مجلـس الـــوزراء

بتاريخ ١٠/ جماد أول /١٤٣٨هـ

الموافق ٧ / فبرايـر /٢٠١٧م

أ.د.عبدالعزيز صالح بن حبتور

رئيـــس مـــ

حســن محمـد زيـد

ر الشباب والرياضة



الجريدة الرسمية العدد العاشرون الصادر بتاريخ ... الموافق ٣٠/ مايو/٢٠١٦م

قرار رئيس مجلس الوزراء رقم (٢٨٦) لسنة ٢٠١٧م

بالترقية إلى درجة مستشار بوزارة الخارجية

رئيس مجلس الوزراء:

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م بين انصارالله و

والمؤتمر الشعبي العام و حلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تح

مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

وعلى القانون رقم (٣) لسنة ٢٠٠٤م بشأن مجلس الوزراء.

وعلى القانون رقم (٢) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن السلك الدبلوماسي والقنصلي

وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (٢٤٤) لسنة ١٩٩٧م بشأن اللائحة التنظيمية لو

الخارجية.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٥٦) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تش

حكومة الانقاذ الوطني وتسمية أعضائها.

وبناء على عرض وزير الخارجية.

قـــــرر

ة (١) يرقى الأخ / جمال محمـد صالح شـيبان إلى درجـة مستشار بو

الخارجية.

(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة مجلـس الـــوزراء

بتاريخ ٢ / صـــفر / ١٤٣٩هـ

الموافق ٢٢ / أكتـوبر / ٢٠١٧م

أ.د.عبدالعزيز صالح بن حبت

رئيـــس مجـــلس الـــوز

نام شرف عبدالله

ر الخارجيـــة



الجريـدة الرسميـة العدد العاشر الصادر بتاريخ ٢٤/ شعبان/١٤٣٧هـ الموافق ٣٠/ مايو/٢٠١٦م

قرار رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا رقم (١٤٤) لسنة ٢٠١٦م

بتعيين وكيل لمصلحة الضرائب

رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا :

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الإعلان الدستوري الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٥/٢/٦م عن اللجنة الثورية العل

وعلى القانون رقم (١٩) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة المدنية ولائحته التنفيذية

وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (١٨٦) لسنة ٢٠٠٧م بشأن اللائحة التنظيمية لمصلحة الضرائب.

قـــــرر

مادة(١) يعين الأخ / طارق زيد مطهر زيد المطهر وكيلا لمصلحة الضرائب.

مادة(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية .

صدر بمقر اللجنة الثورية العليا بالقصر الجمهوري - بالعاصمة صنعاء

بتاريخ ١٩ / شعبان /١٤٣٧هـ

الموافق ٢٦ / مـــايـــو /٢٠١٦م

محمـــد عـلـــي الحـــوثي

رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا



الجريدة الرسمية العدد السابع عشر الصادر بتاريخ ٢٤/ ذي الحجة/١٤٣٨هـ الموافق ...

قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٨١) لسنة ٢٠١٧م

بتعيين رئيس لمجلس القضاء الأعلى

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى:

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م بين أنصارالله وحلف...

والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

وعلى القانون رقم (١) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن السلطة القضائية وتعديلاته.

وعلى قرار رئيس الجمهورية رقم (٤٣) لسنة ٢٠١٤م بشأن اللائحة التنظيمية لمجلس القضاء الأعلى.

قـــــرر

مادة (١) يعين القاضي/ أحمد يحيى محمد المتوكل رئيساً لمجلس القضاء الأعلى.

مادة (٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة الجمهورية - بالعاصمة صنعاء

بتاريخ ١٨ / ذي الحجة/١٤٣٨هـ

الموافق ٩ / سبتمبر /٢٠١٧م

صالح علـــي الصمـ

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأع...

القرار رقم (٨٠) بعدد خاص بجهاز بالأمن والمخابرات



الجريـدة الرسميـة العدد العاشر الصادر بتاريخ ٢٤/ شعبان/١٤٣٧هـ الموافق ٣١/ ...

قرار رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا رقم (١٣٧) لسنة ٢٠١٦م

بتعيين مستشار لمصلحة الضرائب بدرجة وكيل وزارة

رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا :

بعد الإطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الإعلان الدستوري الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٥/٢/٦م عن اللجنة الثورية العليا.

وعلى القانون رقم(١٩) لسنة١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة المدنية ولائحته التنفيذية.

وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (٨٦) لسنة ٢٠٠٧م بشأن اللائحة التنظيمية لمصلحة الضرائب.

قـــــرر

مادة(١) يعين الأخ / أحمد قاسم علي الديلمي مستشاراً لمصلحة الضرائب بدرجة وكيل وزارة.

(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية .

صدر بمقر اللجنة الثورية العليا بالقصر الجمهوري - بالعاصمة صنعاء

بتاريخ ١٠ / شعبان /١٤٣٧هـ

الموافق ١٧ / مايو /٢٠١٦م

محمد علـــي الحـــوثي

رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا



الجريـدة الرسميـة العدد الرابع الصادر بتاريخ ٢ /جماد ثاني /١٤٣٨هـ الموافق ٢٨/ فبراير /٢٠١٧م

قرار رئيس مجلس الوزراء رقم (٤٠) لسنة ٢٠١٧

بتعيين مدير عام لمكتب وزير الخدمة المدنية والتأمينات

...س مجلس الوزراء:

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م بين أنصارالله وحلفائه والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

...على القانون رقم (١٩) لسنة١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة المدنية ولائحته التنفيذية.

...على القرار الجمهوري رقم (٢٢٥) لسنة ٢٠٠٧م بشأن اللائحة التنظيمية لوزا... الخدمة المدنية والتأمينات.

...على قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٥٦) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تشكي... حكومة انقاذ وطني وتسمية أعضائها.

...ناء على عرض وزير الخدمة المدنية والتأمينات.

قـــــرر

(١) يعين الأخ/علي عبد اللطيف المؤيد مديراً عاماً لمكتب وزير الخدمة المدنية والتأمينات.

(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة مجلـس الـوزراء

بتاريخ ٢٢ /جماد أول/١٤٣٨هـ

الموافق ١٩/ فبراير /٢٠١٧م

...ل عبدالكريم عقلان | **أ.د. عبدالعزيز صالح بن حبتو...**

...دمة المدنية والتأمينات | **رئيس مجلس الوزرا...**



الجريـدة الرسميـة العدد الأول الصادر بتاريخ ٦/ربيع الثاني/١٤٣٧هـ الموافق ١٥/ يناير /٢٠١...

قرار رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا رقم (٩) لسنة ٢٠١٦م

بتعيين نائب للمدير العام التنفيذي لشركة توزيع المنتجات النفطية لشئون المالية والإدارية

رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا :

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الإعلان الدستوري الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٥/٢/٦م عن اللجنة الثورية العليا.

وعلى القانون رقم(١٩) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة المدنية واللوائح المنفذة له.

وعلى القرار الجمهوري بالقانون رقم(٢٥) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الهيئات والمؤسسات والشركات العامة وتعديلاته.

وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (٤٧)لسنة ١٩٩٦م بشأن إنشاء المؤسسة اليمنية العامة للنفط والغاز.

قـــــرر

مادة(١) يعين الاخ/ ابراهيم محمد علي المؤيد نائبا للمدير العام التنفيذي لشركة توزيع المنتجات النفطية للشئون المالية والادارية.

مادة(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية .

صدر بمقر اللجنة الثورية العليا بالقصر الجمهوري - بالعاصمة صنعاء

بتاريخ ٢ / ربيع ثاني /١٤٣٧هـ

الموافق ١٢ / يناير /٢٠١٦م

محمد علـــي الحـــوثي

رئيس اللجنة الثورية العليا



الجريدة الرسمية العدد الثاني والعشرون الصادر بتاريخ ١٢/ربيع الأول/١٤٣٩هـ الموافق ٣٠/نوفمبر/٢٠١٧م

قرار رئيس مجلس الوزراء رقم (٣٥١) لسنة ٢٠١٧م

بتعيين مدير عام للشؤون القانونية بوزارة الداخلية

...س مجلس الوزراء:

...بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

...وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م بين أنصارالله وحلفائهم

...والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه.

...وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

...وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

...وعلى القانون رقم (١٩) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة المدنية ولائحته التنفيذية.

...وعلى القانون رقم (٣) لسنة ٢٠٠٤م بشأن مجلس الوزراء.

...وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٥٦) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تشكيل حكومة الإنقاذ الوطني وتسمية أعضائها.

...وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (٤٦) لسنة ١٩٩٣م بشأن اللائحة التنظيمية لوزارة الشؤون القانونية وتعديلاته.

...وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (١٦٩) لسنة ١٩٩٥م بشأن اللائحة التنظيمية لوزارة الداخلية .

...وعلى قرار رئيس مجلس الوزراء رقم (٢٩٥) لسنة ٢٠١٣م بشأن تبعية وظائف الموارد البشرية، الشئون المالية ، الشئون القانونية).

قـــــرر

(١) يعين العقيد / عبدالله عبدالرزاق محمد المداني مديراً عاماً للشؤون القانونية بوزارة الداخلية.

(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة مجلس الـــوزراء

بتاريخ ١٠ / ربيع أول / ١٤٣٩هـ

الموافق ٢٨ / نوفمبر / ٢٠١٧م

الرحمن أحمد المختار — **أ.د.عبدالعزيز صالح بن حبتور**

الشؤون القانونية — **رئيـــس مجـــلس الـــوزراء**

- ٤١ -



الجريدة الرسمية العدد السادس الصادر بتاريخ ٢ / رجب /١٤٣٨هـ الموافق ٣١/ مارس /٢٠١٧م

قرار رئيس مجلس الوزراء رقم (٧٤) لسنة ٢٠١٧م

بتعيين مدير عام للبعثات والمنح الدراسية بوزارة التعليم العالي والبحث العلمي

رئيس مجلس الوزراء:

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م بين أنصارالله وحلفائهم

والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

وعلى القانون رقم (١٩) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة المدنية ولائحته التنفيذية.

وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (٣٩) لسنة ٢٠١٠م بشأن اللائحة التنظيمية لوزارة التعليم العالي والبحث العلمي.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٥٦) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تشكيل حكومة الإنقاذ الوطني وتسمية أعضائها.

وبناء على عرض وزير التعليم العالي والبحث العلمي.

قـــــرر

مادة (١) يعين الأخ / احمد محمد احمد المراني مديراً عاماً للبعثات والمنح الدراسية بوزارة التعليم العالي والبحث العلمي.

مادة (٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة مجلس الـــوزراء

بتاريخ ٢٢ /جماد ثاني /١٤٣٨هـ

الموافق ٢٢ / مـارس /٢٠١٧م

أ. حسيـــن عـلـي حـــازب — **أ.د.عبدالعزيز صالح بن حبتور**

وزير التعليم العالي والبحث العلمي — **رئيـــس مجـــلس الـــوزراء**

- ٢٢ -



الجريدة الرسمية العدد الرابع الصادر بتاريخ ٢ / جماد ثاني /١٤٣٨هـ الموافق ١/ مارس/٢٠١٧م

قـرار رئيس مجلس الوزراء رقم (٤٧) لسنة ٢٠١٧م

بتعيين مدير عام للمؤسسة المحلية للمياه والصرف الصحي بمحافظة ...

...يس مجلس الوزراء:

...وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م بين أنصارالله و...

والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن ...

...مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

...وعلى القانون رقم(١٩) لسنة١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة المدنية ولائحته التنفيذية

...وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (٢٨) لسنة ٢٠٠٤م بشأن اللائحة التنظيمية ...

...لمياه والبيئة .

...على القرار الجمهوري رقم (٥٥) لسنة ٢٠٠٥م بشأن إنشاء المؤسسة المحلية ...

...الصرف الصحي بمحافظة البيضاء.

...على قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٥٦) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تش...

...كومة إنقاذ وطني وتسمية أعضائها.

...ناء على عرض وزير المياه والبيئة.

قـــــرر

...) يعين الأخ/محمد عبدالوهاب حسين الشامي مديراً عاماً للمؤسسة الحل...

للمياه والصرف الصحي بمحافظة البيضاء.

...) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة مجلس الـــوزراء

بتاريخ ٢٨ /جماد أول/١٤٣٨هـ

الموافـق ٢٥ / فبـراير /٢٠١٧م

...عبدالله الوزير — **أ.د.عبدالعزيز صالح بن حبتور**

...لمياه والبيئـة — **رئيـــس مجـــلس الـــوزراء**

- ٧٨ -



الجريدة الرسمية العدد الثالث الصادر بتاريخ ١٩/ جماد أول /١٤٣٨هـ الموافق ١٥/ فبراير /٢٠١٧م

قرار رئيس مجلس الوزراء رقم (٤٤) لسنة ٢٠١٧م

بتعيين مدير عام للإدارة العامة للبرمجة بالمركز الوطني للمعلومات

رئيس مجلس الوزراء:

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م بين أنصارالله وحلفائهم

والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

وعلى القانون رقم (١٩) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة المدنية ولائحته التنفيذية.

وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (١٥٥) لسنة ١٩٩٥م بشأن انشاء المركز الوطني للمعلومات وتعديلاته.

وعلى قرار رئيس مجلس الوزراء رقم (٣٠٠) لسنة ٢٠٠٠م بشأن اللائحة التنظيمية للمركز الوطني للمعلومات.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٥٦) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تشكيل حكومة إنقاذ وطني وتسمية أعضائها.

وبناء على عرض رئيس المركز الوطني للمعلومات.

قـــــرر

مادة(١) يعين الأخ/ ابـراهيم حسين مطهر عقبات مديراً عاماً للإدارة العامة للبرمجة بالمركز الوطني للمعلومات.

مادة(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة مجلس الـــوزراء

بتاريخ ٤ /جماد أول /١٤٣٨هـ

الموافـق ١ / فبرايـر /٢٠١٧م

أ.د.عبدالعزيز صالح بن حبتور

رئيـــس مجـــلس الـــوزراء

- ٩ -



وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٩/٧/٢٨م بين انصارالله وحلفائهم والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٧/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٧م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

وعلى القانون رقم (١٩) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة المدنية ولائحته التنفيذية.

وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (١٣٩) لسنة ٢٠١٠م بشأن اللائحة التنظيمية لوزارة التعليم العالي والبحث العلمي.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٥١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تشكيل حكومة انقاذ وطني وتسمية أعضائها.

وبعد موافقة المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

قـــــرر

مادة(١) يمنح الأخ الدكتور / عبدالله محمد الشامي درجة وزير عامل.

مادة(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة الجمهورية - بالعاصمة صنعاء

بتاريخ ١٥ / جماد أول / ١٤٣٨هـ

الموافق ١٣ / فبراير / ٢٠١٧م

صالح علي الصماد

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى

عبدالعزيز صالح بن حبتور

رئيس مجلس الوزراء



قرار جمهوري رقم (١١) لسنة ٢٠١٧م

بتعيين مدير لمكتب نائب رئيس الوزراء للشؤون الاقتصادية بدرجة وكيل وزارة

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى:

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٧/٧/٢٨م بين انصارالله وحلفائهم والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

وعلى القانون رقم (١٩) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة المدنية ولائحته التنفيذية.

وعلى القانون رقم (٢) لسنة ٢٠٠٤م بشأن مجلس الوزراء.

وعلى قرار رئيس مجلس الوزراء ومكتب رئيس الوزراء الداخلية للأمانة العامة لمجلس الوزراء رقم (٢٠٣) لسنة ٢٠٠٧م بشأن اللائحة

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٥١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تشكيل حكومة إنقاذ وطني وتسمية أعضائها.

وبعد موافقة المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

قـــــرر

مادة(١) يعين الأخ / ابراهيم علي علي الشرفي مديراً لمكتب نائب رئيس الوزراء للشؤون الاقتصادية بدرجة وكيل وزارة.

مادة(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة الجمهورية - بالعاصمة صنعاء

بتاريخ ١٥ / جماد ثاني/١٤٣٨هـ

الموافق ١٤ / مـــارس /٢٠١٧م

أ.د. عبدالعزيز صالح بن حبتور

رئيس مجلس الـــوزراء

صالح علـــي الصمـــاد

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى



قرار جمهوري رقم (١٧) لسنة ٢٠١٧م

بالترقية من رتبة العقيد إلى رتبة العميد بوزارة الداخلية

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى:

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٧/٧/٢٨م بين انصارالله وحلفائهم والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

وعلى القانون رقم (٥) لسنة ٢٠٠٠م بشأن هيئة الشرطة.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٥١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تشكيل حكومة الإنقاذ الوطني وتسمية اعضائها.

وعلى القرار الجمهوري بالقانون رقم (٣٣) لسنة ١٩٩٢م بشأن المعاشات والمكافآت للقوات المسلحة والأمن وتعديلاته.

وبعد موافقة المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

قـــــرر

مادة(١) يرقى العقيد / أمين عز الدين احمد المؤيد الى رتبة العميد بوزارة الداخلية.

مادة(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة الجمهورية - بالعاصمة صنعاء

بتاريخ ٢٨ / جمادى ثاني/١٤٣٨هـ

الموافق ٢٧ / مـــارس /٢٠١٧م

محمدعبدالله القومي

الداخليـــة

أ.د عبدالعزيز صالح بن حبتور

رئيس مجلـــس الـــوزراء

صالح علـــي الصمـــاد

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى



قرار جمهوري رقم (٢٠) لسنة ٢٠١٧م

بمنح درجة وزير عـــامل

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى:

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية.

وعلى الاتفاق السياسي الموقع بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٧/٢٨م بين انصارالله وحلفائهم والمؤتمر الشعبي العام وحلفائه.

وعلى الإعلان الصادر بتاريخ ٢٠١٦/٨/٦م بتشكيل المجلس السياسي الأعلى.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تحديد مهام المجلس واختصاصاته.

وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (٥١) لسنة ٢٠١٦م بشأن تشكيل حكومة إنقاذ وطني وتسمية أعضائها.

وعلى القانون رقم (١٩) لسنة ١٩٩١م بشأن الخدمة المدنية ولائحته التنفيذية.

وعلى القانون رقم (٢) لسنة ٢٠٠٤م بشأن مجلس الوزراء.

وعلى قرار رئيس مجلس الوزراء رقم (٢٠٣) لسنة ٢٠٠٧م بشأن اللائحة الداخلية للأمانة العامة لمجلس الوزراء ومكتب رئيس الوزراء.

قـــــرر

مادة(١) يمنح الأخ/ يحيى محمد احمد الهادي درجة وزيراً عـــاملاً.

مادة(٢) يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة الجمهورية - بالعاصمة صنعاء

بتاريخ ١١ / رجـــب /١٤٣٨هـ

الموافـــق ٨ / إبـــريل /٢٠١٧م

أ.د عبدالعزيز صالح بن حبتور

رئيس مجلـــس الـــوزراء

صالح علـــي الصمـــاد

رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة المالية

قرار وزير المالية رقم (٦٣) لسنة 2017م

بتكليف الأخ/ عبدالله محمد محمد شرف - مديراً عاماً لمكتب المالية بمحافظة صنعاء.

وزير المالية .

- بعد الاطلاع على القانون المالي رقم (8) لسنة 1990م ولائحته التنفيذية وتعديلاتهما.
- وعلى القانون رقم (19) لسنة 1991م بشأن الخدمة المدنية ولائحته التنفيذية.
- وعلى القانون رقم (43) لسنة 2005م بشأن نظام الوظائف والأجور والمرتبات ولائحته التنفيذية.
- وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (27) لسنة 1993م بشأن اللائحة التنظيمية لوزارة المالية وتعديله.
- وعلى قرار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى رقم (56) لعام 2016م بشأن تشكيل حكومة الإنقاذ الوطني وتسمية أعضائها.
- ولما تقتضيه المصلحة العامة.

قـــــــرر

مادة (1): يكلف الأخ/ عبدالله محمد محمد شرف- مديراً عاماً لمكتب المالية بمحافظة صنعاء.

مادة (2): يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره ويبلغ من يلزم تنفيذه.

صدر بديوان عام وزارة المالية بتاريخ / / 1438هـ
الموافق ٦ / ٣ / 2017م

وزير المالية



نشر في أكتوبر 24, 2021

موقع أنصار الله – صنعاء – 18 ربيع الأول 1443 هجرية

دشن وزير الداخلية اللواء عبدالكريم أمير الدين الحوثي ، اليوم الاحد ، العمل في غرفة عمليات الإنذار المبكر والرصد المرئي للسيول والكوارث، في مصلحة الدفاع المدني.

وخلال التدشين الذي حضره مفتش عام وزارة الداخلية اللواء الركن عبد الحميد المؤيد، ووكيل وزارة الداخلية لقطاع الخدمات المدنية للشرطة اللواء عبدالله محمد جحاف، قدم رئيس مصلحة الدفاع المدني اللواء عبدالفتاح المداني والمختصون في المصلحة ، شرحا عن مهام

A news article on the "Ansar Allah" website affiliated with the Houthi movement explains that the leadership within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs belongs to a single lineage.

17- Plundering in the Name of Religious, Political, and Lineage-Based Activities:



Receipt for purchasing items related to the celebration of the Prophet's Birthday from commercial stores.

.

Houthi directive requiring institutions to remove green fabrics and banners, and all of this is done in exchange for a substantial amount of money that should have been used to feed the hungry.

فاتورة تحصيل (نقدي)

الرقم:
التاريخ:

المدفوع من السادة/ اللجنة التنظيمية لإحياء الذكرى الأولى لاستشهاد الشهيد القائد قاسم سليماني
مقابل/ الأعمال المطبوعة التالية

الصنف	العدد	سعر الوحدة	سعر الكمية	ملاحظات
لوحات بوتي بلي (عملاقة)	20	250,000	5,750,000	
لوحات بنر 14 X 6	150	336,000	50,400,000	
لوحات قماش 14 X 6	300	126,000	37,800,000	
بوسترات A4 عادي	40,000	54,000	2,160,000	
بوسترات A4 لاصق	40,000	61,000	2,440,000	
صور للشهيد مقاس A3	25,000	81,000	2,025,005	
صور للشهيد مقاس A4	20,000	54,000	1,080,000	
الإجمالي			(101,655,005 ر.ي) مائة وواحد مليون وستمائة وخمسه وخمسون الف وخمس ريال	

توقيع المدير المالي

توقيع الصندوق

الفروع : مستشفى الثورة بمدينة الحديدة - جولة 26 | المركز الرئيسي - مستشفى الدائري - جولة 20

A bill of more than 100 million rials for the costs of commemorating the anniversary of the killing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps leader Qassem Soleimani at a time when the group refuses to pay the salaries of Yemeni employees.

The Houthis are forcing revenue-generating institutions (finance, taxes, water, transportation, and real estate revenues) to carry out sectarian activities instead of utilizing state funds to pay salaries and provide services.

الأنشطة الدينية والوطنية ومواعيد اقامتها:

م	المناسبة / النشاط	التاريخ
1	ذكرى الهجرة النبوية	1 محرم
2	ذكرى استشهاد الامام الحسين عليه السلام (عاشوراء)	10 محرم
3	ذكرى استشهاد الامام زيد عليه السلام	25 محرم
4	قدوم الامام الهادي الى اليمن	6 صفر
5	المولد النبوي الشريف	12 ربيع الأول
6	الذكرى السنوية للشهيد	13- 19 جماد أول
7	مولد السيدة فاطمة الزهراء عليها السلام	20 جماد ثاني
8	جمعة رجب	أول جمعة من رجب
9	ذكرى استشهاد الشهيد القائد السيد / حسين بدرالدين الحوثي	27 رجب
10	ذكرى غزوة بدر الكبرى	19 رمضان
11	ذكرى استشهاد الامام علي عليه السلام	21رمضان
12	يوم القدس العالمي	آخر جمعة من رمضان
13	عيد الفطر المبارك	1 شوال
14	ذكرى الصرخة	آخر جمعة من شوال
15	ذكرى ثورة 21 سبتمبر	21 سبتمبر
16	عيد الأضحى المبارك	10 ذي الحجة
17	ذكرى يوم الولاية (عيد الغدير)	18ذي الحجة
18	اليوم الوطني للصمود في مواجهة العدوان السعودي الأمريكي على اليمن	26 مارس

والله ولي الصداله والتوفيق

A list displaying Houthi religious and political occasions, with the majority of them being sectarian in nature, often mirroring Iranian practices, and aimed at glorifying and venerating their specific group.

الأخ/ المدير التنفيذي لمؤسسة موانئ البحر الأحمر اليمنية،

المحترم

تحية طيبة:

يتم التوجيه بصرف مبلغ خمسة عشر مليون ريال لمواجهة متطلبات الفعاليات الخاصة بإحياء ذكرى عامين من الصمود في وجه العدوان ..///..

وشكراً،،،

أ.د/ عبدالعزيز صالح بن حبتور

رئيس مجلس الوزراء

Instruction to allocate 15 million Yemeni rials from a single foundation to support the commemoration of a Houthi event.

Republic Of Yemen
Council of Ministers
Capital Secretariat

تعميم

الأخ/ وكيل قطاع شؤون الأحياء — المحترم

الأخوة /مدراء المديريات — المحترم

تحية طيبة وبعد..

يتم توجيه مشائخ المديريات ومشائخ الأحياء وعقال الحارات بتشكيل لجان على مستوى كل مديرية برئاسة شيخ المديرية وعلى مستوى كل حي برئاسة شيخ الحي وعلى مستوى كل حارة برئاسة عاقل الحارة وذلك للإعداد والتحضير والحشد لاستقبال المولد النبوي الشريف صلى الله عليه وسلم لعام ١٤٤٠هـ ،ويتم من خلالهم التعريف بأهمية احياء هذه المناسبة العظيمة، والحث للمشاركة في سائر الاحتفال المخصصة بأمانة العاصمة صنعاء، لكل فئات المجتمع

ولكم جزيل الشكر والتقدير..

أمين العاصمة صنعاء
رئيس المجلس المحلي
حمود محمد عباد

Assigning the directorates of Sana'a to prepare for the celebration of the Prophet's birthday, through which they extort merchants and citizens in Sana'a.

﴿هَٰٓأَنتُمْ هَٰٓؤُلَآءِ تُدْعَوْنَ لِتُنفِقُوا۟ فِى سَبِيلِ ٱللَّهِ فَمِنكُم مَّن يَبْخَلُ ۖ وَمَن يَبْخَلْ فَإِنَّمَا يَ
وَٱللَّهُ ٱلْغَنِىُّ وَأَنتُمُ ٱلْفُقَرَآءُ ۚ وَإِن تَتَوَلَّوْا۟ يَسْتَبْدِلْ قَوْمًا غَيْرَكُمْ ثُمَّ لَا يَكُونُوٓا۟ أَمْثَٰلَكُم﴾

إستجابة لأمر الله سبحانه وتعالى بالإنفاق وبمناسبة قدوم المولد ا

يدعوكم المجلس المحلي بمديرية الثورة للعاصمة في

قافلة الرسول الأعظم صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم

دعماً واسناداً لرجال الجيش واللجان الشعبية

يرجى اغلاق المقرظ بعد وضع المساهمة

Exploiting the occasion of the Prophet's birthday to collect money under the pretext of supporting the fronts, but it goes into the pockets of Houthi leaders, as some have testified, as mentioned in this book.



A memorandum from the presidency under Houthi control addressed to the Ministry of Youth and Sports, instructing to allocate 30 million rials for the Houthi-specific birthday celebration and directing the Houthi minister to disburse the funds.

The director of the Youth Welfare Fund, Nazima Osman, resigned from her position after being compelled to allocate 30 million rials for the birthday celebration, stating that it is an unlawful measure.



اللجنة الإشرافية

إلى من يهمه الأمر

تحية طيبة وبعد ..

اللجنة الإشرافية للصناسية

A memorandum issued by the Houthi Supervisory Committee requests government and private institutions to provide support for their sectarian events.

A photo from an event organized by Ministry of Finance and Tax Authority on the Prophet's birthday, wasting state revenues allocated for salaries on various events with political, military, and sectarian motives.

Houthi sectarian Hussainiyat in schools with the money of Yemenis.

A cartoon by the Yemeni artist Rashad Al-Samai illustrates the Houthi's approach in using starvation to subdue the community and spread their sectarian ideology.

A photo taken From the Houthi's activities related to the Mawlid (celebration of the Prophet's birthday).

The Ministries of Civil Service, Insurance, Agriculture, and Irrigation are conducting celebrations for the Prophet's birthday to achieve political and military goals, despite not paying the employees' salaries.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
Minister's Office
NO.٦٨٥٥٥ الرقم : م/و ت

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة التربية والتعليم
مكتب الوزير
التاريخ : ..... DATE ..... الموافق : ٢٠٢١/٣/١٣

الأخوة/مدراء مكاتب التربية والتعليم بالأمانة والمحافظات المحترمون

تحية طيبة وبعد،

الموضوع : إحياء الذكرى السنوية لاستشهاد الشهيد القائد/ حسين بدر الدين الحوثي 1442هـ

بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه، وانطلاقا من إيمان الوزارة بأهمية إحياء الذكرى السنوية لاستشهاد الشهيد القائد/ حسين بدر الدين الحوثي والتي لها دلالات هامة لما تحمله من معان عظيمة ،و وفاء لما قدمه الشهيد من تضحيات في سبيل الله، وتعزيز الهوية الإيمانية للإنسان اليمني و للجهود العظيمة التي بذلها لترسيخ مفاهيم العزة والصمود و الجهاد في حياتنا، و تشكيل وعي جامع للأمتين العربية والإسلامية بما يكفل تصحيح مسارها وسيادة قرارها وتوحيد مواقفها تجاه القضايا المصيرية، وتذكيراً بالمبادئ العظيمة التي عمل على نشرها وضحى بروحه من أجل تحقيقها، و إرشاداً لاتباع نهج أعلام الهدى الذي تبناه وجعله مسيرة حياة لنا جميعاً.

يتم التوجيه بالآتي:

1. إحياء هذه المناسبة لما لها من دلالات ومعاني الوفاء للشهيد القائد وتضحياته.
2. إقامة الندوات الفكرية حول هذه الذكرى في كافة المدارس الحكومية والأهلية .
3. تنفيذ الأنشطة والبرامج وإقامة الفعاليات الشعرية والخطابية والإنشادية والمسرحية المعبرة والهادفة .
4. الإعداد الجيد لإذاعات مدرسية نموذجية تغطي إعلامياً تحتوي فقراتها على عظمة هذه المناسبة، وضرورة المضي على نهج الشهيد القائد.
5. تخصيص محتوى المجلات الحائطية في المدارس للحديث عن هذه المناسبة.
6. المشاركة الفاعلة في برامج وأنشطة المناسبة على المستوى العام.
7. توثيق الفعاليات وتغطيتها إعلامياً عبر جميع القنوات الإعلامية والمرئية والمسموعة ومواقع التواصل الاجتماعي المختلفة.
8. التركيز في مضامين الندوات والإذاعات والفعاليات والأنشطة على مايلي:
   - استذكار الشهيد القائد ومآثره، لما في ذلك من تعزيز لمواقفنا وثباتنا وصمودنا، ولنكون أقدر على مواجهة التحديات والأخطار التي تسيطر على الواقع المؤسف لأمتنا عموماً وبلدنا بصورة خاصة.
   - أهمية اتباع نهج الشهيد القائد للانتصار للمظلومية التي يتعرض لها الشعب اليمني من العدوان السعودي الأمريكي، ومواجهة بشاعة قوى الشر والإجرام وإفلاسها الأخلاقي.
   - إحياء روح الجهاد والاستشهاد في مشاعرنا وقلوبنا والتأكيد على مواصلة السير في درب الحرية والكرامة والاستقامة التي أكد عليها الشهيد القائد في دروسه و محاضراته، ليثمر ذلك عزاً ونصراً لهذه الأمة.
9. تشكيل لجنة إشرافية في المحافظة ولجان فرعية في المديريات وفتح غرفة عمليات في المحافظة لمتابعة الأنشطة والفعاليات التربوية التي ستنفذ بهذه المناسبة.
10. النزول الميداني من القيادات التربوية في المحافظة والمديريات للإشراف على تنفيذ الأنشطة والفعاليات مع تأكيدنا على الاهتمام بالتنفيذ والمتابعة أولا بأول، ومواقافتنا بما تم انجازه.

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتنا ،،،

يحيى بدر الدين الحوثي
وزير التربية والتعليم

صورة مع التحية إدارة المتابعة والتقييم

صنعاء - شارع جامعة الدول العربية ت: ٢٥٢٧٢٧-١-٠٦٧٠٠٠ - ف: ٢٥٢٧٣١-١-٠٦٧٠٠٠ www.moe.gov.ye

الممسوحة ضوئيا بـ CamScanner

Yahya Badr al-Din al-Houthi directs government and private schools to commemorate the anniversary of the death of his brother, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi.

18- Racial Discrimination Tax Collection:

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة الشؤون القانونية

وزارة الشئون القانونية
الإدارة العامة
للإصدار والتوثيق

الفصل السابع

زكاة المنتجات الحيوانية

المادة (٤٦) تجب الزكاة في المنتجات الحيوانية المعدة للتجارة كالألبان ومشتقاتها وبيض الدجاج وحرير دودة القز وغيرها، وتعامل هذه المنتجات معاملة عروض التجارة من حيث الاحتساب والنصاب والمقدار ونحوها.

الفصل الثامن

ما يجب في الركاز والمعادن

المادة (٤٧) أ- يجب الخمس (٢٠ %) في الركاز والمعادن المستخرجة من باطن الأرض أو البحر أياً كانت حالتها الطبيعية جامدة أو سائلة كالذهب، الفضة، النحاس، الماس، العقيق، الزمرد، الفيروز، النفط ، الغاز، القير، الماء، الملح، الزئبق، الأحجار، الكربي، النيس، الرخام وكل ما كان له قيمة من المعادن الأخرى .

ب- يجب الخمس (٢٠%) في كل ما استخرج من البحر كالسمك واللؤلؤ والعنبر وغيره.

ج- يجب الخمس (٢٠ %) في العسل إذا غنم من الشجر أو الكهوف.

د- يصدر رئيس الهيئة بعد موافقة المجلس قراراً بتنظيم عملية تقرير وتحصيل واحتساب زكاة الركاز والمعادن والمنتجات المائية.

المادة (٤٨) أ- مصارف ما يجب في الركاز والمعادن:

١. السهم الأول: سهم لله ويصرف في مصالح المسلمين العامة كالطرق، المستشفيات، المدارس، أجور العاملين فيها، طباعة كتب العلم والمناهج الدراسية وتحصين ثغور المسلمين جنداً وسلاحاً ومؤونة وغير ذلك من المصالح العامة التي لا يراعى فيها جنس بعينه أو أشخاص بعينهم.

٢. السهم الثاني: سهم الرسول لولي الأمر وله كل تصرف فيها.

٣. السهم الثالث: لذوي القربى من بني هاشم الذين حرمت عليهم الصدقة فجعل الله لهم الخمس عوضاً عن الزكاة ولأولى أن تصرف في فقرائهم.

٤. السهم الرابع: يصرف ليتامى المسلمين بمن فيهم يتامى بني هاشم.

٥. السهم الخامس: يصرف لعموم مساكين المسلمين بمن فيهم مساكين بني هاشم.

٦. السهم السادس: يصرف في مصرف ابن السبيل من بني هاشم أو من غيرهم من سائر المسلمين.

ب- يصدر رئيس الهيئة بعد موافقة المجلس قراراً بتفاصيل وضوابط مصارف الركاز والمعادن.

The Houthi Law for Legalizing the Plunder of Yemeni Wealth Under the Pretext of the "Fifth" Tax.

Annex 3
Photos and Documents:
Chapter Three
1- The suffering of refugees and internally displaced people:

The residents of Damaj city, located in the Sa'ada Governorate, are leaving their areas due to a siege imposed by the Houthi forces and the shelling of their homes with various heavy weapons.

Yemeni Jewish families have been displaced from the country by the Houthi forces.

The rubble of Azam Rajeh Al-Zubairi's house after it was destroyed by the Houthi forces in January 2015 in the Shara Arhab area, north of Sana'a (child on the rubble of the family's house). Photo taken by Nabil Al-Ozri.

The well-known Yemeni writer and poet, Gha'eb Hawas, delivering a statement on behalf of the displaced people from Sa'ada in front of the Prime Minister's office on December 27, 2011.

This photo was taken at the end of November 2014 and shows a family among many families who fled to the mountains, caves, and valleys due to the Houthi invasion of the Al-Mansah region in the Wadi Rabia district, affiliated with the Qifah Al-Mudhahijah tribes. Photographer: Nasser Al-Sani.

Women leaving their villages in Taiz Governorate after being displaced by the Houthis.

Olympic champion Hilal Al-Hajj, who tragically drowned while attempting to migrate to Europe after the Houthis denied him his rights and threatened to take him to the battlefronts.

2 - Extortion of Migrants:

Burning of migrants inside a detention center affiliated with the Houthi-controlled Passport Building in Sana'a. Testimonies confirm that the Houthis force them to fight or pay a ransom for their release.

Photos of the bodies of victims of the fire in the migrant detention center under Houthi control.

An Ethiopian migrant who survived the fire.

The killing of a Somali child in Yemen who was exploited by the Houthis and forced into the frontlines of the conflict.

Victims of Ethiopian migrants after being forced to fight or exploited due to their poverty and convinced to participate and join the frontlines.

3 - Siege of Taiz:

Traffic congestion on the road to Hejah Al-Abd... the only road connecting the city of Taiz to Aden and the sole entry point for goods and food supplies to the besieged city of Taiz.

Children from Taiz transport food across the towering mountains due to the Houthi siege and the closure of ports.

Due to the Houthi siege on Taiz since 2015, people have been forced to use primitive roads, exacerbating their suffering and causing numerous accidents that have claimed the lives of many civilians.

Smuggling life-saving oxygen provided by international organizations to the besieged hospitals in Taiz by the Houthi militia.

Smuggling life-saving oxygen provided by international organizations to the besieged hospitals in Taiz by the Houthi militia.

Smuggling food and medicine to civilians inside the besieged city of Taiz.



The director of the Revolution Hospital in Taiz warns of patients dying due to the Houthi rebels preventing the entry of life-saving oxygen.

Children and the elderly participate in delivering food to the besieged city of Taiz through secondary, rugged, and perilous routes.

Photos from some of the many protests demanding an end to the siege of Taiz.

4 - Depriving civilians of water:

Water reservoir destroyed by the Houthis in Hajjah.

Citizens waiting to obtain drinking water from a mobile tank purchased by volunteers in Taiz.

5- Theft of humanitarian aid:

Republic of yemen
Ministry of public Health & Population
National Program For Medical Supplies

وزارة الصحة العامة والسكان
البرنامج الوطني للإمداد الدوائي

The Houthis imposed a director for the warehouses of the World Health Organization, enabling them to control the distribution of health aid.

The Houthis burn food aid in the province of Rima after it spoils due to prolonged storage and not being distributed to those in need despite their dire circumstances.

Houthi leader Abdul Mohsen Al-Tawous established a private company called "Golden Car" and directed international and local organizations to deal with it for their transportation needs.

A post in which the journalist Akram Al-Ghwezi affirms that the authorities under Houthi control imprisoned him because he was providing aid to the displaced and widows.

الجمهورية اليمنية
وزارة الارشاد وشؤون الحج والعمرة
مكتب الارشاد م/ذمار

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الرقم : ( )
التاريخ : / /
عدد المرفقات : ( )

تعميم

المحترمون

الأخوة / أئمة المساجد بالمحافظة
بعد التحية

يكون منكم الالتزام بالاتي :-

1- منع صرف أي مساعدات سواءً في شهر رمضان او في بقية الشهور في المساجد او المراكز التابعة للمساجد الا بعد اخذ الإذن المسبق من مكتب الارشاد بالمحافظة .
2- يمنع منعاً باتاً استقبال أي فئة او جماعة او شخص ليس لديهم أي تصريح من مكتب الارشاد وشؤون الحج والعمرة ومنعهم من أداء أي مواعظ .
3- مرفق لكم تقويم الاذان و على جميع المؤذنين في المساجد الالتزام بالوقت .

وتحملكم المسئولية الكاملة ومن يخالف ما ذكر أعلاه سوف يتخذ ضده الإجراءات اللازمة .

والله الموفق ....

مدير مكتب الارشاد وشؤون الحج والعمرة م/ذمار
أ/ عبدالكريم علي الأهجي

A memorandum confirming the prohibition of delivering alms in mosques without permission from the Houthis.

Cartoon illustrations were one of the protest methods used by Yemenis against the Houthis' theft of aid provided to Yemen and the silence of international organizations - by the artist, the well-known Yemeni cartoonist Rashad Al-Samai.

Painted by the well-known Yemeni cartoonist Samer Al-Shamiri.

Presidency of Republic
Supreme Council
For Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs & International cooperation
General Secretariat

رئاسة الجمهورية
المجلس الأعلى
لإدارة وتنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية والمساعدات الدولي
الأمانة العامة

التاريخ: / / 20م

السادة / ممثلي المنظمات الأممية المحترمون

"تهديكم الأمانة العامة للمجلس الأعلى لإدارة وتنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية والمساعدات الدولي خالص التقدير"

الموضوع: تعميم (متطلبات مشاركة الموظفين المحليين العاملين لدى المنظمات الأممية والدولية والمحلية في الفعاليات المقامة خارج أرض الوطن)

إشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه، ولغرض تنظيم وتسهيل سفر الموظفين المحليين العاملين لدى المنظمات الأممية والدولية والمحلية للحضور والمشاركة في الفعاليات (ورش عمل - دورات تدريبية - أي فعاليات أخرى) خارج أرض الوطن، ومن أجل الحصول على تصريح السفر الصادر المجلس الأعلى، يتم التقدم بطلب تصريح السفر من المجلس الأعلى قبل فترة الحجز بمدة لا تقل عن اسبوعين مرفقاً به البيانات التالية:-

1) الغرض من الفعالية.
2) أجندة وأولويات الفعالية.
3) فترة الفعالية.
4) طلب المشاركة من الجهة المستضيفة.
5) أسماء المشاركين في الفعالية من المنظمة.

وعليـــه:

نأمل الإلتزام بما ورد أعلاه، وذلك حتى يتسنى للمجلس الأعلى استكمال الإجراءات اللازمة وتسهيل سفر الموظفين المحليين للمشاركة في الفعاليات خارج الوطن.

وتقبلوا منا خالص التحية

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Requiring Yemeni employees in international organizations to obtain a permit from the Houthi Supreme Council for Humanitarian Affairs and Coordination before traveling outside Yemen, in an unprecedented precedent. The Council has prevented many Yemenis from traveling without any explanation.

6 - Healthcare Crisis:

Armed Houthi elements aboard ambulances provided by the World Health Organization to hospitals and health centers.

A cholera patient being treated out under a tree in the hospital yard due to the lack of space.



الإعلان عن خلو اليمن من وباء الكوليرا

أعلن الاخ وزير الصحه والسيد ممثل الصحه العالمية بصنعـــاء بأن الجمهورية العربية اليمنية خالية تماما من وباء الكوليرا وليـــس هناك أية اصابة حتى الان .

وأضاف الاخ الوزير أن الوزارة بالتعاون مـــع الجهات المختصـــة ذات العلاقة قد اتخذت كافـــة الاجراءات الوقائية الممكنة للحيلولة دون تسرب هـــذا الوباء الى داخـــل أراضي الجمهورية العربية اليمنية ولا تزال مستمـــرة في بذل المزيد من الجهود الوقائيـــة لوقاية المواطنين من هـــذا المرض حيث وضعت كافـــة الامكانيات في حـــــالة استعداد لمواجهة أى طارىء كما أنها قد منعت دخول أي مواد غذائية أو غيرهـــا والتى تصل من البلدان التى

— البقية ص٨ —

Following the September 26th Revolution and the establishment of the republican system, the Yemeni government, in collaboration with the World Health Organization, declared the eradication of cholera in 1977. However, this disease resurged after the Houthi takeover of the capital Sana'a and some governorates.

7- Landmines, Hidden Explosives... Planting Hunger:

Vast numbers of Houthi-laid landmines cleared.

The Houthis design explosives to resemble tree branches within palm groves in Al Hodeidah for camouflage, leading to fatalities among farmers and their children.

Explosives disguised as rocks are planted by the Houthis on roads and in farms, making it impossible for farmers to cultivate their lands or transport their produce to markets.

The road of Aqabat Mahlhal, which connects Abyan Governorate to Al-Bayda Governorate, has been planted with mines and explosive devices by the Houthis.

Mines and explosive devices planted by the Houthi group in the classrooms and hallways of the "Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq" school, the health center, and the water tank in the village of "Al-Dahiyah," which is part of the Al-Khawkhah district located in the south of Al Hodeidah, were removed in November 2021 by the Mines Advisory Group (MAG).

Children who are victims of Houthi mines, which the Houthis refuse to provide maps for.

Houthi naval mines cover vast areas along the coast of Hodeidah and have resulted in the deaths of numerous fishermen and hindered their ability to pursue their livelihood.

The death of a camel belonging to a citizen in Hajjah Governorate due to the explosion of a landmine planted by the Houthi rebels in a grazing area – Photograph by the journalist Hisham Al-Shubeili.

The death of a giant whale on the shores of Boklan Island in the province of Hajjah due to the explosion of a maritime mine planted by the Houthi rebels – Photograph by journalist Hisham Al-Shubeili.

The Houthis use explosive devices to blow up bridges and water ferries to hinder the advancement of government forces, leading to a worsening humanitarian situation.

Annex 4
Photos and Documents:
Chapter Four

A severely malnourished child lying on a bed in a hospital in the Aslam Health Center in Hajjah Governorate, the directorate to which the Houthi rebels had prevented aid from entering for months, as previously mentioned in international reports.

A picture of a child suffering from malnutrition.

The systematic policy of impoverishment has driven many women to beg, and this picture was taken on one of the streets of Sana'a in 2017.

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The Composite Crime is groundbreaking piece that sheds light on the origins and impact of racism. Al-Alie argues that racial discrimination not only violates the rights and privacy of individuals but also tears apart the social fabric of Yemen, perpetuating warfare, tragedy, and suffering.

Through meticulous research and compelling narratives, Al-Alie exposes the hidden systemic nature of unaddressed racial starvation and its dire effects on Yemeni society. The author explores various aspects of the crisis, including (Ansar Allah) Al-Houthi crimes, the manipulation of cultural narratives, the role of political and military forces, economic exploitation, forced displacement, and aid diversion.

The book serves as a rallying cry for all those who fight against racial discrimination and advocate for a just and inclusive society. It is a call to prioritize coexistence, equal citizenship, and social justice as the pathway to a brighter future.
The Composite Crime is an essential read for scholars, activists, policymakers, and anyone concerned with human rights and the pursuit of a more equitable world. It challenges readers to confront the harsh realities of racial starvation in Yemen and inspires them to take action in the face of injustice.